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PRECIS OF THESIS 
This thesis is a study of price level behaviour 
and economic grow th in the Philippines over the period 1964 -65 . 
Its aims a re to explain the deflationary and inflationary 
movements In the price level within the context of post-war 
economic reconstruction and growth and to assess the effect~ 
of these movements on economic reconstruction and growth . 
Part One consists of two chapters of an intro-
ductory nature. Chapter I first sketches in the historical 
background to the study by examining briefly the Philippine 
economy prior to the attainment of political independence In 
1946, and then outlines the performance of that economy in 
the subsequent twenty years, with particular reference to 
economic growth and price level behaviour. Ghapter II is 
a theoretical discussion. It 
approaches to explaining price 
surv eys various general 
level behaviour in less 
developed economies and examines means by which it has been 
suggested that price level movements may affect economic 
growth. 
Part Two IS concerned with explaining and 
analyzing the nature of Philippine price level movements. 
To this end, the alternative analytical approaches discusse d 
In Chapter II are applie d to the Philippine exper ience. 
Thus Chapter III examines the r elevance of the Quantity 
Theory of Money as an explanation of price level movements, 
while Chapter IV is concerned with assessing the adequacy 
of a Keynesian explanation of movements in total money 
expenditure and, subject to the behaviour of real output, 
of movements in the price level. Chapter V is Structural ist 
in approach, although unlike pure Structuralist ana lysi s it 
IS concerned with deflation as well as inflation. It 
endeavours to establi sh that sectoral imbalances b etween the 
supply of and demand for food, rather than imbalances between 
aggrega te demand and supply, were the sources of price level 
movements. In Chapter VI, as in Chapter V, 
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partially disaggregative techniques are employed. In 
this case they are used to present a series of historically 
consecutive expJanations of price level beh.aviour which 
emph~size the economy's foreign trade and payments 
relationships. To some extent this approach is also 
Structuralist in nature. 
one of these approaches proved by itself 
to be completely satisfactory and some had considerable 
deficiencies. In Chapter VII, after a brief view, the 
tasks of discarding, combining and reconciling parts of 
them are undertaken. The result is an explanation of 
Philippine price level movements which recognizes that 
these movements were associated with imbalances between 
supply and demand in the aggregate, but which also 
stresses (within this context) the causal roles of specific 
sectoral factors relating to food supply and the foreign 
trade sector. 
The analysis of Part Two indicates that the 
processes of economic 
influences upon price 
reconstruction and growth were strong 
level behaviour. Part Three is 
concerned with a search for causal relationships which ran 
in the opposite direction. In this latter investigation 
attention is concentrated on the medium of capital formation 
b ecause of the dual argument that other determinants of 
growth were not likely to have been affected by price level 
behaviour or, alternatively, were likely to have been 
affected in a manner which also involved capital formation . 
Accordingly, Chapter VIII investigates the 
influence of price level behaviour on the rate of saving 
and Chapter IX investigates the influence of price level 
behaviour on the volume and composition of investment. 
Chapter X takes the analysis one stage further by examining 
the relationships that existed between capital formation 
and economic growth. Chapter XI, the fina l chapter of Part 
Three, draws the findings of the three preceding chapters 
together. It is concluded therein tha t price l eve l behaviour 
probably had only a limited influence on the aggregate rate 
of capital formation; that this influence was largely confine d 
t o a mild, inflation-induced stimulus to both saving and 
inv estment in the later years of the period under study; and 
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that this stimulus failed to have any significant impact 
on the rate of economic growth because of various factors 
subsumed under the phenomenon of a concomitant increase 
. 
in the incremental capital-output rat i o. There iS3, more-
over, no definite evidence to suggest that inflati<Dn 
contributed to this increase though affecting the composition 
of investment. Finally, although th e re appears to have 
been some evidence of nega tive sta tistical relationships 
between the rate of change of prices and the rate of growth, 
these relationships are explained, consistently with the 
findings of Part Two of this study, in terms of a causa, l 
link running from economic growth to price level mov e ments 
rather than in the opposite direction. 
In Chapter XlI, the only one in Part Four, 
th e study is concluded with an attempt to place the 
Philippine experience in perspective. To this end, 
attention is drawn to the relatively moderate pace of 
Philippine price level movements (particularly the mild 
nature of the inflationary experience In comparison with 
the inflationa ry experiences of a number of other less 
developed countries) and to two multi- country studies of 
the r e l a tionship between price l e v e l behaviour and economic 
g rowth. 
M. L. Treadgold. 
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PREFACE 
Thi th si i an inquiry into pric lev 1 
b hay · our and onom c growth ·n th Philippines ov r 
th P riod 1946-65 · It at empts to expla~n the cau s 
of Phil·ppin pric 1 v 1 mov m nt and to a certain the 
eff cts ( if any ) of these move m nt on economic growth . 
The approa h is analytical raLher than policy-oriented . 
It is not dire tly onc rn d wi h judging the Philippine 
econo mic p rform nc according to orne set of policy 
goals . or is it concerned with predicting futur price 
level b haviour and economic growth, or recomm nding 
pol·cie in the e r sp ct In e sence, it is an 
inv tigation into the recent history of a particular 
1 ss develop d onomy, an inve tigation which is 
intend d to illuminate certain aspects of the operation 
of that economy through th use of various analytical 
approache and the empirical e amination of variou 
hypothese found in he g n ral literature on price 
lev 1 behaviour a nd its relation to economic growth . 
Some m ntion of the tatistical data which have b en 
employed in thi inquiry i ne es ary . By the standards 
of many le s d v loped co untrie official Philippine 
eco nomic tati tic are wid in coy rage, long in 
duration nd good in quality . 
th r quirem nt of a udy 
everthele judged by 
u hath pre ent one, 
th Y leave much to be d ir d . Fortunately, it \a 
possible to mak limited unoffi c ial r i ion and 
djustment to om statistical ries of major 
import n e to thi udy . Th e r vision and 
adju tm nts , whi h ar de cribed fully in App ndi A, 
r laL to price indi es, money upply and the nation 1 
a ount . 
With r p to th national · a counts estim te , 
it hould lob noLed that whil thi study w in 
progre s 
1946 w 
full offici 1 re ision t nding back to 
ount 
i 
und rt ken . Regr tLably, th 
did no L r . h min t· m to b 
in m n 1 i 
n" et of 
of any 
Mu h of Lh inform tion u d in thi tudy wa 
g th r d during i month in 1967 wh n I wa attached 
to th In ti LuL of E onom· D elopm nt nd R r h in 
iv 
th S hool oL E onom s t th n iv r ' ty of th 
Philipp' n es . r m mber wiLh grati ud the warm and 
fri ndly ho pitality of my Filipino hosts, spe 'ally 
Professor Am do A . Castro, Di r tor of the Institute, 
P ro.f ssor Jo E n r n ac ' on Jr . , Chairman of th School 
. 
oL Economic , who h lp d greatly in rran gi ng my stay 
in th Philippi n a nd Professor G rardo P . Sicat . In , 
ddition, I a m lnd bt d 0 Dr B nito Legarda y F r nandez, 
Di r ctor o.f th D p rt ment of E onomic Research oL the 
C n tral Bank of the Philippines, and his staff who w re 
mo st helpful in supplyi n g information r lating to price 
index a nd mon Lary tatistics, and to Dr Leon A . Mears 
of the Uni ersiti oL th Philippi n e and Wi consi n 
who provid d proc s d data on rice production, exports 
a nd import 
I nevi tab ly, thi study has benefit d from the 
research oL oth r tudents of the Philippi n e econo my . 
This will b appar nt fro m various work cit d in 
footnotes and in the bibliography . Further, on a mo re 
p ronal lev 1, I have gained much from many long and 
ti mulati ng co n er ation with Profe sor Ri chard 
W. Hooley , .form rly of the Univer ity oL the Philippines, 
and Mr George L. Hi k , for m rly of the atio nal 
Pla nning A ssociaLion . I also recall useful di cussions 
wiLh Profe or An thony Clunie Ro s when this study wa 
in it early tage 
I a m grate.ful Lo Th Australian ational Univer ity 
Lor the award o.f the r s arch cholar hip which enabled 
m to undertake thi study. In all but the la t two and 
a hal.f mon th of i t, when he wa ab nt oversea, 
P ro.fessor H.W. Arndt ha been my upervi or . The advice 
and guida nce which h ha gi en me are greatly 
ppr ci t d . I 1 0 wi h to ackno wl dge ProLe or 
H.G . Grub 1 who u d d P ro.f 'or Ar nd t as my 
up rvi or . 
In ddiLlon . I t nd my tha nl to PrOLe or 
A.W . H . Phillip . ProL or Arthur Smithi e and 
Dr D . W. St mm r , who r ad nd o mm nted upon fir t 
dr L L of riou part of the the i , a nd to 
Dr C.A. Blyth Lor 1 h lpful di c u ion, 
p rLi ul rly in connectio n with App n dix A . 
Dr D . A . L . Au ld kindl uppli d the omput r programm 
wh i h w used in th 
regression qu tion 
ditorial dvi 
1 ul tion of numb r of 
nd Mr A.G . P . Wright gav us lul 
v 
For th typing Ol preliminary drafts of this th sis , 
I m grat ful for a istance lrom Mrs D . Bi nni 
Mrs E . Co chran , Mr H . Harding, Mrs E . Harriss, 
Mr s D . Lov a nd Mrs H. Mi h 1 . Th final typ script wa 
ably produ d by Mrs P. Rippon, a sisted by Miss P . Fry r, 
Mrs O. I sarangkun, Mrs A . ewso me a nd Mrs J . Rodwell . 
Finally, my gr atest debt i s to my wife , Elaine 
Mary . She ha help d me dir ctly in a number of ways 
which range fro m prool-reading and th drawi n g of the 
linal v rsions or the figures to constructive comm n t 
on poi n ts or both style and substance . How ever , 
v luab l e as her as ista n e has been in s u ch areas , I 
rank above it h r mo re intangible co n tributio n s to this 
t hesis - her patience, her willingness and her 
e n co u rage m nt. 
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Th unit of Ph 'lippine curr n y i th P 0 (p) . 
From b for 1946 unt'l ovemb r , 1965 the 
o ff' cia1 par va1u f th p 0 wa 50 Uni d Sta s 
0 n t ( i . P 2 . 00 = . S . $ 1. 00 ) . Howev r , in th 
y ar mm d'at 1y pr' r 0 1965 mo t for ign 
e chan g tran a o n occurr d a hang rat 
wh'ch d'ff r d mark d1y fro m thi par ra On 
ov mb r , 1 65 he offi ia1 par a1u of' th p 0 
was chang d to 25 . 641 Unit d Sta nt 
( i . . 13 J . 90 = . S . $1. 00) . A fu 11 era c co un 0 f 
Phi1ippin 
1946-6 
chang rat history i n th p riod 
found 'n th body of' th te t . 
Al l r f' r nc to ov rnm nt d partm nt , ofri 
and or niz tio n r to tho e of i h r th 
Commonw a1 h of' th Phi1ippin or it u c ~ or , 
h R pub1i of' th Phi1ippi n un1 oth rwi 
ta t d . 
Th 1 tt r ~ n. a . ignify Lhat data ar no t. 
ava'lab1 
PART 0 E 
I JTRODUCTIO 
IIAPTER I 
THE SE'ITI G 
This thesis is a study of the interrelationships 
betw n economic growth and changes in the price le el 
in a less de eloped economy . The economy in which the 
interrelationships are examined is that of the 
Philippines in the period 1946- 65. In broad terms the 
study has two related aims . the first is to endea our 
to explain the behaviou of the Philippine price le e1 
in the context of post - war e onomi growth ; the second 
is to assess the influ nce of price level behaviour on 
this growth p rforman e . 
Th choice of a twenty year period in whi h to 
undertake an analysis of price le el-growth relationhips 
is perhaps an uncommon one . Research in this field 
frequently takes the form of a long term or secular 
study . The tim span chosen may extend for a century or 
longer, pr sumabl be ause it is felt that in a short 
period study the influence of cy i c al and random 
factors may ob cur more fundamen al e onomi forces . 
Other research in this field deals with elation hips in 
the context of pa ticular short t rm movements in 
e'onomic acti it and, indeed, it is oft n a by- product of 
studi s of business cycles . This in stigation fits into 
neith r category completely . \ hile it may resemble to 
some extent the fo mer approa h, it confine s itself to a 
p riod uffici n ly short to b more rele ant to work of 
th latte kind . In f a t, the hoi of period was 
dictat d partl by the limit d a ailability of pre-war 
data . everth 1 ss, 
'nt r st. Beginning 
it is a p riod of great analytical 
in the ear of th Philippines' 
attainment of indep nd n e amid th devastation caused 
by th r ntl nd d Wo ld Wa II, it xtends 0 er two 
d cad in whi h ign'fi ant and sustained a iations in 
both the p ri 1 1 and the at of onomic growth 
occur d aga'n t a ba kground of rna ked stru tu al and 
institutional hange . 
2 
3 
THE ECO OMY PR OR TO I DEPE DE CE 
To und rsta n d proper l y d v lo p m n ts du ri n g the 
s 1 ct d tim - span , so m k n owledg of the Philippin s in 
arlier y ars i requir d . 
Th first Europe n co n tact w'th this group of 
isl nds l o cated on the w st r n margin of the Pacific 
Ocean w s th t o~ Mag llan in 1521 . 1 I t led to ov r thre 
centuri s of Spanish rul , which end d wh n the 
Ph'lippines was c d d to the Uni ed States und r th 
t r ms of the Tr aty of Paris , sign d in Dece mber 1898 . 
As a cons quenc of this treaty th United States 
assum d sov reignty ov rap ople of predominantly Malay 
origin and Christian (Roman Catholic) faith . Thirty-
sev n y ars lat r th Philippine Commonwealth was 
in ugur t d . This brought a measure of self- government 
and the definit prospect of eventual , full independence . 
I n the Co mmonwealth period i mmediately before World 
War II the Phil'ppin econo my possessed an underdeveloped , 
d pend nt and colonial structure . A population of 15 . 8 
millio n in 1938 2 r lied mainly on agriculture for a 
liv lihood . Over two-thirds of all gainful workers were 
mployed in that sector . 3 Of an esti mated gross 
national product t current market prices in the same 
y r of Pl163 million some 51.1 per cent originated in 
th production of agricultural crops and their 
proce ing , livestock production and processing , and 
.p ' h' 4 
.L1S l n g . 
International trad was of considerable i mportanc 
to the co no my . In 1938 total merchandise exports 
amounted to P233 million5 or 20 . 0 per cent of G P . 
1 
Th total number of islands in th group is about 
7 , 100 . Ther re 1 e n which ha era of mor than 
1 , 000 squar mil s . Togeth r , th se account for 92.3 per 
c n t of th tot 1 land area of 115 , 707 square mile . 
2 
Un 't d tio n s , D mographic Yearbook , 1960 . 
3 Fi nance Co mmis i on , R ~ort 
Bur au of Pri nti n g , 19 7) , p . 10 . 
App n i 
5 
t'o n s , Y rboo k of I n t r natio nal Trad 
~~~,~~~ , l222 , Vol . I . 
4 
M rchandis e por s nd gold production tog ther 
qu 11 d P302 millionl or 26 . 0 p r c nt of G P . Th 
pri ncipal pre - war m rchandis xports w r coconut 
products , sugar , baca and cordag , tobacco , min rals 
oth r than gold , and for st pro~ucts . Total m rchando e 
2 
°mports in 1938 a mounted to P265 mOllion - or 22 . 8 p r 
c n t of G P . Pr - war m rchandose i mports w re domOnat d 
by t xtOles , metal manufac ures , foodstuffs and fuels . 
The co mmercial bank s we r e ori nted towards th 
financing of for ign trad including the allied activity 
of supplying cr dOt for the production of export crops . 
The mon tary syst em of which th banks formed a part wa s 
of the chang r s rv standard typ This was int nd d 
to maintain automatically balanc of payments 
quilibroum and the par value of th currency by directly 
r lating the money supply to the balance of foreOgn 
chang r ceipt and disburs ments. To this end , 
Treasury certificate , which form d the official note 
is u , were backed by a 100 per c nt r serve of U. S . 
dollars and silv r coins held in the Treasury Certificate 
Fund , whil still more res rves were held in the Exchange 
S t and rd Fund. 
Th Philippin S l main trading partner was th United 
S at s . n the p riod 1937 - 40 the latter country took 
7 .4 p r c nt of Philippine export and in r turn 
suppli d 68 . 8 per c nt of Philippine imports . 3 This high 
d gre of g ographic 1 conc ntration in trade had be n 
fost red by many years of pr ferential tradi n g relations 
b tw en the two conomies , which had °begun in 1902 when 
Philippine ports to the United States were granted a 
tarOff pr f r nc of 25 per cent. The preference wa 
d into a qualifi d form of mutu 1 free trad in 
1909 , wOth virtually co mplet nd unr strict d free trad 
1 
Th alu of gold productio n in 1938 was obtain d from 
nt rnatio nal Mon t ry Fund , nt rnational Financial 
St tj tics , Vol . III , 0 . 12 (D c mb r 1950) , p . 80 . 
2 
UnOt d ations , Y rbook of Int r natio na l Trad 
~~~~t~l~o~C~S , 1959 , Vol . I . 
5 
following n 191J . hi rrangem nt was to last unt'l 
193 4 'vh n an ab olut quota w'as plac d on Philippin 
sugar ports to th nit d Stat s and a U. S . int rnal 
proc ssing ta was imposed on Philippin coconut oil 
e port to th Un't d States . l n 1935 th ~nauguration 
of th Co mmonw'ealth brought i n to op ration plans for th 
progr ssive disma n tling of the syst m of pr ferences . 
Th ai m was to nsure that aft r full ind pend nc was 
grant d to the Philippin s in a littl ov r ten y ars 
both countries would trade w'i th each other on a non-
pr fer ntial basi s . HO'vev r , impl mentation of th se 
plans was susp nded temporarily in 1941 and further 
interrupted by th war with Japan . 
The preferential trading arrangements of the first 
four dec des of the present century were associated with 
a c rtain a mount of economic expansion in the 
Philippin s . Relying primarily on data provid d by a 
s ries of econo mic c nsuses , Richard W. Hooley has made 
esti mat s of agricultural and non- agricultural output 
at constant prices , in both aggregate and per capita 
2 
r ms , for a number of b nchmark years . His estimates 
for th y a r 1902 , 1918 , 1928 and 1938 , which are 
pr sented in Tabl .1 , provide some measure of the 
pansion . J For the period 1902- 38 , as a whole , 
1 
Th tax also applied to oil extracted in the United 
Stat s from e ports of Philippine copra . It should b 
not d , how v r , that a somewhat higher rate of ta was 
impos d on coconut oil coming to the nit d State from 
non- Philippine sourc s and on coconut oil extract d in 
th U . S . from non- Ph'lippine copra. 
2 
Richard W. Hool y , ' Long T rm Economic Growth in th 
Philipp'nes , 1902 - 61 ' in Growth of Output 'n the 
Ph'lippin s (Papers pr ented at a Confer nce at th 
nt rnational Rice R earch Institute , Los Banos , 
L gun , D c mb r 9- 10 , 1966 ; mim o)~ 
It should b noted that Hool y ' s timates of th 
co mbin d total of agricultural and non- agricultural 
output are not stimat of to al do m stic or nation 1 
product b cau non- agricultura l output , a defin d by 
hi m, do not includ all produc tive activity out id 
gricul ur . t cov rs only th output of the 
following industri s : manu acturing , co mm rc , lectric 
l'ght nd pow r , m' n'ng , for try , i n ter- islan d a n d 
o rs as hipping , r ilroad , 0 her 1 nd tran sportatio n 
and communic t'ons . 
6 
agr'cultural output gr w at an av rage rate of 2 . 5 p r 
c nt p r annum ; non- agr'cultural output gr w so m what 
faster at 3 . 5 per c nt per annum; and total agricultural 
and non- agricultural output grew at 3 . 0 per cent p r 
annum. Ov r the sam period on a per capita , basis th 
av rag a nnual rat s of growth wer respectively 0 . 5 , 
1 
1 . 4 a n d 0 . 9 per ce n t . 
Tabl I . l , how' v r , 'ndicates that this growth was 
far fro m v n over time. Total output (agricultural and 
non- agricultural) doubled in the pe r iod 1902 - 18 , but was 
to show only a 44.4 per cent increase in the next twenty 
years . In fact , in th latter p riod total output per 
capi ta fell so mewhat. Apart from population growth , this 
fall was due to the sharp decline in the rate of 
increase of total agricultural output after 1918 . This 
type of production had e panded rapidly at an average 
annual rate of 5.1 p r cent in the period 1902 - 18 because 
of the op ning on pref rential terms of the United States 
mark t to Philippine exports and , independently of this , 
the World War I boom in Philippine export prices . 
However , the f'rst of these factors was in the nature of 
a onc -and-for-all ffect and the second did not e tend 
long past the cessation of hostilities . In the period 
1918-38 agricultural output increased at an average rate 
of only 0 . 6 per c nt p r annum . Although the growth 
rate of aggregate non-agricultural output also declined 
after World War I , the decline was o n ly a slight one . 
The av rage annual rate of increase for 1918 - 38 was 
3.4 p r cent compared with 3 . 6 per ce n t i n the period 
1902 - 18 . This pansion of non- agricultural output , 
w'hich in the earli r of the abov periods recei v d its 
imp tu largely from h proc ssing and marketing of 
agricultural e port products , sub equently came to rely 
mo on the e port d mand for products such as minerals 
nd ti mb r , such scop as there was for i mport -
sub t' tution , and th growth in th market for good and 
1 
Throughout thi tudy the term ' av rage annual rate of 
(d cr s )', as app l i d to the behaviour of a 
over period of years , should be u nderstood 
h const nt compound a n nu 1 rat of i nc rease 
) which w'ould y' ld over the giv n p riod a n 
'ncr m nt ( d cr m nt ) i n th size o f th 
v r' bl qual to th t absolute i ncre m n t ( de c r mo n t ) 
wh ' ch ctu lly occurr d . 
Year 
1902 
1918 
1928 
1938 
Table I . l : Aggrega te and Per Capita Gross Value Added in Agri c ulture and 
Non-Agriculture at 1939 Pric es for Selected Years , 1902 - 38 
Aggregate (million pesos) Per Capit a (pesos) 
Agricul ture No n -Agricul t ure TOTAL Agricul ture Non-Agricul ture 
134 . 0 109 . 8 243 . 8 17 . 6 14 . 4 
294 . 5 193 . 0 487 . 5 28 . 9 18.9 
313 · 5 270 . 2 583 . 7 25 . 1 2 1.6 
328 . 0 375 . 9 703 · 9 20 .8 23 . 8 
Source : Richard W. Hoolev . ' Long Term Economic Growth in the Philippi n es , 
of Ou t put in the Philippi n es (Papers presented 
at a Confere nc e at the International Rice Research Institute , Los 
Bano s , Laguna , Dec e mber 9 - 10 , 1966 ; mi meo . ) , p . 4 - l0 , Table 1 and 
p . 4 - l4 , Table 2 . 
TOTAL 
32 . 0 
47 . 8 
4 6 . 7 
44 . 6 
-..J 
s rvic s not nt ring into international trad 1 
Th Second World War was a major s tback to th 
PhilOppin conomy. The Japanes invaded and occupi d 
th Pholippon s in 1941- 42 a nd remained until the 
lOb ration of th islands by Unit d Stat s forc s in 
1944-45. The Wa r brought wid spread damage a nd 
d struction whi ch occurred in three major phases . 2 
8 
Initially , th attack by th Japanese and the de mo lition 
carri d out by the th n r treating Am rican forc s 
destroyed a part of the nation ' s soc i al overhead capital . 
Th n , during the occupation period sabotage by Filipino 
gu rillas and retaliation and expropriation by the 
Japan e caused further impairm nt to productive capacity. 
Finally , the gr atest d struction occurred in late 1944 
and arly 1945 during the bitter f~ghting which follow e d 
the return of th U. S . forces . 
An estimate of the xtent of th damage throughout 
the Philippin s was made in 1945 by the nited Stat s 
War Damag Corporation . In terms of 1939 values the 
total warti me loss of private , public and church 
prop rty was esti mated at U . S . $798 , 767 , 595 or about 
P1600 mill i on . 3 Thi s estimate may b compared with the 
gro s s n a tional product at current market prices in 1938 
4 
of Pl163 million . Th Philippin Bur au of th Census 
and Stati s tics suppli d , also in 1945 , an alternativ 
but incomplete estimate of the damage . E cluding from 
this incomplet estimat the Bureau ' s figures for 10 
1 
It must be stres s d that the esti mated growth rat s 
us d in the above paragraphs as indicators of econo mic 
pansion b fore th S cond World War are capabl of 
distorting the tru pictur b caus of th ir dependenc 
upon stimat s of output in isolat d benchmark y ars . 
Short term vagaries in w ather and fluctuations in 
d m nd may have cessiv ly influ nced 1 v e ls of output 
in th s years . 
2 
Shirl y 
Philippin 
p . 42 . 
3 
On J un 
in S p 
14 ). 
4 
Y of War in , Report of 
cial Inv tigating Mission s nt to h Philippin 
1945 by th W r Damage Corp oration a nd completed 
mb r 1945 , 79th Cong ., 1 t s . (Washingto n , 
Cit d i n J nkins , OP e ci t ., p . 47 . 
Th pr c 1 vel in 1938 w s appro °mat ly t h sam 
° n 193 . 
of p rsonal ffe ct s and the valu of J apa n ese notes 
issu d in xchange for go o ds and services , th damag 
a mount ed to P17 92 million at 1941 values . l 
In addition to th damage ann destructio n of 
physi c a l ass ts , and of course the loss of "life , 2 the 
War brought structural malad justme n ts and financial 
9 
disruption to the Phi lippine conomy . During th thr e 
y ars of occupation there was a c ssation of normal 
for ign trade . Virtually t he only goods to leave th 
country w~re materials required for the Japanese war 
effort . Import ed goods disappeared from d omesti c 
markets . Th Japanese tried to encourage the diversion 
of resources into the production of foodstuffs for local 
consumption. They acquired the goods and services they 
themselv s n eeded , if not by expropriation , then by 
payment in Japanese - printed currency not s . 3 The issue 
of th se notes contributed directly and indirectly to 
an aggr gate d mand vastly in exc ss of a diminished 
supply . The result was an inflation which became 
particularly severe just prior to the liberation. In 
January 1945 the J apanese - issued pes o had a purchasing 
pow r equival nt to only one hundr d - and - twentieth of 
the official Philippine peso issued prior to the War .
4 
R al wag sand th standard of living generally fell , 
b caus of both the decline in th over- all availability 
of goods and servic s and the forc d savings i nflic t d 
on ~lch of the population by the inflation . 
1 
:.:A~m~e-=r.::.i:...:c~a:;::.:.;n~C::..:h~a:.:.:m.:.:b :..:::.;:;........:::..:=--..:::.:::..:.:.::..:..:.::::.=....:::..:::.......::J:....::o::...u:::.:::.r.:.n.:.:a=-=l , Vo 1 . XXII , 
(July 1946). 
2 
0.4 
Th Philippine Gov rnme nt ' s reparation claim against 
Japan included an item of indemnity for loss of human 
lives during the Wa r . It was bas d on a figure of 
1 , 111 , 938 casualties. 
3 
By t h e n d or th Japan se occupation the total issu 
of th no t s a moun ted to Pll,149 mill io n appro imately . 
t th n d of June 1941 , i . e . prior to the invasion , the 
total Phi lippine money supp ly (curre ncy i n circulatio n 
and d ma n d d posits ) had be n only ~295 million . 
[ A . V . H. Hartendorp , History of Industry and Trade o f the 
Ph"lipp"nes (Manila , American Cha mb r of Commerc , 1958) , 
p . 163 a n d Ce n tral B nl of the Philippin , Statistical 
Bull tin , Vol . XVI I , 0 . 3 (S eptemb er 19 66 ).J 
4 
E . E . S lph , 'L gisl tio n, Ex cuti Orders and Court 
D cisions ,' A m ri c a n Chamber of Comm r c e Journal, 
Vol. XXV , 0 . 8 ( u gust 1949) . 
With the liberation and the repudiation of the 
1 Japan se occupation currency , prices fell greatly . 
10 
However , for some time during 1945 they wer to rise 
again . The available monthly readings for 1945 of the 
Bureau of the Census and Statistics ' old cOBt of living 
index for a wage - earner's family in Manila (1941 = 100) 
ar shown in Table I . 2 . In the period March 1945 to 
J uly 1945 the index rose from 559 . 8 to 751 . 5 , an 
increase of 34 . 2 per cent. Several factors , which 
completely sw'a mped any seasonal influe nces associated 
with more normal times , were responsible for this . They 
were the United States government's heavy military and 
civil expenditures, an associated rapid expansion of the 
2 legal Philippine money supply, the very limited 
productive capacity of the devastated economy and the 
delay in the arrival of imports . Subsequently , with the 
arrival of supplies from abroad and the expansion of 
domestic production , the inflation was controlled . 
Follow~ng the liberation , relief and rehabilitation 
were initially handled to a great extent by the United 
States ' armed forces. They undertook much reconstruction, 
in particular returning to operation basic public 
utilities such as water and electricity supplies and 
transport and communications. Substantial quantities of 
relief supplies in the form of food , medicines , clothing , 
s e ed and other necessi ties w'ere provided by the Army 
Civil Affairs Program . The Program also helped in the 
provision of transport equipment and educational and 
hospital facilities . Later limited aid in kind came 
from the United ations Relief and Rehabilitation 
Administration (UNRRA).3 
1 
Cf. Hart ndorp , History of Industry and Trade of the 
Philippines , p . 222 . 
2 
By the end of th year the total mon y supply of th 
Philippin s , although not at all comparable in siz with 
mon y supply levels towards the end of the occupation , 
w'as P l120 million or four times the December 1940 level. 
[ C ntral Bank of the Philippines , Statistical Bulletin , 
Vol.XVIII , 0 . 3 (S pt mber 1966 ) . J 
3 
This summary of early post - liberation relief and 
r habilitation activity is based on Golay , op . c,it . , 
pp . 60 - 6 1. 
Table I . 2 : Co st of Living Index for Wag _ 
Earne r ' s Family in Manila , 
March-Dec e mb e r 1945 
(1941 = 100 ) 
March 559 . 8 
April 598 . 8 
May 689 . 7 
Jun 745 . 8 
July 751. 5 
August 724 . 7 
S ept mber 708 . 4 
Octob e r 735 · 3 
o v e mb er 747 . 8 
De c e mb e r 6 69 . 4 
Source : Bureau of the Ce nsus and Statistics 
(reprinted in American Chamber of 
Commerc e Journal, January 1948) . 
11 
On February 27 , 1945 , the Commonwealth government 
was re - stablished in the Philippines . Full political 
independence was sch duled for July 4 , 1946 . As a 
prelud to independenc the United States Cangress 
e nac ted two pieces of legislation which were to hav a 
significant influence on the future reconstruction and 
12 
d v lopme nt of the Philippine econo my . These were the 
Philippine Rehabilitation Act of 19461 and the Philippine 
Trad Act also of 1946. 2 
The Rehabilitation Act authorized the compensation 
of private parti s for war damage in the Philippines to 
the a mount of U. S . $400 million , the restoration of 
public property and essential services to the value of 
U. S . $120 million , and the transfer to the Philippine 
government of United States government property 
possessing a value not exceeding U. S . $lOO million . Thus 
the total outlay authorized for thes purposes was 
U. S . $620 million. The Act als o provided for the 
provision of technical assistance a n d trai ning. 
The Philippine Trade Ac t , from which stemmed the 
Uni ted States-Philippin Trade Agree ment of 1946 , drew 
up new plans for the post - independence eco no mic 
relations between the Philippines and the United States. 
The main provisions of the Act , which related to a 
period of twenty- eight years , were wide - ranging . 
Reciprocal duty- free trade w'as to exist until July J , 
1954 . From then until 197J gradually i ncreasing tariff 
duties were to be applied by both countries on i mports 
fro m each other. Until the end of 1954 the duties were 
to be 5 per cent of the full tariffs . In 1955 they were 
to be 10 per c n t and thereafter they were to increase 
by 5 per cent a nnually until the full tariffs c a me into 
ff ect in 197J · Absolute quotas wer e tab l ished on the 
xport of sev n Philippin products to the United States : 
sugar , cordag , rice , cigars , tobacco , coconut oil and 
buttons of pearl or sh 11 . Th las t four of these 
products , instead of bei ng sub j e c t t o increasing duties 
aft r 1954 , w r given gradually d creasing duty-free 
quot s , co mme ncing in 1955 a n d scheduled to disappear 
1 
Public Law 0 . J70 , 79th Cong., 2 n d sess . 
2 
Publ'c Law 0 . J7l , 79th Cong. , 2nd sess . 
co mpletely by 1974 . Exports to th United States in 
excess of th duty- free quotas were allowed , but th y 
were sub j ect to th li mits imposed by the absolute 
quotas. Furthermor , absolut quotas could , be i mposed 
lJ 
by th Presid nt of the United States on any other 
Philippine articles judged to be co ming or likely to be 
coming into substan tial competition with United States 
products; export taxation was prohibited for the 
1 Philippines on its exports to the United States ; the 
valu of the Philippin currency in relation to the 
United States dollar could not be changed or the 
convertibility of Philippine pesos into dollars 
susp nded without agr ement of the President of the 
United States; and the exploitation of natural resources 
i n the Philippines was , if open to any person , to be open 
to citizens of the Unit d States . 
It was with a still crippled econo my and against 
the background of these tw'o important enactments - one 
altruistic
2 
and the other impaired by inequities and by 
infringements of future Philippine sovereignty - that the 
Philippines became an independent nation . 
THE HISTORICAL RECORD, 1946 - 65 
The remainder of this chapter will be concerned 
primarily with setting out the data pertaining to 
economic growth and the behaviour of the price level in 
th Philippine economy in the period 1946 - 65 . In 
addition , how r , som related issues will be xamined . 
These are the level of economic activity in 1946 compared 
with th pre - war level, the post-war population expansion, 
th reconstruction and recovery from ' the War , th nature 
of so m of the subsequent structural changes which 
1 
Th United States was forbidde n to i mpose export taxes 
by its own constitution . 
2 
The altruis m inher nt in the Philippine Rehabilitation 
Act wa wakened by th provisio n that war damag 
p y m nts in e c ss of U. S . $500 were made conditional 
Upon Ph'lippin e acc ptanc of a Un ited Stat s -Philippine 
trad gre m nt ; that is , in ffect , ccepta nc of the 
Philippin Tr d ct . This was ev ntually forthc o ming 
d spit so me opposition . 
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accompanied cono mic growth , the ext nt of' unemploym nt 
and under mploym nt , and th choice of' indices f'or 
m asuring changes in th pric level . 
n 1946 the conomy was operating grea ly below 
its pre - war lev Is. According to indic s of' the physical 
volume of' production that were published by the C ntral 
Bank of' the Philippines , agricultural output in 1946 was 
only 58 . 2 per c n t of' its 1937 volume, while 
manuf'acturing and mining output were only 21 . 0 per cent 
and a mere 2 . 0 per cent respectively of' th ir 1937 
volumes . The combined index of' production regist r d 
38 . 7 points compared with 100.0 in 1937 . 1 On the other 
hand , th population, though its growth had been slowed 
down by the undoubted short t r m rise in the death rate 
during th War, was substantially higher. From 1937 to 
1946 population increased f'rom 15 . 4 million to 18 . 4 
2 
million , a rise of' 19.4 p r cent. Living standards 
w re well below pre -war levels 3 and would have been e ven 
lower had not imports being considerably in exc ess of' 
t · t· 4 pre -war quan 1 1es . 
From 1946 to 1965 eco nomic growth in the Philippines 
was considerabl , though temporally unev n . Table 1 . 3 
shows the gross national product (G p) at 1955 prices and 
the net national product p) at 1955 f'actor cost f'or 
all years in this period inclusive and Figure 1 . 1 shows 
the ame data diagrammatically . Table 1 . 3 also shows 
1 
Central Bank of' the Philippines , Economic Indicators , 
Vol . I, No . 1 (Jun 1950) . 
2 
United ations, Demographic Yearbook , 1960 . 
3 
Th r al daily wag rat s in 1946 f'or those skilled 
and unskill d workers who could obtain mployme nt in 
Manila industrial stabli hments ar stimated to have 
b n 44 per cent and 30 p r cent respectively below th ir 
1941 1 v Is . [ Econo mic Surv v Mi.ssio n to the Phili ppin . , 
R port to th Pr sid nt of' the United Stat (Washington , 
4 1950), p . 16 ] 
In 1946 total imports were valu d at U. S . $259 . 85 million 
compar d with averag annual i mports f'or 1937-40 of' 
U. S . $124 . 65 million. D f'lation of' th se values by the 
Unit d States ind of' unit values of' e ports (in th 
abs nc of' n appropriat Philippin def'lator covering 
both per ' ods) 1 ads to an esti mat d volum increas of' 
bout 33 p r cent. (Sourc of' data : United ations , 
Y rbool of' Int rnation 1 Trad Statistics , 1959, 
Vol. .) 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
15 
Tab1 I · 3 : Gross ationa1 Product at 1955 
market prices a nd et ationa1 
Product at 1955 ractor cost , 
1946- 65 
G P at 1955 market prices 
Million 
pesos 
2 , 388 
4 , 802 
5,373 
5 , 718 
6 , 228 
6 , 523 
7 , 093 
7 , 646 
8 , 058 
8 , 687 
9 , 132 
9 , 532 
9 , 929 
10 , 514 
10 , 804 
11 , 431 
11 , 832 
12 , 457 
12,967 
13 , 670 
Per cent 
Incr as Over 
Previous Year 
101.1 
11. 9 
6.4 
8 . 9 
4 . 7 
8 . 7 
7 . 8 
5 . 4 
7 . 8 
5 . 1 
4 . 4 
4 . 2 
5 . 9 
2 . 8 
5 . 8 
3 . 5 
5.3 
4 . 1 
5 . 4 
P at 1955 ractor cost 
Million 
pesos 
2 , 170 
4 , 341 
4 , 806 
5 , 106 
5 , 567 
5 , 788 
6 , 211 
6 , 734 
7 , 060 
7 , 624 
8 , 293 
8 , 550 
8 , 766 
9 , 438 
9 , 519 
10 , 090 
10 , 411 
10 , 936 
11 , 317 
11 , 872 
Per cent 
Increase Over 
Previous Year 
100.0 
10·7 
6 . 2 
9 . 0 
4 . 0 
7 . 3 
8 . 4 
4 . 8 
8 . 0 
8 . 8 
3 · 1 
2 . 5 
7 . 7 
0 · 9 
6 . 0 
3 . 2 
5 . 0 
3 · 5 
4 . 9 
Sources : 1946-55: Ruben F . Trinidad , ' A Measure or the 
ation ' s Output at Cons tant Prices,' 
Statistical Reporter , (published by 
Orrice or Statistical Coordination 
and Standards , ationa1 Economic 
Council ), Vol . II , 0 . 2 (April 1959) . 
1956-65 : Estimates prepared by Orrice or 
Statistical Coordination and 
Standards , atio na1 Econo mic Council 
and published in Statistical 
Reporter , Vo1 .IV-X (19 60-66), econd 
number or ach volume . 
Log 
Sca~e 
Hi~~ion 
pesos 
_ ~4, 000 
~2,000 
~O,OOO 
8,000 
6,000 
4,000 
2,000 
~,OOO 
Figure I . ~ : 
46 
Sourc 
Gross Nationa~ Product at ~955 market prices a nd Net Natio na~ Product 
at ~955 factor cost , ~946 - 65 
-- ---
50 
Tab~e I . 3 
--
--
55 
GNP at ~955 prices 
---
.------
- ---,-
NNP at ~955 factor cost 
60 65 
f-' 
0\ 
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t h annual rat s of growth of th s aggr gat s . Betw n 
1946 a n d 19 65 G P at constant pric s incr ased b etwee n 
fiv e a n d six- fold at a n a v rage a nnual rat of 9 . 6 p r 
cent. How ver , from 1946 to 1947 alon r al G P 
incr as d by an extraordinary 101 . 1 per c e nt . 
Excluding t hi s grow·t h , the average annual rate of growth 
of G P at constant prices for the period 1947 - 65 is 
6 . 0 per cent . As an alternative guide to the grow th of 
output , the behaviour of P at constant factor co st was 
very simi lar . Ov r the period 1946- 65 it grew at an 
a erage annual rate or 9 . 3 per cent which for the 
short r period 1947 - 65 fell to 5 . 8 per cent. 
Again t the s u p rficial i mpressiveness of this 
output performa nc must be set two fac tors - the 
increase in populatio n a n d the extent t o which output 
xpansion was mere l y a return to pre - war levels of 
productio n . 
As can be s e n from Tab l e I . 4 , the total mid- year 
population increased over the period 19 46 - 65 from 18 . 4 
million to 32 . 3 millio n . Thi s i mplied an average annual 
rate o f increase of 3 . 0 per c e n t which was considerab ly 
higher than that of pr - war years . (B etwee n 1903 and 
1939 the average rate of increase had bee n only 2 .1 per 
cent p r annum approximat ly . l) Moreover , within the 
p riod the rate of increase acce l erated . For post -war 
1946-55 
1955 - 65 
the rate was 2 . 8 per cent per a nnum , but for 
this ros to 3 . 2 per c e n t per annum . In the 
ab enc of significan t net mi gratio n , this ac c el ration 
of population growth may b p l ai ned in t r ms of a 
relativ ly stable birth rate and a steadily falling 
d ath r te due , a mong oth r factors , to improving 
a ni tary co nditions a n d i nc r a ing effici ency i n 
, f t ' d' 2 contro lling ln c lO US lseases . 
1 
This r te of incr ase was calcula t d fro m c n suS 
population estimat s . (Bur au of t h e Census and 
Stat 'stics , Cens u S of th Phi lippi n es : 1 960 : 
Popul tio n a nd Housi n g , Vol . II , Summary Report , p . 2 . ) 
2 
Cf . d 
and th 
Ch . I. 
Table I . 4 : Esti mates of Mid- Year Po pulation , 
1946 - 65 
Year Mid - Year 
Population 
( thousands ) 
1946 18 , 434 
1947 18, 786 
1948 19 , 144 
1949 19 , 67 4 
1950 20 , 275 
1951 20 , 894 
1952 21 , 533 
1953 22 , 191 
1954 22 , 869 
1955 23 , 568 
1956 24 , 288 
1957 25 , 030 
1958 25 , 795 
1959 26 , 584 
1960 27 , 410 
1961 28 , 313 
1962 29 , 257 
1963 30 , 241 
1964 31 , 270 
1965 32 , 345 
Source : Unit d ations , 
D mographic Yearbook, 
1965. 
18 
19 
The increase of population , taken together with the 
expansion of output meant that G P per capita at 1955 
pric s grew' ov r three-fold or at an average annual rate 
of 6 . 4 per c nt in the period 1946 - 65 . If the huge 
expansio n in r al G P per capita between 1946 and 1947 
is exclud d , then for the remai nder of the period the 
average annual rate of growth was 2 . 8 per cent . When 
per capita growth in output is measured in terms of the 
growth in N P per cap' t a at 1955 fac t or cost , the average 
annual rate of grow't h for 1946- 65 becomes 6 . 2 per cent 
and for 1947 - 65 i t b comes 2 . 6 per cent. The data on 
real G P P r capi t a and real P per capita are 
presented in T a ble 1 . 5 and Figure 1.2 . 
Turning to an as se ssment of the extent to which 
post - war economic grow'th was merely reconstruction 
(i . e . a return to pre-war levels of output) , some 
difficulty arises from the fact that the above real G P 
and P series do not extend back to pre - war years. 
However, such evidence as is available suggests that 
aggregate output recovered very rapidly despite the size 
of the w'ar damage . Marvin Goodstein has prepared 
unof~icial estimat es of Philippine real product for 1938 , 
1948 and 19 56. According to his calculations , gross 
domestic product at 1956 market prices had in 1948 
1 
already exceeded its 1938 level by 10 . 8 per cent . This 
indication of the speed w'i th which production recovered 
rec ives support indirectly from the amazingly high 
growth rates of real G P and real P between 1946 and 
1947 . 2 In per capita terms , however , reconstruction had 
not been comple t e d by 1948 because of the growth in 
population since the pre-war period . Goodstein ' s 
1 ' 
Marvin E . Goodstein , The Pace and Pattern of PhiliP~ine 
Economic Grow'th : 1938 . 1948 and 1956 , Da ta Paper o . 8 , 
Cornell University South ast sia Program (Ithaca , July 
1962) , Tabl 1 - 1 , p . 8 . ote that Goodstein beli ves his 
st' mates may understate a little the proportionate 
increase in output from 1938 to 1948 . (p . 25 , n . 23·) 
2 
Se Tabl 1 . 3 above . ote that although a c ase could 
be made for the us n this study of a geographic or 
do m stic conc pt of aggregate output rather than a 
nat'onal on , such a procedure (w'ith the exception of the 
abov d'scussion) ha not be n follow~d because (at the 
tim of w'ri t' ng) th r ar no published constant price or 
constant factor cost series of do mestic product ( gross or 
net ) which cover the whole period 1946 - 65 inclusive . 
Y ar 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Tabl I . 5 : Gross ational Product per Capita 
at 1955 market prices a nd t 
ational Product per Capita at 1955 
~actor cost , 1946- 65 
G P per capita at 1955 P per capita at 
market prices fa c t or co st 
Pesos Per c nt Pesos Per cent 
Inc r as Over Incr as 
Pre ious Year Previous 
129 . 5 - 117 · 7 -
255 . 6 97 . 4 2J1.1 96 . J 
280 . 7 9 . 8 251.0 8 . 6 
290 . 6 3.5 259 . 5 3.4 
307 . 2 5 . 7 274.6 5 . 8 
312.2 1.6 277 . 0 0 . 9 
329 . 4 5 . 5 288 . 4 4 . 1 
344 . 6 4 . 6 303 . 5 5 . 2 
352 . 4 2 · 3 J08 . 7 1.7 
368 . 6 4 . 6 323 . 5 4 . 8 
376 . 0 2 .0 341. 4 5 · 5 
380.8 1.3 341.6 0 . 1 
J84.9 1.1 3J9 · 8 - 0 . 5 
395 . 5 2 . 8 355 · 0 4 . 5 
394 . 2 - 0 . 3 347.3 - 2 . 2 
403 . 7 2 . 4 356 . 4 2 . 6 
404 . 4 0 . 2 355 . 8 - 0 . 2 
411 . 9 1.9 361. 6 1.6 
414 . 7 0 . 7 J61. 9 0 . 1 
422 . 6 1.9 367 . 0 1.4 
Sourc s: Tables I . 3 a nd I . 4 . 
20 
1955 
Over 
Year 
Figure I . 2 : Gross National Product per Capita at 1955 market prices and Net 
National Product per Capita at 1955 factor cost , 1946- 65 
Log 
S~a1e 
pesos 
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Source : Table I . 5 
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stO mate of real gross do m sti c product and the official 
population estim t togeth r imply p r capita gross 
domestOc product at 1956 prices of P270 .4 in 1948 
co mpared with one , derived in simiLar manne~ of P295 . 6 
in 1938 . Taking as a guide the yearly growth rates of 
real G P per capi ta for 1948 - 49 a nd 1949 - 50 shown n 
T ble . 5 , it would thus see m that the 1938 l evel of p r 
capita real gross do m stic product was not regained until 
about 1950 . 
In the post - r construction years output expanded 
but at rates which wer on averag slower than those in 
the latter part of the nineteen- forties and which 
thems lv s tend d to decrease after about 1955 . Fro m 
1950 to 1955 G P at 1955 prices grew at an average rate 
of 6 . 9 per c ent per annum . This decli n ed to 4.4 per 
cent per annum for 1955 - 60 and then rose only slightly 
to 4.8 per cent per annum over the years 1960- 65 . The 
average annual growth rates for P at 1955 factor cost 
in the same periods , 1950 - 55 , 1955 - 60 and 1960 - 65 , were 
6 . 5 per cent , 4 . 6 per cent and 4.5 per cent respectively . 
Economic growth was acco mpanied by considerable 
structural change . This can be seen from Tables I . 6 and 
I . 7 which show the ab olut and r lativ shares of net 
national product (national inco me) originating in the 
various s ctors of th conomy at both current and 
constant factor costs for the years 1946 - 65 inclusive . 
Th most notic abl f atures of this change were the 
rapid rise in r lative importance of the manufacturing 
ector and th r lativ de cline of th agriculture 
s ctor (which includ d forestry and fishing) . Setting 
aside the reconstruction years , the relative shar of 
manufacturing in P at current · factor cost inc reased 
mor or 1 ss st adily from 8 . 5 per c nt in 1950 to 18 . 9 
p r c n t in 1964, although it subs qu ntly d clin d 
slightl to 17 . 8 p r c nt i n 1965. On the oth r hand , 
agricultur ' s r lative shar estim t d from current 
factor cost data f 11 from 42 . 3 p r c nt in 1950 to 
32 . 9 p r cent On 1 61 , aft r which year it e per oenc d 
no furth r d clin . With r g rd to the constan t factor 
cost d t th r 1 tiv share of m nufacturing increas 
fro m 10 . 2 p r c nt n 1950 to about 17 p r cent in 1964 
nd 1 65 , but in this case agri cul ture ' s post -
d 
r construction r 1 tiv d clOne did not b gin until 1954 . 
Industrial Sector 
Agriculturea 
Mining 
Hanufac turing 
Construction 
Trade 
Transportb 
Other Services 
1946 1947 
2,010 2 , 446 
) 16 
))0 426 
1)2 24) 
551 702 
150 191 
1,026 1 , )40 
1948 
2 , )86 
25 
440 
)07 
716 
195 
1, 442 
Table I.6 : 
1949 1950 
2 .. )08 2 , 505 
40 55 
440 502 
276 2)9 
709 752 
19) 205 
1,498 1,664 
Industrial Origin of Net National Product at Current Factor Cost 
1951 
2 , 787 
79 
6)0 
2)7 
8)8 
228 
1,688 
1952 
2,806 
98 
6)9 
221 
809 
242 
1,7)9 
195) 
) , 009 
107 
8)4 
2)6 
780 
242 
1,807 
(million pesos) 
1954 
) , 118 
105 
850 
205 
781 
2)5 
1,851 
1955 
) , 161 
121 
1,001 
2)0 
861 
250 
2,000 
1956 
) , 049 
122 
1,195 
296 
999 
286 
2,)41 
1957 
),050 
142 
1 , 418 
)29 
1,092 
)21 
2,412 
1958 
),149 
142 
1 , 677 
297 
1,1 2 5 
)51 
2 , 695 
1959 
),)84 
171 
1,701 
)26 
1 , 156 
)61 
2 , 909 
NNP at Factor Cost 4,202 5 , )64 5,511 5,464 5 , 922 6,487 6,554 7 , 015 7 , 145 7 , 624 8 , 288 8,764 9,4)6 10 , 008 
Agriculturea 
Mini n g 
Manufacturi ng 
Construc t ion 
Trade 
Trans portb 
Other Services 
47 . 8 
0 .1 
7 . 9 
) . 1 
1) . 1 
) . 6 
24 . 4 
45 . 6 
0 . ) 
7 . 9 
4 . 5 
1) . 1 
) . 6 
25 . 0 
4) . ) 
0 . 5 
8 . 0 
5 . 6 
1) . 0 
) . 5 
26 . 2 
42 . 2 
0 . 7 
8 . 1 
5 . 1 
1) . 0 
) . 5 
27.4 
42 . ) 
0 . 9 
8 . 5 
4 . 0 
12 . 7 
) . 5 
28 . 1 
4) . 0 
1. 2 
9 . 7 
) . 7 
12 . 9 
) . 5 
26 . 0 
42 . 8 
1.5 
9 . 7 
) . 4 
12 . ) 
) . 7 
26 . 5 
Percentage Distribution 
42 . 9 
1. 5 
11 . 9 
) . 4 
11 • 1 
) . 4 
25 . 8 
4) . 6 
1. 5 
11 . 9 
2 . 9 
10 . 9 
) . ) 
25 . 9 
4 1. 5 
1 . 6 
1) . 1 
).0 
11.) 
) . ) 
26 . 2 
)6 . 8 
1 . 5 
14 . 4 
) . 6 
12 . 1 
) . 5 
28 . 2 
)4 . 8 
1.6 
16 . 2 
).8 
12 . 5 
).7 
27 . 5 
)) . 4 
1.5 
17 . 8 
) . 1 
11.9 
) . 7 
28 . 6 
)) . 8 
1.7 
17 . 0 
) . ) 
11.6 
) . 6 
29 . 1 
NNP at Factor Cost C 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100:0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
1960 
) , 5 2 ) 
177 
1,815 
)4) 
1,2)1 
)85 
) , 1)0 
1961 
) , 858 
209 
2 , 090 
4)2 
1,410 
418 
),)20 
1962 
4 , )48 
261 
2 , )49 
414 
1,514 
451 
),6)4 
1963 
5,1)2 
280 
2 , 686 
544 
1 , 682 
465 
4 , 00) 
1964 
5 , )47 
)10 
),0)6 
55) 
1 , 950 
476 
4 , 424 
1965 
5,778 
)75 
),072 
6)8 
2,066 
478 
4,82) 
10 , 604 11 , 7)7 12,971 14 , 792 16 , 096 17 , 2)0 
)) . 2 
1.7 
17 . 1 
) . 2 
11.6 
) . 6 
29 . 5 
100 . 0 
)2 . 9 
1. 8 
17 . 8 
) . 7 
12 . 0 
) . 6 
28 . ) 
100 . 0 
)) . 5 
2 . 0 
18 . 1 
) . 2 
11.7 
).5 
28 . 0 
100 . 0 
)4 . 7 
1 . 9 
18 . 2 
) . 7 
11 . 4 
) . 1 
27 .1 
)) . 2 
1. 9 
18 . 9 
) . 4 
12 . 1 
) . 0 
27 · 5 
)) · 5 
2 . 2 
17 . 8 
) . 7 
12 . 0 
2 . 8 
28 . 0 
100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
a . I n cludes forestry and fishing . 
b . Includes communications , storage and 
utility industries . 
Sources: Statistical Re porter, Vol . III-X (1959 - 66) , 
second number of each volume . 
c . Percentages may not add exactly to 100 . 0 
owing to r oundi n g . 
1\:) 
\....J 
Industrial Sector 
Agriculturea 
~lining 
ManU£acturing 
Construction 
Trade 
Transportb 
Other Services 
NNP at Factor Cost 
Agriculturea 
Mining 
ManU£acturing 
Construction 
Trade 
b Transport 
Other Services 
1946 
984 
2 
104 
66 
274 
75 
665 
1947 
1 , 8J2 
20 
J84 
200 
578 
157 
1,170 
1948 
1,9J7 
42 
44J 
265 
617 
168 
1, JJ4 
Table 1.7: 
1949 
2,OJJ 
57 
469 
251 
646 
176 
1,474 
1950 
2,214 
74 
567 
224 
706 
192 
1,590 
Industrial Origin.or Net National Product at 1955 Factor Cost 
1951 
2,45J 
92 
665 
198 
701 
191 
1,488 
1952 
2 , 597 
11 J 
700 
202 
7J9 
221 
1,6J9 
195J 
2,900 
119 
791 
218 
720 
22J 
1,76J 
(million pesos) 
1954 
J , OJ9 
111 
889 
200 
760 
229 
1,8J2 
1955 
J,161 
121 
1,001 
2JO 
861 
250 
2,000 
1956 
J,190 
lJ4 
1,158 
281 
97J 
278 
2,279 
1957 
J,186 
150 
1,251 
JOJ 
1,045 
J07 
2 , J08 
1958 
2 , 9J6 
148 
1,J47 
275 
1 , 001 
J25 
2 , 7J4 
1959 
J,2J5 
160 
1 ,459 
287 
1,028 
JJ7 
2 , 9J2 
2,170 4,J41 4,806 5,106 5,567 5,788 6,211 6,7J4 7,060 7,624 8 , 29J 8,550 8,766 9,4J8 
45 . J 
0 . 1 
4 . 8 
J . O 
12 . 6 
J . 5 
Jo . 6 
42 . 2 
0 . 5 
8 . 8 
4 . 6 
l J . J 
J.6 
27 . 0 
40 . J 
0 . 9 
9 . 2 
5 . 5 
12 . 8 
J . 5 
27.8 
J9 . 8 
1 . 1 
9 . 2 
4.9 
12 . 7 
J . 4 
28 . 9 
J9 . 8 
I. J 
10 . 2 
4 . 0 
12 . 7 
J . 4 
28 . 6 
42.4 
1.6 
11 . 5 
J . 4 
12 . 1 
J •. J 
25 . 7 
41 . 8 
1.8 
I 1. J 
J . J 
11.9 
J . 6 
26 . 4 
Percentage Distribution 
4J . l 
1.8 
11.7 
J . 2 
10 . 7 
J . J 
26 . 2 
4J.0 
1 . 6 
12 . 6 
2 . 8 
10 . 8 
J . 2 
25 . 9 
41.5 
1.6 
lJ.l 
J . O 
II . J 
J . J 
26 . 2 
J8 . 5 
1 . 6 
14 . 0 
J.4 
11.7 
J . 4 
27 . 5 
J7 . J 
1.8 
14 . 6 
J . 5 
12 . 2 
J . 6 
27 · 0 
JJ . 5 
1 . 7 
15 . 4 
J . l 
11.4 
J . 7 
J1.2 
J4 . J 
1.7 
15 . 5 
J . O 
10 . 9 
J . 6 
J 1. 1 
1960 
J,09J 
15J 
1 , 506 
28J 
1,091 
J45 
J,048 
9,519 
J2 . 5 
1.6 
15 . 8 
J . O 
11 . 5 
J . 6 
J2 . 0 
NNP at Factor Cost C 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
a . Includes rorestry and rishing . 
b . Includes communications, storage and 
utility industries . 
c . Percentages may not add exactly to 100 . 0 
owing to rounding . 
Sources : As ror Table I . J . 
1961 
J , 262 
162 
1 , 607 
J58 
1,194 
J69 
J,lJ8 
1962 
J , J60 
165 
1,699 
J18 
1 , 229 
J76 
J,264 
196J 
J , 5 22 
168 
1 , 809 
J92 
1 , 276 
J70 
J,J99 
1964 
J , 440 
170 
1 , 957 
J82 
1, J8J 
J50 
J,6J5 
1965 
J , 617 
182 
2 , 001 
4JJ 
1 , 4JJ 
J48 
J,858 
10 , 090 10,411 10 , 9)6 11,J17 11,872 
J2 . J 
1.6 
15 . 9 
J . 5 
11 . 8 
J . 7 
Jl . l 
100.0 
J2 . J 
1 . 6 
16 . J 
J . O 
11 .8 
J . 6 
J1.4 
J2 . 2 
1. 5 
16 . 5 
J . 6 
11. 7 
J . 4 
J 1. 1 
JO . 4 
1. 5 
17 . J 
J . 4 
12 . 2 
J . l 
J2 . 1 
JO.5 
1.5 
16 . 9 
J . 6 
12 . 1 
2.9 
J2 . 5 
100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
1\J 
+-
Fro m 43 . 0 p r cent in that year its shar fell to a 
littl ov r 30 per cent in 1964 and 1965 . 
25 
The above constant factor cost v'dence of 
industrialization r fl cts the relativ rapidity of th 
growth of the manufacturing se c tor . l This growth owed 
much to th stimulus to i mport substitutio n provid d by 
i mport and exchang controls. These w re effectively 
introduced at the end of 1949 in respons to a 
d t riorating balanc of payments situation and remained 
throughout the following decade. They came to b th 
dominant instrument of economic policy in a soci ty 
wher ' the economic role assigned to government .. . is 
2 
limi ted . ' 
However , d spite an impressive rate of industrial 
development and , more gen rally , a creditable over- all 
growth performance , the economy faced continued 
problems of unemployment and und remployment . The 
magnitud of th se problems in the second half of the 
p riod under study is indicated in Table 1 . 8 by the 
percentages of the labour forc une mployed and ' visibly ' 
3 under mployed , as estimat d from sample surveys . 
Although (after allowing for a seasonal factor) a 
downward trend in the rate of unemployment is 
discernible , at the nd of the period this rate remained 
high by the post-war standards of more advanced , Western 
econo mies . The percentage rate of undere mployment , a 
conceptually 1 ss precise measure , failed to show any 
1 
For th post - reconstruction p 
annual rate of growth of real 
manufacturing s ctor wa a high 
2 
riod 1950 - 65 the ave rag 
P originating in the 
8 . 7 p r ce n t . 
Golay , op . cit ., p . 372 . This limited rol is 
'llustrateu uy L le inability or lack of inclination to 
implement , exc pt in fragm ntary fashion , any of th 
seri s of increasingly sophisticat d d v lopment plans 
drawn up ov r the post - war period . For discussions of 
plans drawn up prior to 1960 , s Golay , op . cit ., Ch . XV , 
and J mes A . Storer and Teresita L . d Guzman , 
' Philippine Econo mic Planning and Progr ss 1945 - 60' in 
R . S . M'ln ( Ed . ) , Planning for Progress : The 
Adm' n 'stration of Econo mic Plannin in th 
M nila , Institut of Public 
of th Philippin s , 1960) . 
3 
ines 
rsity 
D fined as tho s mploy d \v'ork rs who worked les s than 
40 hours p r 'v k and wanted addi t' onal mploym nt . 
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Tabl I . 8 : Un mployed and Un d r mp loyed 
Wo rk rs as P rc n tag s o f Total 
Labour Force, 1956- 65 
Un e mployed Und re mploy d a 
Year as per c e nt as p r c e nt of 
of t otal total lab our 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
a 
Sourc 
labour force force 
Oc tober 10 . 0 12 . 8 
May 8 . 7 10 . 5 
October 7 . 1 n . a . 
May 9 . 1 11. 4 
ovember 7 . 2 11. 6 
May 7 . 7 10 . 6 
October 5 · 9 9 · 9 
October 6 · 3 11. 4 
May 8 . 6 10 · 3 
Oc tober 6 . 4 12 . 1 
Apri l 9 · 5 10 . 6 
Oc tober 6.4 11. 8 
May 7 . 8 14 . 2 
October 4.6 11. 9 
May 6 . 4 n . a . 
May 8 . 2 n . a . 
Defin d as those e mployed workers who worked 
less tha n 40 hours per week and wanted 
additional e mployme n t . 
Bureau of th Census a n d Statistics, 
Philippine Statistical Survey of Hous eholds 
Bulletin , various issues ; Ce ntral Bank of the 
Philipp i n es , Eighteenth Annual Repor t , 1966 . 
1 
unequivoc 1 tre n d . 
W'th r spect Lo pr c behav'our , th Phi1'ppin s 
peri nced both ris'ng nd f 11ing mov ments in th 
pric 1 v 1 in th p r'od 1946- 65 . 2 Th s mo v ments 
h v b n m asur d in th's study by numb r of price 
27 
i ndic which it is n c s ary to d scr 'b briefly . Th 
first s the gross nat'ona1 product i mplicit pric 
d £lator ( 1955 = 100). Annual re dings w r obta 'n d 
for this ind x by dividing curr nt pric va1u s of G P 
1 
us £u1 measur of th re1ativ magnitud of 
unuti1iz d labour re ourc s in a limited numb r of y ar 
is provid d by Theodor K. Ruprecht in his article 
'Labor Ab orp ion Problems and Econo mic Developme n t in 
th Philippines ,' Philippin Econo mic Journal , Vo1.V , 
0 . 2 (Second Semest r 1966 ). After mak 'ng so me 
ad ju t ment to the 1 bour force a mple urvey data , 
Rupr ch comput a ' surp1u labor ind ' which is 
defi n ed as the ratio of fully une mp10y d quiva1ent 
labour r to the e"p r' nc d non- agricultural labour 
forc Th num rator of this ratio i th sum of th 
numb r of n o n-agricu1tura11 mp10y d worl r who work d 
1 ss th n 40 h ours p r w k nd d sir d additional work , 
as d just d to fully mp10y d qui 1 n s (40 hours p r 
wI) ccord'ng to th numb r of hour c ua11y work d , 
plus th number of tot 11y un mploy d work rs 'n both 
agricu1tur and non- gricu1 t u re . For th y ars 1959 - 62 
this r t 'o ho rs aroun d th 20 P r c n t 1 v 1 . 
2 
Th t r m ' pr'c 1 v l ' is intend d in t hi s cont 
r 1 t to Lh pric s of 11 goods nd non-fa cto r s ic s . 
The pric s of f ctor r c , . g . wag , are c1uded . 
By ' d f1ation ' nothing mor w~ll b mean t t han a 
condition 0 g n r 11y fa1 1 ' n g pric s of goods nd 
non-f ctor s r ic s . Thus it wi ll b th nti t hesi of 
' infl ti n '. 
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by th corre ponding v ues of G P t 1955 prices . l Th 
oth r thr e indic s m asure changes in consum r , 
whol sal and retail prices r p ctiv ly . They w r 
sp cially construct d for this study by linki n g tog th r 
and partially r - w ighting existing official Philippine 
price indic which wer , w~th one exception , of th 
f·xed weight vari ty . Unrortunately , ther does not 
xist for any of thes three classirications of prices 
a s· ngl official ind which covers the whole period 
1946-65. Old indic s cov ring th arli r part of the 
p riod wer di s continued before th terminal y ar , 
while n wer indices , which do provide coverage until 
1965 (and beyond) , do not extend back to the beginning 
of the period. A detailed descrip ion of the method s 
employ d in putting together reI vant official indices 
to form continuous i ndex numb r series for this study 
appears in pp ndix A. These especially constructed 
series hav be n term d the Composite Consumer Pric 
Ind for Manila , th Compo ite Whol sale Pric e Index 
for Manila and t h Composit e Retail Price Index for 
Manila. All h av a base of 1955 = 100 and all have been 
co mput d in terms oE average annual readings. It is a 
shortco ming that all three refer only to prices in 
1 
In principle , thi typ of ind i perhaps the best 
indicator of the b ha iour of th price level in any 
eco nomy since it hould co mpare the current and base y ar 
prices of the n tir curr nt ne t output of good and 
s r ic s. In practice , however , it ha s th general 
disadva n tage that it is by d Einition a current - w ight d 
or Paasch ind Becaus of the changing nature of th 
weight , th numb r for any non-base year cannot , 
strict ly speaking , be compared validly with that of any 
oth r y r e cept th b e on. e rth less , in 
me suring ch ng s b tw n cons cutive or not too 
dist ntly pac d y ar , thi difficulty ~s fr qu ntly 
ignor d , as it ha b en in this study , on th grounds 
th t th relati e physical compos·tion of output i not 
lik ly to change gr atly in the short run . 
no th r g neral d ficiency of th G P implicit 
pric d flator is its dep nd nc on the accuracy of th 
t·mat d G P ggr g t ·n both current and constant 
pric s . Errors and distortions in thes estimate are 
auto m tic lly refl ct d in th ind L ss develop d 
, includ·ng h Philippi nes r part·cularly 
o f c proble ms in this spher , but in addition 
r conc ptual diEEiculties , uch as those 
as oc· t d w·th con t n pr ·c e valu tion in th public 
s ctor , which r common to all conom s . 
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Manila a n d not to prices in th whole of th Philippin s. 
This d ficiency was unavoidabl si nc e price i n d data 
relati n g to r gio n s outsid of Manila and thu s to th 
whol of t h e Ph ' l ippi n s are unavailabl xcept for th 
per 'o d ince 1957 , a n d t h e n only for consumer pric 
T h e four price 'ndices are pr s n ted in tabular 
form i n Tab l I . 9 and in graphical form i n Figures I . 3 
and I.4 . Table I.lO shows annual percentage changes in 
t h e four i n di c es . Judging fro m the consum rand r tail 
pri c e index numb ers for 1941 and 1946 , th pri c e level 
in the latter y ar was about five tim s high r than it 
was in the form e r year when war came to the Philippines . 
Th s u bseque n t b haviour pattern s of all four indi c es 
over the period being investigated wer quite similar . 
All i ndi c es showed d clining trends fro m 1 946 to 
1955 with the G P i mplicit price deflator fa lling at an 
av rag annual rate of 7 . 1 per cent , the Composite 
Consum r Pric e Index falling at an average annua l rat 
of 5 . 9 per c e n t , the Composite Whol esale Pri c e Ind x 
falling at an ave rag annu a l rate of 7 . 0 p r cent a n d 
t h e Composite R tail Pric e Index falling at a n average 
annual rat e of 7 . 5 per ce n t. 
In ach case the declini n g tre n d wa a decelerati ng 
one , th largest y ar - to - year declines for each inde 
- all withi n a rang of 30 to 40 per cent approximately -
occurring from 1946 to 1947. Following the introduction 
of effect' i mport controls a n d coi nc iding with part of 
the ] orean War , th r e was , moreover , a t mporary 
int rruption to th downward paths of all indic s . The 
Composite Cons umer and R tail Price Indic s both rose 
from 1949 to 1 950 and 11 four indic s rose fro m 1950 to 
1951. Th l argest annual increas regis~ered a mong th m 
in thi tw'o y r period was the 11.4 per ce n t rise in the 
Composite Whol sal Price I nde from 1950 to 1951 . 
How v r , aft r 1951 d clining pri c es r turned and th 
pric 1 v 1 , ac co rdi n g to a ll four indices , reach d its 
low st po'nt for th p riod of tudy in 1955 . n that 
y r h G P i mplicit price defl tor w'as only 51.5 p r 
c nt of 'ts 1946 1 v 1 and the consum r , whol sale a n d 
r tail pric i n d numb rs w re only 57 . 6 p r c e n t , 
52 .1 p r c nt a n d 4 . 7 per c n t r spect i ely of their 
1946 1 v I s . 
y r 
1941 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1 958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Tab1 I . 9 : ndices of Phi1tppin Pric s , 
1941 and 1946 - 65 
(1955 100) 
G P 
mp1·c · t 
Manila 
Composit 
Cons um 
Pric 
Manila 
Composit 
Who1 sal 
Price Ind 
Man · 1a 
Pri c e 
D flat or 
n . a . 
194 . 3 
123 . 4 
114 . 8 
107 . 3 
106 . 4 
112 . 9 
106 . 0 
104.7 
101. 4 
100 . 0 
103 . 0 
104 . 8 
107 . 6 
108 . 1 
112 . 2 
117 . 5 
1 26 . 5 
137.8 
144 . 9 
148 . 3 
J3 . 8 
17J · 5 
116.0 
108.1 
102 . 4 
105 . 0 
11J.5 
106 . 3 
102 . 6 
101 . 0 
100 . 0 
102 . 7 
104 . 5 
108 . 0 
107 . 0 
111 · 5 
113·2 
119 · 
126 . 5 
1J6 . 9 
1 40 . 4 
n.a . 
192 . 0 
121·9 
121 . 4 
110 · 5 
106.6 
118 . 7 
108 . 9 
108 . 6 
102.6 
100 . 0 
103 ·1 
107 . 6 
Ill. 2 
112 · 7 
117 . l~ 
12J.2 
129 . 4 
142 . 0 
14 . 6 
151. 9 
40 . 4 
20 1. 4 
124 . 5 
119 · 9 
107 · 0 
108 . 6 
120 . 4 
11J . 4 
108 . 4 
102.5 
100 . 0 
104 . 6 
107 . 6 
112 . 4 
112.5 
117 · 
119 . 7 
128 . 3 
1J6 . 4 
146 . 9 
149 . 7 
ources : G P Implicit Price D f1ator : s for Tab1 s 
I . J and .6. 
Other pric indices : C ntra1 BanI o f 
App ndi 
30 
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Tab1 . 10 : nd'c es of' Phi1'ppin Prices : 
P rc n tag Change s f'ro m Pr vious 
y ar , 1947 - 65 
G P Manila Manila Manila 
y ar Imp1ici t Composit Compo si t Pri ce Consum Retai l 
D f'lator Price Price Ind x 
1946 
1947 -36. 5 - 33 .1 - 36 . 5 - 38 . 2 
1948 - 7 · 0 - 6.8 - 0 . 4 - 3 . 7 
1949 - 6 · 5 - 5 . 3 - 9 · 0 - 10 . 8 
195 0 - 0 . 8 + 2 · 5 - 3·5 + 1.5 
1951 + 6.1 + 8.1 +11. 4 +10.9 
1952 - 6 .1 - 6 .3 - 8.3 - 5 . 8 
1953 - 1.2 - 3.5 - 0 . 3 - 4.4 
1954 - 3.2 - 1.6 - 5 · 5 - 5 . 4 
1955 - 1.4 - 1.0 - 2 . 5 - 2 . 4 
1956 + 3 · 0 + 2 . 7 + 3 ·1 + 4 . 6 
1957 + 1.7 + 1.8 + 4 . 4 + 2 · 9 
1958 + 2 . 7 + 3 . 3 + 3 · 3 + 4 . 5 
1959 + 0 . 5 0 · 9 + 1.3 + 0 . 1 
1960 + J . 8 + 4 . 2 + 4 . 2 + 4 . 7 
1961 + 4.7 + 1.5 + 4 . 9 + 1.6 
1962 + 7·7 + 5 . 8 + 5.0 + 7 · 2 
1963 + 8 . 9 + 5 . 6 + 9 · 7 + 6 . 3 
1964 + 5 . 2 + . 2 + 4 . 6 + 7 · 7 
1965 + 2 . 3 + 2 . 6 + 2 . 2 + 1. 9 
Sourc s : s f'or Tab1 I . 9· 
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Figur 1. 3 : Price Index B haviour , 1946 - 65 ( I ) 
Log 
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Consumer Pri c e Index 
i' 
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Th reaft rap riod of inflation s t in . Between 
1955 and 1965 the G P implicit price d flator increased 
by 48 . 3 per cent , implying an averag annual rate of 
i ncr ase of 4.0 p r cent . The Manila Composite Consum r 
Pric Ind x show'ed a somewhat s maller rise over the same 
period of 40 . 4 per cent , i mplying an average annual rat 
of increase of 3 . 5 per cent ; while the wholesale and 
r tail price indices show d somewhat larger rises of 
51 . 9 and 49 . 7 p r cent , implying resp ctive average 
annual rates of increas of 4.2 and 4 . 1 per cent . The 
inflation was gen rally an accelerating one . All four 
price indices record d greater perc ntage rises from 1960 
to 1965 than from 1955 to 1960 . Ind ed , until about 1959 
th inflation was v ry mild with the Composite Consumer 
Price I nde actually falling betwe n 1958 and 1959 . 
Succeeding chapters are arranged in the following 
manner . Chapter II , the remaining chapter in the 
introductory section , is a theoretical discussion , 
oriented towards 1 s developed economies , of price level 
behaviour and its interr lationship with economic growth . 
In Part T,vo Chapt rs III to VI inclusive atte mpt to 
e pI in the changes in the Philippine price level from 
1946 to 1965 with the aid of a numb r of hypotheses 
lvhich emerg from Chapter I . Chapter VII , which 
conclud s Part Two , brings the conclusions of the 
pr ceding four chapters together into a general 
ass ss m nt of the natur of Philippine deflation and 
i nfla tion . Part Thre , also utilizing hypotheses 
discuss d in Chapter I , examines the impaqt of price 
level movements in th period 1946- 65 on th rate of 
grow h . Specifically , Chapt r VII deals '.vi th the 
ff cts of infl tion and d fl tion on the rate of 
saving ; Chapter IX is correspondingly co n cerned with 
th ir ff cts on the rate and co mpo itio n of invest ment; 
Ch p r X nquir s into th i mportance of capital 
formatOon On th Philippin growth process ; a n d Chapt r 
XI ti s On th conclusions of Chapt r X with t h ose of 
Chapt rs VI I nd IX , th r by ndeavouring to establish 
th °nfluen ce that pric 1 1 behaviour had o n t h 
co nomy ' s growth p r£orm nc. Cha pt r XII , th only 
chapt r i n Part Four , concludes t h study w·th so m 
g n ra l comm nts on Philipp·ne pric 1 v 1 a nd grow th 
xp ri nc s . 
J5 
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CHAPTER I 
INFLATIO OMIC GROWTH 
This chapter will survey bri fly s ome ge neral 
e planations of price Ie I beha iour i n less dev lop d 
eco nomies , with particular mphasis o n growi n g l ess 
dev lo ped eco nomi s . It will also examine ways i n which 
it has bee n suggested that price level behavi our may 
influence conomic growth . The purpose of th se 
ex rc i ses is to establish a broad conceptual framework 
for sub equent analysis of the Philippi n e experie nc e . 
Although the chapter will be concerned with both 
rising and falling price levels in relatio n to a 
posLulated norm of stability , it is noteworthy that 
mod rn theoretical analyses in this area have been 
concerned predo minan tly with the former. Co nc e n tra tio n 
on th study of i nflatio n has been , in part , a reflectio n 
of it widespread post-war preva l e nc e ; in part , a 
product of the deb te about it role i n the pursuit of 
d e v lopment goals; and , i n part , an indirect reaction 
to the perience of industrial econo mi es during th 
pre - war period , when d flation was usually associat d 
with or even partially replaced by une mploym n t of what 
is now t r med the Keynesian variety . The i mmediate and 
pr ssi n g social problems caused by this type of 
un mployment focu ed theorists ' attentio n away fro m the 
tudy of deflation ~~. The disco ery of the mean s 
of co mbatti n g the e m rgenc of such unemployme n t by 
fiscal a n d mone tary policie , a n d thereby i multan ously 
prev nting the appearance of related d flationary trends 
i n adva nced a nd underdeveloped eco nomi e alike , has 
me a n t a further l ack of attention to what has been 
view d the di mi n ishing IiI elihood of a falling price 
I vel . erthel s , it will be seen b low t hat the 
th oretical tools a nd techniqu s are available for 
d ling with t he c use and effect of d flatio n as well 
a . nfl ion . 
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EXPLA ATIO S OF PRICE LEVEL BEHAVIOUR 
The analysis of price level behaviour in less 
developed c ountries has relied heavily on two well-known 
ge n eral approaches ; namely , tho se of the Classical 
Qua n tity Theory of Money and the Keyn sian Th ory of 
Effective De mand . Both approaches have undergone 
adaptions , m0difications and shifts in emphasis to fit 
the m to specific condi tions ; but , in essence , both see 
upward and downward mo ve ments of the price l e vel as the 
direc t outco me 0 f imbalanc es betw'een aggrega te demand 
and the total output of goods and s rvices . Their 
differences lie fundamentally in their exp l a nations of 
these i mbalances . While the Quantity Theory approach 
stresses that they are a reflection of imbalances between 
th supply a nd d mand for money , the Keynesian approach 
looks dir ctly at the determinants of the various 
components of the aggregate demand for co mmodities . 
Many of the other theories of price level behaviour 
are broadly confin d , explicitly or implicitly , to the 
explanation of inflation in advanced economies . In 
particular , th theory of cost inflation (which is based 
on th assumption of excessive autonomous increases in 
negotiated wage rat s) and the theory of ' mark- up ' 
inflation (which is based on the assumption of mutually 
inconsistent wage and profit claims to the national 
income under a system of administer d wages and prices) 
are gen rally thought to have little r levance , at 
least in their pure forms , to less developed economi s , 
especially to those (including the Philippines) which 
hav consid rable un mploym nt , a rapidly growing w'ork 
forc , relatively w ak trade unions and a large rural 
sector . 
Only recently has th r emerged a challenge to the 
validity or applicability of both th Quantity Th ory 
and K ynesian explanations of the causes of price level 
mov me n t in less d v loped econo mi s . This has co m 
fro m th ' Structurali t School '. It has be n only a 
part' 1 chall nge , sinc the Structuralists , as well , 
h be n concern d sole ly with inflation . Interpret d 
in a n rrow sense , th Y claim that thi ph no me no n often 
h as its origins in th structure of d ma n d , produ ctio n 
and trade a n d changes in that structur brought about 
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by co no mi c growth . Th challeng h as giv n rise to th 
' Mon rist - S ructuralist ' controv rsy ab out the c auses 
of a nd po l ici s for co nt ro lling i nfla ti on in Latin 
A m ric n countri s , a controv rsy whose r 1 vanc , 
how eve , 
r gio n s. 
to less d v lop ed countri . n oth r 
Th Quantity Theory of Money pproach 
Th Quantity Theory of Mon y pproach op rate on 
v ral 1 v ls of sophistication . In its older a n d 
i mpl r ersions it assumes that the d ma n d for mon y is 
so lely a transatlons de mand , forming in the short run a 
constan t proportion of money inco me. l Viewed 
reciprocally , this i mplies that th short run income 
v locity of circulation is constant and thus independ nt 
of mo n y s upply . I also assumes flexible prices a n d 
money wages , ther by ensuring that in the short run r al 
output is consta n t at a full mployme n t level and thus 
i nva riable ' n the face of change in aggregat money 
de ma n d . Under th se circumst a nce s the price level of 
real output can vary only in respo nse to variations in 
the money supp ly . Giv n an initial quilibrium position , 
a chang in money supply w'ill cause a proportio nate 
change i n th aggregate money d mand for co mmo dities 
a n d hence an equi - proportionate change in the pri ce level . 
Th transition to this new equi librium will occur as a 
r ult of the temporarily disequilibrating change in the 
money supply creating an opposit disequilibrati ng 
chang i n th co mmodity mark et , either directly , or 
indir c ly t h rough its ff ct on th capital mark et , or 
in both th se ways , d p nding on the precise v r ion of 
t h th or . Th n w qU ' librium positio n will b 
tain d wh n the pric l ev 1 has ch nged just 
suffic' ntl to b :r ng th d ma n d for mo ne y into equality 
with Lh n 1"" suppl ; i. e . , when pric s , a n d hence the 
d 
s 
1 
m n d for money , h v chang d in th sam proportio n 
th 
In 
mon y suppl 
so m posi t' ons t h. 
ons nt proportion 
t . 0 n. Thi fund 
p ull 1 ss u lul 
d ma nd for mo ney is iew d 
of th. total valu of 
m n ta lly si milar but 
pproach has b n ignor d hr . 
n the long run r I output can b xp c t d to 
ch nge. Incr si n g s u pp l·e s of factors of production 
and t chnical progr ss will give rise to cono mic 
grow t h. ssuming that the de mand for money remains 
consta n t proportion of mon y incom , the growth of 
outpu t ·n ·tial ly unchanged prices will caus an 
p n sion i n the de ma n d for money . If t h s upply of 
mon y lags b hind t h grow'th· n de mand , deflation will 
J9 
result. In t h e long run , h ow ver , t h d mand for money 
as a proportion of mone i nc o me may also vary as a 
r suIt of chang s in the degree of synchro n izatio n 
betwe n receipts and disburse me n ts , in the vertical 
int gra tio n of i n dustry and in the credit and financial 
systems . Giv n t h upply of mone y , such variatio n s in 
de mand (which , by d finition , must be matched by 
reciproc I mo ve me n ts in the inco me velocity of 
circula tio n) w~ ll b reflected in changes in the pri c e 
level. 
More co mpl ex ver io n s of the Qua n tity Theory 
recogniz 
purposes . 
that mone y is not held merely for tra nsactio n s 
n arly aware n ess of this st mmed from t h 
C mbridg School who saw the total de ma n d for money as 
the outco m of subjectiv micro - econo mic decisio n s . 
Money wa s h ld for rea ons of security as we ll as 
co nveni nc , which i mplied a d ma n d for idl ba lanc es . 
In the ho rt run , as a co n s quence , hifts in public 
psychology a nd e p ctatio n s could vary the total de mand 
I for mon y ·nd pe n d n tly of changes in money inco me . 
Short run mov me nt s in the pric l evel could therefore 
be the outcome of such v riatio n s as well as variations 
in the money supply . Th joint i n teractio n of t h e two 
was a l so possib l , as for e a mpl in situatio n s of 
hyper - infl atio n . 
ch n g s , llow' nc 
In long run nalys s of pr· c e leve l 
w'a mad for the grow'th i n full 
mp lo y m nt output or r al ncom influ nci n g he de m nd 
for mon y n a m nn r d p nding on its income -
I ticity in r al r ms . Th possibi li ty of autono mous 
long run h·ft s i n v loc·ty akin to those outlined in th 
pr ious p ragraph w r also t k n · n t o account. 
I 
Al i n H . 
w' Yor] , 
ory a n d Fi cal Polic y 
Ch . J . 
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The p rtial °nsights of this approach w r 
s upers d d by K yn s ' s conc pt of an int r st - lastic 
sp culat Ov demand for money . By borrowing and 
building on this conc ept , it is possible to reformulate 
th Quantity Th ory in mod rn neo - classical terms . 
consid r a short run macro-economic model which 
poss sses , with one xception , the usual classical 
assumptions , including those of wage and price 
Thus , 
fl xibility and the r sponsiven ss of aggregate demand 
to changes in the rate of intere st . Th e xception is 
th t th de mand for money in real terms is assumed to 
be composed of a transactions de mand which is a fixed 
proportion of real income l and an ' asset ' de mand which 
is inter st- lastic . Then , ceteris paribus and barring 
so m type of ' liquidity trap' situation , a change in the 
nominal quantity of money will cause the price level to 
chang in the same direction and proportion . This 
conclusion also holds in Patinkin ' s reformulation 
(wher the demand for money in real terms is assumed to 
be d termined as a whole by real income , the rate of 
interest and real balances) , provided that the money 
supply Os entirely outside money or entirely insid 
money or that insid and outside mon y mov together 
° 2 proportlonately . 
In mo dels such as these , of course , price level 
move ments ne d not b attributed solly to changes in 
the money supply . In principle , they may stem from 
shifts in any of the parameters ; and, in fact , in some 
mod ls money supply itself is not a parameter but an 
ndog nous variabl . vertheless , th broad approach 
underlying mo dern tr at ments is one which stresses for 
1 
I .. , th transactions de m nd for nominal money 
bal nces is a fi ed proportion of mon y income . 
2 
Don Patinkin,Mon y . Inter st , and 
Edition , w York and Tokyo , Harp 
W ath rhill , 1966) , Part II . 
cond 
'OutsOd ' mon y is mon y which is not tied to a 
corr sponding privat domestic debt . ' Insid ' mon y 
is mon y bas d on th d bt of privat ndog nouS 
conomic units . n th Patinkin mod e l , if all mon y 
is assum d to b insid mon y , th walth ffect of 
r a l blanc s is abs nt from all mark ts including 
th m rk t for mon y . (Ibid., p . 297 ) 
both th s hor t and long run th importanc of monetary 
factors , eith r s t h e or·ginal sources of price level 
move ment s or as the reasons why real factors can make 
1 
their influ nce felt on th price 1 vel . 
In th application of Quantity Theory analysis to 
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1 ss dev lop d econo mies the more r ce n t and sophisticated 
mod Is h av generally not b n employed . On the other 
hand , th s · mpler versions have experienced considerable 
popularity . Their u s has been justified on the grounds 
that certain clas sical conditions (or reaso nably 
ad quat e s ubstitutes for them) are likely to be met in a 
context of und erdev lopment . Thus the income velocity 
of circulation is believed to be fairly stab l in the 
s hort run becaus of th relatively s mall demand for 
idle balanc s . Thi is se n to b the result of an 
insignif·cant Keyne sian speculative demand for money 
which , in tur n , is viewed as a consequence of the absence 
of a highly developed capital market . Only if there are 
xp ctation of s harp changes in the price level or 
political upheaval are short run variations in income 
v locit y considered likely . Abstracting from the 
po sibility of cl·matic and pest factors affecti ng 
agricultural production , r al output is also consider d 
to remain stable in th short run. This is thought to 
b n sur d by low supply elasticities in a n upward 
dir ction a nd an assumed downw'ard flexibili ty of prices 
a nd mon y wag s , a flexibility which , it is admitted , 
is oft n l acking in mor dvanced and industrializ d 
economi s . Given th se argument , change in mon y 
s upp ly ar ther for see n as the do minan t force behind 
short term pric level mo m nts . 
Fo r longer periods such dominance is 1 0 cl imed , 
but , in lin with the t n ts of the b ic th ory , the 
rol of th d mand for mon y occupi s a mor pro minent 
po it·on. Thi d mand in real terms will grow w·th r al 
1 
The ab o d·scussion has not referr d to Friedman ' s 
t t m nt of th Quantit Theory as a theory of th 
d m nd for mon y , b c us in that guis it is not 
dir ctly conc rned with . plaining price Ie 1 behaviour . 
Cf . Mil on Friedm n , ' Th Quantity Theory of Money - A 
R st t m n ' . n Milton Fri d man ( Ed .), Studies i n the 
Quan i y Th ory of Mon y (Chicago , Un i rsity o f Chicago 
Pr ss , 1956 ), esp c · ally p . 15 . 
42 
incom . Such growth , 'f it is proportional to that of 
r al inco m , w'ill not alt r th ex ante i ncome veloci ty 
of circulation . l However , it is also r cognized that it 
may grow f ster than real inco me on account of factors 
a sociated w'th the growth of the latter , such as the 
r lat'v hr'nkage of the non-monetary sector , the 
diff r ntiation of production , the spr ad of banking 
hab'ts and the relative e pansion of purely financial 
transactions . 2 Significantly , the last t wo factors are 
lik ly to expand th d mand for idle balances , thereby 
cr ating scope for ~uture short run instability in the 
incom v locity of circulation . 
sian Approach 
Th eynesian Theory of Effective Demand is 
principally a short run th ory of income determination 
and mployment in advanced industrial economies . However , 
it c n Iso offer an e planation of movements in the 
price 1 vel . 
In the formal Keyn sian mo del of a closed econo my , 
wh'ch ab s tracts from governm nt rec ipts and outlays , 
pric s ar as sumed to b flexible , but mon y wag es are 
taken as giv n or fix d except in situations of full 
employm nt when t hey are free to vary upwards . Real 
output and employment are determined, ubject to the 
constraint of full employment , by the real aggregate 
dem nd for goods and ervice . Aggregate de mand 
consist s of con u mpLion and invest ment de mand . The 
former is itself depend nt , in part , on real output or 
income . This rela t ionship is positi e and less than 
unity. The latter (in estm nt demand) i dependent on 
the co t of capital goods , the e pected yield from their 
use and the rate of inter s t . 
1 
It will , on th oth r h nd , 
th nom'n 1 money supply grow 
incom . 
2 
The r t e of interest is 
cause pric defl tion if 
mor e slowly than real 
Arthur . Bloomf'eld , ' Monetary Policy in Underde eloped 
Countri s ' in C.J. Friedrich a n d S . E . Harri , (Ed s . ) 
Public Policy , Vol. VII, (C mbr"dge , Ma s ., Harvard 
Un ' v r "ty Pr ss , 1956) , p . 247 . A t a much l ater stage 
of d lopm n , of COUI , the d mand for mone y relati e 
to incom may decline b c use of t h e m rgence of 
'mon y ub t ' tu e ' or ' qua i-money '. 
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deter mined by the supply and de mand for money , while the 
de mand for mon y is in part a transactions demand 
dependent on the level of money income; i . e . on real 
1 
output a n d its price 1 v 1 . 
A s long as unemployment exists a ny excess of 
aggregate d ma nd over output will bring so me rise in 
prices and a n expansion of output. At full e mployment 
an excess of demand will r sult in pric e infl ation . Any 
d ficiency of de ma n d r la t ive to output will bri n g so me 
fall in pric s a n d d e clines in output and mplo y ment . 
Stability of output , mployment and the pri c e level will 
be achieved only when aggregate de mand and output are 
i n balance. From an i n itial situation of i mbalanc e , 
balanc may result from the operation of two factors . 
First , any changes in output induced by the i mbalanc e 
2 
will change consumption de mand by a s maller amount . 
Secondly , given the mo ney supply and the abse nc e of a 
liquidity trap situation , cha n ges in output and/or the 
pric level will cause the rate of interest to move in 
the opposite direction. Hence i nvestme n t de ma n d will 
3 
change in a stabilizing manner . 
In i t s application to less developed econo mies it 
is r cognized by its supporters that this Keynesian 
approach has to be modified in orde r to take account of 
economic conditions which differ markedly fro m those in 
advan c d conomies . Thus , it is believe d extremely 
unlil ely that aggregate real output in any given period 
w'ill b limi ted by t he available supply of labour . In 
many 1 ss developed conomies structural une mp lo y ment 
1 
Cf . John Maynard Keyn s , The General Theory of 
Employment , Interest and Mon y (London , Macmillan , 1936) . 
The abov summary is based largely on the detai l ed 
discussion in Gardn r Ackl y , Macro conomic Theory ( ew 
York , Macmillan , 1961) , esp cially Part Thr e . ote 
that , although formally assumed so , money w'ag s are 
r cogniz d no t to be absolutely rigid , but rath r 
r 1 tiv ly infl xible in comparison with prices . 
2 
Of course , chang s in output wi ll not occur if the 
' mbalanc takes the form of , cess de mand for a full 
mployme n t level of output . 
3 In si mpl v rsions of th mo del prices are assumed t o 
r m in con tant a long as the conomy is operating 
below th full mploym nt 1 vel. Pric e lev 1 move ments 
are thus conf'n d to i nflatio n i n situations of full 
e mp loym n t , or 'nt rpr ting th s version liberally, 
ne r f ull- mplo y m nt . 
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due 0 factor disproportionalities exists . This cannot 
be r moved by an expansion in aggregate d mand . Maximum 
short run output is determined by the size of the 
capital stock , the acc ptable minimu m real wage and by 
shortages of various specific i np u ts such as technical 
skills and i mp o rted raw materia l s . Pure inflation will 
result whenever aggregate de mand exceeds such a level of 
output , even though unemployment will still exist . On 
the other hand , an excess of demand over a n output leve l 
below this maxi mum limit , will bring an expansion in 
real output comparabl e to a similarly engendered 
expansion in an advanced economy operating at less than 
full employm nt . Whether or not it will be associated 
with a ris in the price level depends largely on the 
initial degree of under - utilization of productive 
capaci ty and the sp ed w'i th which specific bottlenecks 
emerge as production grows . 
However , in the first instance the likelihood of 
the sustained existence of a level of output 
significantly below the maximum capacity limit can be 
qu stioned on the basis of the c laim that less 
d v e lop d countries t e nd to possess a greater degre e of 
downward flexibili ty in money w'ages than was envisaged 
in the original model. 
This claim is supported by the w'eak or non- existent 
state of tr de unions in such countries , the absence or 
unenforceability of minimum w'age legislation and the 
t nd ncy to mak som wage payments in kind . More 
generally , and as implied above , many less developed 
countrie , have supply curves for labour which , for all 
practical purposes , are infinitely elastic at a 
1 
sub ist nce or n ar-sub ist nce real w'age . Given under 
thes circumstances an initial equilibrium ,of aggregat 
d mand and supply at the ceiling lev 1 of the latter , a 
fall in aggr gate d mand will bring a deflation of prices 
and money wages , but little redu ction in output . This 
d flation is believed likely to restore real aggregate 
d mand becaus of falling interest rates and the 
non- l yn sian factor of rising real balances . In an 
1 
Cf . W. Arthur Lewis , ' Economi c Dev lopment with 
Unlimited Supplies of Labo u r, I The Manch ster S c hool , 
Vol .XXII , 0. 2 (May 1954) . 
open economy these forces may be supplemented by an 
expansion of exports and a diversion of demand from 
i mports to domestically produced products . Of course, 
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if such factors do not operate or only ineffectively and 
thus fail to restore de mand , there will inevitably be 
a reduction in output until balance between aggregate 
d d d l ' h' 1 eman an supp y 1S ac 1eved . The reduction in output 
will also be inevitable if , contrary t o the above claim, 
money wages are sticky. 
Complete acceptance of the efficiency of price and 
wage flexibility in preventing a protracted under-
capacity output e quilibrium would appear to eliminate 
so m of the specifically Ke ynesian elements from this 
so-called Keynesian approach . However , regardless of 
their acceptance or not , the theme which is at the 
heart of this approach to the analysis of price level 
behaviour in less developed countries remains . This is 
the emphasis on the role of aggregate demand (in 
relation to output) and the direct determinants of such 
demand . The real aggregate demand for the output of an 
open economy with a public sector 'can be portrayed as 
the sum o f consumption, gross private investment , 
gove rnme nt e xpenditure on goods and s e rvices, and exports 
minus imports . 2 Given a position of initial balance , 
the Keynesian approach points to movements in 
investment , government expenditure and exports as the 
most likely causes of changes in aggregate demand and 
hence of changes in the price level, output or both . 
Consumption, as has been stated , and imports are 
believed largely dependent on total real income or 
output and therefore unlikely to be subject to 
autonomous shifts . 3 In less developed countries which 
1 
R asons why the deflation may fail to stimulate real 
aggr gate demand includ the presence of a liquidity 
trap situation (admittedly unlikely in l e ss developed 
countries) or, alternatively , the existence of interest 
in lasticity in the components of aggregate de mand; the 
absence of a significant real balance effect ; and , in 
an open economy , th e istenc e of deflation abroad. 
2 
All d fined in an ante sense . Exports and i mports 
include .factor and non-factor services as w'ell as 
m rchandise . 
3 
This paragraph abstr cts from changes in the 
international terms of trade which would cause 
discrepancies to e m rge betw'een real income and output . 
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expor t a considerabl propo rti on of their total ou tput 
in th form of a f w primary products to b s old on 
unstabl international commodity mar k ets , which poss ss 
g ov rnme n ts committed to e conomic dev e lo p ment , and 
which have only s mall rates of private investment , it 
is usua l to stress particularly the roles of exports 
and go v rnment exp nditure as destabili zing factors . 
How v er , s uch a summary of this me thod of approach 
is great ly over-simplified . First , there is a n 
awareness t hat the income -consumption relationship is 
not complete ly stab l e . In so far as real consumption 
is a function of real i ncome it is probably a function 
of r a l disposabl e personal income rathe r than r e al 
G P which is the incqme or output total t owards which 
aggregate demand , as defined above , is dire c ted . The 
t w'o measures Of income w'ill be related b u t not 
necessarily in a rigid fashion. Therefore , real 
disposable personal incom , and thu s consumption, may 
alter independent ly of rea l GNP . Such move me nts could 
stem exoge nously from v ari ous sources which include 
change s in ta ation, depreciation a llowanc es , 
undist r i but e d profits , tra n sfer payments and the 
international terms of trad . However, autonomou s 
cha n ge s in consumption may also occur as a result of 
change s in the mor fundamental r e l ationship betwe e n 
real disposable personal inc ome and consumption . The s e 
co uld st m from variability in the o ther i mmedia te 
det r minant s of consumption including the r eal volume 
of wealth , the rate o f interest and the distributio n of 
disposable income. l 
S oond ly , it is r e cognized that th import function , 
which shows the l eakag of aggregate d mand away from 
dom stic output at va ri ous levels of th la'tter , is 
also not complete l y stable . It may vary in respons t o 
xog nous forces s uch as cha nges in tariffs , excha n ge 
rat sand int r national prices . In si tuations wher 
i mports are restrained by quantitative restrictions (a 
not uncommon xp r"enc i n l ess d v loped economi s ) , 
ff ctiv i mport expenditure can be vi wed , above a 
c r tain v ery low income 1 v 1 at which the de mand for 
1 
This discussion abstracts from de mo graphic chang s . 
i mports would fall short of the limits i mposed by th 
controls , as co mplet ly aut onomously d termined a n d 
sub j ct t o s harp c ha nges accordi n g t o administrative 
fiat . 
Thirdly , the mphasis on shifts in g overnment 
pend·ture on goods and s rvi c es ( including public 
inv st me nt) as a pri m cause of move me n ts in aggregat 
d ma n d and th pri c e level is usually confined to the 
cont t of exc ess d mand and inflation . Under so me 
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part·cular circumstances, this e mphasis may be mi splaced. 
At l east in the short run government expenditu re may , 
i n fact , be i ncapable of signifi cant autono mous variation . 
Thus in so m less d velop d countries th re ar various 
constraints - technical , legal and behavioural -
comp lling the gov rnment to mai n tain a more or l ess 
balanced budget . In particular , a lack of c redit 
resourc s available to th government may preve n t 
s·gnificant d fiCits ,l whi l e a lack of budgetary control 
may caus e total government disburseme nts on both goods 
and servic s a n d tran sfer payme n ts a lways to expan d to 
the Ie e l of available rev nue . Therefore , give n the 
1 v 1 of r al G P and stable pric s , a ri e i n 
go r nment outlays on goods and servic s can be achieved 
only if there are rises in tax rates . For political 
r asons , esp cially in a d moc ratic society , these may 
often b i mpracticable . Even if they are not , the 
i mpact o n the total volume of de ma n d of the resulting 
rise in governme n t outlays will be much less signifi c ant 
than if these outlays were deficit - financed . 
A fo u rth ar a of over- simplificatio n relates to 
i nv stment de mand . Although private invest me nt in less 
d v lop d econo mi es may not be dest bilizi n g to the 
a m xt e nt as s ome o ther components of a ggregate de mand , 
ists a reason for this conclusion which is 
ddit·onal to th m r likelihood of investment bing 
r I tiv l y s mall in olume . A feature of investment in 
1 ss d v loped countries is its high i mport cont e nt. 
B c u s of the abs nc o r underd v e loped nature of 
c p · t 1 g oo ds industr · san d th common ori ntation of 
1 
Thi s constr int is most like l y to b found in tho 
countri s which lack ind p nd nt mon tary syst ms ; ., 
thos on curr ncy- e chang st ndards . 
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the manuf'acturing sectors tow'ards the processing of' 
i mp orted raw' materials and i n termediate goods , investment 
in durable equipment (as distinct f'ro m construction) and 
no n-agricultural stocks is largely ref'lected in imports . 
He nce , th i mpact of' move me n ts i n such investme n t on the 
aggregate de mand f'or do mestic outpu t will not be great . 
Furthermore , the treatment of' investment is also over-
si mplif'i d in that , in part at least , it will be 
dependent on the rate of' change of' income. This 
possibility is recognized in the widespread use of' 
c oncepts such as ' induced investment ' and ' the 
acceleration principle ' . The above mode of' analysis , 
which is essentially static , short run and i mplicitly 
conf'ined w'i thin the f'ramew'ork of' a given productive 
capacity , is not suited f'or e xamining the relevance of' 
these concepts . More generally , if' the economy is not 
a stagnant one , total output will be expanding because 
o f' the interaction of' growth in the supplies of' 
f'actors of' production (partly induced in the case of' 
capital) , technical progress and an i ncreasing real 
aggregate demand . There will thus be a need to analyze 
longer run price level movements in terms of' the degree 
of' balance achiev d between an expanding productive 
capacity and a growing real aggregate demand . 
Finally , the emphasis of' the Keynesian approach on 
the various components of' aggregate demand does not 
imply a neglect of' the supply of' money. Rather , it is 
recognized as a possible determinant of' aggregate 
de mand , capable theref'ore of' inf'luenci ng the price level. 
Thus the f'or mal Keynesian analysis suggests that changes 
in the money supply will af'f'ect the volume of' 
i nvest ment and , hence , aggregate demand through 
alt ring the rate of' interest . In less developed 
countries which lack relatively sophisticated capital 
mark ts , this mechanism may we l l be match d in 
signif'icanc e by so me f'orm o f' dire c t l iquidity or real 
balanc e ef'f'eot , similar t o t h at i ncorporated i n to some 
versio n s of' the Quantity Theory . Th is may operate on 
oo n sumption as w'ell as investme n t de ma nd . 
How v r , ven if' it's assum d that the short run 
e l astic'ty of' real output with respect to aggreg te 
d ma nd is zero, th K y nesian appro ach clear l y dif'f'ers 
from that of th Quantity Th ory "n that it does not 
nec sarily conc ntrat on changes in the money supply 
as th do minant caus of short run mov m nts in 
aggr gate d mand and , therefore , in th price level . 
I n deed , mo n y supply is so m times vi wed more as a 
co n s qu nce than a caus of chan ges i n aggregate de mand ; 
for xa mple , a rise in xport demand which leads to a 
balan ce of payments surplus or a rise in government 
de mand for goods a nd s r ices which leads to a budget 
defic i t financed by borrowing fro m the c ntral bank , will 
i ncrea e the money upply . Moreover , it is argued that 
the i n co me velocity of circulation poss sses considerable 
variability . This is seen as a reflection of both the 
inter st - lastici y and th instability of the demand for 
money function . As a Qons quence , aggregat demand and 
the price level may change while the money supply remains 
constant . Equally , changes in the money supply may 
u nder so m circumstances have little effect on aggr gate 
de mand or pric s . e erthele s , despite this alleged 
fl ib"lity of velocity , an upward movement in the price 
lev 1 , according to Keynesian a nalysi , will ulti mately 
be limit e d , given the s upply of money , by a rising 
tr nsactions demand for money ; whil , again given the 
supply of money , a downward movement may possibly be 
brought to an end by a falling transactions d mand for 
mon y . 
Th Structuralist pproach 
Mention was made abov of the ' Monetarist -
Structuralist ' controversy about inflation in less 
dev lop d coun tries. Th Monetarist position with 
regard to the cau e of such i nflation is one which 
r li on Qua n t" ty Th ory and Keynesian techniques of 
i to establish the clai m that infla "on is 
usua l ly th result of cess d mand brought about by a 
lac k of mo n tary restraint . In particul ar , e mphasis is 
pl c d o n the rol of pans"ve monetary a n d fi cal 
polici s which are oft n thought to stem i n part from 
th pursu " t of ov r - mbitiou develop m ntal goals . Thus 
e c de m nd i fr qu ntl he l d to ha e its origi n s 
i n h vy sp nding nd d ficit budg ts in the p u blic 
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s ctor , which ar financ d by th cr ation of 'new ' 
mon y , nd n ' asy ' credit polici s towards th pr ' vat 
s ctor . l 
On the other hand , whil they d o not n c essarily 
dispu t that there may be a lack of mon tary restraint 
during n inflationary p riod , the Structuralists 
cont n d that the Monetarist type o f analysi s is based on 
only the symptoms or outward mani f stations of inflation 
and that 'n many instanc s it fi ls to sta b lish th 
underlying fundamental e sons for rising prices . In 
fa c t , mon tary variables are seen by th S tructuralists 
s m rely adjus ng passiv ly to irr sistible 'real ' 
structural pressur 
e conomic grow'th. 
gener ted by the proc ss of 
Th core o f the Struc tural'st approach is that 
inflation in less d lop d conomi s c an o ften b 
attribut ~ t o structural chang s in s ctoral s u pply and 
d ma nd which require mov me n ts in th r lativ pri c s of 
the commoditi e produced by the various sectors. If 
these move me nts must occur in an environm nt of 
d ownward price inflexibility, the e rfect on th pric 
le 1 in general must be inflationary . Cons id r a 
closed ec onomy in which 'nitially aggregate money 
d m nd quaIs th aggr gate value of output and a t 
o f r lative prices prevails which quat s th~ supply and 
d e mand for each indi Idual commodity and pro ductiv 
s rvice . Assume that mo n y supply always ad just s 
it eLf to th d mand i'or money o r ~ v ersa . ow l et 
th r be a ohang in th pattern of d mand o r a change 
in th conditions of supply ( in each c ase with 
aggregat mo ney d mand r maining e ual to the aggr gat 
1 
Most Monetarists would admi t that inflation could 
stu rn init ially from s ou r o s outside Lh pub l ic s ct r ; 
for mp l e , an e p ort boom . Howev r , n uch in tanc s 
th y would p l a c e the blame for a ny continuation of th 
inflat ' on on the failur t o implement ff c ti v e 
c omp n a o r y financia l pol ' c ies . 
In the unlik 1 cost-p ush inflation 
of int 'rnal origin th would argue that it 
could b sustain d only jf th mon tary authoriti s 
p r m tt d a concomitan pan sion 'n th mon y supply ; 
o h wis a cl cl'n in r al aggregat d ma nd mus t 
ulL'mately r s ul t . This , i n t urn, would c a us a 
w ak ning i n th bargaining or mark t positions of thos 
persons o r institutiollS r ponsib e for the cost 
Ylf'l" bionary pr . u rc , theT'e b re mo ing th pres ures . 
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lu 0 ouLpU) 0 , mo ' t rel v ntly, grow h ' n both 
ggr g t d m nd nd upply wh'ch , at h 'sti n g s t 
of pric , c o n tinu o qu 1 ach oth r , but whos 
st u t u r 1 co mpositio n s no long r match . A ch n g i n 
r lative pri c is cl arly n c ary . 
o p rf ctly fl ibl mon y pric s hi 
nd r condition 
hould occur , 
subj ct 0 Lhe co n c pLual imp rf ctions of inde 
numb rs , wi hout any significant ff ct o n the g n ral 
1 v 1 of pric s . Ho v r , if ·t is assum d - to tak 
a n tr m case - th 11 money prices poss ss only 
uni-dir ctio n al fl ibility , a n y adjust m n t in r lativ 
pr s i mpl' a cha n g i n the pric lev 1 . Thus , wh n 
11 mo n y pr'c s ar i ni'l 'ble in a dow nward direction , 
such a n adjust m n mu sL b u n equi ocally i n flationary . 
So m pr will rise and none will rall. More 
g n rally , 'f th re is a e n de n cy for mon ey pric s to 
b mo r fle ibl upw rds than downwards , then there is 
a stro n g probability that structural chang whi h 
m nif t th mse lves 'n upply and de ma n d i mbalanc s at 
t h s ctoral or i n di idual co mmo dity lev 1 , will hay 
a n inflationary i mpact , despite th postulat d 
ist n c or a co n curr nt 0 er- all balanc b tw n 
ggr g te d mand and supply . Equally i mportan tly , this 
on lusion l s o holds in circumstanc where om 
produc posses a on iderabl mount of pric 
fl ibilit , both upw rd and downwards , a n d other 
products pos ss li tle in either dir c ion , pro id d 
th t th c ss 
a n d th 
ctor 1 d mand r lat s to th 
cLor 1 upply relate to th 
:former 
1 latt r. 
Th t n t of thi . nrla tionary b' d pe n d , 
how r , not onl upon th degree oi' fl ibility of 
mon or absolute pric but also upon th t of r al or 
r 1 t'v pric s. i' Lh r s rri tio n in or re i anc 
to h dju t m n of h 1 tt r , th n th a mount of 
n 1 tion brough bout by a displa m n t or ructur 1 
quil'brium ill b incr a d. E a mpl or such 
i'r'ction r he t nd n c to djust \ g s to the ost 
1 
Th 
o 
SLructur li t pproach on 
conLr st stro n gly wi h h 
heor ppro ch , nd to a 
oi' th modii'i d In i n 
, p rti ul rl n h ir 
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o.f living , t,h nd nc o maintain occup "o nal wag 
di f r nti Is and th L nd ncy 0 m n i n proport"onality 
b tw n th pr"ces of m nufac ured goods nd th "r unit 
vari bl cos s . nd sim"lar .forc s mean that 
ch n g s n r lat"v pr c s , which " n t h pr ent co n t t 
r th ms Iv s alr dy i n.fl tionary , will provok r 5 
in h bsolut pr"c o.f ho s goods n d s rvic 5 
agai nst which relativ pric s hay mov d . Th se last 
ch n g s , by "n urn c using a move back toward the 
initi 1 situaLion , may sti mulat further relat"ve price 
chang s wh"ch ar n cessary to restor tructura l 
balan , but whi ch 150 add still furth r to the 
inflation. Thu a typ o.f mul tipli r process can be 
initi L d , which mayor may not onv rge towards a n 
v n tual qu"librium o.f t h e price 1 vel and , if no t , may 
p oc d at a co n stan t , "rregular or incr asi ng pace .
l 
Th bove proc ss assumes that th flow of mon y 
p nditur adjusts itself to i n creases in the pric 
lev 1; hat is , th t ith r mo n ey supply or th inco m 
velocity of c"rculation or both i n p rt are passive . 
n pr ctice , howey r , if money supply i held co nstant 
a n d t h burde n o.f dju t m n t is plac d wholly on 
v loc"ty , hen (as in th cas of cost infl tio n) 
aggr gat defl t"o nary pr sur swill ultimat ly m rg , 
provid d th t h 1 rises sufficie ntly . 
In "ti lly , of cour e , th y may b postpo n d a nd th 
infl tio n will cont"nu if th r is scop .for the 
ttr ction of "dl blanc into circulatio n , if 
inv t m n t d mand is rel t"v ly int r st inelastic and 
if th r 1 balan c ff ct is n ot "mport n t . Mor over , 
f lls n the d mand for mon y which r sult from 
in.fl io n - "nduc d c at"ons of futur pr"c ri e rna 
also co n ri u e to th po tpon ment. v rth 1 s 
giv n th mon suppl d f"c"e n y o.f aggr g t d ma n d 
mu t n tu lly 0 cur. 
T h bo par gr ph pr e n t p rh ps a mo re 
n rr wl d i n d 
1 
cl 
"on of th natur of ructur 1 
s 
ar nti 
15. 
prior ' d 
such , 
hich n 
so m ' co t - pu h ' 
lly " nduc d in 
nd - pull ' orc 
h y dOff r lro m h 
pr"c ri i n 
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infl tion th n is round ·n much of th writ·ng on th 
1 subj c . t c n b t b plac d . n th conte t of 1 ss 
d v lop d conomi s und rgoing or att mpt·ng to und rgo 
cono m·c g owth by m ntioning two sp c·fic caus s of 
i nflat· on which cit d rr quently in th 
Structuralist lit ratur . Th y rel t 
and th blanc of paym nts . 
to food supply 
n th case of food supply it ·s argued that 
growth ·n r al ·ncom s and population will bring a 
substantial ris ·n th demand for food . How v r , for 
var·ous technological and inst·tutional r asons it is 
beli v d likely that th agricultural s ctor will lag 
behind oth r s ctors in the proc ss of econo mic growth . 
Thus th supply of food will probably also lag behind 
the d mand for it , giv n a closed economy or one with 
limit d capacity to · mport . Under th se circumstances 
a s·tuat·on of excess sectoral demand will result . 
If aggregat d mand as a whol equals aggr gate 
supply , a chang 
can th r fore be 
n r lativ prices in favour of food 
pect d . This will b inflationary 
since food prices will ris absolutely while the pric s 
of thos commoditi s in c ss supply will be (it is 
assum d) r lati ely infle ible downwards , particularly 
if th y ·nclude th products of th industrial s ctor . 
Th ris in th gen ral price 1 v 1 will b aggravat d 
nd th pric 1 v 1 could comm nc to spiral upward if 
th non-agricultur 1 s ctors' costs are affected by 
wag s ris·ng n r spons to high r rood prices and 
possibly by high r prIces for raw mat rials produc d 
2 
co mp titiv ly with rood in the agricultural sector . 
1 
It ow s much to an 
For 
suppl 
G 
c 1 , 
full d·scus ·on of th r 1 
nd th pric 1 v 1 ·n 1 
H.G. Oliv ra , ' On 
n Structuralism , ' 
o . J (ov mb r 
(p.J24) th 
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tw n rood 
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With r gard 0 th balance of p y m n ts , th 
Stru ctu ralist argum nt is that a 1 ss d v lop d c o n omy 
und rgo'ng cono mic growth may fac a sustained 
u n fav o u rabl dis quil'brium in its balanc of paym nts 
wh'ch is not the r sult of excess aggr gate de mand , but 
rath r th outco m of a high inco m - lasticity of d mand 
for i mports and cono mic growth tog th r creating a 
total d mand for imports which cannot b paid for by 
r lativ ly stagnant xport proce ds and a limited 
capi tal inflow' . With th d mand for i mports exc eding 
the capacity to i mport , so me relativ pric chang s 
b tw n trad d and non-traded goods will b inevitable 
if growth is maintain d . l n principl , th s may 
occur wholly or partly in the form of a deflation of 
non- traded goods pric s. Howev r , d flation is 
b li ved neith r practicabl nor desirable b cause of 
a l l g d downward pric infle ibility , which would not 
o n ly prey nt changes in r lative pric s occuring 
s moothly and rapidly , but would also mean an int ri m 
stagnation of production. On the oth r hand, given this 
downward pric infle ibil'ty , other forms of relative 
pric change will b inflationary , yen assuming that 
any xc s do mestic d mand which th y may cause is 
count r d co mpl tely. Thus a currency devaluation will 
caus so m initial inflation by raising the absolut 
do m stic prices of trad d goods. If ther is friction 
or a r sistanc to such a rclativ pric adjustm nt , the 
pric 1 v 1 may ris further on account of non- traded 
good pr'ces rising in r sponse to cost pr sures . 
Such a r sistance may op n th way to an upward piral 
in th pr'ces of both goods and foreign currency . 
Quantitativ import r str ' ctions or tariff , as an 
alt rnaL've mans or controlling a balanc of paym nt 
1 
Tr d d goods ( nd s rvic s) consist or 'portabl , 
whos surplus of production over dom tic consumption 
( if ny ) sport d, nd importable , who e urplu of 
consumption ov r dom stic production (if ny) is 
'mport d. Their pr'c s r influ nc d dir ctly by 
cond'tions in world m rk ts . on-trad d good (and 
s r 'c ~ ) r which do not nt r into world 
tr d . Th r pr'c r d t rmin d solly by int rnal 
co t nd d mands. practic , of cours , th two 
c t gori m rg ch oth r. S W. E . G. Salt r , 
, n t r n 1 nd E ' t rn 1 Bal nc: Th Rol of Pric and 
E p nd'tur Eff ct " Econo mic R cord , Vol.J5 (August 
1 5 ) , p.226 . 
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d fi 't , on lusively on lim't'ng 'mpor 
h y th eff t of a p rt'al d valua 'on in so far 
as th Y cau i n 'ti 1 r lativ pri chang s by raising 
absolu ly th dom c pric s of i mports and ' mport-
co mp t'ng produc s. Thus h y , too , hay a dir ct 
infla t' o nary mpact which ould 1 ad to an upward 
1 
sp rall -' n g of th pr c 1 v l. 
THE EFFECTS OF PR CE LEVEL BEHAV OUR 0 ECO OMIC GROWTH 
Th r has be n consid rabl th or t'c 1 discussion 
about the ff c s o£ the rate of chang in prices on th 
rat of cono mic growth . In ess nc , th discussion has 
be n conc rn d " h th issu of wheth r growth will be 
mo st rapid under cond'tions of inflation , deflation or 
price stability; although ther has b en a strong 
tend ncy to confine co mparisons to th first and last 
cond' tions . It is a criticism of the discussion that , 
with th e cept'on of situations of stability and hyp r-
inflat'on, th r has oft n b en littl explicit 
'd nt'f'c tion of (or significance attach d to) the 
approx 'mat rat s of ch nge of the pric 1 v 1 involv d 
in th co mpar'sons. Th oncern has b n largely with 
th m r d'r ction of mov m nt . It is anoth r criticism 
th t until rec ntly much of th analysis has implicitly 
ssum d th t pric 1 v 1 mov ments ar always the 
out om of imbalanc s b tw n aggr gat d mand and 
supply. Cl arly , if th r ist diff r nt possible 
c u s of pric 1 v 1 mov m nt (as app ar to b th 
c s w'th infl tion at 1 ast) , th n th ff cts of thes 
mo on h r t o£ cono mi c growth may d p nd 
s'gn'fic ntly on which p rticular caus happ ns to b 
r 1 v nt. 
W'th r 
mov m nt s m 
run , tt n 
form t' on. 
1 
spect to th m ns by whi h pric 1 vel 
y ' mlu n c h r t of growth n th long 
ion h s b n conc ntr t d m inly on capital 
Mor pr c s ly , th discussion has b n 
tructural 
n Lat 'n 
l' ,I n 
"Mon t r'st-S ructural'st" 
n Alb rL O. H'rs c hm n (Ed.), Latin 
( w York, Th Tw n ' th C ntury Fund , 
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d vot d pro m rily 0 th ~L cts , if ny , of pr c 1 v 1 
mov m n 5 on r t 5 of savO ng and inv st m nt and on th 
co mpositio n or llo c tOon of investm nt . Of cours , it 
ha b n re ogn oz d that pric 1 v 1 mov m nts may 
i n flue n eco no mi c growth hrough oth r ch n n 15 also . 
F o r a mpl , th r has b n a n i nv stOgation of th 
possObolity that inflatOon lowers th ffici ncy of th 
pric m chan osm in its rol of allocating and rationi n g 
r s ources ge n rally (and not merely n w capOtal good ) , 
a n d thus °mpairs an cono my ' s growth pot ntial .
l 
R e l ated to thOs possobilOty are the argum n ts that 
i nflation sh lt rs in ffoci nt firms , 2 a n d that it 
reduc d labour productivity through encouraging exc ssiv 
labour turnover , unpunctuality and abs nt eism. 3 
How v r , de pOt th 5 and various other examples which 
c a n b pu t forward , it has be n capital for mation that 
f o r th mo t part has be n central to analyses of the 
i nf lu nc of pric 1 vel b haviour on cono mic growth . 
A cco rdO ngly , th re maind r of the pr 5 nt chapter will 
1 
Harold Wolozin , ' In~lation and th Pric M chanism,' 
J ourn 1 of Political Econo m , Vo . LXVII , 0 . 5 (October 
1959 . This investigation r 1at to th U. S . 
of ' re ping ' inflation within the period 
I conc1u io n ° that on th basi of th 
evid n pr sent d in~lation did not erious1y undermin 
th pric mech n ° m in ° t rol of dir cting and 
ratio n "ng r our 5 on re ponse to chang 5 in relative 
d m nd a n d upply . 
2 
For r c nt r f r nc to this argum nt , see 
M J . Bailey , ' Cons ructOo n and nfl tio n: A 
1 Scrutin " Econo mic D v lopme n t a n d Cultural 
ol.X, o . (April 1962 ) , p . 266 . 
pro m caus 5 0 
on r as ) on labour 
° n f 1 t" 0 n ( i . is ° ng 
° n th 1 bour 
or 
of 
p u rn bly 
° ho1so n , 1965 ) , 
king ) these possib1 
( or r duc d rat of 
°ty would not r su1t fro m 
pric ) per , but fro m d ma nd 
m rk t . This pr 5 ur would a1 0 
th d mand for good and th 
bu wer 
Furth r mor , 
o i t d wi h c 5 
n o , th pro i mat 
produc iv "ty would 
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surv y rgum n s r 1 ing only to h·s m d·um of 
. n.flu nc . 1 
Th of Saving 
With gi en level or total r al income , pric lev 1 
b h v our may influenc the volum of saving and 
h nc th veragc prop ns·ty to sav of the conomyas 
a whole in Lwo ways: through redistributing the given 
tot 1 of incom among th various cono mic groups and 
s ctors within the economy; and indep ndtly of incom , 
chang·ng the saving b haviour of th s groups and 
s ctors . 
Discuss·on of the frects of price 1 vel mov ments 
on total saving via induced alterations in income 
distribution has stemmed largely from the propositions 
th t pric lev 1 mov m nts alter th distribution of 
inco m among or b tw n ractors of production and that 
diff r nt typ s of factor income ar associat d with 
diff rent marginal prop nsities to sav . In particular , 
sp cific forms of th s propositions can b used to 
der·v th conclusion Lhat , by comparison with an 
initial state of pric stability , inflation will increas 
th ov r - all rat 
. 2 It . 
of saving , while d flation will 
d cr a 
Th argum nt (in ·ts implest form) divid s income 
into two bro d groups , wag s and profit . Suppli s of 
1 
Th nalysis or th influ nce or pric level 
b haviour on economic growth in th Philippin s , which 
is und rtak n in Part Three of the pr sent study, also 
conc ntrat s on c pi 1 formation as th m dium through 
which this influenc may have b n channelled . In 
Ch pt r 10 an att mpt · m d to justi.fy th~s 
proc dur . 
2 
Argum nts of 
i nf 1 t· 0 n , ha 
Industrial 
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h f'actor of' production ar tak n as co n t nt in th 
ho t run. ToL 1 r 1 neom is sum d giv n at 
1 v 1 qu val nt to rna mum short run phys cal output . 
Mon y w g s r ssum d to b ' st ° cky ' with t nd ncy 
to lag , in terms of' p rc nt g chang , b hOnd mov m nts 
n th proc 1 vel . l H nc , the sh r of profits in 
tot 1 ncom w~ll mov n th sa me dir ctOon as h 
prOc 1 v 1. SO nc °t s postulat d that th margOnal 
propensity to say of profit - arn rs is higher than th 
margi n 1 propensOty to say of wag - arn rs (both 
m asur d in r al t r ms ), ° t follows tha t the over- all 
av rag propensity to s ve wOll also ris and fall along 
with th pric 1 1 . 2 
A major criticism of this analysis r lates to the 
lag of money wages b hind th pric lev 1. The 
criticism is specif'ically directed at th assumption of 
a lag in on latOonary condi ions. If it occurs at all , 
it can e m rge only as the result of certain types of 
1 
I .. , ov r any giv n p riod money wag s , if they 
chang at all , chang in the sam dir ction as prices , 
but th ir proportionat rate of change is 1 ss than 
th t of' proc 
2 
Th mo d 1 , if it may be 0 term d , can be wid n d to 
giv p ciric tr atm nt to oth r type or factor incom 
without n ce s rOly aff cting this conclusoon . For 
a mpl , 1 nd r nts ar 10kely to form a third distinct 
nd important typ or f ctor incom in 1 s d velop d 
conomi s . They ar ort n t contr ctually in advanc 
for long p riods and ar not subject to fr quent r vi w. 
Th r for , pro °d d th t they are payabl in money 
rath r h n kind , th y may lag in mon y t rms b hind 
proc 1 v 1 mo m nts . As a cons qu nc of thi lag and 
th price - w g lag tog ther , th hare of profits in 
incom wOll ris during inflation and f 11 during 
d fl tion . Conv ntion lly , th marginal prop nsity to 
s v of 1 ndlord is t k n to blower th n that of 
profOt - rners. Thu , und r these cOrcum tances the 
1 r t of' a ing wOll still ris nd fall with 
nd d f1 tOon r sp ctiv 1y. Mor 0 er , ev n 
or r nt on total incom r mains constant , 
prop nsity to sav , his 
b caus of th proc - wag 
n wag - a n rs ' and profit -
arn s ' m rgin 1 prop n itO s to s v . 
Lh t th c1 im h t th m 
1 nd10rds is low r th n 
v of profit- b 
t to so m p rticu1 of 
s . nt L nant farm rs on ry 10\ 
ncom s , rn ' p orOt ' s th t rm i mploy d bov , 
nd who , pr - r nt 1 g , will g On from nd los 
to Lh 1 durOng On 1 tion and d f1 tOon r p c .i ly , 
m w 11 low r m rginal prop nsOty to av th n 
Lh ir 1 ndlord . 
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inflation ; nam ly , thos wh r pr"c s r"s ind p nd ntly 
of labour costs . n th past this difficulty was not 
r cogniz d by propo n nts of th analysis b caus , 
plicitly or implicitly , inflat"o n was tak n to b 
always of th aggr gat d mand-pull typ with the ' pull ' 
acting dir ctly on pric s rath r than through th labour 
mark t . How ver~ if , for xampl , xc ss aggr gate 
d mand raises an dminist r d price 1 vel through first 
raising wages and thus 1 bour costs , or if inflation is 
of a pur ly autono mou s wag - push typ , th n cl arly no 
lag in money wag s should b exp cted. 
This asp ct of th criticism is admitt edly weak n d 
w"th r sp ct to 1 ss d v loped countries b cause such 
countri s ar unlik ly to exp rienc typ s of inflation 
where incr ases in th price level are d pendent (in an 
imm diat s n s ) solly on rising labour costs . Howev r , 
1 
th r r mains a mor fundamental point . Th assumption 
of th 1 g was originally d riv d from mpirical 
evid nc upplied by so me tim s suspect ti m s ries of 
pr c sand mon y w g s . t has be n justified , given 
th i mpl"cit b Ii f that inllation wa th result of 
ggr gat demand acting directly on prices , by 
Lh cl "m that th labour mark t suff rs from 
i mp rf ctions such as a lack of for sight , th 
influ nc of custom , and ' in rtia '. This claim negl cts 
th po sibility that th historical d clin s in r al 
wag s und r conditions of inflation may have been th 
result of real forc , such as changes in th relativ 
suppli s of labour nd capital , which w r coincid ntal 
to (or, p rhaps , v n indirectly a caus of) th 
infl t" on . Furth rmor , ev n if a lack of for sight or 
so m sim"l r m rk t i mp rl ction by its If c n and did 
giv r"s to mon y w g 
pric 1 v 1 , it c n b 
lagging initially b hind th 
rgu d that it would b unlik ly 
1 
v 
. K s 
or th 
11 nd A.A . Alchi n , ' Th M ning nd 
nll t"o n- nduc d L g of W g b h"nd 
n Economic R i w , Vol.L , 0 . 1 
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Lo op rat ov r any 1 ngthy p r od of ·nflation b caus 
of t h v n tu 1 m rg nce of xp ctatio n s of .furth r 
1 
pri r s s . 
Th sam degr o.f riticism has not be n ai m d 
dir ct l y t th a sumpt· on of a pric -wage lag in 
d fl ti onary situ tions . Dei'latio n is r garded almo st 
univ rsally as r sulting i'ro m a d f·ci ncy of total 
d m n d for goods and s rvic s relat·v to total supply 
( although , of cours , th re need not b a d e fici nt 
d m nd for ev ry product); whil th work o.f Keyn s , in 
part·cular , has 1 d to considerable acceptanc of the 
notion that under th s circumstances money wages ar 
lik ly t o be r lativ ly inflexibl downwards . On th 
oth r h a n d , as has b e n sen, th re ar grounds for 
b lieving that in so me less dey loped cono mi s money 
wag s may , i n fact , possess a marked d gr e of downward 
fl xib·lity . Cons quently, th pr·c - wage lag may not 
be v ry sign ificant in deflationary situations in these 
conomi v rth less , if there is a tendency for 
mon y wag s to declin less rapidly than the pric lev 1 , 
th n d flation is lik ly to be yen mo re detri me n tal to 
th absolut volum of saving than th above argum nt 
would i ndic te o Th assumption of th lag i mpli s a 
ris in r al wag duri ng d flatio n. Al mo st c rtainly 
thi ca n b P ct d , c t ris paribus , to bring about a 
cut-b ckinoutput and mployment , thus iolating the 
abov ssumptio n of a continuous .full e mployment or full 
c pa ·ty 1 v 1 of production . Ind p ndently of factor 
i n co m distribution , thi cut - back should r ult in a 
f 11 i n th absolut a mo unt of savi n g in r al t r ms and 
also probably fall i n th av rag prop nsity to save . 
How v r , n apart fro m th issu of the pric -wag 
lag, nd ccepting th on th av rag th re do 
1 
n ont th 
lag roan 
mploym n t or .full c pa 
·t · s o.f i n hat 
mo d 
n r s 
Chs . X V 
n v r ou 
ours 9 b i n r spo n s 
d m nd. (C f . Ackl y, 
and Al hian , op . it . , 
t 
ci t. , 
n. ) 
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signific n t diff r nc s in factoral marginal 
prop nsities to say , this broad factor shar approach 
to th inco m - distribution ff cts of pric 1 v 1 
mov m nt s on saving Os still ov r - si mp lifi d . On 
particular d fici ncy of th above xposition stands out : 
th fact that it ignor s th r ol of th public sector 
as a sourc of savi n g . Mor specifically , as a result 
of conc ntrating on factor inco m distribution , th 
approach fails to consid r the possibl influ nc s that 
pric 1 vel behaviour may have on th over-all rate of 
savi n g through its effects on th distrObution of 
1 
inco me between the public and privat sectors . 
Som of th s possib l influenc s can be 
highlighted if it is assumed that real output is 
constan t ; that rea l gOY r nm n t curr nt exp nditur on 
goods a n d servi c es is constant and no t influenced by 
rev nue considerations ; that ther are no governm nt 
transf r paym nt s ; that governme n t revenue is n tir 1y 
in th form of taxes; and that tax rat s ar constant . 
Under these circumstances , if the tax syst m is 
progr ssiv with respect to money incom and therefor 
with resp ct to th price 1 v 1 , inflation must result 
in a transf r of r a1 inco m fro m the private sector to 
the gOY r nme n t . Since r a1 government curr nt 
p n d Oture ( that is , publi c consumption) is constant 
and sinc a fall in the re 1 disposab1 inco me of th 
privat sector should bring so me £a11 in real privat 
consumptOon , inflation can b thus pected to caus a 
f 11 i n total real consumption ; that is , a ris in total 
r a1 sav i n g and in the over-all av rage prope nsity to 
s ve. D flation , o n th other hand , can be expect d to 
caus a £al1 in th ov r - a11 averag propensity to say 
b caus of the transf r of r a1 inco m to the private 
s ctor . With ta syste m which is r gr ssiv with 
r sp ct to money inco m , and hence th pric 1 v 1 , 
th s conc1usoons will b r vers d : inflation will 
low r th rate of ving , whi1 d f1atio n will raos it . 
FOn 11y , st Oll within this co nt t , a proportio nal ta 
1 
How v r , on pon nt of a £actor h r approach who 
lso p 1ic Ot l y a llow s for th °nflu nc of pri c 1 v 1 
b h v Oour (or , mor pr cis ly , i nf1 tion) on t h e 
dOstributOo n of inco m b tw n th public and privat 
s ctors L wis , Th ory o£ Econo mic Grow th , p . 222 . 
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syst m w'll n sur hat th rat of sav' ng sind p nd nt 
of pric 1 v 1 b h v'our . Th inclusion of transf r 
paym nts i n gOY rnm nt current xp nd'tur s wil l not 
ff ct ny or th s conclusions , provid d that th 
paym nt s are assum d to va y pro p ort'onat ly with th 
pr'c 1 vel. 
This analysis cl arly shows th t , even at a very 
s' mpl lev 1, it's impossibl to mak a ny on 
ge n ralizat'on about th influence of pric level 
mo v m n ts on saving , in so far as that influenc st ms 
fro m redistribution of inco m betw n the public and 
privat s ctors . Th nature of th r distribution , if 
any , d p nds on the tax syst m. Furthermor , although 
it is, in ff ct , assumed that the gOY rnment has a r al 
'm rginal propensity to save ' of un'ty , such an 
assumption may be unr alistic . Gov rnm nt curr nt 
e p nditure (in r al as w 11 as mon y terms) may und r 
so m circumstanc s b highly r sponsiv to the availability 
or r v nu . 
Hitherto th discussion has be n conc rn d with som 
ways n which pric 1 v 1 movements may affect aving 
through r distributing income . The marginal prop nsities 
to s v of the various s ctors or groups a mong which 
inco m redistribution may occur hay b en taken as 
giv n, and all variables influencing th saving 01 th se 
groups and sectors , e c pt their real incom s , have been 
assum d unalf ct d by pric 1 vel mov m nts . tt ntion 
will now b focused on th 'nflu nc 01 price level 
mov m nt s on a ing by way or their ff cts on these 
oth r vari bles. Ra ther than looking at th saving 
funct'ons of th uppli rs of factors of production , it 
will b more co mp r h ns've and us luI for thi type of 
a naly is to v' "\v th conomy as poss ssing .thr main 
ourc of aving - th p rsonal or hous hold sector , 
th bu in s s ctor nd th gOY rnm nt s ctor . How' v r , 
it must b str s d that a shift in th averag 
prop nsity to av of th gOY rnm nt s ctor , 
ind p nd n ly of it r 1 di posabl incom , may 
d'r chang incom, and h nc saving, in ith r of 
t s c 0 Th's w'll occur , g'v n th 1 v 1 
or r 1 output, 'f th hif in th gOY rnm nt av r g 
pro n y to s v n olv ch ng n that part of 
gOY nm nt cu r nt outlay which con i ts of transf r 
6J 
paym nts 0 the private s ctor Similarly, a shift in 
the av rag prop nsity to save of th busin ss sector 
w~ll dir ctly aff ct r al disposabl income, and h nc 
saving , in th p rsonal sector ; whil a shi~t in the 
averag prop nsity to save of the personal s ctor, in so 
far as it affects governm nt revenue from indir ct 
taxation without influ ncing government outlays , w·ll 
dir ctly aff ct gov rnment saving . 
Under so me circumstanc s it is possible that real 
p rsona l saving ''''ill be influenced by the behavioural 
pheno menon known as ' mon y illusion'. Although real 
disposabl personal income may remain constant during 
inflation, so me individuals may rroneously view 
incr as s in their money incomes as incr as e s in the ir 
r al inco m s and thus d cide to sav a higher proportion 
of their mon y incomes . Cons qu ntly, the rate of real 
saving will, c t ris paribus , ris . In the case of 
d flati on with r al disposable personal income unchang d, 
th decline in mon y inco me may , b cause of th sam 
typ of il lusion, r duce the rat of real saving. On 
th oth r hand, the illusion may be dir cted towards 
pric s, ignoring th paralle l behaviour of money income . 
Rising prices may be mi interpreted to indicat a 
d cline in real inco m thus causing a d cline in r al 
saving; while falling prices may result in an increas 
in r al savi n g . How'ev r , money illusion of ei ther typ 
is not likely t o b v ry 'lI'idespr ad . Furthermore , it 
not lik ly t o surviv b y ond th early stag s of an 
inflationary or d f l ationary mov ment in prices . Its 
long run n t i nflu nce on th rat of personal saving 
lik l y to b unimportant . 
R lat·v consum r good price chang s which ar 
lik ly to acc ompany absolut pric 1 v 1 movem nts may 
also ·nflu nc th prop nsity to sav out of personal 
1 ncom. Th y may aff ct th total volume of r al 
consumption v n though money incom s may change 
proporti onat ly w~th th averag con urn r good pric 
is 
is 
1 
S Gardn r Ackl y and D ni 1 B . Suits , 'Relativ Pric 
Chang sand Aggr gat Consumer D mand, , Am rican 
Eco nomic R view, ol . XL , 0 . 5 (D c mb r 1950); Gardn r 
Ackl y, Macroecono mic Th ory, pp . 268 - 9 and pp . 576 - 80 ; and 
F . S . Broo man, Macro cono mics (London , G org Allcn and 
Unw·n, 1 62 ), pp . llO - ll . 
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1 v 1. 
e a mpl 
n thOs cont t consod r th following si mpl 
Assum consum rs purchas only tw~ products , 
food n d ccommod tio n. Un d r inflatOon ry conditions , 
i n whoch mon y ncom sand th 1 v 1 of proc s 
ris qui - proportOonat ly , 1 t food pr oc s ris 
r latOvely mor than hous r nts . f consum rs r a c t 
to th r lative pric chang by purch sing a s ma ll r 
qu n tOty of food , but continu to r nt the same 
acco mmo dat Oon , th n tot 1 consumption will have fallen 
n r 1 t r ms . Ess n tially , this typ of out com st ms 
fro m th possibility that saving and so me it ms or 
consumption may b clos r substitut s than th se sam 
it ms nd oth r items of consumption . How ver , it is 
i mposs obl e to gen ralizc about th differ nt typ s of 
r lativ pric mo v m nts which may acco mpany upward and 
dow'nward bsolut pric lev 1 move m nts and th ir 
eff c ts on personal s ving propensiti s . 
Anoth r possibl way in which th pri c e level may 
i nflue nc r al p rsonal saving is through the op ration 
of th r al blanc or Pigou eff ct . l Given the nominal 
v lu of th personal s ctor ' s holdings of financial 
ss ts (which wOll °nclud , in addOtion to money 
b 1 nc s , various int r st - b aring cl i ms ), the real 
lue of th sass ts will vary invers ly with the pric 
1 v 1. 
ctor ' 
Sim Olarly , giv n th nominal valu of th 
financi 1 liabilities , th real value of th s 
should lso v ry nv rs ly with th pric lev 1 . 
How v r , providing th t th s ctor as whol is ant 
cr dotor , ° ts r al n t financial wealth hould fall 
duri n g in£l tOon nd rOs during d flation . Since th 
valu of w alth h ld n oth r forms can b assumed to b 
mo r 0 1 s unafr ct d in real t rms by pric 1 vel 
mov m nts, th p rson 1 s ctor should thu be com 1 ss 
w lthy s r sult of inflation and mor w althy as 
r sult of d flation . According to th POgou ff ct, 
th O wOll m n , c t ris paribus , a rOs in saving during 
°nfl tOon nd a fallon s ving during d rl tion. 
On d f c t in thOs argum nt s appli d to larg 
n d con i nu Ong proc 1 1 mov m nt Os that th mon y 
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s upply ' l ik ly to ch ng in th sam dire c tion as th 
pr c 1 v 1 . Such a chang in th mon y supply n d not 
b an n tiating or susta' ning caus of th move m nt in 
th p ic 1 vel : 't m y instead b m r ly a passiv 
r spons . In ith r v n t , how v er , it should bring 
so m change 'n t h e gross nomina l financial ass ts of th 
p ronal s ctor . To the n t tha it d o s , a nd to th 
xt n t that this chan g is a chang in ' outside ' mon y 
or a ch n g in 'ins'de ' mon y which is not backed by 
p rsonal s ctor d bt , it will also bring a c hange in th 
n t n o monal financial assets of th personal sector . 
This may offset to a signifi c a nt degr th eff e ct s of 
pr c 1 v 1 mov m n ts on r al p rso nal w alth and 
th r by on real personal savi n g . 
Anoth r def ct in th argument is that in n gl cts 
th possibility that a price lev 1 move m nt , if 
s uffici n t l y rapid and sustained , may ng nder 
xp ctations of furth r price l evel move me n ts in the 
sam dir c tio n . Th se e pectatio n s may influenc real 
p rsonal saving in a direction counter to that 
indicated by the Pigou effect . In mo st countries the 
accumulation of fi nancial assets for ms a large part of 
person 1 saving . In 1 ss d v lop d co nomies , because 
of t h und rdevelop d nature of th ir capital markets , 
th accumulation of money balanc s is particularly 
i mport nt . A s has b n seen , inflation erod s th r al 
valu of past savi n gs h ld as mon y balanc s . Th r for 
° f ° t cr at s p ctatio n s of furth r pro ce i nc r ases , 
it m y discourag r al avi ng in th form of a fUrth r 
ccumulatio n of th balanc es . Cony rs ly , deflatio n 
may n ourage r al av Ong in this form. 
Oth r financial ss ts such as savi n g depo its , 
bonds nd d bentur , although partially r ,sembli n g 
mon y blanc s on ccount of bei n g cl ims to fi d 
a mount of mon y , diff r from th m becaus of th ir 
°nt r st rning pow r . n pri ncipl xp ctations of 
futur pric 1 v 1 mo m nts g n r t d by current or 
i mm di t 1 past pric 1 v 1 behaviour shoul d caus 
mon y rat of i n t r t to djust so to 1 v th 
nt ' cOp t d r 1 r t of r turn on th s financi 1 
t t th s m 1 v 1 as th y would b if no futur 
pr' c ch n w' r P c t d . This will nullify hop 
nd f s of r c ving r al c pital g ins a n d loss 
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r sp ct" 1 through ing n h .form o:f ccumulating 
th s s ts . How v r , .for s v ral r sons curr nt 
r t s of nt r st may :f il to r .flect .fully pot nt"al 
say rs ' :future pric lev 1 chang s . 
F"rs s r ' or , mor g n rally , 1 nd rs ' pecta ions , 
of futur pr c 1 v 1 r s s or .falls may xce d in 
magn ude thos of borrowers . Secondly , money rates of 
1 
inter st cannot b n gative . Thus , ev n i.f 
xpecta ions of .futur price level b haviour are similar 
on bo th sid of th markets for th sass ts ( as they 
may well be) , the P ctcd rat o.f d cline of pric s 
m y be 0 gr at as to r quire unattainabl negativ rat s 
of int re t in order to maintain constant th real 
r turn on h sass ts . Finally , and again despite 
si mil ri t of pectations , institutional rigidities 
n d gOY r nm nt policies may prevent adjust ment o f money 
i n t r st rates . In g neral , if rates o:f interest do not 
ad just fully to s v rs ' exp ctations of pric level 
mov me n ts , an in.fl tion which creat s xpectations of 
furth r inflation m y r duce the incentives for saving 
in th form of adding to holdings of interest - b aring 
.fin ncial claim ; whil a dc:flation m y increase the 
inc ntiv for sav"ng "n h"s :form. 
Of cour e , personal saving is not confined to th 
accumulation of :f"nan ial clai ms d nom"nated in mon y . 
Equity sh res and ph sical assets (such as real estate 
a nd jew 11 ry) ar al 0 me ns by which individual may 
accumula c r sourc s . Th e assets di:f.f r fro m the 
.form r typ in that th ir mon - valu s t nd to mov 
with th price 1 1 . Ther for i:f in:flation causes a 
d cl"n in th r lat "v ttractiv 
ss ts , so m ng will b div rt 
tow rd th a c qui it"on o.f s hare 
Con rs ly, if d fl L" on n reas s 
ttra ti n of .finan i 1 ass t 
d" rt d toward th m :fro m h rc 
1 
W" ll" 
n ss of financial 
d away fro m th m 
or phy i al a et 
th r lative 
, o m ving will 
and physical a et 
i 
not 
v n 
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How v r , i cannot b conclud d .from this hat 
total p on 1 saving will no L b a.ff ct d at all by the 
xp ct tion 1 ff cts o.f pr c 1 v 1 changes . Consumption 
s n It rna to v to both th se forms o.f r al saving . 
r , in 1 s d lop d conomies th scop o.f 
indi iduals to accumulat qui ties nd som types o.f 
physical ss ts ma b limited , so that the scope for 
' switching' beLwe n thi .form of saving and .financial 
cl ims may also be limit d . Equity mark ts in 1 ss 
d v lop d conomi s ar rrequently not organized for or 
p rticularly acc s ibl to unin.form d p rsons d siring 
1 to trad in har s; the volume of equity available to 
th public may b r latively small becaus o.f the strong 
t nd n y towards ramily or privat own rship or firms; 
and so m physical ass ts of the 'non-productiv ' variety 
are indivisibl with respect to price , requiring outlays 
beyond the means o.f at 1 ast s mall savers. There.fore , 
contrary to the Pigou ffect type of analysis , it is 
possibl th t inflation, in so far as it detracts from 
th attractiveness or accumulating financial assets , may 
reduc total real personal sa ing out o.f a giv n r al 
2 dispos ble personal incom; while deflation may for th 
opposOt r ason incr ase it. 
Turning to a consid ration of the influ nce of 
pric 1 vel b ha iour on business saving out o.f a given 
r al busin s incom , it hould b not d initially that 
thi form o.f a ing is usually de.fined as th aving of 
1 
Th am, of cours , is true of markets .for so me types 
of °nt r st-b aring financo 1 claim , with the result 
th t , rr pective o.f pric 1 vel b haviour, personal 
sing On .financial laims m y be con.fin d to a narrow r 
rang of claims than found in d an d eco nomi 
2 
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orpor 
profo s . 
fOrm Ion that i , a c orporate undistrObut d 
Th v r g pr p nsity to s v of th buson ss 
s ctor Os Lhus th r LOo 01 undistribu d profits to 
tot 1 co por t pr01it , n t of d pr cOatOon and 
t
o 1 
a lon . Th s vOng of unin orporated ent rprise 
( their tot 1 n P of it 1 withdrawals by the owners) 
is tr at d part 01 P rsonal saving. How ver , in so 
far a bu ine s ng m y be distOnguish d conceptually 
fro m saving in other s ctors by °ts principal proxi mate 
motiv - the desir of or need for ntrepr n urs to 
pro id dir ctly from their own resources the means for 
financing the pan ion of th ir busin sses - there ar 
ground for sugg sting that it should in principl 
includ at least par of th saving of unincorporated 
enterprises . It wa for this reason that the above 
di cussion of p rsonal aving did not specifically 
consid r the saving of unincorporated nt rprises . 
To th tent that bu ines saving is a respons to 
entr pr neurs ' P cific plan for xpansion and to th 
extent that these plan entail net investment , the 
effects 01 pric level mov m nt on such saving in r al 
t r ms are largely det rmin d by th ir caus lly prior 
ff c s on the indu men to invest. Th latter effects 
will be amOn d in th ne s ctOon . However , so me 
busones aving Os al 0 und rtaken for general 
pr c ution ry motive and thi , too , will be aff cted by 
pri 
1 ar 
r 
1 1 mo ment Thu inflation may give ris 
bout th ad qu cy of accumulat d d pr ciation 
for the future financing of repl cement 
inv st m n , a uming that the e r rve are h ld 
to 
ca h bal nc s or mon y laims . A a consequenc , firms 
m y d cid o suppl m nt the res rv s by in rea ing 
th r r al n t undos ribut d profits. Conv rp ly , 
1 
11 n 
a S 
, g en Lh 1 el of to al r al net 
pr01it , a rOs in h 
of th bu in tor u a 
1 di °dend Gi en also 
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d fl ion may 0 incr s h real v lu of he 
r s Lh L th 
purpo s s . Th ° s 
y ar d m d c ssiv for r pl c m n 
( onsod r d in isolatOon ) may caus 
firm to r duc Lh ir undistrObuted profits .
l 
Th r r mains for a mOn tOo n gO Y rnm n savi ng , 
whoch i d fined as th difler nc betw n gOY rnm n t 
curr n t r nue and gOY rnm nt current outlay wh r th 
1 tt r includ both purchase of goods and s rvoces and 
curr nt tr n sfer p y m n ts . In discus ~ ng th e ff cts 
on tot 1 sa ing of thos chan g in th distribution of 
income b tw e n the public a n d privat s tors whoch may 
be induc d by pric 1 v 1 mo ve ments , it was assumed , 
in r lia , that r al gOY r nment p nditur on goods 
and servic s was con tant o The xist nce of current 
governm nt transfer payments to the privat sector was 
allow d for only on the assumpt Oon that they vari d 
proportOonat ly w~th the price lev 1; that os , that 
they , too , w r constant in r al terms . The pos ibility 
hat gOY r nments vary their real curr nt outlays in 
respons to changes in th ir real curr nt rece Opts was 
igno r d cept a a criticism of th approach . However , 
n il it is assum d that the r al resour s availabl 
to th gOY r nment on t r ms 01 curr nt r v nu are 
cons nt , ther r m Ons th lurther pos ibility that 
re 1 go rnment sa ng m y be influenced by price 1 v el 
1 
ot , how v r , that il inlla ion i acco mpan i d by 
econo mic growth , th accumul tion of depreciatio n 
r s rv will be nh n c d by additional d preciatio n 
allow n c whi h st m lro m th growth of th fi ed 
c pi al stock . Such ddiLional provo ion lor 
depr C O tion will olf t , at lea t in p rt , Lh d clin 
in t h r al v lu 01 th pr iou l y umulat d re rv 
nd n th r t of inflation , th y rna do so 
co mpl t l y , 11 th growth of th c pOt 1 tock is 
suff oci n tly rapid. n th se 1 tt 
10rm wOll continu to h d qu t 
r r lor r pl c t m nt 
re ct 0 th ri ing t 
sin g . °milarl , 
growLh on th fO d 
to m k d preci ion for 
r pl c m nt purpo 
m y t n d Lo duc r . 
S 
Econo mo 
R pl 
ch 195 
m n nd Grow h , ' 
) . 
mov m nts through th "r di ct fr ct on r 1 curr nt 
1 
outlays . L is this possib"lity which w"ll now b 
con id r d . 
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Go rnm nt s ving may be affec d by a 1 g in th 
mon y valu of o m current outlays b hind price 1 v 1 
movem n ts . Sp cirically , som types of tran sf r 
p y m nt m y not chang proportionat ly with th pric 
lev 1 . Thus int rest charg s on gOY rnment d bt ar 
fi d i n money terms for the lir of th d bt, a n d 
i n teri m price lev 1 ch nges will It r th r 1 valu 
of t h charg s . Social s rvice b n fit and pension 
rate ar usually fix d in money t rms also , and 
typically show consid rable ' stickiness ' in the face of 
a changing pric 1 
value of th s item 
1. Inflat"on will reduc the r al 
th r by tending to pro mote r al 
go r nm n t saving , whereas deflation will i ncrease th ir 
r al valu , th r by t nding to depress r al governm nt 
savin g. 
How v r , not all curr nt transf r payments lag 
proportionat ly behind price 1 v 1 mov ments . In 
"nflation subsidies in money terms may mov proportionat ly 
fast r than the pric level if gOY rnm nts atte mpt to 
maint in price control in som politically strategic 
s ctors through th us of th m. n practice they are 
fr qu ntly mploy d in 1 ss develop d conomies to 
limit food pr"c increas and to m et loss in the 
op ration of public utiliti s , which r sult fro m rising 
cost pr sing against unchang d or only slowly changing 
polit"c lly d t r min d or regulated pric s . On th 
whol , subs "dies of this natur are likely to ert a 
1 
To th t nt that uch ch ng in r 1 government 
saving r th count rparts or chang s in the ' real v lue 
of gOY rnm nt outl ys on curr nt ransf r to the private 
s ctors , th r w"ll b corre ponding change in pr"vate 
r al 'nco m. As a cons qu nc , th r m y also b 
chang in r 1 pri t 'ng wh' h will off t 
parti lly th hang al go rnm nt s ving . Howev r , 
ch ng n r 1 pri at a d not b p ct d 
und r th bo condition in gOY rnment 
s th count rp rL 1 go rnm nt 
p nditur on good Thi follows 
arlo r umpt"on output is 
con t nL. G"v n this , ch ng in th go rnm nt ' s 
acqu ' s't"on of co mmodiLi s w'll not rf ct th re 1 
i n co m p y m nt ccruing Lo th pr"v t ctor . Se lso 
pp . 62 - J bo 
d press'v 'n£luenc on re 1 gov rnm nt saving during 
'nflat'on . 
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nflation may lso t nd to d pr ss gov r nment 
saving 'n so far as the 1 tt r is und rtak n ~or reasons 
of d bt a mortization . If a governm nt plans to a mor tiz 
its debt of fixed money value by savi ng a certain given 
quantity of mon y ach p riod , then inflation will 
reduc th r 1 valu of th saving r quir d per period 
for this purpos Given that real government curr nt 
rev nu is constant (i. that curr nt rev nue in money 
t r ms chang s proportionately with the price lev 1), 
this will p rmit a high r r al volume of government 
current e p nditure and , h nce , a lower total real 
volume of gov rnment saving . In the opposite cas of 
d flation , such a d bt amortization policy will r quir 
for its fulfil ment a larger volum of r al savings , and 
may thus cause a correspond'ng reduction in real 
gov r nment current 
governme n t saving . 
p nditure and a rise in total r al 
Of cour e , it do s not follow 
automatically in either 'n tance that total real 
government saving will change by e actly the same a mount 
as th t port'on of it r quired for d bt amortization . 
Rath r th n real curr nt penditur acting as the 
buffer ~or th varying real requirements of debt 
a mortization , the outl ts for r al sav'ng oth r than 
a mort'z tion (for e mpl , public investm nt) may adjust 
in an offs tting mann r. As a consequ nc , total r al 
gov rnm nt saving m y b una£f ct d or only slightly 
ffect d . Alt rnativ ly , ( lthough in thi posit'on 
such a possibility h s b n as urn d aw y) tot I re I 
gov rnm nt saving may, in pr ctic still adjust , not 
bec us r 1 gov rnm nt current e p nditur do , but 
'nst d b c us the gov rnm nt vari s autonom~usly its 
volum of curr nt r v nu (for ampl , by ch ng'ng t 
r t ). 
On shortcom'ng of th's typ of pproach to th 
eff ct of pric I v I movem nts on gov rnment saving 
is the p S3 v rol it implic'tly g'v s t fis c al 
pol'cy . Sp c'f'cally , 't ignor th poss'bil'ty th t 
pr'c 1 v I mo m nts m c 11 forth di cr t ' onary 
chang s in t rat 
d sign d to l: mit 
gg g t d mand. 
nd r al gov rnm nt outlays 
mov m nt through ch ngi n g 
Th s chang s m y h v i mplicat ' o n s 
for th r t of gov rnm nL saving. A mor 
hortco ming 's th t nd ncy to und rpl y th 
g n r 1 
f ct th t 
si n gOY rnm nt ving to a larg t nt policy-
d termin d , iL n d in principl hay no clos or 
con ist nt r lationship wiLh pr'c I v I mov m nts . 
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This compl tes a so m what s lectiv e a mination of 
the possibl ff cts of pric I vel mov m nts on th 
over- all rat of sav'ng . t is apparent that in terms 
of basic principl s no general conclus'ons can be 
form d about how , i~ at all , an econo my ' s rat of 
say' ng will b aff ct d (in comparison with a norm of 
pric stability) by inflation and d flation . This is 
obviously not becaus of a lack of hypoth ses ; rather , 
' t is becaus thes hypoth ses , which in many instances 
ar conflicting or o~fs tt'ng ones , rely for th ir 
validity on as umptions whos applicability and 
r levanc may vary over tim and a mong econo mi es . Of 
th se ssumptions two of the mor e important are 
usually i mplicit - specifically , th approxi mate rate 
and th durat'on of th inflation or d flation . It is 
cl ar that in the privat s ctor, at l east , these 
f ctors , through their influence or lack of influence 
in moulding p ctations , are likely to playa crucial 
role in d t r m'ning the ffect of an upward or downward 
pric I v I movem nt on total saving . 
B fore concluding thi section , mention must 
briefly b made of th eff cts of pric lev I movements 
on capit I inflow from abroad, sinc this ~inancial flow 
prov'd s r ources for dom st'c cap'tal formation 
dditional to those made avail ble through do mestic 
sa ing . Att ntion w'll b focussed on the case of 
privat capit I inflow to a country with an independent 
mon tary syst m. Th pric I v I in th world out ide 
th ho t or rec'p ' nt countr is as um d con tant o 
Pro pect've capital inflow in th form of 
borrow'ng will b in~lu nc d by pric I v I mov ment in 
th host country ma'nly through th ~f cts of the 
I tt r on th t country ' b lance of p y m nt To th 
nt th L inrl tion w ak ns th b lance of payment , 
th r ' sk of ch ng control and d luation , 
alt rn L'v ly or ly, are incr d ; while to 
th tnt Lh t defl tion str ngth n th b I nc of 
p y m nt , th s di min' h d. On account of 
th ri -Lion in th s ri ks , it follows that inflation 
lik I Lo di ourag and d fl tion ~ __ i 
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lik ly 0 ncourage th a il biliLy of' for ign cap· tal 
·n th form or 10 n s whos principal and int r st 
p y m n ts r d no m·nat d in th ho st country ' s curr ncy . 
With r g d to h av ilability of for ·gn c p·tal in 
t h f'or m 0 10 n s who princ · pal and i n t re t paym nts 
ar d nom ·n t d ·n f'or ign chang , th same 
conclus·on h ld , but solly b caus of' th variat·on 
in th ri k o.f c h ang control. Prot ctio n against 
th risk of d valuation is gu rante d by the transactions 
bing d nomin ted in for ign exchange . 
Equ· Ly ·nv stment f'ro m abroad , in ith r direct or 
portfolio f'or m, w·l b inf'lu nc d (lik loan capital 
d n o minated in the ho t country ' s currency ) by price 
1 v 1 mov me n ts in so far as th y af.fect the risks 
assoc ted with both d evaluation and e change control . 
How v r , i n additio n, 
influ nc d by pr c 1 
quity investm nt will be 
1 mov ments in so far as th e 
mov m n ts arf ct th invest m nts ' e p ct d money returns , 
s m sured in the host country ' s currency . If 
·nf'lation , by g neraLing e pectations of further 
· nflation , cr ate an nticipation of a corr spo nding 
rising 1 v 1 of mon y r tu n s , then - subj ct to th 
a n ti ·pat d risk of ch ng control - thi will tend 
to of'f t , parti lly or wholly , in ror ign ·nvestors ' 
m·nds h ncr a d hanc of' loss , m asured in for ign 
chang , whi h will te rn rro m he incr a d risk of 
devalu on . Ind ed , und r o rne circum tance it i 
h or t·c lly possibl th t inflation m y n 
n cour g qui nve t m nt. Thus , jf' inflation is 
P ct d to cont· nu , but in doing 0 i no pect d 
to br·ng the i mposit·on of' change control , and if 
is e p ct d to r· th of for ·gn 
proportion t 1 1 s 
ch ng 
Lh n th incr a in money returns 
on t h t m n , h n , in t r m of for ign chang , 
th p r 1 r Lurn on th nv t m n t w·ll ri 
On Lh oLh r h nd , d .flat·on may po 
n t m nL f' o m abro d b c u 
·bly di courage 
qu 
p 
·t m y 
ti n s of .falling mon y r turn , 
th ho t ountr ' 
m y u tw igh th 
urr n Th· p 
· mulus to inv t m nt 
m a ur d in 
declin 
t mmi n g .fro m 
th n r d c rt ·nL of' bing bl to r p tri t 
th s r turn in ull L h ch n g at pr vail · n g 
t th ti m 0 Lh n Lm nt d ion. 
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Th 
n add"tion to th "r possible eff cts on the 
avail b"lity of both do m stic and for ign resourc s for 
cap 1 for m tion , pric 1 vel mov m nts may influ nc 
th d m n d for th s r source . Ac cordingl y , an 
mination will now b mad of the rf cts , if a ny , 
that th s movem nts m y hay on th induce m n t to 
"nv st . Th discuss"on will be conc rn d s olely with 
privat inv st ment . 
i nflu n c d by pric 
Public invest m nt is lik ly to be 
1 v 1 mo ve ments only in s o far as 
chang s in "t form part or stabilization polici s ai m d 
at pr v n ting or mo dirying thes mov m nts; or , 
alt r n tiv ly, in so far as it is constra" n ed by the 
resourc availabl to th public sector for capital 
formation , assuming that th supply of th se r sources 
is afrected by pric 1 vel move ments . 
Following the conventional ' pr s nt value ' or 
' margin 1 efficiency of invest ment ' approaches , the 
volum or private inv stment d mand can be viewed as the 
outcom or thr e i mmediat determinants: the cost of 
addition 1 capi al goods , th e pect d yi ids on th m 
( " . e . th e ces of th p cted gross revenue stemming 
from the goods and ser ic s produced by the m over the 
p ct d operating cost involv d in their use), and 
' th ' m rk t rate or interest . Any influence of price 
1 1 movem nt on "nv stment d mand can ther for b 
analyz d n t r ms of thi rram work of d terminants . 
On w ii-known hypoth s"s is that , co mpared w~th a 
s"tuati on of pric stability , i nflatio n low rand 
d flation r is s th r al rat of int r st (as 
sti rn t d fro m th i wpo"nt or ntr pr neurial pric 
p c ta tions ) , th r b r p ct" ly stimula ti.ng and 
d pr ssi n g r al"n m n d m nd. p cif"cally , it is 
argu d th t during infl tio n ntr pr n urs will p ct 
rur h r pric ncr s 
qu" - p oport" ona 
on th ir pot nt" 1 in 
n d , hence, appro j mat ly 
"n th lik ly mon y yield 
tm n outla s . As uming that 
th curr nt mon y rat or int r un rf ct d by 
infl tion or, t 1 s L , 
m 'nt n onst nt Lh 
by nt n nr"al pric 
do no r uffici ntly to 
of i n t r t , s judg d 
P ct tio n s , th n oth rw 
unat r ctiv in t m nL proj ct w'll pp r profitab l 
and th volum of investm nt will ris. Cony rs ly , 
·t ·s argu d tha during d rlat·on ntr pr n urs w·ll 
e p ct furth r falls n p ices and h nc ralls·n 
likely mon y yields. Assuming that th mon y rate of 
inter st is unaffect d by deflation or , at I ast , does 
not fall uffici ntly to maintain constant the real 
rat of int r st , as judged by entr pren urial pric 
xp ctation , the volum of invest m nt will thus 
d cl· n . 
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The principal objection which can be raised 
agai nst this hypoth s·s is that if entrepreneurs expect 
c rtain pric lev I mov ments , thes xpectations are 
lik ly to b shared by other sections of the co mmunity . 
In particular , they ar likely to e ist on both sid s 
of the capital market , w·th the result that th money 
rat of i n ter t will adjust to maintain constant the 
anticipated real rat of interest. Und r these 
circumst nc s ·nv st m nt d mand will not be affected. 
How v r , this objection is itself subject to two already 
m nt·on d constraint. Th first appli s to the case 
of d flation . The mon y r of int rest cannot be 
negative . Ther for v n if the capital mark t as a 
whole shar s an p tation of a certain rate of pric 
d flation , the pro pective real rate of interest must 
rise , provid d that this e pected Iat of price d cline 
is ufr·ciently gr at . Inv stment should thu fall. 
The s cond c ons traint also concedes th t the capital 
mark t as a whole may ha a common p ctation of price 
I v I mo e m nts . How ver, th latt r may be prevented 
fro m ke ping he pro pect·v real rat of interest 
const nt be aus of in t·tutional infl ibilities and 
go rnment polici s . For e a mpl , if th government 
k ps 
. nfl 
h 
tion, 
mon y suppl rea onably las tic dur~ng an 
h · ~ll hold down ny ris in the money 
ra of int r t and thu low r th r al ra 
1 
nv st ment hould b timul ed accordingly . 
It n b 
al 0 fr 
d tha pri I v 1 mov m nts may 
m nt d m nd in 0 f r a thes 
mo m n n orpor tap c -wag 1 g . t ha be n 
s n h t th m rg n of thi 1 g w· 11 h ng a ual 
1 
M y n rd , op . c· L., p.JO. 
rIp oCts on 
n tr pr n urs 
ng cap' t 1. Prov'd d th 
P cL it to be sust 'n d (in p rt at 
1 a t ), it may in ddit'on chang sti rn t d yi Ids on 
pot n i 
ra t o.f 
d fla 
1 'nv stm nt proj c and thus 'nrlu nc th 
1 
n s m nL. Sp ci.fically , inflationary and 
on ry pric 1 1 movements may through this 
hann 1 r sp cti ly r is and low r th rat or r al 
inv s m nt. How v r , th r is a possibl diff ' culty 
' n th O rgum nt wh'ch r lates to the pr viously 
d doubt about th continued exist nc of a 
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pr'c - wag 1 g . Even i.f 
such typ as to permi 
pric lev 1 mov m nt is of 
th initial m rgence of a lag , 
n w r n ss or its istenc may influ nce th supply 
nd d m nd .for labour and thus soon liminate it w'thout 
in e t m nt being af.f ct d mor than t mporarily . 
Esti maL d yields on potential inv st m nt proj cts 
are so metim s clai m d to b aff cted by price level 
mo m nt in on oth r way . It is said that , even apart 
fro m r al rat or int r st and pric - wag lag 
consid ration , ' nflation ... tends to make entr pren urs 
opti mi tic , 
I Iso m k 
confident 
the m 
nd more willing to take risks . ... 
ns'on- mind d . , 2 These attitud s 
ar b Ii v d to stimul t investm nt. Deflation is 
thought to g n rat th oppo ite attitud s which ar 
b l' v d to d pr ss in tment. This a sociation of the 
buoy ncy o.f ntr pr n uri 1 ' ani m 1 spirits ' and pric 
1 mo m nt s is lik ly to b confin d to s·tuation 
wh r pr c lev 1 ar th r suIt o.f i mbalanc s 
b tw n ggr ga e d m nd nd supply . Thus , if inflation 
s cud and br'ng th peri nc of c s 
ggr gaL d mand, entr pr n urs m y P t littl 
diff'culty n ut'l 'z 'ng th new c p c'ty and s lling h 
ddition 1 ou put r ult'ng from tra nv t ~ nt. Th 
d gr 
shor - g 
agg g 
1 
o f 0 mp tit' 0 nth y .f c wi 11 b 1 
d fi 
n d by 
ncy of On th oth r h nd , wh r 
d m nd 1 ds to d .flation , ntr pr n ur may 
1 w g r s as a 
rtin J. B '1 y , 
1 ( w orl , McGraw -
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Z w dzki , op . i ., p . 74 . 
77 
ant"cipat f cing fi rc co mp t"tion in th disposal or 
th dd"tional output wh"ch r sults rro m an xpansion 
of product "v capacity , and may th r fore cut back on 
1 inv st m nt plans . 
In all , "t app ars that und r so m particular 
circum tanc s inflation may po sibly incr as and 
defl tion may possibly r duc the over- all lev 1 of 
inv t m nt . How' ver , th boy analysis is highly 
aggr gativ and cons quently ov r - simplified. In 
rea l ity , a rising or falling price lev 1 is l ike l y to 
hav e diff rent eff cts on different typ s of invest ment . 
I t " s with a consid ration of this ph no menon that the 
n t s ction is concerned . 
Th Composition of I nvest m nt 
To the ext nt that pric level move ments affect th 
co mposition or direction of private investment , they are 
lik ly to affect also its ov r - all productivity and h nc 
the rat of conomic growth . In this resp ct there has 
be n considerable discussion of the influence of 
inflation on the r 1 tiv composition of private 
" t t" 1 dId "2 H l nv s m n ln ess ve op economles . owever , little , 
" f any , att ntion has b en paid explicitly to the 
corresponding influ nc of deflation . As a consequence , 
th rollowing par graphs will b largely concerned with 
the cas of infl tion, although they will conclud with 
o m ugg tion about th c s of d rlation . 
By co mparison with a tat of pric stability , 
inflat"on (through th p ctations it arouS s) may bias 
1 
It c n thus b rgu d that , strictly sp aking , such 
variation in inv st m nt d mand are ind p nd nt of pric 
1 el b haviour as such , bing inst ad directly the 
r s u lt of c ss or d fici nt d mand. 
2 
s :for E . M. B rnst I . G. Pat 1, 
lopm nt ,' 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r~ , ol . II ( 1951-
, op . cit ., pp . 5J - 9 i Eugenio Gudin , 
ric " in D. C. Hagu ( Ed .) 
of Conf r nc h Id by th 
A oci tion ( London , Macmillan , 
h lan , ' Th I mp ct of Inflation 
t Dom stic nv t m nt ,' 
ry t ff Pap rs , Vol . I X (1 962 ). 
in tm nt w y from r' d ss ts towards inv ntori s . 
Although c rtain amount or inventory inv stm nt is a 
n c s ry condition for conomic growth , b caus it 
contribut s to th continuity and smoothn ss of 
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produ tion , an e c ssiv ccumulation of stocks , judg d 
by t chnic 1 crit ria , do s not aid th pansion or 
output . n ract , to th xt nt that it is at the 
p ns of fi d inv stm nt , it actually imped s growth. 
On r ason why inrlation may bring a shift in th 
compo ition of inve tment in ravour of inv ntori s is 
that it m y induc some persons and institutions whos 
savings are usually chann 11 d into financial claims 
to inv t dir ctly , at 1 ast at the margin , by 
purchasing physical assets with th ir savings . l 
Inv ntori s ar lik ly to b an attractiv form of ass t 
for this purpose. Th y do not requir th technical 
skills and knowledge r quired for inv sting directly in 
most typ s of fix d capital . P rhaps a mor important 
reason for p cting this bias is that an inflationary 
environm nt offers gr ater opportuniti s for short term 
sp culativ gains than do s one of stable prices . 
Provid d that th e p cted n t profits from additional 
r ources acquired for such purpos s ar judged to 
outweigh th p ct d net profits rrom acquiring 
productiv ri d ass ts , ntrepreneurs will prefer to 
ccumulat r sourc in a liquid rorm r ady to tak 
advant g of th s sp culati e opportuniti s . ow , th 
usu 1 l'quid ass t of mon y , and probably also short -
t rm int r st-bearing financial claims , los in 
inflation their ttribut of r ty or rficiency as a 
in fr ct, a ta on tor of lu . InrI tion i 
r'nancial wIth . How v r, in ntori s orfer a 
reI ti ly l'quid h dg g inst rising pric Th Y 
omp r ly sily pur has d , h ld and sold . 
H nc ntr pr n ur will b nduc d , r lativ ly sp aking , 
to p nd th ir hold ' ngs of r ourc in this form 
r tIl r th n Lo pand th ir stocks of t'i d sset£ . 
Turning to th omposi tion of in stm nt in t'i d 
as t i . s ort n sugg t d that int'l tion ncourag s , 
r 1 ly , in tm nt n construction , p cirically 
1 
ct' . p . 66 bo 
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inv stm nt n own r-occup · d lu ury hous·ng. l For 
high r incom groups his ~orm of ass t is asily 
cqu·r d nd , sinc it appr ciates in valu as th pr·c 
1 , it pro id prot ct·on for th r al valu 
of avings wh·ch th accumulation of fixed mon y ass ts , 
part·cularly cash balanc s , does not provid . 2 t is 
also possibl that such a durable form of investm nt 
is ncour g d · n so far as ·nflation low rs real rates 
of int r t. 
More generally , on the assumption that the r al 
rate of int r st (a anticipated by entr pr n urs) is 
low r in an inflationary environment than in one of pric 
stability , it has b en argu d that a rising price 1 v 1 
w·ll bi ·nvestment towards projects with longer 
economic live or processes mploying higher ratio of 
capit 1 to l a bour . J If such projects a n d processes are 
associated with higher capital - output ratios , growth may 
be initially retard d . However , it has also been 
argued that investment in processes in which capital 
rath r than labour plays th most important p a rt will 
ultimat ly acceler t growth , principally b cause uch 
inv stm nt lead 
1 
to a 1 rg r shar of the r suIting income going 
to pro~it - earn r and a maIler shar to wage -
rn rs. Sinc profit- arners have a higher 
prop nsity to av th n wage - earners , saving 
rath r than consumption is encouraged , nd a 
1 rger proportion of the yi ld of the initial 
inv tment becom s ava·labl for furth r 
inv tm nt . In oth r words , 
proc ss s of production hay 
co fficient 4 
capital int nsive 
high re - inv stment 
Sh 1 n, op . cit ., pp . 25l-2 . 
2 
Th 
for r 
th 
nd 
i 
cau 
pur ha 
not lik 
of th 
c . lings on th 1 vel 
M ynard , op . cit ., pp . JO-J . 
4 
Ib·d ., p . Jl. 
prosp cts .for 
n stm nt in 
Oth r rgum nt 
conomic d lopm 
pit a l-·nt n i 
of resid ntial prop rty 
ly to b stimulated to 
prop n ity of go rnmen s 
of mon y r nt during 
sugg sting that the 
nt r improved by 
s ar ~ound in 
W It nd H r y Lib ns tin, ' Inv tm nt 
lopm nt ,' nd Econom·c D 
, Vo 1 . LX 
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On th oth r hand , it can b argued that s Once th rat 
of s vOng is d p nd nt , giv n th populatOon , on the 
total 1 v 1 of incom , as w 11 as its distribution , 
o 
inv st m n t in more c pital- intensiv proc ss s may 1 ss n 
rath r th n incr as £utur s ving . Thus , i£ inv stm nt 
in such proc sses i mpli higher capOt I - output ratOos , 
th s m 11 r total incom yi Id may d press futur saving 
nd h nce growth , not only initially but in th long run 
a l so . 
t should , of cours be not d that th effect of 
an infl ation- induc d low r r al rat of interest in 
shifting °nvest ment towards process s mploying a high r 
ratio of capital to labour may b of£set - partially , 
wholly or c ssiv ly - if wages rise more slowly than 
pric s . Provided that ntr pr n urs expect this latt r 
ph n o menon to b sustained , it w~ll ert a counter- bias 
in favour of more labour- intensiv activiti s . 
Furth r mor , a d clin in real wages may have an 
additional influ nc on th composition of investment . 
If such a decline 1 ads to a transfer of r al income in 
fav our of upper inco me groups , it will , in addition to 
ny ffects on total consumption , stimulat th 
production of goods consum d by th s groups and 
d pr ss th production of goods consum d by lower incom 
1 groups . This w~ll hay a corresponding influenc on 
th r lative profitability of invest m nt in th 
i ndustri s th r by a££ect d . 
nflation may also influence tho industrial 
co mposition of investm nt through its eff cts on an 
co no my ' s int rnational trading relationships . In this 
r sp ct 
i mportanc 
port ta 
chang rat policy and b haviour are of k y 
Assuming that th xchang rat and any 
s ar h ld constant and that inflation is 
not associ t d with a ris in th d mand £or a country ' s 
ports , as m asur d in £or ign chang , a r Osing 
do m st Oc pric 
po t ctor . 
1 v 1 will discourag inv st m nt in th 
For most 1 ss d v lop d countri s th 
world pri c ~s of th ir port products r ' giv n l in th 
s ns th t th yare d tcrmin d by int rnational 
condOtions nd ar una£f ct d by chang s in do m stic 
1 
M rtOn J . Bail y , ' Construction nd n£l tOon : A 
Crit Oc 1 Surv y ,1 p . 265 . 
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d mand 1 nd costs . Und r th s c'rcumstanc sand 
granting th above assumptions , in~lat'on will induc a 
pric -co st sque ze in th xport s ctor : d om stic costs 
will ris but pric s will not chang . As a r suIt , n 
this s ctor the prosp ctiv profitabil'ty of inv stm nt 
and , c t ris paribus , inv st ment its If should declin 
In th cas of a product whose export volum is so 
larg relativ ly as to influ nce its world price , a 
do mestic in~lation, through causing a r duction in this 
volum , may t mporarily raise th product ' s world and 
do m stic prices so mewhat . How ver , in this instanc 
also , th prospective profitability o~ inv stment 
should d cline , sp cially becaus increased co mpetition 
fro m abroad should v ntually lower th world and 
dom stic prices of the product . O~ course , in the long 
run continuing inflation must c rtainly bring xchang 
rat d preciation which will restore th induce ment to 
inv st in the export sector . If inflation continues 
ov r a considerabl p riod mo re than on depr ciation 
will b nec ssary . A floating exchange rate may even b 
introduc d . 
With regard to inv st ment in the import - substitut 
or import-comp ting s ctor , the in~lu nce of inflation 
is also likely to b significantly d t r mined by 
change r te policy and b haviour . In g neral, a 1 ss 
d v lop d country will face a virtually infinitely pric -
lastic supply curv for its imports . Hence , in th 
abs nc of quantitative controls , th dom stic curr ncy 
pric s of i mports nd thus o~ import-competing products , 
will b d t r min d by th ' giv n' world prices of 
imports, th chang r te and i mport duti s . Assuming 
th s last thre factors constant , dom stic inflation 
will bring a ris in imports . Assuming furt~er that th 
world pric s of ports ar not rising and that 
utonomous transf rs , capit 1 and curr nt, re constant, 
thi c rt in to caus balanc of paym nts d ficit . 
If th authorities in'Lially m t this by for ign 
borrow 'ng nd running down 'nternational r s rYes , th 
'mport-substitut s ctor is lik ly to ~ac a pric - cost 
squ z similar to th L which th port s ctor will 
1 
s'ngl country f c s a v'rtu lly infinit ly 
pr 'c - 1 stic d mand for ' ts ports . 
fac . Costs of dom stic 'nputs will b rising , whil 
outpu pric swill b unaff ct d by inflation . Under 
th s circumstanc s th d cr asing profitability of 
i mport-substitut production will, if xp ct d to 
continu , det r inv stment in this sector . 
How v r , no country poss sses unlimit d for ign 
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exchange r s rves or cr dit. Given th continuation of 
inflation, the authoriti swill b forc dither to 
d valu or to r strict imports by mor dir ct mans . A 
suffici nt d valuation (or a series of th m, or the 
floating of th xchang rate) will restore profitability 
and th induc m nt to invest in th import-substitut 
sector through raising output prices . However , ther 
will probably be a r luctance to und rtake d valuation 
despit its ultimate nec ssity . Typically, the 
authorities are pron to postpone this action by 
introducing such d vices as quantitative r strictions 
on imports , exchange controls and special import duties . 
Li miting the volume of imports, through direct physical 
controls or various forms of explicit or implicit 
i mport taxation tends , lik devaluation , to r stor 
profitab'lity and the induc m nt to inv st in the 
i mport- ubstitut sector by raising th pric s of its 
output . In this instanc the price ris swill b 
caus d by ith r shortages or ta ation of imports. 
In practice, polici s for controlling imports 
usually discriminat most strongly against imports of 
manufactur d consum r goods . Imports of capital 
quipm nt, raw materials and semi-proc ssed inputs ar 
usually judged to b mor In cessaryl and are admitt d 
on a mor liberal basis . As a cons qu nc , profitability 
and inv stm nt in that part of the import-substitute 
s ctor which produc s manuf ctur d consumer goods with 
th id 0 'mport d capit 1 goods and int rm diate 
products ( nd this is lik ly to b a major part of th 
s ctor) m y und r som circumstanc s not only b 
r stor d to pr -infl tion 1 v ls but , n fact , may be 
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posi ly i mu t d. 1 Of' from v course , long t rm 
v wpo n , thi may b a tr n itory ff t. Ev n t u a l 
d v luation, assum ng that °t bro n gs th aba ndonm n t of 
physic 1 con rols , sp c al i mport a atio n a nd 
dO cri mination a mong °mport categori s , hould rais th 
do m s °c cos s of i mpor ed i nputs a nd capita l g oods by 
propor °onately mo r than it will rais h do m stic 
pric of °mported and i mport- ompeting manufactur d 
consum r good . 
Gov r nment co n trols th t ar i nitiated in respons 
t o inflation will no t necessarily b confi n d t o imports. 
In th discu sio n of gOY rnrnent saving it was me n tion d 
that tt mpts may b mad to limit proce i nc r ases in 
politically trat gic ctors , such a th food 
produci n g a n d public utility sectors, through the us of 
prOce co n trols. f such controls are not supported by 
subsidi , inv stm nt will b divert d away fro m thes 
s ctor b cause of the r lativ ly unprofitabl e 
2 
opportuniti e ha th y off r. Wh r such controls are 
difficult to nforc th op ration of black mark ts may 
b a par ially offs tting factor. Howev r , thes are 
h rdly f a ible in h public utOlity sector . 
In conclusio n, th lfec s of deflation o n the 
composition of' pri ate investm nt mu t b briefly 
con id rcd. Although th literatur app ar to have 
larg ly dis: garded h subj ct , thes eff cts may be 
expect d , lor th major p rt, to b th r er e of 
thos s ocia d with infl tion. inc a falling price 
lev 1 hould incr th attractiv n s of holding 
mon y a n d probabl oth r f'i nanci 1 a t also , 
r lati to th holding of tangibl ts , individual 
a n d ° nstituLional av r r lik 1 to b di courag d, 
at t h m rgin , fro m in sting th ir aving dir ctl 
1 
Th 
l so contribut 
l s wh in th 
th 
of ' c heap ' i mpor ed pi al goods may 
Lh tO mula ion of inv stm nt 
m 
on in r 
o .fo ign 
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11 
trai n d 
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C . Do r n c , op. c · 9 p.5 . 
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a nd in d ncourag d 0 a~qui rOn n ial claim. A s 
co n s qu n c so m bi s n inv stm nt away fro m 
inv ntori s nd own r-occupi d hou n g ar probabl 
Entr p n u or fOr ms ar 1 0k ly 0 ontrObut t o th 
bias away f om nv n ori s . Th y will find ° 
advantag ous to bu old up th r worki n g capit 1 mor in 
fin nci 1 th n physical form. If th r al rat of 
°nt r s s nticipat d by ntrepr n urs , is higher 
than wh n pr s ar tabl , i nv st m n t in labour-
intensov proc ss s will be n courag d r lativ ly e On 
th oth r hand, if ther is a price - wag lag , this may 
x rt c ount r-boas in favour of capital-intensive 
proc ss S . 
towards th 
Mor ov r , th 
low r inco m 
shift in inco m distributio n 
groups , which is likely to be 
associated with s uch a lag, may tend to shift investm nt 
aw y from industri s producing lu ury items towards 
thos producing wage-goods. Finally, giv n the 
structur and le 1 of xport and i mport duti s , th 
e chang rat and constant , infinit ly price - lastic 
demand a n d supply curv s for ports and i mports 
r sp ctO ly, in stment in both th port a n d import-
substitut s ctors will b stimulat d by d fla ion. In 
th s s ctors do m stic os swill b falling , while 
pric s wOll b unchang d . Howev r , d flation in a 1 ss 
dey lop d country may s m fro m falling world prices . 
Und r such 
will b d pr 
slow l y . 
rcum tanc s , n stm nt in th s sector 
sed , pro ided that cost ar falling mor 
Th ° s c hap t r WO 11 c onclud wi th 
m in topOc s WO h whi h °t ha d alt. 
signof Oc nc for he r maind r of the 
°ndo c t d. 
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as n pl n to ari bl in 11 hr appro ch but 
·t s th Structuralists who are p rticularly prone to 
str ss its c usati rol . n the fiv chapt rs 
mm diat ly .following th·s one an inv stigation of th 
r 1 v nc and validi ty o.f ach of th approaches in 
pla n ng Philippin pr c 1 v 1 b haviour in th 
p riod 1946-65 will b undertak n. How v r , in d aling 
with Structuralist hypoth s s th analys·s will to so m 
ext Jnt go beyond the usual Structural·st conc rn w·th 
i nfl tion . nord r to inv st -· gat wh ther or not this 
approach offers anything towards an 
Phil·ppin d flationary e p ri nce. 
planation of th 
Th second part o.f this chapter has b en a somewhat 
sel ctiv urvey o.f th means by which it has been 
sugg st d that pric 1 vel movements may influ nce 
econo mic growth. Following the general emphasis of 
writings on this subj ct, att ntion has been concentrat d 
on capital formation as the m dium of influ nce . In 
th · s r sp ct it appears that price 1 v 1 movem nts , 
depend·ng on their direction , pace and cause and on th 
nature of the economy, may affect the over- all propensity 
to say (and rat of capital inflow) , the d sir d 
volum of inv stment and th desired pattern or 
co mposi ion of in stment; but it also app ar that , 
d spit an abund nc of hypothes s , no g neral 
conclusions about th impact of either inflation or 
defl tion on capital forma ion can be form d. However , 
in Par Thr n ttempt will b mad to ass ss the 
mpirical sign · fic nc o.f many of th s hypotheses (and 
also th import nc of c pital form tion as a det rminant 
of conom·c growth) in th post-war Philippin conomy. 
PART TWO 
A ALYSIS OF PRICE LEVEL BEHAVIOUR 
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CHAPTER III 
A MONE SUPPLY APPROAClJ 
Th Quant Oty The~ y of Money as a n explanation of 
Philippin p 1 level mo ements appears to have pre-
o upied to an important (though not ex lusive) extent 
th mone tary authorities of the Philippines and other 
offi ial bodies ol The main on ern of this chapter is 
to assess th adequa y of this explanation for the period 
1946-65. Howe r, sin e the money supply is a functoon 
of both e onomi behaviour and institutional arrang ments, 
an examination will first be made for the same period of 
the natur of the Philippine monetary system and, within 
this ontext, of the aus s of changes in the money supply . 
TI MO TARY SY TEM, 1946-65 
After the orld War the Philippines resumed 
°t pre- ar urn y reserve standa d whi h, subject in 
the short run to th p oss ibly offsetting b haviour of 
b nk r di t, nsur d that the mon y supply varied directly 
with th stat of he balan e of p ayme nts. This 
resumption wa a hie d with a minimum of difficulty 
be a use h gold and doll r as s who h had supplied mo t 
of th P -wa ba ing to the peso had been held inta t 
in th 
th 
Stat s during the Japanese 0 upation of 
2 sl nds. The p r a lu of the peso, fixed by law, 
remained t 50 nited t tes ents, and th Philippine 
Treasury as oblig d to buy a nd s 11 p sos on demand at 
this rat of ex hang Apart from minor oins, the 
urren y ssue onsist d of Tr asury C rtifi ·ates . 
Ag °nst h s 
in th fo m of 
e e held a 100 p r cent re erve, mainly 
d 11 
form of il e pe 0 
1 
Cf. 1 Bank of h 
mim 
Go y, p . ., p . 2l5 . 
, but to a small xt nt in the 
h, Un1 
p o7. 
8 
Despit the nfo c d liquid a ion f m ny banks 
during the 0 upation, th un ertain i s r lating 0 th 
legal v l ' dity of d bt obligations in urred 0 s ttled 
during th s m period, nd the d struction of r cords , 
qui pm n , et " the banking system r cov r d relatively 
rapidly , After libe ation seven banks op n d for 
business in Jun and July 1945 and by th end of 1946 
eleven w re in pe ation , By 1948, it has b en claimed, 
the b nking system was substantially restored , l The 
r ov ry w s aided by several fa tors, First: 
Prior to the Japanes in asion, most banks had 
gr at l y in reas d thei dollar balan es in the 
United Stat s and had pla d onsiderable parts 
of their se u 1ty holdings with United States 
orrespondents on a safe keeping basis. 2 
ondly: 
. . ,in De ember, 1941, th U.S , High Commissioner, 
with th ooperation of the Co mmonwealth Government, 
has transferred to Corregidor over P8,000,000 of 
till ash, 1 aring hous banalces of P19,000 000, 
nd l arge a mounts of se uri ties and other valuables, 
From Co regidor these valuables were taken to the 
nit d State by submarine ofJwere de troyed aft r 
proper re ords had been mad . 
Thirdly: 
There also remain d to the banks at the time of 
libe ation some unpaid balances on lo ans grant d 
b for the nemy 0 cupation . 4 
inally, in 194 6 publi finan ial assistan e was provided 
to some banks. Thi as in the form of P5 million in 
pr f rred capi a l sto k from the Finan ial Rehabilitation 
Fund stablish d by the Philippine Gov rnment. 5 
How v r, the 'nstitutional s ru ture of he mon tary 
syst m had no oon r b n re-built than plan were drawn 
up for 1 
r mm nd 
Finan 
1 
E on mi 
p . 27 · 
2 
Ib·d . 
4 
bid. 
5 
E nomi 
ub t nti 1 m dif ' 
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hang standa d should b abandon d and r pl ed by a 
man g d ur n y syst m in whi h a nt a1 bank would 
hold ul imat authority and responsibilo y.l The 
Commission b sed this r omm ndation on sev ra1 arguments . 
Ther was a n ed, it beli v d, to r gu1ate th money supply 
to m t th internal requir ments of th onomy with 
resp t to th maintena nc of both short and long t rm 
stabi1°ty. n the form r respect a ntral bank in a 
manag d ur ency system 
ould moderate the inflationary effects of temporary 
surplus s in th balance of payments by p rmitting 
r s es to ris in relation to the mon y supply, 
if necessary, 0 reduce th deflationary ffects of 
a t mp or y defi it by allowing r s ryes to fall . 2 
n the 1 att sp t a central bank could ensure that the 
money supply was adjusted to th increasing demand 
created by a growing e onomy. The a1ternativ prospect 
was subs qu nt1y pointed out by one of the members of the 
Commission and another writer . 
Wh n a system r quiring a 100 per cent r serv 
ag inst the not issu is app1i d to a growing 
onomy, it m y 10gi ally be expected to impart 
to it a d f1ationary bias. In ord r to create 
th larg r money supply r quired for an 
in re sing population and an ev r-expanding 
domesti trade, it would be ne essary for the 
ountry to ha e a p rsist ntly active balance 
of p y ments, whi h in itself would be a costly 
lu ury for an under-d veloped conomy .3 
noth r rgument of th Commission was that und r a 
man ged moneta y syst m a central bank ould as ist in 
th t blishm nt of n internal mark t for government 
s uriti s. Fin 11y, it w s a gu d that a ntral bank 
would impro th ff tiv n ss of the banking syst m by 
su h m ans as engaging in th 1 ctive en ou agem nt and 
ont 01 of dot, ting as lend r of the last esort, 
nd p oviding r dis ount f iliti s. Th latt r two points 
w r p rh p not r 1 van 
op tOng in th Philippon 
for fund on th ir ov 
Phi l Oppon -own d b nk 
1 
Joint Philippin - m 
pp.lj7- 53. 
2 
b Od., p . 47. 
3 
D id 
o b h s of foreign banks 
sin th y ould always rely 
he d off o Sj but h 
d under th th n urrent 
n FOn n Commi sion, op. cit . , 
I Th Philippin 
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Cen ral 
(August 
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sy 
port 
m to m intain 1 g x ess res rv 
1 lios fo pr c utionary asons , 
s and highly l'quid 
Th plans fo a m n ged moneta y syst m ontrolled 
by a ntr 1 bank w re fo mali zed in th Cent a l Bank Act 
of June 15, 1948, 2 nd som months l at r, on January J, 
1949, th Central Bank of the Philippines began operation 
Th A t d la d that the p incipal obje tives of th Bank 
w re to b th maintenan e of internal monetary stability, 
the preser ation of th int rnational value and 
conv rtibility of the peso,J and the promotion of growth 
in produc tion, mployment and real in omes. The Bank 
was given a monopoly of the issue of currency and required 
to maintain an intern tional reserve to preserve its 
stability and on e tibility. However, changes in the 
reserve and the urrency issue were no longer automatically 
link d. Inst a d, the A t conferred upon the Bank 'broa d 
regulatory authori y over the credit and xchange 
4 
op rations of the banking system'. The Bank's 
instruments for dome - tic credit contro l included 
vari ation of reserve ratios, open market operations,S 
lending to bank'ng institutions, and th s le ctive 
regul tion of b nk operations. Its mo t important power 
over ex hange operations lay in the provision of Section 
74 of th A t whi h stat d that exchange licensing and 
ont 01 ould be adopted as an emergency m asure to 
prot t the internation 1 s r during an hange 
i is. 6 A hange in the pa value of th peso cou ld be 
1 
Ibid. 
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mad only by th P esident of h 
1 Philippin s and was 
p r m'ssibl only: 
(a) When the xisting p r v a lu would mak 
impo 'ble th hiev ment and maint n n of 
a high 1 1 of P odu ion, employment and r al 
in orne i hout : (1) Th deple ion of the int rn tional eserv 
of he C ntr 1 Bank; 0 
(2) The hroni use of e trictions on the 
on ertibility of th peso into foreign 
cu en ies or on th transferabil'tyabroad 
of funds f om the Phil'ppin Sj or 
(J) Undu Go rnm nt ' nterv ntion in, or 
rest i tion of, the international flow of 
goods and s vi es; or 
(b) When unifo m p oportionat 
r made by the ount i s which 
nternational Monetary Fund; or 
hang s in par valu s 
are members of th 
) When the operation of any ex 
international ag em nt to which 
Ph'lippines is a party requi e 
gold value of the p so . 2 
utive or 
the Republi of the 
an alteration in the 
Th A t ma de the entral Bank financial adviser and 
b nk r to th Go e nm nt . Direct loans from the Bank to 
the Governm nt and its politi al subdivisions were limited 
to short term seasonal advan es to be repaid by the end 
of th first quarter following the fiscal year in whi h 
they w re m de. Thei total could not ex eed 15 per cent 
of th a erage annual in orne of the borrower for the last 
thr e pr ding years . J Howe er, the Bank was also given 
responsibilit for developing and maintaining a market 
fo go rnm·nt e uriti s wi h a view to promoting private 
investm nt n gove nm nt obligations . 
The C nt al Bank had be n fun tioning for l ess than 
a y ar wh n the a 1 rating rat of de l ' ne of the 
1 
H in tu n, ould t only on the propo al of th 
Mon t y Bad with 1 st fi of it m mQers 
on nd ubje t to h pro isions of any e e utive 
or ion 1 gI em nts to whi h th Ph'lippines w s 
p Tn add ' t'on, Cong ssion 1 pp 0 al was required 
n , unl ss onditi ns w uffi i ntly grave and 
nt, 'n whi h as th Pr sident was r quir d to 
por on his tion to ong e at h earliest 
oppo tuni y. 
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int rnational reserv 
controls . Th s were 
induc d it t o impl ment xchange 
introduced on D c mb r 9, 1949,1 
and w r to r main throughout th following dec a de in an 
att mpt to pr s rve th p ar value of th p so . ot until 
1 960 was a process of d v luation and 'd ontrol' initiat d .
2 
twas spr dover n a rly two years by th use of a multiple 
exchang rate system was subj ct to discr t chang s . 
Vi wed ompositely, th price of foreign exchang rose 
whil at th sam time restrictions on its avail a bility 
for importing purposes w r gra dua lly removed. Ev ntually, 
on January 2 1, 1962, n arly a ll direct r strictions on 
trad and payments were abandoned J a nd a single free market 
e change rate, modified by some offici a l stabilization 
activity, was permitted to move relativ ly freely to an 
'equilibrium' 1 vel . By ovember of that year the buying 
rate was PJ . 89/U.S . $ 1 ,00 a nd the selling rat was PJ . 91/ 
U .S . $l,OO at approximately which levels they r ma ined with 
the aid of Ce ntra l Bank support . On ovember 8, 1965, the 
o ff i cial par value of the peso was changed from P2 . 00 to 
P J . 90 per U . S. $ 1.00, t hus officially recognizing the 
4 
xistenc of these new rates. 
During t he period of exchange control, and subsequently, 
the monetary system developed in as much as there was a 
rapid exp a nsion in the number of banking institutions 
accepting d mand deposits. This institutiona l growth was 
to some e tent a response t o the inc ntives, security a nd 
encouragement oIf red by the C ntra l Bank, but it was 
prob bly a lso in p art r fl ction of the over- a ll grow th 
of th e onomy . n 1950 there were 1 2 comm rcial b a nks 
1 
C ntr 1 Bank of th Philippin ,Circular 0 . 20, Dec mber 
9, 1949 . 
2 
C ntral B nk of th Philippine, Circular' 0 .105 and 
0 . 1 0 6, pril 25, 1960. 
J C ntr 1 B nk of the Philippin , Circul ar o .lJJ . Th r 
r m in d, or r t h r, w s introdu ed a single signifi ant 
r striction. Thi w s on th for ign e hange proc eds 
of m r h ndis xpor s. Tw nty per c nt of thes had to 
be so l d to th C ntral B nk t the offi ial rate of 
P2 . 00/U .. $ 1.00 . On D mb 1964, 
w s mod ' f' d to empt 
ov mb r 6, 1965, it w s 
C ntr 1 B nk of th Ph ' lippin s, port, 
1 965, p .116.) 
~ 
C ntr 1 B nk of th Philippines, 
R port, 1965, p.116. 
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op rating 20 offi s in Manil nd 84 branch sand 
agen i s Is where "n th 1 ountry. By he nd of 1965 
th numb of commer i 1 banks had ncr ased over 
thr fold a nd th re w s a tota l of 368 branches and 
" 2 1 ( agen 1es. Fo lowing legislat ion in 1952 Re public Act 
0.7 2 0) , system of rural banks was stablish d . Th s 
banks w re dependent for their formation on loc a l 
initiative, but were assist d by th subscription of s om e 
gov rnm nt capital and by special rediscount privileges 
with th Central Bank . By th end of 1965 there were 309 
of the m of which 49 wer authori z ed to accept demand 
deposits. 3 
THE BEHAVIOUR OF THE MO Y UPPLY 
I n this study the money supply is defin d as the sum 
of curr ncy in circulation and 'adjust d' demand deposits . 
Curren y in circulation is taken to be the tota l currency 
issue 1 ss curr ncy held by the ationa l Gov rnment and 
the banking system, wh r the latter consists of the 
comm rcial, rural and savings banks, excluding the Pos tal 
avings Bank . 'Adjusted' demand d posits include unused 
ov rdraft and man g rs ' and cashiers' cheques, but 
exclud ational Go rnm nt nd int r-bank deposits .
4 
End-of-year timates for th Phi lippine money upply, so 
defin d, ar pres nt d for th years 1945-65 in Tabl III . l . 
Th behaviour of th money supply can be analysed in 
terms of th behaviour of the ass ts backing it . This 
'balanc sh t' ap pro a h views th money supply as equal 
to th sum of th int rnational reserve and the domestic 
credits of both th banking system and th C n ral Bank 
(exc luding C ntral Bank r dit ext nded to th banking 
sys m i If) minus th urn of non-mon y upply d posits 
and th n t bal n of those misc 11 neous accounts of 
th b nk "ng syst m and th C ntral B nk whi h ar not 
c l ssifi d I s wh r . on-mon y supply d posits consist 
1 
2 
R 
3 
4 
< onomi urv y Mi sOon to the Philipp"n s, loco it . 
Philipp"n s, nth Annua l 
b"d . , p . 23 · 
for hoo ing this d fin"tion of mon y supply 
b low in pp nd " A, Part I . 
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Tab 1 I . 1: End of Year Money Supply, 194 5-65 
(Mill ion pe s os) 
End of Curren y in Dema nd To ta l Money Per cent 
Y a r Cir u1ation Deposits Supply change of 
money supply 
over previous 
end of year 
figure 
1945 882 . 0 238 .0 1,120.0 
1946 539 · 0 401 . 0 940 . 0 - 16 .1 
1947 558 . 0 457 · 0 1,015 .0 + 7 · 8 
1948 576 . 0 618 . 0 1,194.0 + 17 · 6 
1949 569 · 9 465.5 1,035 . 4 - 13 · 3 
19 50 674 . 7 554 · 3 1, 229 · 0 + 18 . 7 
19 5 1 644 . 5 5 15 ·9 1,160 . 4 5 . 6 
195 2 629 . 7 568 . 5 1,198 . 2 + 3 · 3 
1953 665 · 9 558 .1 1, 224 . 0 + 2 . 2 
1954 676 . 5 55 0.0 1, 226 . 5 + 0 . 2 
1955 670 . 3 665 · 8 1,336 .1 + 8 . 9 
1956 7 18 . 5 7 0 . 4 1,498 .9 + 1 2 . 2 
1957 781 . 0 8 16 . 9 1, 597 . 9 + 6 . 6 
19 58 18 . 3 919 · 5 1 ,737 . 8 + 8 . 8 
1959 894 .1 948 . 0 1, 842 .1 + 6 . 0 
1960 949 · 2 94 2 . 9 1, 892 . 1 + 2 · 7 
196 1 1 ,047 . 1 1,169 . 7 2,216 ·9 + 17 · 2 
1962 1,169. 6 1,331. 2 , 501.4 + 12 . 
19 63 1,358 .4 1, 590.9 2,949 . 3 + 17 · 9 
1964 1,318 .9 1, 549 . 1 2,868 .0 2 . 
1965 1, 475 . 4 1, 583 . 7 3,059 ·1 + 6 . 7 
our C nt 1 B nk f the Phi lippines, tatistic a 1 
Bulletin, iou issues . 
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of th at iona l Go ernment's balan s, h ld as either 
urr n y 0 on d posit, nd the savings and tim d pos·ts 
of r sid nts wi h the banking syst m. The n t bal a nc 
of th mis ellaneous a ount s includes h pita l 
ac ount of the b a nking system a nd the Central Bank . 
Mov m nts in the mon y supply a n th refor b treat d 
as th n out om of mov ment in a ll th s it ms . 
Estimates of t hem for the p riod 194 5-65 ar shown in 
Table I . 2 . 
Over the twenty years from the end of D cember 1 94 6 
to the nd of D cember 1965 th money supply grew from 
P l120 million to PJ 0 59 million, a n increase of l7J . l p r 
cent . Column 1 of Tab le III . 2 indi ates that over the 
sam p riod the ne t ontribu t ion of the changes in the 
int rna tional reserve to this growth was a negat ive one, 
ev n despit e a n upwa rd peso reva luation of the reserve 
as a r sult of ex hange d ep reci ation . (This reva luation 
~ ~ h a d, of course, no e ffect on the money sup p ly . I n 
terms of t his b a l a n ce s hee t appro ac h it was offset by a n 
equivalent a d j ustmen t in the misc e ll a neous accounts of 
the b a nking system a nd Centra l Bank . l ) T hus the growth 
in mon y supply resulted from a n expansion of domestic 
r dit which in reased from P162 million to P7767 million . 
This xp a nsion easily outw ighed the decline in th 
int rnati ona l r serve, the in rease in non-mon y sup p ly 
deposits a nd th in rea e in t he ne t balan e of 
mis 11 n ous a count a ll taken tog ther . 
Within the p riod 194 5-65 the rate of expansion of 
th mon y supply was f ar from e ven . At th nd of 194 5 
the money supply wa about four time its pre-wa r level . 
Th P so a lue of t h int rnational r s rv xc ed d it 
in s z domesti redit wa (relativ ly) very sma l l, 
a nd th b nks h ld 1 rg x ess r ser es. During 194 6 
th mon y supply d lin d by 1 6 . 1 P r ent . The prin ipal 
r a on for this w s th 1 rg defi it in th b l a n of 
p y m n s whi h b rought a fall of U. $22 7 mi ll ion in 
1 
Mo g n rally, it should be note d t h t th nd-of-ye a r 
t s of th pe 0 lu of th internationa l r s rv 
p riod 19 6 0 -65, d by the C ntra l Bank 
of Philippin s nd hown bl I I . 2, w re m d 
by ting the for ign x v l u s of t h r 
o at ar iou x h a nge Con quent l y , within 
iod 19 5 9- 65 , nd- f-y ar t o nd-of-y ar hang s 
in p so lu of th int rnation 1 r s r s a re not 
m p opo tio n £1 tion of mo m nt in for ign 
holdings . 
Tab l I . 2: o igins of the Mo n y Supply, 1945-65 
( mi llion p s o s) 
(3 ) ( 4) (5) 
End o f nter- Domesti 
Year national Credits 
R serve 
on-Mon y Mis el l aneous Money b 
Supply Accounts ( t Sup p ly 
Dep osits Bal anc)a 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
195 1 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1 ,338 . 3 
885 · 1 
907 · 0 
840 . 2 
520 . 2 
711. 8 
607 . 7 
611. 8 
592 . 0 
545.4 
418.4 
449.4 
280 . 1 
290 . 6 
325·8 
472 . 3 
292.0 
418.3 
421. 7 
324 . 8 
776 . 4 
162 .1 
348 . 6 
558.0 
689 · 5 
813 · 9 
898 . 4 
1 ,1 14 . 2 
1,142 . 2 
1 241. 3 
1 , 344 . 7 
1,758 . 8 
2,082 . 5 
2,521.7 
2,807 . 9 
3,210 . 3 
3,379 . 6 
4,567.9 
5,120.5 
6,328.4 
7,141.4 
7,766 . 6 
164 . 3 
250 . 2 
315 . 6 
302 . 2 
369 . 6 
452 . 7 
590 . 6 
539 · 6 
572 . 2 
619 · 0 
735 · 2 
893.2 
927 . 8 
1,049 . 8 
1,265·1 
1,442 . 3 
1,945 . 4 
2,427 . 8 
2,867 . 2 
3,082 . 2 
3,392 . 5 
216 .1 
43 . 5 
134 . 4 
33 · 5 
- 70 . 9 
- 71. 5 
- 29 ·1 
16 . 2 
37 · 1 
44 . 6 
105 · 9 
139 . 8 
276 . 1 
310 · 9 
428 . 9 
517·5 
697 . 6 
609 . 6 
933 . 6 
1,516 . 0 
2,09 1. 4 
1, 120 . 0 
940.0 
1,015 · 0 
1,194 . 0 
1 ,035 . 4 
1 ,229 · 0 
1 , 160 . 4 
1, 198 . 2 
1, 224 . 0 
1,226 . 5 
1 , 336 . 1 
1,498 . 9 
1,597 . 9 
1,737 · 8 
1,842 . 1 
1 , 92 . 1 
2,216 . 9 
2,501.4 
2,949 . 3 
2,868 . 0 
3 , 059 ·1 
a Data in this olumn in l ude for som years a residual 
item rep esenting lags in e 0 ding inter-bank 
trans tions and oth r rror 
b (5) (1) + (2) - (3) - (4) 
All data p ior to 1961 r p rodu e d fro m 
C ntral B nk of th Philipp ine , Statistical 
Bull t ' n, ol . X I, 0 . 1 (Mar h 1961 ), Tab l e 
1 . Al l sub qu nt data re d riv d fro m 
riou bl in C ntra l Bank of th 
Philippin , t tisti a l Bul l tin, Vol. XVIII, 
0 . 2 (Jun 1966), mon Y and b nking e tion . 
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th internationa l res rv I n the following two ypars 
th money supply gr w to Pl194 million, an increase of 
P254 million ov r its l evel at th end of 1946 This 
growth r ived its imp tus from the xpansion of bank 
cr di t whi h, as an b s en from Tab l e I1 . J, was 
xtend d m inly to the private sector . The expansion 
was undoubt dly associated with the rapid recovery of 
produ tion follow · ng the devastation of the War . 
Cr dit outsta nding to the public sector r mained 
relativ ly low despit the budget deficits exp rienced 
in that se tor . Although the fiscal year nding June 
JO, 194 8, h d yi Ided a small surplus of PJ million, 
the cumulat ive budg t deficit of the at iona l 
Government from F bruary 25, 1945, until the end of the 
1948 fiscal year amounted to P250 million a nd this was 
to rise by another p40 million in the following fisc a l 
1 y ar . evertheless, the total b a nk credit outstanding 
to th at iona l Government (and the public sector as a 
whole) at the end of Decemb r 1948 a mounted to only some 
P9J million. The prin ipa l source of fina nce for the 
cumul ative defi it had, in fact, been a loan of P120 
million in 1947 from the United stat s Reconstruction 
Finance Corporat ion. 
With th stablishment of the Ce ntral Bank in 1949, 
the public s ctor's ess to b a nk credit was greatly 
in r sed, not only be a us the Centra l Bank was permitted 
to make limited hort term d a nces directly t o it, but 
a lso b ause th Centr a l Bank, by being willing to 
r dis ount, buy 0 ma k advan es against government 
s uriti s a qu · red b the other banks, cou ld encourage 
b nks to in r s the ir purch ses of such securiti s . 
At th end of 1949 the C ntra l Bank had outs anding 
redit of P148 million with the publi sector . However, 
the d lin of hint rn tional re rve in i949 by U. 
$ 1 60 mill ion, r fl ting in p art re ord b a lan e of 
trad d fi it, en ur d th t th money supply decr as d 
ov r th ye r . T h tual rat of dec lin was IJ.J per 
n . Du ing 19 5 0 th r w s a b a l a n of paym nts 
surplus brought bou by h Ko a n W r boom in e port 
pri nd stri t impo t and e h ng ontrols . This, 
tog th r with n p nsion of edit to th publi 
1 
E onomi Sur ey Mission to th Philippin op. cit ., 
p. 22 . 
End 
of 
Year 
194 5 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1 94 9 
1 950 
1 951 
1952 
1953 
1 95 4 
1 9 55 
1 95 6 
1957 
1958 
1959 
196 0 
1961 
196 2 
19 6 3 
196 4 
1965 
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Tabl II . 3: Outst nding Dom stic Credits of 
Ba nks, 1945- 65 
(m'llion p sos) 
To Public Sector a To Privat S ctor b 
fr om from fr om Total 
Centra l o t h r otal othe r Domestic 
Bank Banks c Banks c Credits 
- 25 · 9 25 · 9 136 . 2 1 6 2 . 1 
-
54 . 2 54 . 2 294 . 4 348 . 6 
- 71 . 8 71. 8 486 . 2 558 . 0 
- 92 . 6 92 . 6 59 6 . 9 68 9 · 5 
148 . 1 91. 6 239 · 7 574 . 2 813 · 9 
218 . 2 109 · 1 3 27 . 3 571.1 898 . 4 
264.1 89 · 8 353 · 9 760.3 1,114 . 2 
265 .1 115 · 1 380 . 2 7 62 . 0 1,142 . 2 
260 . 2 133 · 2 393 . 4 847 . 9 1,241. 3 
282 . 5 1 23 · 4 405 . 9 938 . 8 1,344 . 7 
417 · 9 234 . 8 6 52 . 7 1,106 . 1 1,758 . 8 
472. 6 355 · 5 828 . 1 1,254 . 4 2 . 082 . 5 
841 · 3 1 6 7.5 1,008 . 8 1,512 . 9 2,521. 7 
1,049 . 2 171.1 1,220 · 3 1,587 . 6 2,807 · 9 
1,249 . 0 182.4 1,431.4 1,778.9 3, 210 . 3 
1 ,222 . 8 194 . 1 1,416 .9 1,95 2 . 7 3,379 . 6 
1,425 . 7 530.4 1,956 .1 2 , 611.8 4,567.9 
1,528 . 6 433 · 4 1,96 2 . 0 3,158.5 5,120 . 5 
1,561. 2 635 . 5 2,196 . 7 4,131.7 6 ,328 . 4 
1, 622.7 732 . 1 2,354.8 4,786 . 6 7,141 . 4 
1,584 . 8 1,126 . 7 2,711.5 5,055 · 1 7,766 . 6 
a Including local government and semi - government enti t ies . 
b 0 Central Bank credit outstanding directly to the 
pr'vate sector . 
c Commercial banks, sa v Ings banks (excluding the Postal 
Saving Ba nks ) and rural banks . 
Sourc s : nt al Bank of the Philippines, Statistical 
Bulletin,various issues . 
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1 sector, caus d an increase in the money supply of 18.7 
per cent, raising it to a level of P1229 million. 
Although it was to continue to climb to a peak of P1292 
million at the end of April 1951, it subsequently 
d ropped rapidly to Pl16 0 million by the end of the 
follow ing December . For the year 1951 as a whole the 
growth in outstanding domestic credits wa s more than 
offset by a balance of payments deficit of U. S . $ 52 
mill ion (resulting from a partial relaxation of import 
contro l s which was intended to reduce inflationary 
2 pressures ) and by a growth in non-money supply depos its 
(reflecting, particularly, an improvement in the cash 
balance position of the ational Government, which owed 
much to a considerable volume of tax legislation enacted 
in the latter half of 1950 and 1951) . 
The t wo year period from the end of 1951 to the end 
of 1953 saw surplus budgets for the ational Government 
and a slight net decline in the international reserv e . 
The growth in the money supply was only p 6 4 million, 
representing a rate of increase of 5 . 5 per cent over 
the t wo years. The main stimulus to this growth 
appears to have been an expansion of credit to the 
pr'vate sector. The same stimulus was also present 
during 1954, but its impact was off set mainly by a 
larger decline in the international reserve and a rise 
in non-money supply deposits which together kept money 
supply virtually constant. Howev er, the events of 1954 
were highly significant for future monetary developments. 
The advent of President Ramon Mag aysay ' s administration 
brought a switch to expansive monetary policies t h a t 
we re designed to finance a five year devel opment plan. 
Republic ct 0.1000 of June 12, 1954, authorized the 
issue of up to Pl,OOO million of government bonds . The 
absence of any significant market for these outside the 
bank 'ng sector implied a large extension of bank cred it 
to the government . The money supply increased by 8 . 9 
per cent in 1955 and by 12 . 2 per cent in 1956 . Although 
a large proportion of th bonds were initially bought 
by th ommercial nd o t her private banks, the Central 
1 
Th ation .l Gov rnment ' s d fi its for th fiscal y ars 
1949/50 nd 1950/ 51 w r P153 million and P13 million 
r sp ctlv ly. (Un't d atlons, Economi Surv y of Asia 
and th F a r East, 1954) . 
2 
f . Golay, op . cit . , p.224 . 
B nk loa qu ed s1gn1f1 ant quantit1 s und the 
authoriz tion of s tion 97 of th Central Bank Act 
whi h p rmit ed the Bank 0 engag n op n m rk t 
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op rations . Ultim t ly, by thes mans, mos of th 
bo nd s t nded 0 end up in th C ntral Bank's portfolio . 
This p 0 ss allowed a onsiderable xpansion of 
pri a r di in 1957 . ev rthel ss, the rate of 
in r of mon y supply d lined to 6.6 per c nt in 
that y ar . Th p vious year the international r s rv 
had shown a slight rise due to stri ter import controls, 
but th w re r lax d in 1957, imports rose to their 
high st post-war level, and the international reserve 
f 1 1 by U.S. $85 million . This last factor plus rises 
in non- money supply deposi sand th mis ellaneous 
a ounts of the banks damp ned the impa t of the credit 
expansion and thus aused the reduction in the rat of 
i n crease of the mon y supply . 
The y ar 1958 and 1959 witnessed small balanc of 
payments surpluses on ac ount of a return to stricter 
controls 0 er imports and a growth in export earnings . 
Th e, together with a ontinued expansion in outstanding 
Central Bank red · t 0 th publi ector and a sharp 
ris in th outstanding redit of other banks to the 
privat se to in 1959, were the main forces underlying 
th growth in th money supply from P1598 million at the 
nd of 1 957 to P1842 million at th end of 1959 · 
In 1960 the money supply in reas d by only 2.7 per 
cent . Th rise in th international reserve by U.S. $ 29 
million nd th p ob bl boost to th money supply 
resul ing from the t u tur of the multipl ex hang 
rat ystem intr du d at th start of th exchange 
d ontrol p og amm in Ap il 1960 w r not a companied 
by ny 1 rg is in dome red1t . In par.t th1S was 
a refl tion of h 10n 1 0 ernm nt budg t urplus 
fo h fi 1 y a 1959/60. This h lp d bring about a 
d l ' n in redit outs nd1ng to th publi se to In 
achi v ' ng th urplus th Go rnment w s assist d by 
r v nu f om a r 'm rg1n fe ' on ale of for ign 
int odu d p io t and m intained during th 
d ntr 1 p ogr mm 
Th 0110 ing a th rate of 1n r a of money 
supply 1 rat d r p1dl. From th nd of 1 960 to th 
nd f 1 9 1 ' t g w b 17.2 P n 35 . 2 p r nt 
xp n ion n u stand1ng dom ti ' edits w s th main 
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contributor to this growth . It st mm d from v ari ous 
sources in luding a 1 g n ati ona l gov rnm nt budget 
deficit for the fis r nding June 30, 1961, a nd 
g n ral e asi ng of mon ary policy. The y ar 1962 saw a 
sharp cutb a k in th rate of expansion of domestic cr dit 
and a ris in non-mon y supply deposits as a result of 
tight r mon tary a nd mor conservat'v fiscal policies 
which w re d igned to support the abandonment of dir ct 
controls over for ign xch nge transactions and the flo ting 
of th x hange rate . verth 1 ss, a sl ack ning in 
the int nsity of these policies towards the end of the 
year and a balanc of payments surplus ensured that the 
money supply rose for the year as a whole by 12 . 8 per 
cent . In 1963 i increased by a further 17 · 9 per cent 
the high st rat of increase since 1950 . Private credit 
played the major role in this growth, though it was 
support d by an in rease in credit outsta nding to the 
p ublic sector which a rne mai nly from the commercial 
banks . The net impact of the foreign s ctor was 
negligible. 
Aft r a thr e year period in whi h the money supply 
h a d grown by n arly 56 per c nt, it fell by 2 . p r c n t 
in 1964 . This decline had its origins, to a l arg extent, 
in a d terioration of the balan of payments, which 
stemm d in p art from a spe ulative ap ita l outflow . The 
det rioration impli d a redu tion in the liquidity 
position of the omm rial b a nks which was intensified 
by a transfer from th m to th C ntra l Bank of government 
d posits . As a r sult there was also som retardation 
in the growth of outstanding domestic cr dit . Final l y, 
during 1965 money supply on e mor expanded, this time 
by 6 . 7 p r c nt a nd a r ach d 1 vel at the end of the 
year of P3059 million. Th stimulus to this growth came 
mainly from a bal n of p aym nts surplus, sin e the rat 
of in r s of domesti redit a g a in de lined . 
T EMPIRICAL RELE A CE OF THE QUA TITY THEORY 
As a starting point to this mpiric 1 inve tigation 
o h v lidity of th Quantity Theory of Money in the 
Ph' l ipp n it key v a iabl must b s t d . 
Let M 
b th qu nt·ty of mon y, h incom v 
locity of 
ul ion, P th price or P i 
1 ve l of final 
outp ut, nd T ggr g t al output 0 n 
om Tog th r, 
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th s v riables yield a version of ish r's famous 
truism, th Equation of Ex hang 
(II . 1) M = PT 
Interpr t d in an s nse, this °d ntity becom s 
condition of mac 0- quilibrium: 
I . 2) MV :: PT 
which can b mployed to illustrate the hypoth ses of the 
Quantity Theory. However, empirical testing of thes 
hypotheses must re l y necessarily on ~ post data, even 
though su h r liance creates the difficulty of 
distinguishing between th observed and the true 
behavioural or ' quilibrium' values of V, T and P . The 
Philippine data for the years 1946-65 inclusive are 
p resente d in Table III . 4 
n this table M is identified as the average year l y 
money supply; 1 MV( :: PT), the level of money income or 
exp enditur , is defined as GNP at current prices ; P is 
me as ured by the GNP implicit price deflator index ( 1955= 
100); nd T is represented by GNP at 1955 prices. The 
~ post in ome velocity, V, is calculated by dividing 
GNP at current pric s by the average yearly money supply . 
Thus ther is established a form of the above identity . 
Th most famous but also th most naive of Quantity 
Th ory hypothese is that the money supply determine 
the pri e lev 1 on a directly proportional manner. This 
hypoth sis ould b test d by examining directly the 
lin ar statisti 1 el tionship between average yearly 
money supply and the G P implicit price d flator for 
1946-65 . How ver, in order to reduc the likelihood of 
auto orr 1 tion, 
seri s of thes 
th 
ari 
first diff ren es of th annual 
2 bles ar employed . This latter 
1 
Av r g 
comput d 
stimat 
y a to 
stim 
y rly mon y supply for any 1 ndar year is 
th wight d v rag of th five nd-of-quarter 
stret hing from Dec mber Jl of the pre ding 
of thr 
c omput 
mb r Jl of th urrent year . The two t rminal 
r e h signed only half th weight of ach 
middl e estimat s. In eff t, this proc dur 
s v rage y arly money supply as the unweight d 
of fou stimat s of averag quart rly money supply, 
y a , 
est ° m 
of th 
2 
the four qu rte s lies within the curr nt 
h of th four av rag quart rly 
a th mean of mone y supply at th end 
t th end of th pr vious qu rter. 
ai Ez ki 1 nd K 1 
(Third 
of Corre l ation 
York, J ohn 
Y a r 
1946 
1947 
194 8 
1 949 
1950 
19 5 1 
1952 
19 5 3 
19 54 
19 55 
1956 
195 7 
19 58 
195 9 
19 60 
19 6 1 
19 62 
1963 
1964 
1965 
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T bl III . 4: Equation of Exc h ang Comp one n ts , 
1 9L~ 6 - 65 
Money Income G TP GNP at G at 
a Su pply v 10city ofb i mplici t 19 55 
curr n t 
circulation price p r i ces pric s 
(million def l ator ( million ( million 
p os) ( 19 55= 100 ) pes o s ) P s os ) 
(M ) (V ) (p) (T) PT (= MV ) 
9 19 . 6 5 · 05 194 · 3 2 388 46L,0 
91 8 . 6 6 . 45 123 . 4 480 2 5924 
1093 · 7 5 . 6L~ 114 . 8 5373 6 168 
1099 ·1 5 . 58 107 · 3 57 18 6 136 
1124 . 7 5 · 89 10 6 . 4 6228 6625 
12 1 5 · 1 6 . 0 6 11 2 · 9 652 3 7367 
1152 . 5 6 . 52 106 . 0 7 093 75 19 
1 186 . 6 6 . 7 4 104 . 7 764 6 8002 
12 19 · 0 6 · 70 101. 4 8 0 58 8 170 
123 5 · 3 7 · 0 3 100 . 0 687 86 7 
141 5 · 7 6 . 64 103 · 0 91 32 9406 
1556 . 4 6 . 42 104 . 9532 999 1 
1643 . 0 6 . 50 107 · 6 992 9 10648 
1804 . 8 6 . 30 108 . 1 105 14 11369 
18 16 . 8 6 . 67 112 . 2 10804 12 126 
2 0 17 ·0 6 . 66 117 · 5 1143 1 1343 2 
2240.0 6 . 68 126 . 5 1183 2 14 972 
26 9 .0 6 · 36 137 · 8 12457 17 170 
2768 . 3 6 . 79 144 . 9 12967 18787 
2820 · 7 7 ·1 9 148 . 3 13670 20 274 
M t 1 + 2M t. + 2M t . . + 2M t + M t Av r g e year l y mo ney _ - iv 1 11 iii i v 
s up ply in y ar t - ----~------~~8~------------~----
wh r e M is money s up ply at e nd of peri od; 
t -i ,t i ndi te t h yars; 
nd i, i i, i ii nd i v i nd i at th quarters e nding 
M rch 3 1 , Jun 30 , Sep t mb r 30 nd Decemb e r 3 1 
r s p ctiv l y . 
b G t u rre n t pr i c s ~ v rage year l y mon y supp l y . 
our s : Ce n tra l Bank of t h 
C n tr 1 Bank of t he 
Bull ti n , v r i ou issu es ; 
Vol. II -X ( 1959- 66), s o nd 
v o lum; nd Tab 1 s 1 . 3 a nd 
r, 
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appro h p s nts, of ourse, only a part· 1 test of 
th ex·st n e 0 p opo ion 1ity betwe n mon y supp ly 
a nd th 
th two 
lev 1. Even if th first differences ·n 
i b1 ended to b 1ated proportionately, 
this would be only a necessary bu not suffi ient 
ondition of p oportiona1ity b tween the absolute 
va1u s . n fa t, the line a r egression of first 
diff ren s in the pri e level on first dirferences n 
th money supply is: 
( I . J) 6P t = -8 .059 + 0.05 6 6M t (O.OJJ) 
0 .144) 
where 6P
t 
is th first difference in the GNP imp1·cit 
price d e fl ator between y ar t and year t-1, 
and 6M
t 
is the first differenc in the average y ar1y 
money supply between year t nd year t-1. 
This relationship is 1e ar1y a very w ak on The 
regression oeffi ient is not statistically signigicant 
1 
at the 5 p r ce nt 1 v 1 and the co frici nt or 
determination indi ates that only some 14 per cent of 
the v a rian in th first differences of the price 
index is xp1ained statisti a lly by the first differenc s 
2 
in money supply. 
1 
Throughou this study the statisti al significance of 
r gr ssion oeffi i nts is tested through the use of t 
statisti. The hypothesis is a lways the null one that 
the true regression oeffi ient is z roo 
2 
The r l at ionship is strengthen d onsiderably, and the 
constant t rm r du ed in si ze, if th 194 6 data (or, 
mor pre isely, th first differen es for 194 6-47) are 
droppe d from th omputations. The result b omes: 
2 
( II . Ja) 6P - 1.602 + 0.028 6M t (0 .010 ) 
(r = 0.J54) 
This impro ment r fIe ts the abs n e of th influen 
of th traordinarily larg expansions in ~ and 
b tw en 1946 and 1947. 
Further 
th 
addi ion, 
th 
n n 
months ending 
mon y upp1y for 
y r - 1. ( 
Thus: 
.Jb) 6P t 
How in bo h 
d t tion, 
- 1. 96 
t h 
2 i , 
the statisti al signif·can of 
nd in r2 a hi v d if, in 
ed into th re l ationshi p; 
ble b om s the first 
age money upply for Lh t el 
JO, year t, a nd h ave age 
1 e months nding eptemb r JO, 
r. 5) . 
+ o . OJ 26M t 1 
2 0.417) 
(0.009) -4 
s th 0 ff · i nt of 
st · ll ra h low. 
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How ver, su h a e ult ~ s s not n ssarily 
damaging to th validity of the Quantity Th 0 y. s was 
seen in the last chapt r, th Th ory b ses its claim of 
proportiona lity betw n mon y supply and th pric 1 v 1 
on the assumptions of a constant income velocity of 
circulation nd a constant volume of real output . It is 
recognized that these conditions are likely to exist 
only in th short run. In the long run (and this must 
surely in 1ude a twenty year time span) both V and T 
are p rmitted to vary, a lthough only independently of 
the other variab1 s in the Equatio n of Exchange, a nd 
ther by to influence prices. Accordingly, there is a 
need to examine th b haviour and ffects on the price 
level of both thes factors. 
Velocity is of importance because of the causal 
link it is alleged to provide b tween money supply and 
the 1 vel of a ggregate demand or expenditure . From 
Tab1 III.4 it a ppears that in the Philippines V has 
exp ri nced movements both in the form of tre nd a nd 
short run fluctuations. A fuller discussion of the 
behaviour of velocity is undertaken below, but one way 
o as essing its over-all stability or instability is 
to examine for the period 1946-65 the relationship 
betwe n mon y supply and G at current prices, where 
the 1att r is a n ex post measure of a ggregate demand . 
Again using first differences, the line ar regression 
r 1ationship is: 
(I I . 4) 6PT t = 512 . 57J + J.1016M t (0.961) 
O. J 0) 
wh r 6PT t is th first difference in G at c u rent 
pri s betw en year t and y ar t-1, 
a nd ~t is defin d as in quation (III.J). 
Th r gr ssion 0 ffi i nt i ignificant at the 1 p r 
c nt 1 v 1. This n b vi w d as some upport for th 
Qu nt Oty Th ory argument that h ng s in mon y supply 
us h ng s in tot 1 nditure or income . On th 
oth r hand, the lativ low v 1ue of the oefficient 
of d t rmin tion1 plus th pr sen a g on of a large 
1 
A mu h high r co ffi i nt of 
obtain d if, in pla of the ir 
1 v 1s of mon supply nd 
d termin tion (0 . 9 4) i 
first diff r n es, the 
at urr nt pri s are 
us d s v ri b1 s . How r, 
b us of th st ong upw rd 
this re ult is suspect 
trends in both vari b1 s . 
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onst nt te mind · a e that h ng s in mon y supply 
cannot b th 0 1 aus of hanges in mon y in orne . 
A pting, howey r, that some degre of positiv 
relationship does exist b tween hang s in money supply 
and hang s in total e penditure, the n xt step is to 
inv stigat to what tent the former, together with 
hang s in r a l output (whi h are always assumed to b 
autonomous 0 independ nt of hanges in aggr gate money 
dema nd), explain pri e lev 1 b haviour . In other words, 
the aim is to examine a mor genera l long run Qu a ntity 
Theory hypothesis. Uti lizing t he 1946-65 data , the 
fo l lowing relationship an be obtained by linear multiple 
r gression: 
(II . 5) lJ . 89l + 0 . OJ7 6Mt - 0 . OJ4 6T t (0.011) (O.OOJ) 
where 6P t and 6M t are defin d as in equation III .J 
and 6T t is the fir st difference in GNP at 1955 pri ces 
between year t and year t -l. 
Prima f acie, this result is highly fa ourable to a 
Qu a ntity Th ory of Money explanation of Phi lippine pri e 
lev 1 b h viour. The nnual movements in money supply 
and real output together account for ne ar ly 91 pe cent 
of 11 the v rian e in annua l movements of the G P 
implicit pric deflator, a nd both partial regression 
co fficients e signifi nt a t the 1 p r c nt 1 v 1. 
Equally impo tan 1 , th ' igns or the regre ion 
oe ficients re onsi tent with the bro d a priori 
arguments of the Qu ntity Theory, given that th re exists 
a r 1ationship b tw n mon y upply and aggregate demand. 
An in r as in money supply, other things being qual, 
will t nd to r is th pri e level, whil an increase in 
real output, other things bing equal, will tend to lower 
it . 
How ver, th re a two difficultie as soci ate d with 
the bo sult. The fir tithe high valu of th 
const nt t m, wh O h impli s that wi hout ny hange in 
money upply or re 1 outpu th pri inde would h v 
ris n sub t nil lJ. point nnu lly. This sugg st 
ith r th t 0 h r pl n to y riabl ar missing 
from th fo mulat10n or th t th stru tu of the 
qu tion i n pp op iat condly, th us of the 
fi st d · 1 n o th P · mpli it p i deflator as 
th d P nd nt bl wh n the first dilf r n of G 
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at constant prices was us d as an ind pendent variabl 
may have bi sed the results . This follows be aus the 
GNP i mplicit p ice deflator is obtained by dividing 
G at curr nt pri es by G t constant prices . G · ven 
GNP at current pri es, any errors in GNP at constant 
p ri es must be ref l cted inversely in the G implicit 
price deflator. This type of ph nomenon may possibly 
hav contributed to the negative statistical 
r l ationship between 6T and 6P . 
To reduce the possibility of such bias equation 
I . 5 can be re-estimated emp loying first differenc s in 
the Composite Co nsumer Price Index for Manila (1955 
100) in plac of first differences in the GNP implicit 
price deflator. 
different: 
The new result is, however, not greatly 
(III . 6) 
wher 
6P t = 12.714 + 0 . 02J6M t - 0 . 0286Tt (0.010) (O . OOJ) 
0 . 088 ) 
6Pc t is the first difference in the Manila Composite 
Consumer Price Inde betwe n year t and year 
t-l , 
and th independent variables ar defined as above . Both 
regression coefficients h ve unchanged signs and both are 
statistica lly significant, a lthough the coefficient of 
6M t is now significant at th 5 p r c nt level but not 
at th 1 P r c nt 1 1. The size of the coefficients, 
r gardless of sign, has fallen, that of 6M t by relatively 
mo re than 6T t . De lines also occur for the constant t rm 
and th coeffi ient of multiple d termination . However, 
th l att r d lines ar only marginal . Wi th r sp c t to 
the imp ct on th pric 1 vel of hanges in money supply 
and real output, the r suIt is still onsistent with the 
Qu ntity Th ory of Mon y. 
On g n 1 criti ism of 11 the results presen ted 
bov s tha th d ta in Iud om highly typica l first 
diffe for th 1946-47 p iod . 1 Betw 1946 and n 
1947 th e oc urr d by f th 1 rgest abso lu te and 
per nt g h ng s n ity, real output nd prices 
for th whol twenty y und r onsid r tion . These 
undoubt dly r fl t d h di turb d and d v st ted 
n atur of the onomy in 194 6 and the r pid r 0 ery 
th r ft As may th for be P t d, omission of 
1 
Cf . p.l 4 n.2. 
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the y r 1946 f om the period whose pr b h viour is 
bing inv stigated has a not· abl impa t on the 
r sult . For th p riod 1947-65 the r lationship betw n 
first diff r n s in money supply a nd first differenc s 
in GNP at curr nt pri es improv s consid rably by 
comp aris on with equation II . 4 to b om: 
6PT t = 432·914 + 3 .44 86M t (0.9 2 3) 
2 (r = 0.466) 
wh r th regr ssion oefficient is significant at the 
1 p r c nt 1 vel . 
On th oth r hand, th relationship betw n first 
diff r nces in the G implicit price defl ator as the 
dependent v ariable and first differences in money 
supply and r a l output as th indep nd nt variables is 
mark dly wakened by comparison with equation III . 5 . For 
1947- 65 it becom s: 
(I I . 8) 6P t = 2 .32 5 + 0.0306Mt - 0.0086Tt (0.010) (0.009) 
0 . 387 ) 
D spite the facts that the constant term is gr atly 
r duced in magnitude, that the signs of the regression 
co ffi ients are consistent with Quantity Theory 
hypoth se , and that the oefficient of chang s in money 
supply is signifi ant at th 1 per cent 1 v 1, the 
ind pendent variabl s together e plain only 39 per cent 
of th v arian e in h nges in the price index and the 
regr ssion coeffi ient of hang s in real output is no 
long r signifi ant at ev n th 5 p r c nt 1 v 1 . Th 
use of hang s in th Manil Composite Consumer Price 
nd . n pla 
furth r w 
of ch ng s in th G P d flator still 
ns th r lationship: 
(II . 9) 5·85 + 0 . 019 6M t - 0.013 6T t 0.225) (0.010) (0.010) 
Lagging th mon y supply v riabl by one quarter brings 
no sub t nt'al impro m nt in the sults fo 1947- 65 
and , in f t, slightly wor ns the d gr of correlation 
betw n fir t diff ren s in mon y supply and G P at 
curr nt p Thus : 
3,5 6 66M t 1 
2 (II , 10) 6PT t 423·700 (r =0 . 457) ( 0.971) -"4 
(r . 11) 6P t -1 . 324 + 0.03 2 6M t 1 - 0 . 001 6T t (0.010) -"4 (0 . 009) 
(H2= 0 . 41 ) 
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(I I .12) 6P t - 3. 233 f o. 023 6M t 1 
(0.010) "4 
-0 . 0076T 
(0 .009) 
wh ~t-L is th fi st di ference betw n av rage 
4 
mo n ey supply for th tw Iv months ending 
S pember 30, yea t, nd th av rage money 
supply for the twel e months nding eptember 
30 , yea t-l (s e Tabl III.5), 1 and the 
other ri bles are defined as abov . 
Howeve , if instead of onducti ng the ana l ysis for 
th p eriod 1947-65 in t rms of first differen s , atten tion 
is co n entrated on explaining the p ercentage rate of change 
of the pri ce level, a somewhat different pi ctur e m rg s . 
Re la ti ng annual per entage va iations in G at urrent 
pri s to the orresponding annua l percentag variations 
in money supply yie ld s the following result: 
. 13) %6PT t = 5 · 213 + 0.290%6Mt (0 .11 5) 
where %6PT t is the p rentage change in GNP at current 
pies f om year t-l to year t, 
nd %6Mt is the p r ntage hange in the av rage 
year l y money supply f om year t-l to year 
t. 
Although 2 r alue is low, th regression oeffi ient is 
still st tisti ally signif1 ant at th 5 per c nt 
Ie 1. This suggests that some re l atio nship d oes exist 
be tween p rentage hang s in money supply and percentage 
chang s in th Ie el of xpenditure, ev n if it is weak 
a nd app r ntly not the propo tional one hypothesized by 
2 
simple rsion of th Quantity Theo y . 
A p ting the isten of this re l ationshi p and 
tu ning to a dire t onsider tion of annua l pe~ entage 
1 
Also s bo e, p.l04, n.2. t should be not d that 
be us of n appar nt un ilabi li ty of qua te l y mon y 
supply stirn t s p io to D mb e 1945 it w impossible 
to us 1 gg d money supply riab l e in testing 
r la tionships overing th fu ll tw nty y ar period 194 6-
65 . 
2 
_n his 1ns 
riable w 
n e Iso a one qu rt r lag b tween th 
ens th r 1 tionship . Thus: 
.13 ) %6P t = 5 . 478 + 0 . 24 9%6M t _ 1 (0 .122) 'if 
2 (r = 0.206) 
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Tabl 111.5: Average Mon y Supply for Tw lve 
Mo n ths nding S pt mber 30 , 1947 - 65 
(mil l ion p sos ) 
Y ar nding 
September 30 Money supply a 
1947 903 · 3 
1948 1047.1 
1949 1122 . 9 
1950 1084.9 
19 5 1 1230 . 5 
1952 1148.7 
1953 1180 . 4 
1954 1213 . 9 
1955 1217 . 9 
1956 1368.6 
1957 1531. 8 
1958 1611. 8 
1959 1772.1 
1960 1813 · 3 
1961 1945 . 2 
1962 2177 . 9 
1963 2 576 . 4 
1964 2788 .1 
1965 2788 . 9 
a Money s upply 
M + 2M t _ l . t-l. . . 
111 1V 
2M 2M M 
+ t. + t . . + t ... 
1 11 111 
8 
wher M is money upply at end of period ; 
t -l, t indicate th years; 
a nd i , ii , iii and iv indicate th quarters ending 
March 31 , June 30 , September 30 and D cember 31 
respectively. 
Sourc s : Central Bank of the Philippin s , Annual R e ports; 
C n tral Bank of the Philippin s , Statistical 
Bull tin , various issu es . 
111 
changes in prices, the following further relationship 
can be estimated for the period 1947- 65 : 
(III.14) %6P t = 8 . 61 1 + 0.282%6M t (0.098) . 
- 1. 556%6T t 
(0 . 296) 
(R2= 
where %6P t is the p rcentage change in the GNP implicit 
price deflator from year t-l to year t, 
%6T t is the per entage hange in GNP at 1955 
prices from year t-l to year t, 
a nd %6M t is defined as above. 
In this equation the coefficients of changes in money 
supp l y and real output are both significantly different 
from zero, the former at the 5 per cent level and th 
latter at the 1 p r c nt 1 vel ; their signs are 
consistent with Quantity Theory hypotheses; and the two 
variablps together determine 70 per cent of the variance 
in the annual percentage rate of change of pri ces . l This 
important result is not improved by the introduction of 
a one quarter lag in the money supply variable, and 
2 
a lthough the R value is raised slightly if the annual 
percentage change in money supply lagged a full year is 
introdu ed as an additional or third indep8ndent 
ariable, the additional regression coefficient is not 
signifi ant . 
n spite of the superior performance which results 
from using annual percentage changes in the variables, 
it is lear that mone y supply and real output do not 
supply anything like a complete explanation of price 
le el behaviour. Changes in income velocity must ac ount 
for a major and hith rto unexplained part of this 
beha iour. This is particularly ap p arent from Equation 
III . 13, the values of whose onstant term , regression 
o ffi i nt and 0 fficient of determination highlight 
th ari bi1ity of elo ity . As h s b n stated, such 
1 
Per nt ge changes in money supply and real output do 
not acc ount for per entage changes in the Manila 
Composite Co nsum r Price Index so satisfactorily . Thus 
for 1947-65: 
(I 9.238 + 0.148%6M t - 1.50 7%6T t (0 . 111) (0 . 334) 2 
(R = 0 . 592) 
wh re %6Pct is h p r entag change in th Manila 
Co mposite Consum r Price Index from year t-l to year t, 
and %6M nd %6T t are defined as above . The regression 
co ffic '~nt of %6M t is not tatisti all significant at 
oith r th 1 or 5 P r c nt 1 1 . 
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variability is not inconsistent with the Quantity Theory 
app roach provided that it was due to som long un trend 
in the demand for money relative to income . On the 
other hand, if the variability was merely sustained 
short run instability, then the approach is c l early 
u nsat i sfactory . 
The actual movement in the annual income velocity 
of circulation for th entire p riod of study, including 
1 946, is plotted in Figure 111.1 . The corresponding 
l inear time trend of the in orne ve l ocity of circulation, 
estimated by the least squares method, is also plotted 
in th same figur It is apparent that this trend was 
a rising on . As such it ontributed to the weakening 
of th relationships between money supply and aggregate 
demand which have been investigated above. Its 
·mportance in this respect can be judged by the fact 
that the passage of time explains statistically some 49 
per cent of the variance in velocity . l Accordingly, 
th re is a need to examine the reasons for this trend. 
Initially, it must be noted that the trend 
contradicts the hypothesis, suggested in Chapter II, 
that n growing less developed economies velocity will 
1 
The actual equation for the trend for 1946-65 is: 
2 Vt = 6 . 424 + 0 . 061X (r = 0 . 486) 
where Vt is he trend value of velocity 
and X is the year, the origin (X = 0) being 1956 . 
Dropp ing ve l ocity for 1946 fro m the estimation of the 
trend a nd uti l izing only the data for the period 1947- 65 
yields the following equation: 
Vt = 6.464 + 0 . 048X 
2 (r = 0 . 398) 
where V
t 
and X are d fined as above and the origin (X=O) 
is a g ain 1956 . In view of the extreme l y low value of 
velocity in 1946, it is perhaps surprising that its 
o mission lowers the coefficient of det rmination . 
From inspe tion of Figure 111 . 1 it is p o sible to 
argu that the real trend of v e l ocity is not accurately 
portray d by st a·ght line . Rath r, it can b suggested 
that, ith r e cluding or inc l uding the 1946 estimate, 
the tre nd of elocity ros re l atively steep ly until about 
1 955, wh r after it ·n r as d only ery gradually . This 
argum nt is supported by the straight line trend for th 
sub-period 1955-65 whi his: 
t = 6 . 658 + 0 . 0 1 X 
wh re V
t 
and X ar de ·n d as above and th origi n (X = 0) 
is 1 960 . Howe r, th positiv oeffici nt in thi s 
se ond qua i on, though gr at l y di mi n is h d in m gnitud e, 
sugg s s hat velo ity n sti l l be said to hav be n 
fo llowing ri ·ng tr nd 0 the fu ll p r i od und er 
m·nation . 
Figure III . l : Income Velocity of Circulation in t he Philippine s , 1946- 65 
8 . 0 
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fall or the money~income ratio will ris ov r the long 
run because of fa tors such as an increasing monetiz at"on 
and specialization of production a nd an expanding d mand 
for idl balances . Although difficult to me asure 
quantitatively, these factors were probab ly in operation 
in the Philippines. evertheless, the rising trend valu 
of velocity clearly indicates that they were more than 
offset . It is likely that the principal force underlying 
this pro cess was the in re a s in quasi-money or those 
debt issues of finan i a l intermediaries which are highly 
competitive with money. The growth in this interest-
earning form of liquidity would have acted as at le ast 
a partial substitute for the growth in the money supply. 
Somewhat arbitrari l y, quasi-money can be identified as 
time a nd savings deposits. As can be seen from Table 
111 . 6, these increased in tota l ne ar l y nine-fold from 
PJ16.l million at the end of 1949, the earliest date for 
which a dequate d ata are a v ai l ab le, t o P2766.6 million at 
the end of 1965 . Over the same period, end-of-year money 
supply increased only about three-fold. Taken together, 
end-of-year money suppl y plus time and savings deposi ts 
increased 4.J fold, while G P at current prices increased 
only J .J fold, thus implying that, even though the ratio 
of money supply to income fell over the p eriod, the ratio 
of average yearly money supply plus average year l y quasi-
mone y to income probably rose. l 
The increase in quasi-money was encouraged on the 
supply sid by the d evelopment and extension of the 
banking system and its f ac ilities and on the demand side 
by the security and interest-earning power of this form 
of liquid wealth. B cause cheques remained uncommon and 
unacceptab l e to th bulk of the popula tio n, a l arge 
proportion of the money upply was held as cu~rency (55 .0 
p r c nt at th end of 1949 and 48.2 per cent at the end 
of 1965). Thus for most individuals, if not institutions, 
the hoi of ss t in which to hold liquid wealth rested 
between curr n y and s avings deposi ts . For reasons of 
saf ty, onv nience and income, the growing demand of 
individua ls for liquid ass ts was increasingly channelled 
tow rds th l att r. 
1 
Th la k of quarterly d ata on tim and savings deposits 
prior to 1949 pr vented the us of a broader concept of 
money supply, embra ing th se forms of debt, in the 
qu ntitativ investig tion of pri e 1 vel behaviour for 
th whole period, 1946-65. (S also Appendix A, Part II.) 
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Table II . 6 : Qu a s' -Mon a 1949-65 y, 
(million pesos) 
( 1) ( 2) ( 3) 
End of Savings Time Total 
Year deposits dep osits ((~)i:M(~)1 
1 949 287 .1 29 · 0 31 6 . 1 
1 950 285 . 1 40 . 1 32 5 · 2 
1951 279·1 41.8 320·9 
1 952 2 99. 8 42.8 342 . 6 
1953 349 . 3 7 1.8 421.1 
19 54 326 . 4 73 · 9 400 . 3 
19 55 341.8 169 . 1 510 · 9 
1956 500 . 6 102 .1 602 . 7 
19 57 584 . 2 120·9 705 · 1 
1958 66 1. 9 14 5 .9 807 . 8 
1959 744 . 7 185 .2 929 · 9 
19 60 842 . 9 244 . 4 1087 ·3 
196 1 1017.8 484 . 1 1501 · 9 
1962 1141. 6 867·2 2008 . 8 
1963 1355 · 3 1130 · 3 2485 . 6 
1964 1548 . 6 1045 · 0 2593.6 
19 65 1 695 .4 107 1. 2 2766.6 
a Time a nd s avings deposits of c ommerci a l, s avings and 
rural b a nks plus s avings deposits of Posta l avings 
Bank. 
Sour e: Ce ntral Barn of the Philippines, Statis t ical 
Bulletin, Vo1 . XVII, 0.3 (September 1966) . 
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It is possibl t h at the upward tr nd in v locity may 
also have b e n i nflue nc d by people ' s expectations of 
futur pric changes . In pri ncipl e , the n et cost of 
holding money is d t rmined i n part by the rate of chang 
in prices . The higher the rate of inflation or th lower 
1 
rate of deflatio n, the higher beco mes this cost. If , 
after a period of stability , prices change at a constant 
ra te , it c a n be assumed t ha t people will co me to anticipate 
t hi s rate of change and will adjust their real cash 
balances accordingly. The r w'ill be a ' onc e-and- for - all ' 
shift in velocity or, inversely , the ratio of real cash 
balanc es t o real income. However, an accelerating 
inflation or a decel rati ng deflation may mean a 
conti nuously risi n g velocity si nc e , assuming that such 
price b ehaviour ge nerates expectations of further 
acceleration or dece leration respectively , the anticipated 
cost of holding money will be rising continuously.2 
With regard to the Philippi ne s over the period 
1946 - 65 , t he price level tended in broad terms to 
decline at a decelerati ng rate until 1955 and thereafter 
to rise at a n a cc e l erati n g rate . This is evide n t fro m 
a n examination of Table III . 7 which shows average annual 
Tabl III . 7: Philippine Price Indices: Average 
Annu a l Rates of Change per Sub-Period 
Average Annual Rate of Change (per cent) 
G P Manila Manila Manila 
Implici t Composite Composite Composi te 
P eriod Pric e Cons umer Wholesale Retail 
D flator Pric e Pric e Price 
Ind x Index Index 
1946 - 50 -14 . 0 -11. 8 ·-l J · 7 -1 4 . J 
1950 - 55 - 1. 2 - 1. 0 - 1.J - 1.7 
1955 - 60 + 2 . J + 2 . 2 + J . 2 + J . J 
1960-65 + 5 · 7 + 4 . / + 5 . J + 4 . 9 
Sources : As for Table I · 9 . 
1 
Th net cost may b n gati e duri ng d flation . 
2 
Strictly speaking , this p ossibili ty contradicts t h e 
Quanti ty Theory assumption t hat long r un variations i n 
velocity (i .. , those in th nature of a t r end ) ar 
indep ndent 0 changes in mone y supply and , more 
sp cif'cally, prices . 
117 
rates of change in various price indices for t he sub-
periodsof 194 6- 50, 1950-55 , 1955-60 a nd 1960-65. If it 
can be t aken tha t expecta tions about the cost of holding 
money followed, a s a consequence, a simil ar p attern, 
this ma y a ccount to some extent for the rising trend in 
the v e locity of circulation. However, the theoretic a l 
argument supporting this hyp o thesis seems ma inly 
relevant to conditions where the rate of change in pri ces 
is large a nd this r ate itself changes r a pidly . Apart 
from the f a ll in prices from 194 6 to 1947, which acc ounte d 
for the bulk of the deflation prior to 1955 , the rate o f 
increase or d ecrease of prices per annum was relatively 
moderate ; a nd difference s from year to year in this rate 
were, with the exceptions of those in the sub-periods 
194 6 -48 a nd possibl y 1950-52, not great . 1 Accordingly, 
it appears unlikely that actua l price behaviour exerted 
a very strong imp act on the subjective attitudes of the 
publi c t owards holding money . This inclusion is 
supported b y the a ppare n t f a ilure of price level 
behaviour to deter the large a nd acce lerating grow th 
of time a nd savings deposits in t he pos t-1949 period, a nd 
espec i a lly after 1955 . Thes e deposit s resembled mo ney 
in so f ar as they possessed a fixed money value, and 
their interest rates were inc apable of varying with 
pri ce expec tatio ns bec ause the maximum rates were set by 
the Central Bank. 
It is now necessary to c onsider the short run 
inst abili ty of t he income velocity of circul at ion. The 
greater the ma gnitude of this inst ability , the l ess 
useful becomes the Qu a n t i ty Theory of Money a ppro ach in 
expl a ining the behaviour of aggregate dema nd and the 
price l evel, since the The ory i ts elf do es no t recognis e 
a nd thus offers no expl a nation for the existe~ce of such 
ins tabi li ty . 2 r. o1umn 1 of Table III . 8 provides a crude 
me a sure of i ts ma gnitude in the form of the perc en tage 
vari at ions in velocity from year to year ove r the full 
period 1946- 65 . This me a sur suffers from the defec t 
1 
Cf., Tab l es I .9 a nd I .10. 
2 
This is perhaps somewhat of a n overstatement since, a s 
m n tio n d in Ch apt , mo r re a lis ti and flexible 
versions of the Quantity Theory a ppro ch concede that 
some short run inst ability in velocity may occur as a 
result of e traordin ry mone tary disturbances or 
politi cal uphe av a l. Howev r, such conditions did not 
aris in th Phi lippines . 
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Table III . 8: Short Run I nstability in t he I ncom e 
Velocity of Circulation, 194 6-65 
( 1) (2 ) 
Per Cent Per Cent 
Change in Divergence 
Year Observed of Observed 
Velocity Velocity 
from Previous from Trend 
Year 
194 6 
- 13.1 
1947 + 27 · 7 + 9 · 7 
1948 
-
12.6 5 ·1 
1949 1.1 7 ·0 
1950 + 5 . 6 2 . 8 
1951 + 2 ·9 1.0 
1952 + 7 . 6 + 5 . 5 
1953 + 3.4 + 8 .0 
1954 0. 6 + 6 .3 
1955 + 4.9 + 10· 5 
195 6 5·5 + 3.4 
1957 3 · 3 1.1 
1958 + 1.2 0. 8 
1959 3·1 4.7 
1960 + 5·9 0.0 
19 6 1 0.1 1.0 
1962 + 0·3 1. 6 
1963 4.8 7 · 2 
1964 + 6 . 8 1. 7 
1965 + 5 ·9 + 3 · 2 
Source: Table III .4. 
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that the v rations are gro s of the perce n tage hanges 
in vel city du to trend factors. ev rth le ss, it 
indicates that v 10city v ri d, reg rd1 ss of sign, by 
mor han 5 p r c nt b tw n consecutive y a s in 'ghL 
instances ou t 0 a possible 19 . The second co lumn of 
able . . 8 prov de s a mor sohpist cated me asure of the 
short run instability in ve lo city. The abs olu te 
di f renc b tween the obs ved nd the linear trend 
v a lues of velocity for a h y ar is xpres sed as a 
percentage of the t nd value or that year, where the 
tr nd is that fi ted or th ful l period 1946-65 . I n 
eight of the 20 y e rs in th s p riod the p ercentage 
difference e p r c nt, whil 'n only two 
years wa th p c ntage differen e l ess h a n 1 p r 
cent . h ye rs o f gre a es 'nst bility, according to 
this m a ure, were in the periods 19L~6-49 and 1952-55, 
wi h th 
he tr n 
94 6 and 
pictur 0 
1 rg 
bing 
1955 r 
t 'nd'vidu 1 p rcent ge divergen es from 
-13.1 per ent nd +10 . 5 p r cent in 
spective1y . Final l y, an over- 11 
he hort run instability of the income 
velo city of c i r u1ation can b obtained by recalling that 
h in ar tr nd for 1946-65 ac ounts st tisti a lly for 
only 49 p r c nt 0 it v iance . The r m in ' ng 
(un xpl n d) 51 per nt can b int rp eted for the 
p n purpos s ndic tiv of short run instability . 1 
t 's th r for app r nt that, v n a fter allowing 
for long un hang s 'n the v locity of 'r ulation, 'ts 
b haviou was su h a to nsur tha a Quantity Theory 
f M n y p l anat on f . I s to P ovid comple t 
e pl a nation of th g n rati n f Philippin money incom 
or p nd'tur n h p ri d 1 46- 65 . Thu it a l so 
fa'ls to provid fo th s m omp1 e 
exp l ana on of Philippin pri 1 v 1 mo m nts. How v r, 
v n if v 10 'ty had b en mu h mor ab l this 
ppr'o ach wou d h ave sti ll two maj or prob l ms: 
hat of d monstr ting ha 'n th st ti t al 
1 ionsh p b tw n mon y s upply an the 1 ] of 
x p nditu th tion 0 causation w s onsistently 
.from th 
analY ' i 
th s 
Th 
m 
o 
o h 1 tt r; and that of modifying h 
a oun 0 r ding re l ati onsh' ps with 
£' h wor d. 
nda d of' ~t m o th r nd is 0. 3 4. 
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With respect to the first of these problems, it is 
theoretically possibl that under some circumstances 
variations in G P at current prices may induce 
variations in mone y supply rather than vice v ersa . Assume 
for example, that G P rises bec a use of either an expansion 
in production or pri c s or both a nd let t he re a son for 
this exp a nsion lie not in t he stimula t ive effect of an 
'ncrease in money supply on aggregate dema nd, but in 
some other force on either the c os t or demand side of the 
mark et . Further assum , this time in accordance with the 
Qu a ntity Theory , that the transactions demand for money 
is the predominant a nd determining element of liqui di ty 
preference, and that this dema nd is a fi xe d proportion 
of money income ( define d as G p) . Thus the exp ansion of 
GNP at current pri ce s will expand the dema nd for money 
propor tionately . ow, if the monetary a uthorities are 
conducting a purely pass ive mone tary poli cy, pe r mi tting 
t he money supply to expand t o meet an increase in the 
demand for it, a situation will arise where the 
rel a tionship between money supp l y a nd money income is a 
strong one, but one where the causation runs in the 
reverse direc tion t o that suggested by the Quantity 
Theory . 
This type of possibili ty canno t be a l together 
dismi ssed in the case of the Philippines. Admittedly, 
it ould be l argely discounted if i t were po ssible to 
show that the relationships between annu a l first 
differences in the mone y supply and G P at current 
pric s and between a nnua l percentage hanges in the sam 
vari a bles become strong r whe n money supply, treated as 
the independent variable, p receded G P in time . However, 
1 
as has been seen, such l a gged re l ationships are in f act 
we aker than those where the variables are syn~hronous . 
Moreover, in the full tw n ty year period, 194 6- 65, 
during which GNP at urr nt pri s incre se d in a ll bu t 
one year a nd a rage a nnu 1 money supply in reased in 
a ll but two years, the b a nks possessed reserves whi ch 
for mo st of th t ime e ce ded considerab l y those 
2 
stipulat d by the C ntr 1 Bank . They a re shown in 
1 
2 
Cf . equ t ions II . 7 nd I .10 and 
. 1Ja. F o r the 1 st equ tion, see 
quat ions III .1J and 
p . 109, n . 2 . 
Ther w re, howe r, some instances of temporary 
r se ve d fici e ncies owards the nd of th p eri od. 
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T a ble I.9 on a n e nd-of-yea b sis for h comm rci a l 
b a nks a nd thos rur 1 banks acc pting dem a nd d posits. 
These gen r a lly mor t h a n a mpl r serv es , tog ther with 
the C ntra l Bank's moneta ry policy which kept the 
redis ount r a te w 11 b low a 'pena l ty' level for muc h of 
th . d 1 p er10, suggest tha t the b a nks were usua lly in a 
position to xpand edit, a nd henc the mon y supply, 
in respons to the d e mand for i t or 'the ne ds of trade' 
Of course, this evid nce can 1 nd its lf equa lly to the 
more onventi a l interpretation that the supply of money 
was the pace-ma ker to which dema nd was a respon e, but 
it is sufficient t o show at this stage t hat t h e 
alt rnative interpretation is possible . 2 
The other problem of t he Qu a n t ity Theo ry a pproach, 
as pr sented a bove , re s ults from the a n a l ysis having 
been conduct d seemingly in terms of a closed economy . 
n an open dep e nden t co nomy with export d e mand a nd 
i mport supply el astic ities both approaching infinity 
(assump t ion which may posse ss c onsid erable relevance for 
t he Philippines J ) , th Qu a ntity Theory m chanism, e v e n 
if v a lid, is subject to cons iderab le modifi cation . Export 
a nd import p ric s are determin d indep ndently of the 
dom sti supply a nd demand for mone y . ince these 
pri es in turn dete r mine a major part of the general 
pri e lev 1 of a dependent e onomy's ou t pu t, the 
causa l link b tw n mon y supply a nd pri s is weakened . 
D P nding o n the ross-e l asticities of d e mand and the 
d gre of r sour e mobili ty betw en the non-trad d and 
trad d good sector , ch nges in money supply a nd thus 
1 
B tw n 1949 (the y ar of found ation of the Central 
Bank) nd t he first quart r of 19 54, the r dis c ount rate 
was only 2 p e r c nt. It th n fell even low r t o 1. 5 
per cent where it r mai n e d for three years. ubsequently, 
in th p riod of study, it was t o rise, but n ver a bove 
the 6 . 5 p rent 1 0 e l whi h it reached during 1959 a nd 
early 19 60. (Int rnat ion 1 Mon ta y Fund, Int rnat iona l 
t tisti s , v rious issue .) ~~~~~~~~~~~ 
o how v r, th t (wi t h regard to i ther int rpretation) 
reser r qui m n ts w r no t h only pot nti a l constraint 
on cr dit xp n ion . Co mm rial b nks cr di t wa in 
prin ipl onst ai n d by th exist n of a lega l minimum 
pit 1- t at · o. Th orne viden e t o ugges t 
that hi an ffe ti limi t to 
c dit on. op. it., p. 2J7 . ) 
J 
Cf . h pt 
p.1 27 n.1 5 , 
blow; 
p.129 · 
lso Go l ay , op. i t . , p . 1 2J , 
Tab1 
End of 
Year 
194 5 
1946 
194 7 
1948 
1949 
1950 
19 5 1 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
19 56 
1957 
19 58 
1959 
1960 
196 1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1I · 9: R serves of Commerci a l Banks and 
Rural Banks AcceptOng D mand 
Deposits, 1945 - 65 
( million pesos) 
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Avai 1ab1 
To a 1 
152 · 9 
190 · 9 
225 · 8 
304 . 7 
143.8 
244 · 3 
11 6 . 0 
147 · 5 
147 · 8 
165 . 8 
188.5 
234 .3 
201. 9 
324 · 7 
296 . 5 
251.1 
3 10 . 2 
404 . 6 
459 · 9 
449 . 6 
465.4 
Require d 
23 · 5 
55 · 8 
88 . 8 
12 5 · 5 
93 · 2 
11 5 · 7 
107 . 8 
113 · 5 
117 · 7 
136 . 8 
161. 0 
160 . 4 
253 . 2 
197 · 2 
229 · 3 
313 . 6 
397 · 0 
3 4.2 
4·01 . 5 
Exc ss 
129 . 4 
135 ·1 
137·0 
179 · 2 
50 . 6 
128 . 6 
19 · 3 
39 · 7 
34 · 3 
48 . 1 
51. 7 
72 . 7 
4 1. 5 
43 . 3 
53 · 9 
80 . 9 
91. 0 
62 . 9 
64 . 4 
63 · 9 
Excess as 
Perce ntage 
of Tota l 
84 . 6 
70 . 8 
60 . 7 
58 . 8 
35 · 2 
52 . 6 
16 . 6 
26 · 9 
23· 2 
31. 0 
20 . 6 
47 . 7 
14. 6 
2 1. 5 
26 . 1 
22 · 5 
13 · 7 
14 . 3 
13· 7 
our n tra1 B nk of th Phi1ippin , tatistica1 
Bull tin, ol.X I, 0 . 3 ( p t mber 1966 ) . 
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aggr gate demand may work th ms I ves out mor through 
balances of p ayments defi cits or surpluses than through 
pri ce increases. The same applies for long run chang s 
in v e lo city and the growth in rea l output. Fur thermor 
changes in the price level can often b attributed to 
world pri ce changes, variations in the xcha nge rate 
a nd changes in import and export duties and subsidies . 
F inal l y, it should be recalled that changes in money 
supply may in fact be determined by the state of the 
balance of p ayments with the result that it cannot b 
considered a completely independent variable, p articu l ar l y 
if monetary policy is weak or passive . One implication 
of this l ast point is that exogenous price changes in 
the foreign trade sector may , in fact, affect mone y 
supply . This t i es in with the problem of the direction 
of caus a li ty discussed in the immediately preceding 
p aragraphs . 
The implicati ons for Philippine price level 
beha viour of changes in the prices of export and imports 
will be inv stigated full y in Chapter VI . However, it 
is worth noting here that in so far as import and exchange 
c o ntro l s effectively created an artificial inelasticity 
in the supply of impor ts for over half the period und r 
consideration in this study, the Philippine ec onomy can 
be regarded as having been at l east parti a lly a c los ed 
one during thos years . This enables the Qu antity 
Theory a ppro ach to side-step to a limi ted ext nt th 
probl ems posed by a fully open and depend nt conomy . 
The argum nt is reinforced if it is further recognized 
that th commodity composition of exports was such that 
a n excess or deficiency of demand for other commodi ti s 
was unlikely to le ad to any gr at diversion of d ma nd 
towards or away from xportables, a process wqich would 
otherwise constrain changes in th p r ices of these other 
co mmod iti s. 
T o sum up, th Quantity Th ory of Money is un ble 
to gi e a full pI nation of Phi lippine pri e 1 vel 
beha viour in th period 1946-65 . This is ~t to deny 
that th re e ists some e id nc of relat ionships whi h 
ar onsis t nt with the Th ory. Ch nge in t o ta l 
x penditure or incom t nd d to some nt t o vary w' th 
chang s in mon y supply; hang s in mon y s upply a nd in 
real outpu t t oge th r c oun t d stat i s ic a lly and in a 
ma nner c onsistent with th Theory for much of th v arian 
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in pri lev 1 mov m ntsj and som of th instab'lity 
in th in orne v locity of circulat ion was a ppar ntly th 
result of long run forc s. How ver, the videnc is not 
suffi iently strong to justify ignoring what the a ppro c h 
fails to xplain . n th following hapt r, therefore, 
a n examin tion of p i ce level behaviour in terms of a n 
a lt rnativ a ggr g tiv a pproac h, that of the K yn sian 
Incom -Expenditure Th ory, will b und ertaken. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COME - EXPE DITURE APPROACH 
L Ok th QuantOty Th ory of Mon y , th Keynesian 
Incom - Exp nditur Th ory vI ws pric 1 v 1 movem nts s 
th outcom of imb 1 nc s betw n aggr gate de mand and 
supply . t dOffer from th Quantity Th ory in two 
e pect in its analysis of th d t rminants of 
ggr gat d mand; and in its recognition that r al 
output , s w 11 s prices , can vary in r spons to an 
ce or d fOciency of d mand. In the cas of output, 
such v ri tions can occur , of course , only within the 
limits or th economy ' s productive capacity . l 
By d finition , pric 1 vel movem nts ar a 
manif 
of 
tation of x post discrepanci s betw en the rat s 
2 pan ion of total mon y e penditure and real output. 
Howev r , in ex ante t rms , thes discr panci s are seen 
by both th ori s s th proximate cause of change in 
th pric 1 v 1 . This chapter will be conc rn d 
prom ril with an °nv stig tion of som Keyn ian 
hypoth s s about th det rminants and b haviour of total 
mon y nditur in th Philippin s during th period 
B cause of data limitations, th analysis will 
b conduct d on e trem ly simple plane . However , to 
the nt that it points to th r 1 vance of a 
K yn si n planation of mov ments in total exp nditur , 
and in so far as r al output fail d to r pond 
1 
A wa n in Ch pt r II , this second differ nce may 
possibly not be of gr at ignificanc if th i is a 
con °d r bl d gr of downward fl ibility in mon y 
w g n d of real ggr g t d m n d is c p ble of bing 
stimulat d quickly and ff ctiv ly by pric d flatio n. 
Und r th s circumst nc s output should lw ys t nd to 
r m On clos to its rna i mum short run 1 vel (which will 
be panding in a growing conomy) , with th r suIt that 
th impact of i mbalanc s b tw n aggr gat demand and 
output will b conc ntr t d m Only on pric s . 
2 
to 
., ° t 
t r m ' pr oc 
output (i . 
m nt th t r m ' total mon y p nditur ' 
on th output of th cono my only 
J P nditur on i mports ) nd the 
1 v I ' r 1 t to th av r g proc of r 1 
., it clud th pric s of ° mport d products) . 
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proportionat ly to th s mov ments , th r can thus b 
deriv d Keynesian xplanation of pric 1 v 1 b haviour . 
THE DETERMI ATIO OF AGGREGATE DEMA D 
Simpl mul tiplier analysis separat s total 
expenditur on final products into an autonomous 
compon nt which is independent of income and an induced 
compon nt which is d pend nt on income . The equilibrium 
1 v 1 of output or incom (i. . , that level which is 
equal to aggregate d e mand or ex ant total exp nditur 
is thus det rmined by autonomous d mand and the 
relationship b e twe n income and that part of demand 
which it induc e s. Giv n this relationship, changes in 
income are caus d by changes in autonomous de mand . 
For any op n economy with a public sector , 
quilibrium income can b defined as: 
(IV.l) y C + Ip + G + X - IM 
wh r Y is th gross national product , 
C is privat consumption expenditure , 
Ip is gross private investm nt, 
G i g overnm nt exp nditure on goods and servic s , 
including public investment , 
X is e ports, including factor income received 
from abroad , and 
IM is import, including factor income paid abroad . 1 
n this instance th components of aggre gat demand are 
mea ur d in x ant terms. Estimates of their 
corr ponding ___ post values at curr nt prices for the 
Philippin s in th y ars 1946-65 are shown in Table 
IV . l . 
In ord r to d rive a multipli r hypothesis for the 
Philippin s from th abov equation it is n c ssary to 
dist' ngui sh th autono mo us it ms of expenditur from th 
induc d on s. Following custo mary practic , exports and 
1 
Th y mbol IM is chos n to repres nt imports in plac 
customary symbol M, b caus th latt r has be n 
d in this ch pt r for money supply. [ Cf . Charles 
Schott Jr. , ' The Mon y . Supply , E ports and Income in 
an Op n Economy: M 'co , 1939-63 ,' Economic D velopm nt 
and Cultural Ch ng , Vol . XIV (1966 )J. On th oth r hand , 
follow'ng K yn pr ctic , G P t curr nt prices has 
b n r pr nt Y ' nd not by PT as in th pr vious 
ch pt r . 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Table IV . 1: Expenditure on Gross National Product at 
Current Market Prices , 1946-65 
Private 
Consum-
ption 
4 , 053 
3,221 
5 , 194 
5 , 594 
5 , 533 
6 , 371 
6 , 479 
6 , 816 
6 , 960 
7,501 
7 , 873 
8 , 523 
8 , 982 
9 , 392 
9 , 968 
10,604 
12 , 104 
13 , 068 
14,302 
15 , 451 
Gross 
Private 
Domestic 
Invest-
ment 
371 
644 
631 
468 
381 
397 
391 
494 
552 
616 
649 
804 
733 
778 
959 
1 , 527 
1 , 605 
1,933 
2 , 724 
2 , 558 
(million pesos) 
Government 
Expenditure 
on Goods 
and 
Servicesa 
373 
459 
540 
648 
664 
702 
761 
796 
821 
891 
1 , 023 
1 , 085 
1 , 138 
1 , 221 
1,340 
1,496 
1 , 710 
2 , 052 
2 , 157 
2,367 
Export 
of Goods 
and b 
Services 
779 
1 , 135 
1,259 
888 
955 
1,095 
1,011 
1 , 151 
1 , 124 
1 , 136 
1 , 239 
1 , 220 
1,284 
1 , 351 
1 , 559 
] , 806 
2 , 515 
3,198 
3 , 386 
3 , 846 
Less 
Imports 
of Goods 
and 
Servicesc 
936 
1 , 535 
1 , 456 
1 , 462 
908 
1 , 198 
1 , 123 
1 , 255 
1 , 287 
1,457 
1 , 378 
1 , 641 
1 , 453 
1 , 373 
1 , 700 
2,001 
2,962 
3 , 081 
3 , 782 
3 , 948 
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GNP 
at 
Market 
Prices 
4 , 640 
5 , 924 
6 , 168 
6 ,136 
6 , 625 
7 , 367 
7 , 519 
8 , 002 
8 , 170 
8 , 687 
9 , 406 
9 , 991 
10 , 684 
11 , 369 
12 , 126 
13 , 432 
14 , 972 
17 , 170 
18 , 787 
20 , 274 
a Includes public investment. 
b Includes factor (investment) income received from abroad. 
c Includes factor (investment) income paid abroad. 
Sources : Statistical Reporter , Vol . III-X (1959-66) , second 
number of each volume ; United Nations , Yearbook of 
National Accounts Statistics, various issues ; 
International Monetary Fund, Balance of Payments 
Yearbook , 1948 and preliminary 1949 , and Vo1 .3 
(1949-50). 
Also see Appendix A, Part III , below for details of 
adjustments made to some of the official 1960-65 
data. 
governm n t expen ditur will b tr ated as having been 
autono mou s el ments . 
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To tr at export s as having varied only ind p nd ntly 
of i ncom is , of cours , ope n to the obj ction that th y 
may hav b n influ nc d by move m nts On do mestic pric s 
n d cost , and thus may have been related to variations 
in mo n y inco me . In subsequ nt chapt r s arguments 
related to this obj ction will , in fact , be advanced 
with r sp ct to merchandi s xports . Howeve r , throughout 
t h e period of study xport receipts as a whole wer 
subj ct to strong exog nous influ nces . Thus in the 
arly post-war years thes r ceipts w r do minated by 
the Unit d States Governm nt's mi litary and civil 
xp n do ur s on goods and services in th Philippin s . 
D spit much higher world pric s after the war , low 
1 v ls of op rati on i n the export i ndustri s resulted in 
th valu of m rcha n dise xports in 1946 being a mere 
~162 millio n,l compared with an average value for th 
years 19J8 - 40 of P2J8 million . 2 The 1946 figure 
r pr s n t d only 20 . 8 p r c nt of total receipts in 
1946 fro m the int r national sa l of goods and servi c es 
( i n cluding r ceipts fro m abroad); a n d in 1948 the 
corr sponding perc ntag was still a low 51 . 9 . By 1955 , 
how v r , merchan dise ports accounted for 70.5 per cent 
of total port rec ipts n d by 1959, the y e ar prior to 
th t in which the xchang decontrol programm was 
in roduc d , th Y account d for 78 . 4 per c nt of total 
port r c ipts . The principal e og nous influe nc es on 
th peso v lue of m rchandise exports w r fluctuations 
in world pric and vari tions i n the e change rate . 
Th form r w re par icularly large in the first post - war 
decad . R gardl ss of the dir ction of fluctuation and 
1 
This . o . b . sti rn t , which forms part of th official 
n tio n 1 accoun ts st Omat of p orts of goods and 
s rvOc in 1946, is p ubli sh d spar t ly in Internationa l 
Mon t ry Fund , Balanc of Pay m nt Yearbook , 1948 nd 
pr lOmOn ry 1949 . Wh n conv rt d to U. S . dollars at the 
th n pr aili n g rat of e chang, it is so mewhat high r 
th n th U .S. dollar . o . b . sti mat of m rchandis 
port in 1946 publish d by th C n tral Bank of t h 
Pholippin s . (S T bl .1 blow) Th sam is true 
of t h 1948 stO mat uOtliz d blow . 
2 
Un ° t d t ion , ..:::Y~::.:::.r..::b:..:o:..:o::..:k:..::-...:o:..:f:...-=...:.~=~::..t::..J.=o -=o..::n~T::;..:=.r..::a.;..:d::..e~..::S..;t~a.......;:;.t ..:;:i...:s~t::..J.=o -=c~s , 
1:.2.2..2. , VoL 
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ignoring any possibl tr nd, the average year-to-year 
fluctuation in the dollar unit value index of merchandis 
1 exports betw' n 1946 and 1955 was 16 . 9 per cent . 
Exchange rate variations , which affected the peso value 
of non-m rchandis as w 11 as merchandise export s , began 
formally in April 1960 w~th the introduction of th 
d control programme and the mul tiple exchang rat 
syst m which form d part of it. By the end of 1965 when 
a si ngle xchange rate aga'n xist d , the official p so 
value of one U. S . dollar ' s worth of xports was 95 per 
c nt higher than it had been six years earlier . 
Functionally, government expenditure on goods and 
s rvices can be divided into current outlays and gross 
capital formation. Administratively, it can be divided 
(for th Philippines) into national government 
exp nditur , local government expenditure and 
expenditur on final products by public corporations . 
The last category consists entirely of expenditure on 
capital goods . Although the usual practice of 
clas ifying total government expenditure on goods and 
services as auto nomously det rmin d is followed in this 
instanc , it is n c ssary to consid r the r levanc of 
the claim that in som less develop d econo mi es 
gov rnm nt penditure on goods and services is largely 
an induced component of aggregate de mand. The 
argument supporting this claim is that , subject to the 
b haviour of public transf r payments , government 
p nditur on goods and servi c es is largely dependent 
on gov rnm nt current dom stic revenue which, in t urn , 
is a function of G P or national income. The dependence 
of gov rnm nt expenditure on government revenue is 
thought to r suIt from a lack of cr dit r sourc es , which 
prev nts outlays from xc ding r v nue , and . a lack of 
budg tary control, which causes outlays always to 
e pand to th lev 1 of available fund . 2 
1 
Thi ind is shown in Tabl VI . 7 , blow . 
2 
Cf. H nry Christoph r W llich, Mon tary Probl ms of 
an E por Economy (Cambr'dge, Mas ., Harvard Univ rsity 
Pr ss , 1950), p . 205 . Also s p.47 ab ov for a relat d 
rgument conc rning th unlik lihood of autono mous 
v riations in gov rnm nt penditur . 
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How v r , regardl ss o f wheth r or not there xists 
a r lationship betw n th governme nt ' s current do m stic 
r venu and the national income , th argum nt app ars 
largely 'rrelevant to the Philippi n s . Whil th r w r 
undoubt dly i nstanc s of a lack of budg tary control , 
budget surpluses w' re c rtainly no t unknown . For th 
ational Government alone , this is evid nt fro m 
Tabl V . 2 . Similarly, while fiscal diffi culti s w r 
far fro m uncommon , it is clear fro m an xamination of 
the sam tabl that for t he ational Government ther 
oft n xist d suffici nt financial resourc s to permit 
s ubs tantial xcesses of t otal disbursements ov r 
curr n t do m sti c rev nue . Prior to 1949 the larg st 
contribution to these resourc s was a loan of P120 
million from th Unit ed States Reconstruction Financ 
Corpora tion ,l but other finance was also available as 
a re ult of the freeing of exc ess currency reserves and 
th xtension of so me limited credi t by co mmercial 
ba nks. After 1949 the Central Bank of the Philippin s , 
which was stablish d in that year , became , directly 
and indir ctly , the main sourc of finance for 
gov rnm nt deficit . 
In t r ms of curr nt prices total government 
exp ndi tur on goods and services increased absolutely 
i n ev ry year of th p riod under investigation . 
How v r , the rate of increase vari ed considerably . The 
mo st rapid e pansion occurred in a period of falling 
pric s , 1946-49 , when the average annual rate of 
increase was 20 . 2 p r cent. This was larg ly a 
refl cti on of the progressive r storation of governm nt 
s rvic s aft r the War , mo st noticeably in educ ation ; 
but it also refl ct d in part the growing costs of 
nation 1 d fe nc a nd th maint nanc of law and ord r , 
particularly in the fac of the arm d Hukbalahap 
r b Ilion , a rebel l ion which , whil communist -l d , dr 
it str ngth from agrarian disc ont n t . Oth r p riods 
of r lat'v l y rapid e pansion in gov rnment e p nditur 
on goods a nd s rvic s wer 1954- 56 a nd 1959 - 63 when th 
av r g nnual r t s of growth of this compon nt of 
aggr gat d ma n d w' r 11 . 6 and 13 . 9 p r c nt 
1 
S bove , p . 97 . 
w 
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Tabl IV . 2: at" onal Gov rnm nt Budget Balanc , 
Fisca l Y ars 1945/46- 1965/66a 
( millio n pesos) 
Budget Balan c Budget Balanc 
Fisca l Budget as P rce n tage as P 
Y ar Balanc of atio nal of G 
Govt . Revenue Curr 
1945/46 - 86 
- 67.7 
1946/47 - 117 - 44.3 - 2 . 2 
1947/ 48 + 3 + 0 . 8 + 0 . 0 
1948/49 - 41 9.6 
- 0 · 7 
1949/50 - 153 - 40 . 2 - 2 . 4 
1950/5 1 - 13 2 . 5 - 0 . 2 
1951/52 +117 + 15 . 6 + 1.6 
1952/53 + 40 + 5 . 7 + 0 · 5 
1953/5 4 - 76 - 10 · 9 - 0 · 9 
1954/55 - 59 7 . 4 - 0 · 7 
1955/56 - 118 - 13 · 7 - 1. 3 
1956/57 - 80 8 . 2 - 0.8 
1957/58 - 71 7 · 0 - 0.7 
1958/59 + 6 + 0 . 6 + 0 . 1 
1959/60 + 32 + 2 . 5 + 0 . 3 
1960/61 - 115 8 . 3 - 0 · 9 
1961/62 - 20 1.3 - 0 . 1 
1962/63 - 28 1.4 - 0 . 2 
1963/6 4 - 28 1.3 - 0 . 2 
1964/65 - 167 8 . 0 - 0 · 9 
1965/ 66 c + 69 + 2 . 7 
a The budg t balance is d fined as the exc ss of 
b 
ational Gov rnm nt r venue over ational 
Gov rnment penditure . Revenu e cludes the 
proc eds fro m loans , other borrowing , grants and 
a"d , and transf rs from res rye funds . Similarly , 
p ndi ture , while including n t loans "and advanc s 
gra n t d , cludes d bt r d mption , contributions to 
s"nking funds and transfers to r rv funds . 
Th G P st" m t s utilized in th 
th av rag s of the official G P 
of the two cal ndar y ars which ar 
includ d i n ach fiscal year . 
calculation ar 
stimates for each 
partially 
c Dr ft stimat . 
Sourc Budg t d t , 1945/ 46-1947/48 : 
th 
y 
lJ2 
r spectiv ly . Th form r period , on of approximat 
pr c stability , corr sponded broadly to th period of 
th Magsaysay administration which abandon d cons e rvativ 
monetary and fiscal policies in pursuit of the 
d v lopm n t goals it had set itself . Th latter period , 
how v r , was one in which prices increased considerably 
( the Manila Composit Wholesale Price Ind x rose at an 
averag annual rate of 5 . 9 p r cent) , so that the 
growth in governm nt xp e nditure in r al t erms was 
considerably less than its growth in money terms . 
Co nsumption penditure is usually considered in 
Keynesian analysis to be a stable function of personal 
disposabl income . Because of a lack of reliable data , 
it was not possibl to m asure with any degre of 
1 
accuracy this latt r aggr gate for the years 1946- 65 . 
Cons quently , and rather crudely , consumption is tr ated 
as having been an induced component of aggregate 
e penditur determined entirely by G P . Specifically , 
it is postulat d to have been an ~ ante constant 
proportion , c , of G P , where c was positive and less 
than unity . This v rsion of the consumption function is 
stat d in t rms of current prices . Strictly sp aking , 
K yn sian Theory vi ws the function as a r eal 
r lationship . However , the above procedure is not 
inconsistent with that theory because the postulate that 
consumption at current prices is a constant proportion 
of G P at curr nt prices is equivalent to the postulate 
that r al consumption is the sam con tant proportion 
1 
Th Philippin data w re u n re l iable because of a 
d ficiency in the official metho d of estimation . 
Disposabl p rsonal inco me was found official ly by 
m kOng appropriat adjustm nts to th esti mates of 
national inco me , which w' r themselves d riv d by th 
' valu add d ' t chniqu . Th ad j ust ment inc luded th 
clus "on of undistr"but d corporat profits . Th 
offic" 1 m ns of sti rn ting this last it m were 
totally in d quat . S e App ndix A , Part III , s ction J . 
lJJ 
of r al G P (wher real G P is m asur d i n terms of real 
cons um r purchasing pow~r).l 
Th r re main tw'o co mpone n ts of aggr gat expe ndi tur 
to b clas sified . T~ s are gross private investment and 
imports . Priv ate inv stme nt is likely t o have consisted 
2 
of both autonomous and induced elements . Unfo rtunately 
th r are no unambiguous m a n s of distinguishing them. 
1 
s Wal l ich has wri tte n , 
In practice ... it often is difficult to p oint 
to any particular piec e of investment a n d say 
whether it is induced or ind pe ndent . T o 
s ome extent t he classification depe nds on how 
broadly the term "product" is defined . Give n 
a v ery n arrow defi ni tio n, . .. there may 
f requ e n tly b no preexisting market for the 
product of a new p l a n t or machine . The 
inv stme n t w'Ould thus have to be put in the 
ind pe nde n t category , eve n though a rising 
national incom may be generati ng de mand for 
this ge n eral class of produc ts . Again, 
investment may be induc d by shifts in de mand 
no t associated with a rise in income , whi ch 
would bar the investm n t from being classed 
as "induc d " in the meaning of the acceleration 
pri ncipl . Even ~ post , therefore , the 
statistical determination of induced investment 
w'ould b immensely difficult . Ex ante , the 
chances ar even sli mmer . . .. This naturally 
d tracts from th usefulness of the distinc tion 
for quantitative a nalYSis , although J 
qualitatively it remains a valuable too l . 
Eve n apart from the devi c e of relati n g consumption to 
G P rath r than to p rso nal disposab l e i ncome , the 
postulate of a constan t proportionate relatio nship 
b tw en consumption a nd t o tal income is stil l obviously 
a crude one in s o far as it fails to allow for a 
possible l e ment of r al auto nomous consumption which 
may hav be n sub j ect to xogenous change . In fact , 
consumption d mand is lik l y to have been affe c ted , 
ind p n d n tly of incom , by many factors i ncluding a 
back- lo g of p nt - up de mand in the early post - war years 
which r sulted from shortag s duri n g the occupation 
ye rs [Cf . Migu 1 Cuad rno , Sr . , Guid posts to 
Stability and proyr ss , (Manila , C n tral Bank o f the 
Phi lippin s , 1955 , p . 72 ] , t he subs qu n t introduction 
of i mport controls which sharp ly curtail d a vailabl 
s uppli s of consum r goods , an accelerating rat of 
growth of p opulation , and changes in the distribution 
of incom . 
2 
Th·s divisi on of privat i nvestm nt is not , of cour e , 
n c ssari l y inconsist n t with t h ' marginal fficiency 
of inv stm nt ' or ' pr s nt valu ' approach to th 
d t r m· natio n of inv stm n t d ma nd . Such an approach 
will b u s d in Ch pt r IX . 
J 
Wall·ch , op . ci t ., pp . 202 -J . 
lJ4 
H adds : 
n addition to th probl ms of definition , an 
at tempt at sta istic al determi nation of i nduc ed 
i nv st ment would co m up against t h e fact that 
'nv stme n t fr qu ntly is t h e combi n ed result of 
'nduc d and ind p nd e nt lement s . l 
B caus of probl ms such as thes , all privat 
inv t m nt ( including inv ntory investm nt) is treated 
as having be n auto nomously d termined . Although this 
proc dur s based la rg lyon exp di ncy , invest ment 
d cisions i n th Philippin s during the period 1946 - 65 
were undoubtedly s ubj ct to strong exog nous forc s . As 
was str ssed in the Report of the United States Economic 
Surv y Mission in 1950 , much of the investme nt in the 
y ars 1946 - 49 wa for purposes of r construction and th 
r stor tion of inve n tori s depleted during the War . 2 
Subs qu ntly in th 1950 ' s privat investme n t was 
i n flue nc d by fa c tors suc h as priority exchange licensing 
f or th i mport of capital goods a n d tax ex mption for 
'n wand nec ssary ' industries . Fi nally , the de control 
progra mm brought not only the reduc tion a nd eventual 
removal of trade and change contro l s , but also a 
h'gh r pric of foreign xchan ge . 
On th oth r hand , the possibility that there was 
an induc dI m nt in private i nvest ment clearly c annot 
b rul d out . A probabl a mple resulted fro m the 
quantitativ import restrictio n s which existed for ov r 
half th p riod under xamination . These provided a 
sh It r d m rk t for i mp ort substitution in ma ny 
manuf ctur d con urn r goods . Th forc d containment 
and div rsion of d m nd away fro m i mport of this natur 
i ni tiat d or incr as d th de ma nd for do mesti c ally 
produc d substitutes which , in turn , l mo t c rtainly 
ti mulat d inv st m n t in this sector . Mor objectiv ly , 
a nd for l at r p riod (19 62 ), Hooley nd Sicat in a n 
conom tric study of th fi d inv stm nt d mand of so m 
160 manufac tur'ng fir ms dis cov red that , taking the 
a mp l as a whol , th firms ' sal s or sal s l agged on 
y r w r st tistic lly signifi c a n t plan a tory 
1 
b ·d ., p . 20J , n . 16 . 
2 
Eco nom 'c Surv y Mis on to the Philippin s , op . ci t . , 
pp . 8 - l0 . 
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var"able . They conclud d that th r was ' ample vid nc ' 
that sal s aff ct d inv stm nt d cisions . l Although at 
a macro 1 v e l the conceptual difficulties cited by 
Wallich cannot be disr garded , this result can perhaps 
b tak n as indicativ of the operation of some sort of 
induced invest m nt function , if not accel rator 
m chanism , within on s ctor of the eco nomy . 
Imports are conv ntionally related to income through 
a positive propensity to import function. However , a 
stable causal relationship of this type cannot have 
ff ctively exist d in the Philippines duri ng th p riod 
1946-65 . In th 1950's the import and excha nge controls 
plus variabl taxation of imports and sales of for ign 
xchang nsured this. The date in Tabl IV . l indicate 
that b twe n 1949 and 1959 the total peso value of 
imports of goods and s rvices f 11 by 6 . 1 per cent , whil 
ov r the same interval of time GNP at current prices 
increased by 85 . 3 per cent . In real terms, the quantum 
2 index of merchandis e imports fell by 20 . 2 per cent , 
whil G P at 1955 prices increased by 83.9 per c ent . 3 
Mor over, in th immediate post-war period, prior to th 
introduction of controls , expenditure on imports was 
lik ly to have been affect d in a major way by forc s 
oth r tha n incom. In particular , the backlog of 
unsatisfied demand from the war years 4 and the mat erial 
requir ments of reconstruction (capital equipment and 
inv ntori s) wer strong autonomous influences on import 
d ma nd . Similarly, in th arly 1960 's the mul tipl 
change rate system , th devaluation of th peso and 
th abandonment of controls mus t have distorted any 
normal r lationship betw n imports and income . 
1 
3 
4 
Richard 
This ind 
S Tabl 
is shown in T bl VI . 4 blow . 
.3 abov . 
Imports , 
nt 
r 
arch , 
In so f r as this was a consum r demand , the consumptio n 
function postulat d abov is lik ly to provide a som what 
unr list "c plan tion of consum r b haviour in th 
arly post - w r y ars . S p . 133 n . l , above . 
th r for , ar assumed to have be n autono mously 
d t r min d. 
On th basis of the above discussi on, and using 
curr n t pri c values, th fol lowing mul tiplier 
hypoth sis can be derived for the Philippin s from 
quation IV . l : 
(IV. 2 ) y 1 l -c (Ip + G + X - 1M) 
lJ6 
wh re c , the margi nal (and av rage) propensity to 
consum out of G P, is a constant which is positive and 
less than unity . R pr s nting autono mous expenditure 
(Ip + G + X - 1M) by A , th formulation simplifies to: 
(IV.J) y = _1_ A l - c 
In this quation A and care ex ant values . However, 
for e mpirical testing it is necessary to examine the 
quival nt x post relationship . Moreover , since the 
quation is a timeless static one it is also n e c essary 
to hypothesize a chronological relationship between the 
variabl s . The simplest hypothesis is that there is a 
synchronous or unlagged linear relationship between G P 
a n d autono mou s expenditure , as defined above . Howev r, 
th corr lation of these two variables involves a 
statistical problem. Since inco me i n any y ar is by 
definition identical with the sum of induced (consumption) 
and autonomous exp nditures °inthat year , it follows that 
corr lation of Y and A i mplies correlation of Y with 
part of itself . This contributes no thing to the 
v rification of a true mul tiplier relationship . Howev r , 
th probl m can b overco m by testing for the existenc 
of a synchronous relationship betw e n autono mo us and 
i n duc d e penditur s . l Th theoretical justification 
of this solution can b asily seen . Subtracting A 
fro m both sid s of quation IV . J yields th following 
expr ss on : 
( I V. 4) 
1 
C c A l-c 
MOl ton Fri d man and David Meis lman , ' Th R lative 
Stability of Mon tary V locity a nd the Investm n t 
MultOpli r in the Unit d Stat s , 18 97 -1958 ' in E . Cary 
Brown tal ., Stabilization Policies (Eng l w~od Cliff s , 
.J., P;-nti c Hall , 1 96J ), p . 175 
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n ddition to inv st'gating a synchronous 
relationship it will also b nec ssary to xamin th 
possibility that the multipli r acts with a ti m lag . 
A 1 gg d hypoth sis can b d velop d in th £ollowing 
mann r. Assume that consumption , C , in the curr nt 
period , t , is a constant and positiv ly proportionat 
function of incom , Y, in th previous p riod, t - l . 
That is: 
(IV.5) Ct = cY t _ l 
Given that : 
(IV . 6) 
wher A is autonomous expenditure in the previous t-l 
period, it follows that: 
Ct = c(C t _ l + A t _ l ) 
or , mor generally : 
(IV.7) 2 3 n Ct = cA t _ l + c A t _ 2 + c A t - 3 ... + c At 
Accordingly, it is possible to t st for th exist nce 
-n 
of 
a lagg d lin ar r lationship between consumption and one 
or mor earli r values of autono mous expenditure . l 
Any attempt to ascertain whether or not relation hips 
of one of these two broad types xisted in th Philippin s 
in the p riod 1946-65 is handicapped by the fact that the 
es imat s of autonomous and induc d penditur ar 
con£in d to the annual eri s shown in Table V. l. The 
unavailability of quart rly estimates means that 
hypoth siz d lags must unfortunately be of a full year's 
1 
It should be not d that , despit th lag introduced 
into the current pric consumption function in quation 
IV . 5 , this function can still b viewed as equival nt to 
a function in which r al consumption is an identical 
const nt proportion , c , o£ real incom . It may be 
thought th t if th pric 1 vel chang s from period to 
p riod this qui val nc is d strcyed wher a lag is 
involv d . How v r , this follows only if r al incom is 
m sur d s mon y incom deflat d by an ind x numb r o£ 
consum r pric s in th p riod in which it is arn d and 
1 consumption is m asur d as mon y consumption 
p nditur d flat d by a differ nt inde numb r of 
consum r pric s in th follow~ng p riod . If , on the oth r 
h nd , r 1 incom is m asured not jn r lat'on to its 
purch s'ng pow r 0 r consum r goods and s rvices in 
th p riod 'n which 't is arn d , but (as would app ar 
v lid) in r lation to its purchasing pow r in th p riod 
in wh' ch it is postul t d to d t r mi n consumption , then 
th bo quival nc r mains . 
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duration . Another difficulty is that there are 
virtually no national accounts data available for years 
prior to 1946 . 1 Cons quently the use of lags r duces 
th number of sets of observations available for 
regression analysis . 
B fore pres nting the results obtained fro m fitting 
lin ar regression equat·ons to the data on consumption 
and autonomous expe ndi tures at current prices , one final 
probl m should be not d; namely , the dange r of 
autocorrelation . In order to reduc this possibility 
the equ tion were not fitted to the absolute values of 
the bove variable s , but to the first differences or 
annual cha nges in th se values (6C and 6A) . This 
procedure is entirely consistent with the theoretical 
relatio n ships that were derived above using absolute 
values . nd ed , mul tiplier analysis is usually 
concerned w·th the effects of change s in autonomous 
e penditur o n · nduc d e penditure and incom . 
The re ults app ar in Table IV.3 . The equations 
shown here were designed to test for the existence of 
a number of synchro nous and lagg d r lat ·o n hips and 
combina ions ther 0 • t is clear , howev r , that th r 
exists virtu 11y no syn chro nous or un1agged relatio n s hip 
b w n th first diff rences of autonomous penditure 
and consumption penditure . This conc1u ion holds both 
for he full p riod of the study , wh·ch mbraces 
obs vat·ons of fir t differences in co n s umption ro m 
1946/47 to 1964/65 inc1usiv , and fo short r periods 
wh·ch o m·t so m of the ar1y post-war observations of 
first diff rence in co n umption in order to permit the 
testing of agged re1a ionships. This absence of a 
synchronous relat·onsh·p is no only appar nt fro m the 
four s· mp1e regres ion equations , in each 0 which he 
curr n n in autono mous e ' p nditur i 
th s 1 ·nd p nd n t v riable , but also from thos 
mu1t· 1 r gr s·o n equations wh re , n addit·on to the 
curr nt s dif r nc n utonomou8 penditure , the 
1 
Th only c 
nco m or 193 
Ph·l·pp ·n -A m 
1947 w· h h 
W.L. H bb rd. 
of G P and n t·onal 
r were p pa d by the Jo·n 
Fin nc Comm· ssion (op . cit.) n 
an ar1i r unpubl·shed study by 
Table IV .)I Regression Equations Between Annual First Differences 
of Private Consumption Expenditure and Annual First 
Differences oC Autonomous Expenditurea 
c 
R2 
Periodb 
Depen- Constant Regression CoeCficient (and its Standard 
r2) dent Term Error) (or 
!variable 
AAt AA t _ 1 ~At_2 6 At _) 
1946/4 7-64/65 A Ct 570.072 0. 1)4 0.011 
(0 . )06) 
1947/48-64/65 Ll Ct 5)0 . 797 0.164 0.018 
(0. )00) 
1947/48-64/65 Ll Ct 279.762 0.)41 0.972** 0 . 641 
(0 . 190) (0.19 1 ) 
1947/48-64/65 ~Ct )71. 207 0.910** 0.565 
(0.200) 
'1948/49-64/65 AC t 56).425 0 .1 76 0 .024 
(0.290) 
1948/49-64/65 A Ct )1).8)7 o. )4.7 0.948** 0.692 
(0.17 1 ) (0.172) 
1948/49-64/65 A Ct 268.086 0 .21 8 0.987** 0.)21 0.756 
(0. 17) (0.160) (0.175) 
1948/49-64/65 A Ct 406.)60 0.885** 0 . 60) 
(0 . 186) 
1948/49-64/65 A Ct )04 . 0 17 0.964* * 0.410* 0.726 
(0.16) (0.16) 
1949/50-64/65 A Ct 578.41) 0.141 0.012 
(0.))8) 
1949/50-64/65 A Ct )17.689 0.))8 0.947** 0.688 
(0.201) (0. 179) 
1949/50-64/65 A Ct 281.)02 0.180 0.984** 0.))2 0.755 
(0.205) (0.166) (0.18) 
1949/50-64/65 A Ct 274 . 226 0.074 0 . 892** 0.427 0.251 0.764 
(0 . 267) (0.222) (0 . 2)8) (0.)89) 
1949/50-64/65 ACt 420 . 465 0.891** 0 . 619 
(0 . 187) 
1949/50-64/65 Ll Ct ) 18 . 487 0.968** 0 . 401* 0.7)9 
(0.16) (0.164 ) 
1949/50-64/65 A Ct 281.7)5 0.86)** 0.469* 0.)17 0.762 
(0.189) (0.175) (0.294 ) 
* SigniCicant at the 5 per cent l avel. ** Significant at the 1 per cent 
level. 
a Aut onomous expenditure defined as private investment , government 
expenditure on goods and services and exports less imports . 
b Each time span in this column indicates the range of observations of 
first d ifCerences in consumption which was used in the estimation of 
the equati on pres ented alongsid it. 
c Not adjusted Cor degrees of fr eedom. 
Sourc e of data l Table IV .1. 
139 
140 
ind p nd n t variabl s inc Iud arli r or prior first 
diff r nc s in autono mous xp nditur . n no t on of 
th latt r equations is th r gr ssio n co ffici nt of 
th curr nt first di£f renc in autonomous xp nditur 
statisti c a lly significan t . Mor ov r , £or ach of th s 
quations t h pr s nc of this indep n d n t variable 
g n ral ly rais s the valu of th coefficient of 
2 
det r mi nation (R ) only a s mall a mount above its valu 
for that equation which is comparable in v e ry r spect , 
xc pt for its clusion of this particular ind pend nt 
variabl . Therefore , it can be conclud d that , giv n 
th d finition of autono mo us expenditur ther is no 
evidenc of the op ration of a stabl , unlagg d 
mul tipli r or K yn sian inco me determination me chanis m 
in th Phi lippines during the period und r inv stigation . 
Howev r , there does app ar to b so m vid nc 
suggest 'ng that a stabl lagged version of the mul tipli r 
may have op rat d . In th thre si mpl r gression 
equ ations relati ng the chan ge in autono mous expenditure 
b twe n y ars t - 2 a n d t -l (i . e . 6 t - l) to the change in 
consumption e penditure b twee n years t -l and t (i . 
6C t ) , the simpl r gr ssion coeffici nts are consist ntly 
significa n t at the 1 p r c nt 1 v 1 , whil th 
co ffici nts of d t r mination indicat that in ach 
instanc th form r variabl xplains statistic ally well 
over half the varianc in the latt r . (Th i mportance 
of th f ct that th co ffici n t of d t r mination ris s 
fro m 0 . 565 to 0 . 603 to 0 . 619 as th ti m span shrinks 
should b aL 1 ast partially discount d by the fact that 
the numb r of obs rvations simul taneous l y shrinks . ) 
For th r ng of obs rvations of first diff r nc s 
i n consumption stretching fro m th first di£f re nc e 
betw n 1948 nd 1949 to that b tw n 1964 and 1965 , th 
introduction of an tra 'nd pend n t ariabl , 6At _2 , 
rais s th co ffici nt of d termination fro m 0 . 603 to 
0 . 726 . n th's relation hip 6 t - l r m ins significant 
at th 1 p r c nt 1 v 1 , whil 6At _2 is signi£i c ant at 
th 5 p r c nt 1 v 1. Th s 1 v Is of ' gnificanc ar 
s u st i n d wh n, in ord r to p r mit th i n troduc tio n of 
th ' rd bl 
fo r 6 C tis r duc 
consumpt'on b tw 
, 6At _3 , th ti m 
d by droppi ng th 
n 1948 nd 1949 . 
p n of ob r at'o n s 
fir t dilf r nc in 
How v r , th 
r gr s ' on co ffici nt of 6 At _3 fails th t st of 
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significance at the 5 per cent level . Furthermore, the 
presence of this third indep ndent variabl results in 
2 
a value of R only marginally higher than that 
associated with the use for the same p riod of just th 
independent variabl es 6 A
t
_ l and 6A t _ 2 . 
In all, these lagged results suggest that changes 
in current consumption may have been dependent to an 
important extent on chang s in autonomous expenditure 
occurring one and two years previously. The s upport 
that they thus lend to a lagged multiplier hypothesis 
is reinforced by the fact that the greater the lag the 
s ma ller becomes the regression coefficient of the 
indep ndent ariable . l This latter phenomenon is 
consistent, at least in terms of ordinal ranking, with 
the coefficients of the A val ues in equation IV . 7 above, 
given that in the latter equation the marginal propensity 
to c onsume, c, is l ess than unity . 
The next step in this Keynesian analysis of the 
determination of aggregate money demand is to examine 
more closely the beha iour of autonomous expenditure, 
as it has been defined above . To this end, attention 
wi ll be concentrated initially on the simple linear 
relationship between first differences in annual 
autonomous expenditure and first differences in annual 
conswnption expenditure which involves a one year lag. 
To obtain maximum cov rage of the p riod under 
investigation the specific equation chosen is the fourth 
one from the top in Table IV .J; namely, that one which 
relies in its estimation on observations of first 
differences in consumption extending from the first 
difference b tween 1947 and 1948 to the first difference 
betwe n 1964 and 1965, inclusive . The equation is : 
( v . 8) 6 C t = J71 . 207 + 0 . 9 106A t 1 (0 . 200) -
t is plotted, tog ther with the data fro m which it is 
estimated, in Figure IV . l . Th independent variable in 
this equation isth urn of th first differences or 
1 
This st t ment refers only to those quations in which 
all th ind p ndent variabl s precede in time the 
dep nd nt variabl . It excludes those multipl 
r gression results wh re current chang s in autono mous 
exp enditur r included among th indep ndent variabl s . 
Figure IV . l : Lagged Relationship of First Differenc es of Consumption 
and Autonomous Expenditure ; Annual Data , 1947/48- 64/65 
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annual chang s in gross private investment, government 
expenditur on goods and services and exports less the 
first difference or annual change in imports, all of 
course being appropriately dated . Accordingly, it can 
be argued on grounds of consistency that if this 
eq ua t ion is to be accepted as evid ence supporting the 
xistence of a lagged multiplier process, each of the 
above components of its independent variabl should 
a l so, ceteris paribus, have a lagged relationship with 
first diff rences in consumption expenditure, which in 
eac h instance is consistent with the multiplier 
hypothesis . In fact, the linear multiple regression 
equation fitted to the relevant data for the same 
period as equation (IV . 8) is : 
6 Ct = 264 . 948 + 1 . 25l6 IPt 1 + 1.5946G t 1 (0 . 360) - (1.244) -
+ 0 . 5 446Xt 1 - 0 . 6 l 3 6 IM t 1 (0 . 424) - (0 . 260) -
2 (R = 0.682) 
The regression coefficients of changes in private 
investment and imports (6IPt_l and 6IMt _ l ) are both 
significant, the former at the 1 per cent level and th 
latter at the 5 p r cent level. However, th 
coefficients of the other independent variables, namely 
changes in government expenditure and exports (6G
t
_ l 
and 6 t-l)' are not statisticall y significant . 
everthel ss, it is particularly noteworthy that the 
signs of all the regression coefficients are consistent 
with th lagged version of the multiplier theory, as it 
has been formulated in this chapter for the Philippines . 
11 coefficients are positive except the coefficient 
for changes in imports which is negative . The . 
th oretical r ason for expecting a negative regression 
coeffici nt for imports is that, other things being 
equal , an utonomous ariation in imports should bring 
about a synchronous change in the opposite direction in 
income , and this, through the positive marginal 
propensity to onsum, should cause a lagged change in 
consumption which is also in the opposite direction to 
th origin 1 chang in imports. 
As so far pr sent d, this Keyn sian attempt to 
xpl in th gen ration of aggreg te demand 0 er the 
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p riod 1 946 - 65 has fail d to consid r xpli ci tly th 
possib l influ nc of th money supply . Admitt dly , it 
was s n in th last chapt r that mov m n ts in this 
variabl ar no t abl to provid by thems lv s a 
satisfactory p lanatio n of mov m nt s in t o tal 
xp nditur . How v r , it was als o pr v i ous ly not d (in 
Chapt r II) that the g n ral K yn sian approach d o es not 
comp l et l y disregard their role . For example , th 
appro a ch rec o g niz es that cha nges in mon y supply may 
l ead to chang s in th sam dir ction in autonomous 
xp ndi t ure . For the Philippines there is s ome 
v ide nc of a positive statistical association b tw e n 
th se v ariables . The following equation was stimated 
from the rel vant absolut data for 1946-65 inclusiv : 
( IV .10) 6A t = 2 l . l5J + 2 . 0l76Mt (0 . 5 2 7 ) 
2 (r = 0 . 46J) 
wher 6A t is the first diff r nce in autono mous 
xpenditur at curre nt pric s , as defined abov 
b tw n y ar t and y ar t -l , 
and 6M
t 
is th first differenc e in average y arly 
money supply betwe e n y ar t and y ar t -l. 1 
Th r gr ssion co fficient is significant at the 1 per 
c n t 1 v e l and the co ffici nt of d t rmination indicates 
that so m 4 6 p r c e nt of the varianc in mo ve m nts in 
autono mous xp nditur is e plain d statistically by 
mov ments in mon y supply . Th r e lationship is 
virtually th sam, apart fro m a declin in the constant 
term, if th first diff r nc s b tw n the 1946 and 
1947 data ar omitt d fro m the c alculation . 2 
Thus : 
(IV . ll) 6A t = 11 . 194 + 2 . 0606M t ( 0 . 552 ) 
0 . 465) 
Th s two equations do no t , of cours , nec ssarily 
i ndic t c usality , let lon th dir ction of causality. 
Th r for , i n a n att mpt to st blish wh th r o r no t 
mon y supply influ nc d aut onomous xp ndi t ure , this 
inv stig tio n will b xt nd d in tw o r sp cts . 
1 
like 6A t , is measur d in mi l l i ons of p esos . 
2 How v r, on comparing th r valu s of quations 
V. 10 nd IV . ll, not t ha t on f w r s t of obs rvations 
was mp loy d n stO m ting th 1 tt r . 
, 
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First, quations V . 10 and IV . ll show synchronous 
rela tionship s . If, however , changes in money supply did 
l ead to changes in autonomou s expendi tur e , it is lilely 
t hat they would have done so with something of a lag. 
There would have be en at least a s ma ll d elay while the 
i mpa ct of changes in money s upply was transmitted to 
xpenditure decisions and these in turn were impl emented . 
Accord ingly, there would be grounds for expecting a 
l a gge d relationship between changes in money supply and 
change s in autonomous expendi ture t o be stronger t han 
an unl a gg ed one. However, if equation IV . ll is 
re- estimated with its dependent variable preceding its 
indep n d n t a riablc in time by three months, the new 
result is, in fact, weaker . Thus : 
(IV . 12) (r2 = 0 . 221) 
where 
and 
6A t is defined as above, 
6 M 1 is the first difference between average t - 4 
money supply for the twelve months ending 
S ptember 30, year t, and the average money 
supply for the twelve months ending September 
30, year t-l. 
The regression coefficient is now significant only at 
2 the 5 p er c nt level and the r value is less than one 
half of tha t of equation IV .ll . 
Se condly, it can be argued that if changes in money 
suppl y did aff ct a utonomous expenditure, then 
(theoretically) this influence should have been felt 
mainly in the gross private investment component of 
a utonomous expenditure, presumably through interest rate 
and wealth eff cts. Yet, in fact, a synchronous 
correlation of a nnual first differences in money supply 
and annual first diff rences in gross private 
inves tm nt for th p riod 1946 - 65 yield s a coefficient 
of determination (r2) of only 0 . 080 . This is cons i d rably 
l ess than t h coefficients obtained fro m correlating 
annua l first diff renc s in money s upply and government 
e xpenditure (0.537) and annual first d ifferences in 
money supply a nd ports (0.367 ) for the same p eriod . l 
1 
All thr of th corr 1 t·on coefficients corre s ponding 
to th s co fficient of d termination were positi e in 
sign . 
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Moreover, ev n if the relationship b tw en chang s in 
money supply and investment had been stronger, the fact 
that investment expenditure was directed to a consid rab1e 
extent towards imported capital goods would have t nd d 
to reduce any eff ct of changes in money supply (via 
changes in investment) on total autonomous expenditure . 
This follows be ause, by the definition of this chapter, 
changes in imports re treated as a negative component 
of changes in autonomous expenditure . 
Th re is thus room for some doubt that the 
synchronous statistical relationship between changes in 
average yearly money supply and changes in autonomous 
expenditure can be taken as indicative of the causal 
influence of the former on the latter . Inde d, it is 
possib1 that the causation ran to some d gre in the 
opposite direction, although the relationship would not 
n cessari1y have been a simple linear one . Among the 
determinants of changes in money supply from the 
beginning to the end of ach year were the national 
government's budget surplus or deficit, suitably defined, 
and the 0 er-a11 balance of payments surplus or deficit. 
The former of these d terminants may have been affected 
by annual variations in total government expenditure on 
goods and services and the latter by annual variations 
in exports and imports. Accordingly, these annual 
ariations may ha e had some influence on changes in 
money supply during each y ar and thus possibly some 
inf1uenc on chang s in average y ar1y money supply. 
However, regard1 ss of th precise role of money 
supply, the prec ding statistical results permit the 
pro isiona1 statement of a broad Keyn sian explanation 
of the beha iour of ggregate mon y expenditure (i . e . , 
of G P t current pri s) 0 r the period 1946-65. 
Changes in consumption expenditure at current prices, 
it can b 
d gre by 
rgu d, w re determined to a consid rab1e 
lagged mu1tip1i r process; th t is, by 
pr"or chang s in utonomou expenditur at current prices. 
inc, by d finition, b tween ny two periods 
in total G P at ur nt pri es must ha be n qual to 
th sum 0 the hang in onsumption and autonomous 
xp ndltur b tw n th am two p riod , it can further 
b rgu d th t h ng s in G P t current pri es were 
Figure IV. 2 : 
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1 rg ly d t r min d by th prior and synchronous chang s 
in th mon y value of autono mous p nditur . 
If this conclusion is acc pt d , th n it can b 
rgu d th t , aft r m king allowanc lor mov ments in 
r al output , a multipli r e planatio n of chang s in tot 1 
mo n y exp nditure is able to account for a consid rabl 
p rt 01 th variation in the pric lev 1 of output . 
Sp cilically , to th e t nt tha t the abov approach can 
be con id r d to xplain satisfactorily th move m nts 
i n G P at curr nt pric s , it can ( tog th r with the 
mov m nts in real G p) b clai m d to xplain the 
behaviour of th G P implici t price deflator inde 
Figur IV . 2 co mpares the a c tual behaviour of G P 
at curr nt pric sand G P at 1955 pric s ov r the p riod 
1946- 65 . Si n ce the vertical scale is logarithmic , 
differ n c s in the rates of growth of thes aggr gat s 
are easily disc rnibl Such differenc s indi c at chang s 
i n t h e price level as measur d by the G P i mplicit price 
d flator . It can b s en that , even apart fro m the 
traordinarily large xpansion of real output betw n 
1946 nd 1 47 , the rate of growth of r al output 
tend d to d cel rat over time . On the other hand , 
total mo n ey inco m or p nditure , largely stimulated 
( th pr c dOng a naly is would sugg t ) by th behaviour 
01 autono mous p nditure , showed a tendency to grow at 
an acc 1 r ting rate . However , until 1955 r al output 
was still growing laster than money penditure , thus 
i mplyi n g that prices w re lalling . l Subsequently pric s 
ro as th rat of growth of e p nditur cam to ce d 
th t of output . 
A CRITIQUE 
This highly si mplifi d inco m - pe nditur approach 
to pl ining Philippi n pric lev 1 b haviour is 
in d qu t in sev r 1 r sp cts . 
1 
Th only c pt"on to th"s stat m nt r lates to th 
y rs 1950- 1 when G P at 
11 . 2 p r c nt , whil G P 
4 . 7 p r c n t. As qu nc , 
d 11 tor ros by 6.1 p r nt . 
ncr a by 
s d by only 
pric 
---
First , th b haviour or aggr gat supply or r al 
output is treat d as datum . Th analys·s ·s conc rn d 
with plaining th b h viour or mon y 
and 
comp ring this b hav·our w~th th g v n b haviour or r al 
output. It thus rails to show eith r that r al output 
was d P nd nt on aggr gat demand or , alt rnativ ly , that 
(·n classical fashion) it stay d always clos e to its 
grow·ng rna ·mum short run level . In thO r sp ct , th 
an lysis differs , of cours , from K yn sian theory 
prop r wh·ch , as has be n obs rved , is de ply concern d 
with the det r mination of the lev 1 or r al output and 
its responsiveness to movements in aggr gate d mand . 
This shortcoming mans that th abov analysis is 
in n incomplet . Moreover , ven within its limits 
ther are other difficulties. A major on , already 
briefly nticipat d , relat s to the 1 ngths of the lags 
employed in those regression equations which have b en 
us d as videnc of a stable multiplier relationship. 
As was noted , it is the r gression coefficients of 
6A t _ l and 6A t _2 (i . e. th regression coefficients of 
annual first differ nces in autonomous exp nditure on 
and two years prior to the depend nt variable , annual 
rirst difr rences in consumption) which r the 
statistic lly signific nt ones . l To int rpret these 
r suits, as has b en provisionally done , as support (in 
fir t diff r nce form) for th sp ciric lagged mul tiplier 
hypoth sis d v loped in equations IV.5, Iv . 6 and IV.7 
can b sharply criticiz d becaus that hypoth sis, when 
rei t d to a nnual d ta , mbodies a consumption function 
·n which consumption in any year t is d t rmined by 
incom in the pr c ding y r t - l . A lag of this duration 
app 
in som 
b n 
implau ibl sag n ral condit·on . Admitt dly 
gr· cultural industries farm incom .may have 
lump sum paym nt , in cash or lind , received once 
v ry tw lv months aft r Lh har ting nd sale of an 
annu 1 crop , nd this rna ha larg ly d t rmined 
con u mpLion ror the following y r. How v r , this 
condition would c rt inly not ha ppli d to all 
1 
Th co fr·ci nL or 6A t _2 is st t· tic lly significant , 
only if , for ch or th r gr ss · on qu tions in which 
it pp r , th synchro nous indep nd nt ri bl 6 t 
is lud d. 
----------
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gricultural incom wh"ch its If nev r c d d 50 p r 
cent of tot 1 nation 1 "ncom nd which , n .f ct , tow rds 
th nd o.f the period und r "nvestig tion , f 11 in Som 
y ars b low one third o.f total national incom . (s 
T bl 
. 6 . ) Moreov r , th statist"cal obs rv t"on o.f 
uch lag on 
clos to th 
c 1 nd r y ar basis would d pend on how 
nd of th calendar year this typ o.f 
agricultural inco m was rec iv d . For oth r sectors or 
the cono my , part"cul rly those mploying large numbers 
o.f w g - arn rs , th r app ars to b littl ~ priori 
r son for acc pting th istenc of gen ral "ncome -
co n sumption r lation hip which involv d a .full year ' s 
lag . 
Whil this particular int rpr tation of the lagg d 
r gre ion r suIts may ther .fore b r j cted , it is still 
possibl to argue that th se r suIts do indicat a stabl 
K yn ian multipli r or inco me - gen ration r lationship. 
Th re i lik ly to hay be n so m inco m - consumption lag , 
v n if it wer much shorter than a year; and , in 
addition , two other lag , which would hay contributed 
to t mporal lengthening of the multipli r proc s , ar 
lik ly to h v op r ted . 
in output behind chang 
hese ar the lag of chang 
in consumption or , mor 
g n rally , sal s ; and th lag of chang s in income 
paym nts b hind chang s in earned incom or production . 
Th latt r is particularly r levant to pro.fit . l nd r 
uch circum tanc s it app ar plausibl that th 
int rv Is betw n th ucc siv ' rounds ' of consumption 
p nditur initiated by a chang in autono mous 
p nditur m hay b n o.f a dUration suffici nt to 
en ur that a multipl" r proc ss would still hay b n 
op rating trongly on and pos ibly two y aft r it 
comm nc m nt . Furth rmor , giv n th siz of thes 
int rv Is , th 1 rg r th r - sp nding co ffici nt (th 
' m rgin 1 prop nsity to consum I ) , th mor 
1 
This thr -.fold 1 s 
Lloyd A. M 
in mon 
nco mp ss s th 
s w 11 s th ph 
lowly 
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would a multipli r proc shave dwindl d into 
in ign'.f·canc . Cons qu ntly, in so r r as the 
r -sp nding co .fr·ci nt w s r lativ ly high in th 
Ph'lippin s, and this is a normal xp ctation for less 
d v lop d conomi s, this also off rs support to a 
K yn sian xplanation of th e mpirical r lationships 
discov r d b tw en changes in autonomous e penditur 
and changes in consumption expenditur some consid rabl 
tim lat r . Ther is thus still a cas for the 
exist nce of a lagged multiplier relationship , albeit 
a r lationship not in the form of th hypothesis 
originally formulated. 
How v r , this looser interpretation of the 
r gr ssion results has its own probl m; namely, th 
fa'lur to discover any synchronous or unlagged 
r lationship betwe n annual first differences in 
autonomous xp nditur and annual first differences in 
consumption. Ev n if the ph nom na discuss d in the 
previous paragraph did operate to bring about th 
observ d lagg d r lation hip between 6A and 6C , it could 
still be reasonably expected that , becaus of the n d 
to m asure tim in units of twelve month , so me vid nce 
of a significant relationship betw n the synchronous 
value of these variables would al 0 exist. Some 
'rounds' of th mul tiplier would surely have occurred in 
th same year as the initiating change in autono mous 
e p ndi tur . Y t, in fact , s was not d, in not one of 
the stimat d quations in which th value or the 
current change in autono mous xpenditure (6At) occurs 
as an ind pendent variabl is the r gr ssion coeffici nt 
of this ariabl statistically significant at eith r th 
1 or 5 p r c nt 1 1. Thi s i~ true or both t h 
si mpl and multipl r gr sions . 
Irre p ctiv of th precis interpr tation plac d 
upon th r gr ssion quations which hay b n us d as 
v ' d nc of a 1 gg d multipl' r r lationship, ther i 
a furth r difficulty; nam ly, th r 1 vant co ffici nts 
of d t rm 'nation (R2 valu ), although quit high, 
' ndic t th t th ind p nd nt variabl s of the quations 
by no m n ccount st ti tically ror th whol of th 
v rianc s in annual f ' rst diff r nc in consumption 
p nditur. As h s be n s n from Tabl IV . 3 , th 
mul ipl corr lat'on of obs rvations or 6Ct for th 
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p rOod 1948/ 49 - 1964/65 with 6At _l and 6At _2 yi Ids an 
2 
R valu of only 0.726. Short ning the tim period by 
omitting th first set of observations incr ases it to 
only 0.739. The inclusion of additional ind pend nt 
variabl s ( 6 A t in th .former instanc and 6 At and 
6 A t _3 in the latter instance) has littl ff ct on th se 
values. Moreover, th presence of constant t rms in th 
quations implies that th re would hav b en mov ments 
in consumption expenditure , even if there had b n no 
prior or current changes in autonomous xp nditure. In 
all, these facts sugg st that the relationships are not 
suffici ntly strong to warrant th view that an 
explanation of movem nts in G P at curr nt prices ne d 
be conc rn d only with the behaviour of autonomous 
xpenditure at current prices , as it has been defined in 
this chapter. For a p riod as long as the one under 
examination and ncompassing, as it did, substantial 
chang s in the nature of the Philippin economY9 this 
conclusion is hardly surprising . 
One final criticism, which is also broadly 
applicable to the Quantity Theory approach of the previous 
chapter, concerns the aggregative nature of the analysis . 
Pric 1 el movem nts have be n viewed as th result of 
imbalances between aggr gate demand and aggr gate supply 
or, in dynamic t rms, as the result of divergences 
between th rate of change of money expenditur and the 
rate o.f change of aggregat real output. The 
compositions or patterns o f aggregate sp nding (e c ept 
in so far as it has b n divid d into autono mou s and 
induc d lem nts) and output have both b en ignored . 
ff ct, th analysis h s b en conduct d as if there w 
only a singl product . Cons qu ntly, no con id ration 
has b n giv n to th i mplications for ov r .... all price 
lev 1 movem nts of the struc tural chang s and marked 
s ctoral diff renc s in conomic p r.formanc and 
b haviour which occurr d in the period 1946-65, exc pt 
in so far as th ir n t impact was r flected in the 
r 1 vant macro vari bl s . How v r, in th following 
two ch pt r , which ar mainly 'Structuralist' in 
vi wpoint, an att mpt will b made to consid r th 
f ctors. 
In 
r 
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CHAPTER V 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS : ( a) FOOD SUPPLY 
This chapter will xamine th significance of the 
supply and demand for food as determinants of th b haviour 
of th Philippin price lev 1 in the period 1946-65. 
With r gard to the post-1955 inflationary e perience , an 
ass ssment will be mad of he relevance of the 
Structuralist argum nt that , even in the absence of 
general exc ss demand , a rising price level may occur if 
th proc Sses of economic and population growth are such 
as to cause the demand for food to rise more rapidly 
than th supply . With regard to the largely deflationary 
e perience prior to 1955 , an assess ment will be made of 
the relevance of a conceptually similar and at least 
partially symmetrical argument ; namely, that a falling 
price level may result not only from a general deficiency 
of aggr gate d mand, but also from merely an excess supply 
of food. 
Th form r argument was outlined in Chapter II. 
Growth in r al inco m per capita and an expansion of 
population will caus growth in the d mand for food . 
If, however, the growth of output is concentrated not in 
the food-producing or agricultural sector , but rath r in 
the non-agricultural or ' industrial ' sector , and if th 
economy is a clos d one; then the supply of food may 
well lag behind the d m nd for it . situation may 
arise wh re aggregate de mand is in balance with aggr gat 
output, but wher th r i exc s d mand for food or 
agr'cultural products and an excess supply 'of industrial 
goods. If this occurs , a shift i n r lative prices or 
in th int r - sector 1 terms of trad against the 
industri 1 sector will result . Under Structuralist 
assumptions such a shift will have inflationary 
·mpl·cat·ons . Agricultural or food pric s which are 
r 1 t'vely sensitiv to market imbalanc swill ris , 
whil industri 1 pric s which ar cost-d t rmined and 
poss ss consid rable downward infl ibility in th fac 
of c ss supply w'ill fall lit tl , if at al l. Thus th 
ov r-all price 1 v 1 will r · s . This rise will b 
xac rbated in so far as industrial costs , and h nc 
pr'c s , ar increas d by industrial wag s rising in 
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r spo n s to higher food pric s and by high r prices for 
gricultural raw mat rials . Mor over , a rise in 
i ndustrial prices will t nd to r store the original 
r lativ pric structure , with the result that the 
inflationary process may continue. 
Th latter argument (i . e. the deflationary on ) can 
b dev lop d up to a c rtain stage in a more or less 
parallel fashion . Assume that economic growth is 
concentrated on th food - producing or agricultural 
sector and that the xpansion of industrial output lags 
behind the demand for industrial products . Ignoring 
th possibility of foreign trade , a situation may 
th refore arise where aggr gate d mand equals aggr gate 
supply , but wher there is an excess demand for industrial 
products and an excess supply of food or agricultural 
products . If food prices are fl xible , but industrial 
prices are generally cost - determined and unresponsive , 
at least directly , to excess demand , then the required 
change in relative prices will be deflationary . Food 
prices will fall , but industrial prices will not ris , 
or at least only slightly . Wh ther or not the 
d flationary proc ss will continue past this stage 
depends in the first instance on the specific assumption 
mad about the b haviour of industrial costs. If forc s 
exist which maintain a constant real wage (i.e . if 
industrial money wages decline with food prices) , then 
industrial costs will fall . l Given th maintenanc in 
this situation of full-cost pricing principles, the 
prices of industrial goods will fall . Ther will thus 
bat nd ncy for th original r lative price structur 
and d fl tionary pre sur s to re - m rge . However , the 
1 tt r part of this argument is not v ry r alistic . 
Ev n p rt fro m the possibility of downward infl xibility 
in 'ndu strial money wages , and granting th xist nc of 
falli ng costs of industri 1 production , it app ars 
unl'k ly that und r conditions of 
i ndustri 1 goods firm would r duc 
1 
ce s demand for 
the pric s of th s 
n 0 f r s i ndustri 1 costs i n c lud the c ost of 
gricul tur 1 raw m t ri Is which d cli n w~th f oo d pri c s , 
t h y w'l l sti l l fal l, v n if i n d u stria l mo n y wages do 
n ot . 
1.5 .5 
goods in accordance with full - co st pr"cing princ ipl s . 
Thus , whil th initial situation of s ctoral imbalanc 
m y giv ris to a d flationary bias , it may not 1 ad to 
a sustain d and r petitiv deflationary pro c ess . l 
In the si mpl two sec tor form i n which th s 
rguments have b n present d , th Y abstract from 
int rnational trade . It s clear, ther fore , that in 
assessing th ir r 1 vance to th Philippine economy , they 
must be modified to t a k into account that econo my ' s 
trading relationships with the r st of the world . This 
will subs quently b done . Howev r , as a starting point 
to an inv st "g tion of the broad approach which they 
mbo dy , an examination will be und rtaken of the 
behaviour of Philippine food prices , both absolutely and 
relatively to other pric s over the period 1946- 6.5 . 
THE BEHAVIOUR OF FOOD PRICES 
Data on food prices , together with comparable data 
on oth r pric s , are presented in index number form in 
Tabl s V. l and V. 2 . The first of these tables shows the 
Composite Consum r Pric Ind x for Manila for the 
p riod 1946-6.5 broken down into two major components , 
th food group ind and an index covering the other 
it ms in the r gi m n. The second table shows the 
corr ponding breakdown for the same period of th 
Composit R tail Price Ind x f or Manila . 
t is appar nt that the food pric indices and th 
ov r - all or ' all items ' indi c es tend d to move in th 
sam direction , both in terms of long run trend and 
y ar - to-y ar chang s . Th pr - 19.5.5 period , which saw 
d c 1 rating downw rd tr nds in the ov r - all consum r 
and r tail price indic s , trends that w r admi tt dly 
subj ct to t mporary interruption t bout th time of 
th Kor an War , also s w d c 1 rating downward tr nds , 
mo r or 1 s s" mil rly int rrupt d , in th food pric 
co mpon n of th t\vO i n di c es . Corr pondingly , th 
1 
Furth mor , in 0 f r as "ndustri 1 fir ms p ri nc 
f ll"ng costs in th f c of an c ss d ma nd for th ir 
output , industrial ns"on would b gr at ly ncourag d . 
Thi growth wuuld s rv to incr as th d ma nd for food 
n d h nc w'ould h lp to r mov th d fl tio nary bias . 
T a b l e V. l : Manila Composite Co nsum r Price Inde x : 
Year 
Food 
194 6 19J . 6 
1 947 124 . 9 
1948 116 . 1 
1949 107 . 6 
19 50 105 .J 
195 1 I1J.l 
1952 108 . 0 
195J 102 . 0 
1954 100 . 8 
1955 100 . 0 
1956 10J .J 
1957 106 . 8 
1958 I1J . 4 
1959 108 . 7 
1960 116 . 0 
1961 118 . 9 
19 62 127 · 9 
196J 140 . 4 
19 64 158 . 4 
19 65 161. J 
F ood, Other Items a nd All Items, 
194 6- 65 
( 1955 = 100) 
Indices Per cent change from 
previous y e ar 
Other All F ood Other All 
Items Items Items Items 
155 . 2 17J · 5 - - -
107 ·9 11 6 .0 
-J5 · 5 -JO · 5 - JJ . l 
100·9 108 .1 
- 7 · 0 - 6 . 5 - 6 . 8 
97 . 6 102 . 4 
- 7 · J - J . J - 5 · J 
104 . 7 105 · 0 - 2 . 1 + 7 . J + 2 · 5 
IlJ. 8 Il J · 5 + 7 . 4 + 8 · 7 + 8 . 1 
104 . 9 10 6 . J 
- 4 . 5 - 7 . 8 
- 6 . J 
10J . 0 102 . 6 
- 5 . 6 
-
1. 8 
- J · 5 
101. J 101. 0 
- 1. 2 
- 1. 7 - 1. 6 
100 . 0 100 . 0 
- 0 . 8 - l.J - 1.0 
102 . 2 102 · 7 + J . J + 2 . 2 + 2 · 7 
102 . 4 104 · 5 + J . 4 + 0 . 2 + 1.8 
103 . 2 108 . 0 + 6 . 2 + 0 . 8 + J.J 
105·5 107 .0 
- 4 . 1 + 2 . 2 - 0 · 9 
107.4 Ill. 5 + 6 · 7 + 1. 8 + 4 . 2 
10 . 2 I1J.2 + 2 · 5 + 0 · 7 + 1. 5 
112 . 4 11 9 . 8 + 7 . 6 + J · 9 + 5 . 8 
114 . 0 126.5 + 9 . 8 + 1. 4 + 5 . 6 
117 . 4 IJ6 . 9 +12 . 8 + J .O + . 2 
121. 5 140 . 4 + 1. 8 + J . 5 + 2 . 6 
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ources : Centra l Bank of the Philipp ines, tatistical 
Bulletin, Vol . VIII , 0 . 4 (D c mber 1956); 
Vo l. XVII , 0 . 4 (December 1965)j ' Bureau of 
t he C nsus and Statis t ics, J ourna l of 
Phi l ippine Statistics, Vo l. XIII ( 1960) . 
Al so see Appendix A, Part I , below . 
Table V . 2 : Mani1 Composi te Retail Pr ice I nd x: 
Year 
1 94 6 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
19 52 
1953 
1954 
1955 
195 6 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
19 6 1 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Fo od, Ot her Items a nd All Items, 
1946-65 
(1955 = 100) 
I ndices Per cen t cha nge from 
previous year 
Fo od Other All Food Other All 
Items Items Items Items 
228 . 8 175 . 8 2 01 . 4 
- - -
128 . 8 120 . 5 124 . 5 
-4 3 . 5 
- 29 · 9 - 38 . 2 
12 9 · 7 110 · 5 119·9 + 0 · 7 - 8 . 3 - 3 · 7 
115 . 8 98.6 107·0 
-10· 7 -10 . 8 
-10. 8 
110· 5 10 6 . 8 108.6 
- 4 . 6 + 8 . 3 + 1. 5 
117·3 123 .4 120.4 + 6 . 2 +15 · 5 +10 · 9 
112 . 7 114.0 113 . 4 - 3 · 9 - 7 . 6 - 5 . 8 
105 · 7 110 · 9 108 . 4 
- 6 . 2 
- 2 · 7 - 4 . 4 
101. 7 103·3 102 . 5 
- 3 . 8 - 6 ·9 - 5 . 4 
100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
- 1.7 - 3 . 2 - 2 . 4 
103 . 6 105 . 6 104 . 6 + 3.6 + 5 . 6 + 4 . 6 
107·1 108 . 2 107 . 6 + 3 . 4 + 2 · 5 + 2 · 9 
113 · 7 111.1 11 2 . 4 + 6 . 2 + 2 · 7 + 4 . 5 
109 . 6 115·2 112 . 5 
- 3 . 6 + 3·7 + 0.1 
117·0 118 . 5 117 .8 + 6 . 8 + 2 · 9 + 4 . 7 
120 . 2 119· 3 119·7 + 2 · 7 + 0 · 7 + 1. 6 
130 . 2 1 26 · 5 128 . 3 + 8.3 + 6 .0 + 7 · 2 
143 . 1 130.1 136.4 + 9·9 + 2 . 8 + 6 . 3 
16 0 . 7 133.8 146.9 +12.3 + 2 . 8 + 7 · 7 
163 . 3 136 . 7 149 . 7 + 1. 6 + 2 . 2 + 1.9 
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Sourc s : Ce ntra l Bank of th Philippines, Statistical 
Bu11et'n , Vo 1.XVII, 0.4 (Dece mber 1965); 
Centr a l Bank of the Phi lippine ,. Fif th 
Annu a l R por t, 1953, Ap p endi E . l~o 
see App nd' A. Part I , below . 
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post-1955 p riod, whi h saw acce l rating upward 
trends in th ov r-all consum rand r t il price indic s, 
a lso s w acce lerating upward tr nds in their food pric 
compon n ts . n terms of year l y movements, the food 
omponent index of the over-all consumer price inde 
a nd th over-all index its If moved in the same dire ction 
in eighteen of a possibl nineteen instances b tween 1946 
and 196 5 ; while with r s pect to the retail price index 
over th same period, the food componen t index and the 
over-all index moved in the same dir ction in sixteen 
of a possible nineteen instances. 
The fa t that each of the 'all items' indices 
and its respecti e food component index moved broadly 
in the arne direction is not surpriSing in view of the 
l arge fi ed weight given to the food componen t in each 
of the 'all items' indices. In the Manila Composite 
Consumer Pri ce Ind x this weight is 47.50 per cent, 
and in the Manila Composite Retail Price Index it is 
1 
48.87 per cent . Utilizing thes weights, it is 
possible to show the major influenc e that food price 
movements had on the behaviour of the pri ce level as 
ltern ti ely me sured by these two indices. With 
r pect to the consumer price inde , the decline in 
the food omponent between 194 6 and 1955 accounted for 
44 . 5 of th 73 . 5 points fall in the 'all items' index 
ov r the arne period (i . e . some 60.5 per cent of the 
d flation as recorded by the latter index); while for 
195 5-65 th rise in th food component accounted for 
29 .1 of the 40.4 points rise in the ' al l items' index 
(i.e. some 72.0 per cen of the inflation as recorded 
by the latter index). With respect to the retail 
pric ind x, the de c line in the food component between 
1946 a nd 1955 a counted for 62 . 6 of the 101.4 points 
fall in the ' a ll items' index over th sarne period 
(i.e. some 6 1.7 p r cent of its total net fall); while 
for 1955-65 th incr as in the food component 
ac ounted for 30.9 of th 49.7 points rise in the 
1 
For th d riv tion of thes weights see Appendi A, 
Part 
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' all it ms ' index (i.e . some 62 . 2 per c nt of its 
total net rise).l 
n ddition to onsidering the absolute behaviou 
of foo d prices, it is necessary to examine their behaviour 
relative to other pri es. Although it has been shown 
that movements of food prices and the over-all price 
lev 1 tended to be in th same direction, these 
movem nts w re by no means qui-proportionate ones; 
n ither, th r fore, were the movements of food prices 
and other prices. Table V.3 and igure V.l summarize 
relative food price behaviour as ecorded in the consumer 
nd retail pri e indic s . For ach of these two over-all 
indi es the food component index is e pressed as a ratio 
of the ' other items' index on a base of 1955 = 100 . In 
so far as food prices rose relatively to other prices, 
these ratios show rises; in so far as food prices fell 
relatively to oth r prices, they show declines. 
1 
It is unfortunate that no official estimates of the 
proportion of final food outlays in G P at 1955 prices 
are av ilable, as it would be interesting to know the 
food wight in the G P implicit price deflator . This 
weight would, of ourse, b a variable one, since the 
index is by definition of the Paasche variety. However, 
a very rough idea of its average size for the period 
1953 - 60 an be obtained from various pieces of 
information . Ri hard W. Hooley [Saving in the 
Philippin s 1951-60 (Quezon City, Institute of Economic 
D elopment and Resear h, University of the Philippines, 
1963)J has made unoffi ial estimates of food outlays 
and total consumption e penditure at current prices for 
th above period . These estimate, when deflated to 1955 
pric s, show food outl ys to hav averaged (geometrically) 
som 49 . 9 p r cent of tot 1 consumption . For the same 
period the offi illy published national accounts data, 
aft a ll owanc for th revision for 1960 undertaken 
in Appendi A of this study, 'ndicate that onsumption 
at 1 955 pri es av rag d (geom trically) 84 . 7 per cent 
of G P t 1955 pric s . Thus, ignoring the discrepancies 
b tween Hooley ' s stirn t s (deflated) and the officially 
publish d timat s of real consumption, it a p p ars 
h t food outl y at 1955 pric s a counted on the 
for about 42 pe nt of GNP t 1955 prices fo 
1953-60 . Cl rly, food pri e mov ments 
b n i mport nt d terminants of 
G P i mplicit pric def l ator . 
Table V . J: Ratio of Food Pric I ndex to Other 
Items Pri e Index : Manil a Composite 
Consumer and Retail Price Indi ces, 
19 l~ 6 - 65 
(1955 = 100) 
Year 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
195J 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
196J 
1964 
19 65 
Manil a Composite 
Consumer Pric 
Index 
124·7 
115 . 8 
115 ·1 
110. 2 
100.6 
99 . 4 
10J.0 
99.0 
99 · 5 
100.0 
101.1 
104 . J 
109 · 9 
10J . 0 
108.0 
109 · 9 
11J . 8 
12J . 2 
1J4.9 
1J2 .8 
S ources : Tab les .1 nd . 2 . 
Manila Composi te 
Retai l Price 
Index 
1J2 · 7 
106 . 9 
117 . 4 
117 . 4 
10J . 5 
95.1 
98 . 9 
95 . J 
98.5 
100.0 
98.1 
99 . 0 
102 . J 
95 .1 
98·7 
100.8 
102 . 9 
110.0 
120 .1 
119· 5 
160 
140 
130 
90 
140 
90 
161 
igure V . 1: Th R .lativ Pric of Food , 1946-65 
( 1955 = 100 ) 
() Food Compon 
Other It e m ComponenL 0 
50 55 60 
x 100 
Ind e x 
65 
Pric Index x 100 ~~~~~~~~.~~~~~~~~~~ 
Retail Price Index 
65 
Sour e : Tabl e Vo 
162 
n te rms 0 the onsumer pri e ind x, the r l ative 
pri ce of fo od de l i ned by abo u t one fifth b tw en 1946 
a nd 1951. As measured by the ov r-all index , the first 
three years of this period saw considerable defl ation , 
but the l ast two years were inf l at ionary . Aft r a s mall 
shift in their f a our between 1951 a nd 1952 , food 
p ic s in 1953 reached their lowest leve l relative to 
other p ri es for the ntire period 1946- 65 . Subsequently, 
a risi ng tr nd e m rg d . Fo th de ade 1955-65, during 
whi h t ime the over-all consume r price index record ed 
continuous annual in reases, except for a very small 
decline b tween 1958 and 1959, eight of the ten annual 
c h a nge s in r lative food prices were positive . The 
only de lines in food pies relative to other price 
w re, firstly and significan tly, from 1958 to 1959 and 
sec ondly fro m 19 64 to 1965 . The total rise in food 
pri es relativ to other prices in the cons umer price 
index from 1955 to 1965 was ne ar l y one third . 
I n terms of the retail price inde x , the re l ative 
p r i c of food exhibited a similar but not identical 
behaviour pattern . Between 194 6 a nd 1951 retail food 
p ices de l ine d elative l y to o ther retail prices, 
although the de c line was interrupted in the years 1948-49 . 
n part, this was the result o f a small abso lu te rise 
in food pri ces betwe n 1947 and 1948 which had no 
ounterpart in the food c omponent of the consumer price 
inde . However , in similar fashion to the 'all items' 
co nsumer p ice inde , the ' a ll items' retail price 
inde f el l from 1946 to 1949 but rose from 1949 to 1951 . 
Between 1951 and 1959, during which time the ' a ll items' 
retail price ind e once agai n f 11 a nd the n rose, 
reI t i retai l food pri s showed no ne t change . 
v rtheless, taking into ac ount relative, pric 
b h viour fter 1959, i t i perhaps possibl to detect 
g aphi a lly the beginning of an upw rd tr nd in food 
pric s r 1 t iv to other pri s in 1953- 54 or even 
e rlier . Certainly, fter 1959 food price s rose 
r 1 l y muc h fas er than other prices un ti l 1964 . 
F or the d a d 1955-65, whi h saw ontinuous inflation 
as nd' at d b y t h annu 1 c ha nges in th over-all 
r il pri ind se en of t he ten a nnu a l changes in 
r t il food pri s 1 t iv t o o t her ret a i l p ri c s 
w in n upward di ction . 
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The dis rep n ies between the behaviour of food 
pri es re1ativ t o other prices, measured in terms of 
h e c omponents of the consumer price index, and that 
beha viour measured in terms of the componen t s of th 
r tai l pri e ind x, are , like the dis crep ancies between 
t h e absolute behaviour of the two indices, primari ly 
the r su1t of differences in regimens . T he ove r - a ll 
retail pri ce index differ s fro m the over- a ll consumer 
pri ce index in s o far as it excludes services and 
includes construction materials. The s e materi a l s hav 
a weight of 10. 29 p r ce n t in the over-all index . 
F urthermore , they tend to be more sensi tiv e in pri ce 
than servi ces , p articul ar l y housing services (re n t) 
which h ave a wight of 7 . 8 1 per ce n t in the c onsumer 
price index. 
Despite the discrep a n cies , the evidence does 
indicate that , taking the post-19 55 de cade of 
infl at ion a s a who l e, food prices rose relatively to 
o t her prices . This rise was mos t no t ice a ble after 1959 
when t he rate of inflation became more r a pid. For the 
ar1ier period 194 6- 55 t he evidence is more obs cure 
i n t he s ns that there was possibly some tendency for 
the tr nd in the re l at ive price o f food to reverse 
itself within this period. However, taking the period 
as a whole, there was s ubs tanti 1 d ef l at ion which was 
acc omp a nied by a considerable fall in food prices 
relative to other pri ces . T his broad posi tive 
associ tion betwee n changes in the re l at ive pri ce of 
food and chang s in the a bsolute pri ce l evel, t ogether 
with the l arge role that movements in a bsolute food 
prices h a d in det rmining movement in the indi ces 
re c ording the b haviour of t he pri ce l eve l , provides 
prim 
the r 1 
f ac ie case for investigating in some de tai l 
n ce to th Phi 1ippin s of the Stru t ura1ist 
food upp1y ppro h. 
THE UPPL A D DEMA D FOR FOOD 
Two hypoth s s w'll be e a mined . On is that th 
pos -1955 inflation n b p1 a ined, not by genera l 
o ggr g t s d m nd, but b y a l a gging fo od supply . 
Th oth r is that th pr -1955 d f1 t ion an be p1 ained, 
not by g n ra1 or gg egat d eficient dem a nd, but b y a 
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rapid e p n s 'on of food supp l y . n g n ral terms th 
proc dur wIll b first to pr s nt th cas s in favour 
of th s hypoth s s a nd then , at the nd of the chapt r , 
to off r so me criticisms of them. 
Initially , it is n c essary to st blish th 
to which domestic food mark ts wer insulat d from world 
food mark ets . In a s mall and dep nd nt op n econo my 
facing a v ' rtually i nfinit l y pric - elast' c supply of 
food i mports , or ( if it were a food porter ) a virtu lly 
infinit ly price - lastic d ma nd for food exports , 
i n ternatio nal food prjces would larg ly determine 
do mestic food prices. Since the prices of other goods 
a nd ser ices are assumed i n the Structuralist approach 
to be ' sticky ' or unr sponsive to mark et imbalances, it 
would follow that in such an e cono my chang s in food 
prices rel tiv to other pric s , and thus chang s in th 
price lev 1 , could not r sult directly from internal 
sectoral 'mbalance. Indeed , sectoral imbalance , at 
l east in the do mestic food market , would be eli minat d 
solely by a rise or fall in food i mports or exports . In 
t he long run , o f cour s , cumulat ive changes in food 
i mports or ports could bring a balance of payments 
dis qu'librium sufficiently severe to induce policy 
m sur s ( .g. , an alteratio n of t h e xchange rate) 
which would change th relative pric s of traded and 
non- tr d d goods a n d thus th relative price of food. 
How v r , in so far as the Philippi n s suffer d fro m 
sector 1 i mbalanc with r spect to food , it can b 
argu d that changes i n its relativ price ar lik ly to 
h v b e n a chiev d m inly t h rough mo r i mmediate and 
d'r ct cha nn lS i na m 1 , through changes in absolute 
do m st ic food prices which wer ind pe nd nt of t h e cost 
of food i mports or ports . Various factor contributed 
to th consider ble ins ulation of Philippine domestic 
food m k ts fro m world marl ets ov r much of th period 
1946- 65 . 
to a ss 
part Lro m s u g r , dibl coconu t productb nd 
te n t c nn d pi n app l , t h Philipp'n s w s 
not a 'gn if'can t e port r of food , nd do mestic 
consumption of th it ms was a minor part of to al 
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food consumption . l With regard to other food products, 
do mestic prices, although they varied considerably, wer 
generally sufficiently high to have prevented exports . 
On the other hand these prices were for the most part 
not determined by the cost of marginal imports . Shipping 
bott l enecks in 1 946 and the existence of i mport and 
xchange controls from 1949 until the decontrol 
programme of the early 1960's imposed limits on food 
imports, thereby effectively creating an inelastic supply 
fro m this source . ndeed, in several instances during 
the period of controls, outright bans were imposed on 
the importation of many foodstuffs . Thus, for example, 
Presid ential Executive Order 0 . 471 of 24 August 1951 
banned totally and immediately the importation of a large 
variety of meats, fish, eggs and other food products, with 
further bans to become effective on 1 July 1952 . Subsequently, 
Repub l ic Act 0 . 1296 of 16 June 1955 prohibited or extended 
th prohibition of the importation of various vegetables . 
Even after decontrol, which brought the abandonment of the 
system of quantitative restrictions, there remained bans on 
imports of finished coffee prod ucts and vegetables such as 
2 fresh onions, potatoes, garlic and cabbages. Moreover, 
factors such as perishability and lack of storage and 
warehousing facilities possibly still limited the elasticity 
of imported supplies in some cases . 
Howe er, the strongest force serving to insulate 
the Philippines from the prices of food imports related 
to rice which provides over 60 per cent of total 
calorie consumption for approximately 80 per cent of 
the population . 3 (In the Central Bank ' s Consumer Price 
1 
According to Hooley's current price estimates (Saving 
in the Philippines 1 951- 1960, p . 95), annuaL household 
consumption for food purposes o f sugar, molasses, 
coconut oil and other coconut products averaged 
(g o metric mean) only 4 . 2 per cent of total annual 
househo l d consumption of foo d 0 er the period 1953- 60 . 
2 
United States Department of Agriculture, Agricultural 
Polici s of Foreign Go ernments Inclu d ing Trade Po l icies 
Affecting-AirIcul tur , Agri cultura l Handb oo k 0 . 1 3 2 
(Washington , 1964 ) , p . 233. 
3 
Leon Mars and Randolph Barker, ' Effects of Rice Price 
Policy on Growth of the Philippine E c ono my - An Anal ytical 
Fram work ' in Growth of Ou tpu t in the Phi l ippines (Papers 
pr s nt d a t a Conf rence a t t he Int erna t ion a l Rice 
Research nstitut, Lo Banos, Laguna , Dece mber 9 -10, 
1966 ; mi m 0 ) , p . 2 . 
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Ind x n Manil , wh'ch was us d 'n the construct'on of 
th Composit Con urn r Pr'ce Ind x mploy d in this 
tudy , the w . ght of rice is about 11 p r c nt of all 
·t ms and 23 p r cent of food items .) Throughout th 
p r'od 1 46-65 there was no free i mportatio n of ric 
e·ther in the y ars of ge n eral import restrictions or 
outside those years . Rice i mporting was a gov rnm nt 
mo nopoly . For much of the period th monopoly was 
admin'st red by the at ' onal Ric and Corn Corporat'on 
( AR C). This gov rnment corporation was founded in 
1936 and r turn d to operation after the War in 1945 . 
In October 1950 't was absorbed into th newly created 
Pr' c Stabilization Corporation (PRISCO) , 1 but in June 
1951 it became again an autonomous government 
t
. 2 
corpora lon. Fro m 1959 even ARIC ' s importing 
activities w r , in principle , curtailed considerably . 
R public Act 0 . 2207 (May 5 , 1959) banned the 
impor ation of rice completely unless ther was held to 
e i t an actual or i mminent shortage in local supply 
larg nough to constitut a national mergency . 3 This 
ban continued to b 1 gally effective past 1965 , although 
' t did not , in fact , preclud substantial , controlled 
r'c impo rt in 1961 and 1963 - 65 . ARIC itself was 
f'nally abolish d in 1962 . It was succe ded , however , 
by noth r go rnment in titution , the Ric e and Corn 
Adm'n'stration (RCA). 4 Even within the t r ms of the 
proviso of Republ ' c Act 0 . 2207 , th RCA was prohibited 
fro m i mporting rice dir ctly . This , when it was d emed 
n c sary , was to b don by private parties . 
T chnic lly , therefor , th gov rnment monopoly in ric 
importing no long r ist d . Howev r , in practice , it 
cont'nu d to xist b cause the RCA was th ole 
d' tributor internally of import d r'c 
1 
E cuti Ord r 0.350 , Oc tob r 3 , 1950. 
2 
R public Ac 0 . 663 , Jun 1 6 , 1951 . 
3 
Th Ac appl' d s' mil r ban to imports of corn 
(maiz ). Corn i th s co n d larg st food crop i n th 
Ph 'lipp 'n and h st pl c real for th 'non- ric-
ting ' popul t·on . 
4 
R public Ac 0 . 3452 , Jun 14 , 1962 . 
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Gr nt d cons" d bl d gr o.f n sulation of th 
do m t"c ood m r k t , the ne t st p s to x min th 
t nd in he Ph"l ppines ' food supply . This 
i mp d d so mewh t by an n dequacy of "nform 
Ho w v r , T bl v .4 s ts out the Ce n tral Bank ' s quan um 
"n d do mestic food crop product"o n (1955 = 100) in 
both ggr g tiv and p r capita t r ms . n addi t " 0 n to 
th m "n do mestically co n sumed food crops , this ·nd 
Iso covers f"sh , Ii sto ck and poultry . It exclud s , 
o n th oth r hand , ugar cane which is treated as an 
export crop . Unfortun tely , the "ndex , which is 
co mpil d for c rop y rs end"ng June 30 , extends only as 
far back s 1949 . How v r , so m broad idea of th tr nd 
in food production for earli r y ar can be obtained 
fro m T b l s V. 5 n d v . 6 . These provide , i n aggregativ 
a nd p r capita terms r spectively , separate quantum 
inde nu mbers for the production of so m of the main 
foods for the crop ye r 1938 and 1946- 49. 2 
1 
o us has been mad in this study of th food bal nc 
h t publish d by th ational Econo mic Council ' s 
Off"c of Stat"st"c 1 Coordination and Standard for the 
y rs 1953 - 65 . [St tisti cal R porter , Vol. VII , 0 . 4 
(October- D cemb r 1963); Vol . I X, 0 . 1 (January- March 
1 65) ; Vol .X, 0 .1 (J nuary- March 1966) ; and Vol . X , 0.4 
(Oc tob r -D cemb r 1966) . J The esti mat s in these sh t 
uffer fro m s v r 1 i mportant deficienci s . Fir t , th 
m thod of stimat"ng th volume of agricultural food 
crop b orb d i n to non-food outl ts are tremely crud . 
S co n d , i n t rte mporal co mpar"son are limited by chang s 
n o m of hes m hod . Third , intertemporal 
co mp riso n s re also limit d by th inclusion of 
add "tio nal commod"ti i n th b l a nc sh ts f or 
1 62 -65 . Fourth , h beh viour of food inv ntories i 
gno d . 
2 
t hould b not d that the population eptimate 
mploy d to crop productio n data on p r 
cap" t b is m"d- c 1 nd r y ar sti m t s . 
Sp cific 11 , ggr g e product "o n ind numb r for 
ny crop y ar nding June 30 is divid d by popul Lion 
"nd numb r r f rring to th first day succ ding th 
of t h . July 1. Thi procedur r t 
ju "fi 
1 gs n d 
·t c n b 
foods ( . g . , fr 
o llttl sign ".f"c 
ump tion , "mpl"cit i n th follow"ng 
crop producti on in ny crop y r 
i nflu nc s food upply at t he 
c 1 ndar y ar nding ix months 
t nt such n as umptio n can b 
fru " t 
nc 
of m rk t: n g nd proc essi n g 
so n 1 f ctors . Of cours , 
c to s om p ri habl 
g t bl s ), but th se r 
n comp ri on with food gr in 
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Table v . 4: nd x of the Physical Volume of Fo od 
Cr op Production, 1949-65 
( 1 955 = 100) 
Aggr gate P r cent change Per Capi ta Per c n t 
Ye a r I nde from previous I nd x change from y a pr vious 
year 
1 949 58 . 6 70 . 2 
1950 63 . 2 + 7 . 8 73 · 5 + 4 . 7 
1 951 69 . 1 + 9.3 77 . 9 + 6 . 0 
1952 77 . 8 +12 . 6 85 . 1 + 9 · 2 
1953 87 · 2 +12.1 92 . 6 + 8 . 8 
1954 94.6 + 8 . 5 97 · 5 + 5 · 3 
1955 100.0 + 5 · 7 100 . 0 + 2 . 6 
1 95 6 105 · 5 + 5 . 5 102 · 3 + 2 . 3 
1957 1 07 . 4 + 1. 8 101 . 1 - 1. 2 
1958 108.4 + 0 · 9 99 · 1 - 2 . 0 
1959 117 · 2 + 8.1 103 · 9 + 4 . 8 
19 6 0 118 · 9 + 1. 5 102 . 2 - 1.6 
1961 117.8 - 0 · 9 98 . 1 - 4 . 0 
1962 125 . 4 + 6 . 5 101.0 + 3·0 
19 63 125 . 8 + 0 · 3 98 . 1 - 2 ·9 
1964 132 . 1 + 5 · 0 99· 5 + 1.4 
19 65 140. 2 + 6 . 1 102 . 2 + 2 · 7 
a Crop year ending J une 30 . 
ources : Centra l Bank of th Philippines, Ce ntral Bank 
ews Digest, Vo1 . XIX, 0 . 4 (January 24, 1967) ; 
United ations, Demographic Yearbook, 19 65 . 
T ble V.5: Index umbers of Production of Princip al 
Foods;a 1938, 1946-49 and 1955 
(1955 = 100) 
b Palay Beans Fruit Root Meat Year (rough Corn and and Crops and 
rice) Vegetables uts Poultry 
1938 71. 9 65 . 0 17.5 41.0 27 ·9 88 . 6 
1946 50·7 43 . 0 14.4 41.8 3 6 . 2 31.4 
1947 65 . 2 61.3 18.5 59·1 38 . 4 37 . 6 
1948 70.0 67 .4 19 . 8 27 .8 43 . 7 53·9 
1949 77 . 8 69 .4 26 .7 43.1 44.0 67 . 3 
1955 100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
a Indices computed from d ata in either metric tons 
or thousands of metric tons. 
b Crop year ending June 30 . 
Sources: Department of Agriculture and atural 
Resources; Ce ntral Bank of the Philippines, 
Annual Reports. 
Table v . 6 : Index umbers of Production per Capi ta 
of Principal F oods; 1938, 194 6-49, 19 55 
(1955 = 100) 
Palay Beans Fruit Root Meat 
Year a (rough Corn and and Crops and 
rice) Vegetables uts Poul try 
1938 107 · 2 96 . 9 26 . 1 61.1 41. 6 132 . 0 
1946 64.8 55.0 18 . 4 53 · 5 46 . 3 40 . 2 
1947 81. 8 76.9 23 ·2 74.2 48.2 47.2 
1948 86 . 2 83 . 0 2.4 . 4 34 . 2 53 .8 66 . 4 
1949 93 · 2 83 . 1 3 2 . 0 51. 6 52 · 7 80 . 6 
1955 100.0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100.0 
a Crop year nding June 30 . 
Sources : T ble V . 5; 
United ati ons, Demographic Yearbook, 1960, 
1965. 
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Th latt r two tabl s °ndicat that for most of the 
crops or products w~th which they ar concerned , ther 
wer very substantial gains in total production and 
production per head of population over the period 1946-49. 
The per capita production of the two staples , rice and 
corn , i n creased by 43 . 8 per cent a n d 51 . 1 per c nt 
respectively in this interval , although it is clear that 
in both cases the xpansion occurred mainly between 
1946 and 1947 and that it represent d merely a recovery 
towards pre - war 1 v ls. Subsequently , between 1949 and 
1955 there was a sustained and relatively rapid growth 
in aggregate food crop production . Th Central Bank 
index (Table v . 4) rose by 70.6 per cent or at an 
av rage annual rate of 9.3 per cent . After about 1955 , 
however , the rate of growth of aggregate food crop 
production d clined. For the period 1955-65 the 
aggregate index increased by only 40 . 2 per cent or at an 
average annual rate of 3.7 per cent . Food crop 
production per head of population experienced a similar 
retardation . The Central Bank index on a per capita 
basis rose by 42.5 per cent or at an average annual 
rat of 6.9 per cent in th six years between 1949 and 
1955; while betwe n 1955 and 1965 it rose only a 
negligible amount. In fact , for the shorter period 
1959-65 it declined slightly. 
Food crop production is not , of course , equivalent 
to food supply. evertheless , together with movements 
n food imports it should provide a fairly reliable 
1 guid to movements in food supply . Table V. 7 shows 
the behaviour of deflated or real food imports in both 
1 
It may be thought that net food imports (i . e . food 
imports minus food ports) rather than gross food 
i mports would be the appropriate measure to employ in 
thi cont t. How v r , Philippine food xports were 
dominated by a few products ( particularly sugar and 
d ssicat d coconut) whos contribution to do mestic food 
consumption was r la ti v ly very s mall . (See p . 165 n. 1. ) 
E c pt in so far as thes exports utilized r sourc s 
capable of bing mploy d in the production of oth r 
foodstuff for dom tic consumption , the n gative 
i mpact of Philippin food e ports on domestic food 
supply would have b , n slight . Moreov r , most of the 
food xport products ar cluded from th r gi m n of 
th C ntral Bank ' s food crop production index w'hich is 
conc rn d w~th predominantly do mestically consum d food 
crops . For th s r asons food exports have bee n ignor d 
in thO s cont xt . 
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Tab l e . 7 : Fo od I mpor ts , 1948- 65 
Food Def l ated Ind ex of Index of 
I mports F ood Def l ated Deflated 
(thousand a Year I mports Food F ood U.S. doll ars ) ( thousand I mpo rts I mports 
U. S . doll ars) ( 1955=100 ) per Capi ta 
(1955=100) 
1948 111,820 152, 13 6 148 . 6 183 . 0 
1949 147,971 201,321 196.6 235 . 4 
1950 57,490 59 ,823 58 . 4 67 . 9 
195 1 96,040 91,554 89 . 4 100. 8 
1952 76,862 72,580 70 · 9 77 . 6 
1953 76,739 73,859 72 .1 76 . 5 
1954 79 ,148 70,794 69 ·1 71.2 
1955 102,382 102 ,382 100.0 100.0 
1956 88,208 89,099 87 .0 84 . 4 
1957 108,004 106 ,935 104 . 4 98.3 
1958 117,760 120, 1 63 117 . 4 107 · 3 
1959 68,301 74,89 1 73 · 1 64 . 8 
1960 85,407 95,748 93 . 5 80 . 4 
1961 101,582 115, 172 112 · 5 93.7 
19 62 87,442 99,141 96 . 8 78 . 0 
1963 104, 616 103,580 101. 2 78 . 9 
1964 122,683 118,078 11 5 · 3 86 . 9 
1965 155,238 159,874 15 6,2 113 . 8 
a The current U . S . doll ar value of food imports deflated 
by a linked price index of world trade in food . 
Sources : F ood I mports : Centra l Bank of the Philippines, 
Statistical Bulletin, Vo1 . XVIII, 
0.3 (September 1966); United 
ations, Ye arbook of I nternatio na l 
Trade S ta tis tics, .various years. 
Pri e Deflator : United ations, Statistical 
Yearbook, 1955 , 1962 arid 1 966 . 
Mid-year Population : United ations, Demographi c 
Yearbook, 1965 . 
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aggr gat've and per cap'ta terms for calendar years 
1948-65. It can b se n that in the late 1940 ' s th 
ind of real food imports per capita was at very h'gh 
1 v Is compared with subsequent years . The imposition 
of s vere quantitative import controls at the end of 
1949 caus d a sharp decline in food i mports . Although 
th per capita ind x was to fluctuate considerably , it 
did not again attain in the period under consideration 
'ts 1948 and 1949 1 v Is. In the post-1955 period 
ther was a virtual absence of tr nd in this ind x. 
Moreover, in only two years (1958 and 1965) did it 
exceed its 1955 base of 100 . 0 ; and even the average of 
th index numbers for the years 1954-56 inclusive 
(85.2) was xce d d in only five of the nine subsequ nt 
years . 
Although it has not been possible to estimate real 
food imports prior to 1948 , and although the Central 
Bank ' s food crop production index extends back only to 
1949, the trends in output per capita of individual 
foodstuff over the y ars 1946-49 (see Table v . 6) 
together suggest that food supply per capita in this 
p riod xperienc d considerable growth . Subsequently, 
b tw n 1949 and 1950 the very larg fall in food 
import must hav off et to some extent th impact on 
food supply per capita of an e timated 4.7 p r cent 
ncrea in food crop production per capita . For the 
following five years 1950- 55, taken as a whole , 
convinc'ng evidence of a substantial growth in food 
supply per capita is provid d by a 36 . 1 per cent 
increase in the ind x of food crop production per capita 
and a 47.3 per c nt increase in the index of food 
imports per capita. Mor over , ev n within this period , 
the t mporary declin in food import betwe , n 1951 and 
1954 was probably more than outweighed by high annual 
rat s of growth in per capit food crop production. 
Finally , a lack of signific nt trends in food crop 
product ' on per capita and food imports p r capita in the 
succ ding inflationary d cade 1955 - 65 suggests that 
this growth in food supply p r c pita was no t sustain d. 
Inde d , between 1955 and 1964 th r may well have be n 
a d lin . Th 'ndeJ numb rs of both production p r 
capita and imports p r capita for the latt r year ar 
blow th ir 1 vels for th form r y ar. 
l7J 
Turn"ng to the d mand for food , th"s can best be 
m"n d "n t rms of its inco m - elasticity and th 
b h v "our of r al inco m per capita . Tabl V. 8 shows 
r 1 d"sposabl pr"vate i n co me per capita f o r the yars 
1946- 65 "nclusiv . This var"able is us d i n p l a c e of 
r al disposabl p rsonal i ncome per capita f o r which no 
I " bl " tIC t r la m asure 1S s . oncen rating first on th 
infl tionary period 1955- 65 , per capita real inco me 
ncr d by 20 . 2 p r cent b tween 1955 and 196J . In 
the i n teri m p riod only on annual d clin , a s mall one , 
occurr d. This w s b tween 1959 and 1960 . In 1964 , 
h o wey r , real income per capita again d clined fro m th 
previous y ar and the r cov ry i n 1965 was only slight . 
ev rth les s , r al income per head in 1965 was still 
17 . 2 p r cent abov its Ie e1 in 1955 . Thus at constant 
relativ prices a n d ignoring a ny changes i n inc o me 
di tr "bution , it could be xpected that betwe n 1955 and 
th y ar 196J - 65 there would hay been a noticeabl 
rein th d mand Lor food per capita , given a ny 
reasonabl assumpt"on about its per capita income 
el sticity . 
J Lrey G. Williamson has estimated the incom 
1 ticity of dem nd for food in the Philippines over 
the p rOod 1955 - 64 to have be n appro i mately 0 . 946 .
2 
U ilizing thi t "mate , th per capita de ma n d for food 
at unchang d reI tiv pric s would ha risen so me 19 . 1 
p r c n t b tw n 1955 and 196J ( in response to a 20 . 2 
p r c n ris in r al p r c pita inco me ) . Over the same 
p iod Tabl s v . 4 
E 
nd V. 7 sugg st that per capita food 
nding the period to include 1964 and supply f 11. 
1965 , it sill pp ar , give n the elasticity estimate , 
th t th per cap "ta d mand Lor food at unchang d 
r la pr c s would hav grown fast r than the per 
c pit supply . 
hould be not d th t th s ass s me n t ar not 
n c rily d p nd nt on th nco m las icity of d mand 
for food havi n g b n s h"gh as Williamso n' s stimat 
1 
S blow' p . lJ 2 n. 1 abo e . 
2 
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Tab 1~ V.8: Real Disposable Private I ncome per Capi ta, 
194 6- 65 
Real Disposable Private n c ome per Capita 
Year pesos index per cent 
(1955=100) change from 
previous 
year 
1946 130 . 29 lf1.2 
1947 245 . 83 77 · 7 + 88 . 7 
1948 273 . 84 86 . 6 + 11. 4 
1949 285 . 62 90 . 3 + 4 . 3 
1950 287 .19 90 . 8 + 0·5 
195 1 268 . 19 84 . 8 6 . 6 
1952 280 . 52 88 . 7 + 4 . 6 
1953 302 . 66 95·7 + 7 · 9 
1954 303.19 95 . 8 + 0 . 2 
1955 316 . 32 100.0 + 4 . 3 
1956 323.41 102 . 2 + 2 . 2 
1957 325·50 102 · 9 + 0 . 6 
1958 3 28 .1 6 103· 7 + 0 . 8 
1959 342 . 10 108 .1 + If . 2 
1960 337 · 41 106.7 1. 4 
196 1 354 . 79 11 2 . 2 + 5 · 2 
1962 365 . 57 11 5 · 6 + 3 · 0 
19 63 380 .06 120. 2 + 4 .0 
1964 368 .13 11 6 .1 3 .1 
1965 370 · 73 117· 2 + 0·7 
a Disposable priv t income per capita defl ated by 
Manil a Composi t e Consum r Pr i ce Inde ( 1955= 100 ) . 
Sources : porter, Vol. III-X ( 1959 - 66), 
s co nd number of each ; 
United ation, D Yearbook, 1965; 
T ble I . 9. 
a 
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nd d , if th 'nd 
production p r capit 
or th physical volume of food crop 
s tak n as an ind x of food 
supply p r capita , th n , giv n the b haviour of p r 
capita r al inco m , the 'ncome elasticity of de mand fo 
food would have had to hav be n as low as 0 . 128 to hav 
n s u r d that th de ma n d for food at unchanged r lative 
pric s i nc rea d by no more than the supply over th 
period 1955 - 65 . 
This evidence of lagging food supply provides 
support for an expl nation of the 1955 - 65 inflation 
ba d on the Structuralist th ory stout at the 
beginning of this chapter. That theory also requires 
that , in re ponse to a lagging food supply , food prices 
should rise relativ ly to other prices . As has been 
noted , such a rise in fact occurred . This makes the 
relevance of th Structurali st approach still more 
likely. 
Tur ng to the earlier period , 1946-55 , real 
disposable private inco me per capita increased by 
142 . 7 per cent . Most of the increase occurred between 
1946 and 1947 when the rate of growth of this variabl 
w 88.7 p r cent. This reflected the rapid post-war 
r co ry of aggregate output. Aft r 1947 a nnual rates 
of growth wer much low r and , in fact , between 1950 and 
1951 th r was a declin. evertheless , over the ight 
years 1947 - 55 the total increas in per capita real 
incom was 28 . 7 p r c nt. Unfortunately , no stimat 
of th inco m el sticity of d mand for food is available 
for this period , so th t in this respect reliance has to 
be placed on Will i mson ' s stimate for lat r years . 
Admitt dly , it is IiI ely to be om thing of an 
und rest'mate for th pre - 1955 pe iod , since the incom 
last ' city of de mand for food t nds to be inversely 
r 1 t d to the 1 v 1 of p r capita inco me . However , 
th r is no obv ' ous w y of djusti ng for this bias. 
E mploy'ng , ther for , the la ticity stimate of 
0.946 , 't pp ars that t unchanged relative pric th 
d mand £'or food p r c p'ta would ha ris n by about 
IlJ p r c n betw n 1946 and 1949. A h s been 
r m rl d , d t on Lh. chang in the food supp l y 
situ tio n 0 r th's p riod re tr mely limited . 
How n mi n tion of T bl v.6 u gg sts t h at 
agg g t ood production per capita is unl i k ely to 
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h v grow n faster than or ev n as f st as this , ev n 
t h o ugh its growth or r c overy from low war-time levels 
w s v ry s ubstan t·a l . Rea l food imports p r capita, 
howev r , may h ave grown s uffi ciently rapid ly to e n sur 
that for t he thre years as a whole the total s u pp l y of 
food gr w faster t han de mand would have grown had 
re l ative prices remaine d constant. 
Subsequently, b tw n 1949 and 1955 , the rise n 
per capita r al i ncome and the elasticity es timate 
together i mply a rise in t h e de ma n d for food per capita 
of only about 10.1 per ce n t . This was far exceeded by 
the 42 . 5 per c e n t rise i n the i ndex of food crop 
produc tion p r capita . Although real food i mports p r 
capita i n 1955 were less t han half what they were in 
1949, it is probably safe to conc lude that over this 
six year period t he supply of food grew faster than 
demand would have grow n at unchanged relative prices . 
Whil e the evidence for the period 1 946-55 as a 
whole is much 1 ss convincing than t hat for the 
fo llowi n g decad , it can stil l be suggested that , unless 
d mand els wh er in the conomy lagged greatly behind 
supply , rela tive food prices in the period 1946- 55 would 
have be n subject to downward pr ssure . However , while 
a net f 11 in relative food price did i n fact occur, i t 
wa confined ssent·ally to the pre -1951 period . Indee d , 
betw en 1951 nd 1955 there was , if a nythi n g , a slight 
rise . 
RICE 
So f r t he n ly i has be n conc rned with the 
ggregat supp l y a n d d m nd for food . It ha be n 
h a mp r d , inter a li, by n dequ cy of dat · on the 
u pply s·d For so me indiv·dual co mmo dities , 
esp c·ally rice , this diff·culty does no t e i t to th 
s m te nt . Ther for , in an atte mp t t o confirm and 
mplify th pr c ding a nalysis , a bri f e amination will 
b m d of the tr nd in th s upply and demand for ric 
nd th b h iour o f ric prices 0 r the period 
1 46-65. 
Th mpor nc of ric t h st p I food of som 
four f·fths of th populati on has aIr ady be n plain d , 
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s h s the °nsul tion of its dom s tic pric from °ts 
world proce. From th iewpoint of production it w s 
cons t ntly nd asily the major food crop of th 
Philippines throughout the period 1946- 65 . In no y ar 
on thOs period did palay (roug~ rice) occupy less than 
h lf th total area und r cultivation to food crops and 
n the arly post - war years it occupied over 60 per cent 
of that area. 
Tabl V.9 s ts out i n index number fo r m the 
b haviour of ret il, wholesale and farm rice prices 
over the period under investiga tion. As can be seen , 
thes prices all t nd d to follow th s ame broad trend 
which , in turn, resembled On terms of direction the 
trends in the ' all it ms ' price indices presented 
arlier. ROce prices generally fell until the 
mid-fifties and th n rose . Figure V.2 compare on 
logarithmic cal the behaviour of the r tail price 
ind x of rice and the non- food co mponent price index of 
the Manila Composite Consumer Price Index . Clearly the 
rOc ind x was the more unstable of the two , as would be 
exp cted , sinc it ref rs to the price of only a single 
commodi ty , rather than an average of prices , as does 
th other. In addi tio n , however , it tend d ( in terms 
of trend) to fall faster than the non- food index until 
th mid-fifti 1 nd thereafter to ris faster . s 
E tOmates of the supply of rice in the Philippines 
on calendar y r basi re hown for 1946- 65 in 
Tabl V.10. Thes stimate ignore the absorption of 
rice into non-food us such as animal fe d , se d and 
n ntories . Th y also ignore wastag . For any 
c lend r year the supply ha be n assumed equal to th 
milled ric quival nt of pal y production for the crop 
y r nding June 30 withOn that c lendar ye r , plus th 
net mOll d ric import for that calendar ye r . 
Ab s tr 
this 
tot 1 
har 
jus 
1 
ctOng from ric which flowed to non-food outl ts , 
s umptOon yi lds a valid appro imation of the 
supply availabl for co n sumption . The main 
of ach crop r tarts to ent r the market 
proor to th b ginning of the calendar year , whil 
h non- foo 
d its low 
co mpon nt of th 
t point in 1949 . 
co n sumer pric 
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T bl V ·9: ndic es of Rice Prices, 194 6- 65 
(1955=100) 
Manila Retail Mani la Wholesale 
Rice Price Indexb 
Farm Pric 
Year Rice Pric of Palay Indexa Output 
I nde x c 
194 6 214 .4 22J ·9 207. 6 
1947 140.0 141. 6 170.J 
1948 1 J1.1 141. 4 15J.J 
1949 1JJ.J 140.8 154. 5 
1950 114.4 108.J 154.J 
1951 127.8 1 29 ·0 1J8·9 
195 2 1 22 . 2 1 2J.4 1 28 . 5 
195J 95.6 95· 2 112 . 8 
1954 92 . 2 92 . 8 98 . 6 
1955 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1956 94.4 9 6 .0 97.4 
1957 106 . 7 105 · 7 97·1 
1958 1 2 0.0 122 .0 10J·7 
1959 9 2 . 2 90 · 5 100.1 
1960 97 · 8 98.1 99 . 6 
19 6 1 120 .0 128.8 11 8 . 4 
1962 111.1 11J·7 120·7 
19 6J 1 25 . 6 127·J 1 25 .1 
1964 1 54 . 4 1 60.1 1 56 . 4 
196 5 1 5J. J 154.9 n. a . 
a Based on the yearly a v erage retai l price per g anta 
of Macan 2 nd Cl ass rice in Manila. 
b Based on the ye r1y av rage pri ce per sack of 56 
kilogra ms of Macan 2nd Cl a ss rice in Manila. 
cBs d on the v r ge fa m price p r 44 kilograms . 
of th n at iona l output of p a1ay (rough rice) . 
Ind numbers r fer to crop years ending June JO . 
Sourc Bur a u of Comm rce; 
D p a rtm nt of Agriculture a nd atura1 R sources . 
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Manila R tai l Pric e of Rice Index and 
on-Food ('O ther It ms ') Comp on nt of 
Manila Composite Consum r Pric e Ind x , 
1946-65 
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Tabl V.l0: The Supply of Milled Ri e, 194 6-65 
Domestic et Total b Supp ly p r 
Y ar Produ tion mports supply C p ·ta 
(metric tons) (m tric tons) (metric tons) (kilo grams) 
1946 1,053,690 149,343 c 1,203,033 65 . 3 
1947 1,355,460 125,383 1,480,843 78.8 
1948 1,454,520 120,111 1,574,631 82 . 3 
1949 1,617,070 145,55 6 1,762,626 89.6 
1950 1, 691,570 4,682 1,686,888 83 .2 
1951 1, 698,270 109,123 1,807,393 86 . 5 
1952 1,837,410 62,941 1,900,351 88 . 5 
1953 2,040 840 1,235 2,039,605 91. 9 
1954 2,065 , 690 42,628 2,108,318 92 . 2 
195.5 2,078,980 63,.5 10 2,142,490 90.9 
1956 2,124,690 42,382 2,167,072 89 . 2 
1957 2, 171,820 77,888 2,249,708 89·9 
1958 2,079,350 230,639 2,309,989 89 . 6 
1959 2,391,.580 6,48 1 2 ,389,061 90 . 2 
1960 2,427,300 1, 627 2,425,673 8 . 5 
1961 2,404,720 186,380 2,591, 100 91. 5 
1962 2 ,537,980 53 2,537,927 86 . 7 
1963 2,574,930 256,214 2,831,144 93 . 6 
1964 2,494,360 300,000 2,794,360 89 .4 
1965 2,591,050 569,300 3,160,350 97·7 
a fill d rice quivalent of palay production for crop 
years nding June 30. 
b Dom stic production plus net imports (also see text) . 
c Gross imports. 
Sour es: D partment of Agriculture a nd 
nd Bure u of th 
rnational Trade 
Yearbook, 1965. 
ric i mports for ny cal ndar year te n d to b 
co n c ntr ted around °ts 
m rk t so me tim b for 
hOrd quart r a nd to b 
1 th nd of that y ar . 
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on th 
B w n 1946 and 1954 the supply of rice p r capita 
incre d fro m 65 . J to 92 . 2 kilo gra ms . Th largest 
nnu 1 ri , absolutely a n d proportio nately , occurr d 
betwe n 1946 and 1947; but , even al lo wing for th slump 
On 1 950 , subsequ n t growth i n this period was still 
subst ntO 1 . After the mid- fOfti s , on the other hand , 
supply p r capit stagnated until about 1965. In that 
y ar , m i nly b caus of r cord rice i mports , the p r 
c pita supply was 7 . 5 p r ce n t above its 1955 lev 1 and 
9 .J per ce n t abov its 1964 1 vel . 
Ri ce being a staple , it is lOkely that its incom 
1 ticity of de ma n d was low r than that for food as a 
whol . M rs and Barker , 2 in a discussion of the 
probabl inco me elasticity of de ma n d for rice in the 
mid - sixti s , cit an FAO e timate of 0 . 5. If this 
sti mat is used , tog th r with mo ve ments in p r capita 
r al di po able private inco me , to proj ct what the 
mov m n in th d mand p r capita for ric at unchanged 
rel tiv pr oces would have be n b tw n 1955 and th 
ye r 196J - 64 , it appears that this d mand would have 
grow n fast r than the upply p r capita. To a less r 
d gre th same conclusion holds if th period is 
xt nd d to 1965. Signifocantly howev r , between 1964 
and 1965 , th de mand for rice so stimated ros less 
th n the supply , whil at th sam time th retail pric 
of rOc f 11 not o nly absolutely , but also relatively to 
non-fo od consum r good prices . 
G n rally , it app r r aso nab l to conclud that , 
t kOng th infl tio n ry post -1955 p riod as a whol and 
irr sp ctiv of th d gr of bal nc achi v d b tw n 
ggr g t d m n d and supply , the supply of rOc t nd d 
to lag b hOnd d m nd. This co nclu ion , sp c lly in 
vi w of th r in ric pric s r 1 tiv to non- food 
pr Oc , str ngth n th 
1 
n 
(S 
2 
Op. CO . , p.JO . 
upport lr ady d riv d for th 
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S ructural·st hypoth sis fro m an minat·on of th 
supp l y a n d d mand ror 11 foodstuffs ov r this p riod . 
With regard to arlo r y ars , it is probably 
inappropr·at to us th same stimat of the ·nco m 
lasticity of d mand for ric . Howev r , if the years 
1946 a n d 1947 are cluded from the a n a l ysis b cause of 
th xtrem distortio n which still xist d in th conomy 
as an aft r math of th War , this stimat , together 
with the growth n real i ncome per cap·ta betw n 1948 
and 1955 , suggests that ov r th same perio d at 
unchanged r lat·v prices th d mand for rice per 
capit would have grown by only about 7 . 8 per cent . By 
co mparison , th net growth in the supply p r capita of 
r·ce was 10 . 4 per cent . This evidence can be interpr t e d 
as support for a Structuralist-type xplanation of the 
d fl t·o n betw en thes y ars ; specirically , a 
Structuralist - typ planation bas d on a lagging demand 
for food . Th support is strengthened by the fact that 
over this p riod the pric of rice f 11 not only 
absolutely but also r latively to non-food consum r 
pr c s , which themselv s show d littl n t absolute 
ch ng . 
SOME DETERMI A TS OF FOOD PRODUCTIO 
Attention mu t now be focused bri fly on some of 
the factor det r mining th behaviour of food supply 
or , more precisely , domestic food crop production ove r 
th P riod 1946- 65. In particular , th r is a ne d to 
ccoun t for ·ts r lat·vely rapid , v n if d celerating, 
rat of growth ov r the rli r part of the period and 
its failure to grow f st r in the latt r part of the 
p riod in r spons to what w r , at least at the 
consum r or retail 1 v 1 , rises in food priG s 
r lativ to oth r pr·c s . 
Th Phil·ppin agricultural s e ctor can be divid d 
n 0 two co mpon nts , on producing crop m inly for 
port such as coconuts , sugar and ab c , and on 
produc·ng food crops for do m stic consumption such as 
ric , corn nd sw t pot toe How v r , as Golay has 
rightly mph . z d , Lh d· f r nc b tw n th t\vO 
co mpon nts . not on of f ctor proportio n s a n d 
1 3 
1 t chno10gy , inc in contrast to th cony ntiona1 
mod 1 of t chno10gic 1 dua1"sm , IP1antat"on and 
"ndustria1 production do s not charact r"z th xport 
s ctor .. . Sma11 - ho1d r gricu1ture dominat th export 
produc ion of coconuts , abaca , and tobacco and is 
"d d " " 1 2 Wl pr a ln sugar growlng . On th oth r hand , th r 
s significant diff renc in de mand cond"tions and 
cons quen 1y in th d termination of prices . Thus th 
pric of port crops are d termin d b as "ca11y by 
ov r a price and exchang rates , whi1 t he prices of 
food crops are d termined , as has b n demonstrated , by 
forc s largely "nt rna1 to the Phi1ippin economy . 
Disp r te behaviour in these two s ts of pric s ex rts 
an i mportant inf1u nce on the allocation of agricultural 
r sources , most notic ably land , b tw n food and 
xport crops . 3 
The 1 rge xpansion in food crop production in th 
early po t - war period was , it has been suggested , 1arg 1y 
a proc s of r turning to pre - (Pacific)war 1 ve1s of 
output . In 1940 th ar a under cultivation for food 
4 
crops had b en 3 , 442 thous nd hectar s . During the 
occup tion and e p cia11y during the military campaigns 
towards its nd , much of this land went out of use , so 
that in 1946 the ar a und r food crops wa only 2 , 603 
h ctar s , 5 about one qu rter less than it had been six 
y ars previously . Although there was ne d for 
consid rab1e r c1 mat "on , clearing and rebuilding of 
t rraces nd irrigation faci1itie , this w achiev d 
much mor r p"d1y than "f there had b n a ne d to op n 
up n quiv 1 n mount of irgin land of qu 1 
fert"l"ty. By 1949 h 1940 are under cultivation had 
b n r tor d. Sim"lar1y , at the beginn"ng of 1946 the 
numb r of liv tock nd poultry had b n only 40 and 
1 
Go1 y , op . cit ., p.267 . 
2 
b" d. , p. 41 . 
3 
1M 
Ph"l"ppin 
(Fi s Sm 
4 
r M ng h s , Aid E . R cto nd V rnon W. Ruttan , 
1 on hOps for Ric nd Corn n th 
, PhiliPy"n Economic Journ 1 , ol . V, .,Io . l 
t r 1966 . 
Econom"c Su v M" on to th Phi1ippin s , op . cit ., 
p. 
5 
bid. 
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27 P r c nt r sp ctOv ly of their 1940 numb rs , but by 
th beginn ing of 1950 larg liv stock had bee n r stor d 
to bo u t two thirds and s mall liv stock and poultry to 
th full ext nt of th 1 r pre - war numbers . 
This recovery wa undoubt d ly acc lerat d as a 
r sult of th shifts i n r lative pric s whi ch merged 
from th inflation at the nd of the occupatio n a n d 
during th liberation (1944 - 45) . This i n flation m ant 
th t in 1946 absolut food prices w r so m five to six 
ti mes higher than they were in 1941 whil , at the sam 
tim xport pric s , b caus of th d cision to maintain 
th pre - w r xchang rat , wer only thre to four ti mes 
higher than they wer in 1941 . Subs quently food pric s 
wer to fall absolutely and relatively , but th ir 
i mmediate post - war 1 vel had a strong influ nce in 
directi n g agricultural reco n structio n towards do mestic 
food crops and away fro m the then r latively unprofitabl 
e port crops . In fact the pre - war h ctarage of export 
crops was no t regai n d until the mi d - fifties , although 
of co u r their recovery was also i mpeded by physical 
bottl n ecks at the processing 1 vel ( . g . the war - time 
d struction of plant and equipment in sugar centrals , 
coconut 0°1 mills a n d d ssicated coconut factori s ) , 
which did no t exist to th same exte n t with food 
productio n . 
Turning to th lat r year of this study , it has 
b e n s ugge ted that betwe n 1955 and 1965 the supply of 
food s a whole tend d to lag b hind th growing d mand 
for i . Si n c food pric ros r 1 tively to oth r 
prOc s , according to both the consum r and retail price 
indic s , 2 there is and to xplain why this latter 
ph nom non did not call forth a greater r spons in 
food productOon and thus food supply as a whole . 
Sp cific lly , why dOd not food crop production accel rat 
its growth to constr in thO r lativ pric rise? In 
p rt th n s wer Ii s i n slow r t of techn i c al 
progr ss n h agricultu r 1 s ctor a n d in th 
ncr si n g sc rcity a n d di minishing qu lity of n w 
1 
bOd . 
2 
n th 
co n fon d 
c 
f 
of th 
ctO ly 
r taOl pric ind 
o th post -1959 y 
this 
ars . 
rise was 
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agricultural land;l but to a consid rabl tent °t also 
pp ars to 1° On the lact that in t r ms of the r lativ 
pric s whoch det rmin d production d cisions at th 
f rm or prO mary producing level th i mpact of this 
r lativ pric ris was mor than offs t by anoth r 
factor . Thus , although th pric of food r o se both 
absolutely and r lativ ly to the pric s of non- agricultural 
n on-food products , it did not rOs r lativ ly to the 
pr c s of oth r agr Ocultural products, i .. export crops. 
I n oth r words , vis - a - vis the products of the non-
agricultural sectors the int r - sectoral terms of trad 
for both food and xport crops i mprov d , but the 
latt r did so by more . This meant that although it 
b came relatively more e p nsive for th consumer to 
purcha food , it also b c m paradoxically relatively 
1 ss profitable for the far mer to produce it . 
Cons quently , ther was a lag in food supply . 
There so m i mportant vid nce to support this 
argum n t . Figure V . J shows for the period 1955 - 65 th 
Central Bank ' s wholesal price index of agricultural 
products for ho m consumptOon ( which covers mainly 
do mestically consumed food items ) and the C ntral Bank ' s 
wholesale pric ind of agricultural xport products. 
It is apparent that ov r the decade as a whol the latter 
rose much faster than th for mer , with th result that 
ther w s 
pric s to 
h d th 
a sustained t ndency for relative agricultural 
2 
mov in favour of e port products. That this 
ff ct of diverting (relativ ly) land r ourc s 
aw y fro m th production of food crop towards the 
production of e port or ' comm rcial ' crops is suggest d 
by FOgur v . 4 which is r produc d fro m a study by 
1 
B tw n 1946 nd 1955 total crop area (inclusive of 
mul °pl croppOng ) gr w t an av rag annual rate of 
5 . 8 p r c nt . Thi growth p rtly r fl ct d a 
r stor tOon to us of grOcultural land whoch had gone 
out of productOon durOng th War . For the period 
195 -65 th a r g nnu 1 r t or growth r 11 to 2 · 5 
p r c nt , nd within this p riod it was fa ter for 
1955- 60 ( J.4 p r c nt ) th n for 1960-65 ( 1 . 6 p r c nt). 
[Sour of d t : D pt . of Agricultur nd atural 
R our s . ] 
2 
Th on for th ri in gricultur 1 port pric s 
r us d n th n t chapt r . Cl rly , how v r , 
d v lu tion w s n i mport nt factor . 
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F· gur V. 3 : Who 1 1 Pr· c Indic s of' Agricu1 Lura 1 
Product s for Ho m Consumption and 
E port , 1955- 65 
Log (1955 100) 
Sc 1 
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Figure v . 4: Re l atio n ship betwee n La n d Ut ili z atio n a n d Relativ e Pri c es 
in Agriculture 
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Notes to Figure v . 4 
1 . Crop area refers toarea harvested (except for tree crops) . Data are o n a crop year basis ; 
that is , they refer to the twelve months ending Jun e JO in any c alendar year t. (Source : 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics , Depart ment of Agriculture and Natural Resources . ) 
2 . Price indices refer to wholesale prices . Both indices have bases of 1955 = 100 . (Source : 
Central Bank of the Philippines , Central Bank News Digest , Vol .XVIII , No . 5l [ Dece mber 20 , 
1966J . ) 
J. The price ratio plotted against the area relating to any crop year ending June JO , calendar 
year t , is the average of the price ratios for the three previous calendar years , t - J , t - 2 
and t - l . 
4. In the above figure the numerals alongside the plotted points identify the crop years of 
the area data . 
General Source Note : This figure is reproduced from Malcolm Treadgold and Richard W. Hooley , 
Decontrol and the Redirection of Inco me Flows : A Second Look , Discussion 
Paper (Institute of Econo mic Develop ment and Research , University of th 
Philippines , 1967 ; mi meo) . 
t-' 
co 
co 
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ROchard W. Hool y nd th pre 1 nt wrOt r . Thos ~igur 
shows ~or th period 1956-66 the r 1 °onship b tw en 
th proportion o~ tot 1 crop r a d vot d to e port or 
' commercoal ' crops in any crop y r nd th av rag ~or 
th thr pr ceding c 1 ndar years o~ the ratoos o~ th 
ind numb r o~ '''hol 1 proces o~ agricultural xport 
products to th °nd x numb r of whol sal pr oc es o~ 
home-consum d agricultur 1 products . Th coef~ici nt 
o~ d t r mon tion betw en h varoabl s indo cates that 
th latt r ' xplaons ' statistically nearly 82 per c nt 
o~ the var nc in the ~ormer . Finally , the trends in 
actual crop product'ion al 0 support th argument . 
Figur V . 5 (whoch is i milarly bas d on th Treadgold-
Hool y study) shows indoces o~ the physical volume of 
produc ion o~ ~ood crops and port crops over th 
d 1955 - 65 . 
2 In this riod th of cad p rat expansion 
o~ ~ood crop production t nded to ~all aw y , whil the 
rate of pansoon o~ xport crop production acc lerat d 
dr m tOcally . B tw n 1955 and 1960 the average annual 
rate o~ growth o~ ~ood crop production was 4.2 p r cent , 
but b twe n 1960 nd 1965 it was only 3 . 0 p r c nt. By 
ontr st , the a rag nnual r t of growth o~ e port 
rop produ tion jump d fro m 1 . 8 p r c nt betwe n 1955 
a n d 1960 to 6 . 0 p r c nt b tw en 1960 nd 1965 . 3 
How ver , i should b not d that in his period 
mo v m n ts in relative agricultural pric s w re not the 
sol ~ c or r sponsobl fo the di rsion o~ resourc 
1 
h uld b 
o n es co mput d 
crop ind r f s 
co n tra t to th C 
ot 
w hOn 
S 
fi h , 
n 
th s °ndoc r uno~~ici 1 
or th bov study . Th food 
crops prop r nd thus , in 
nk ' s ind hown On T bl v . 4 , 
nd poultry products . On th 
mong port crops , s th t r m i 
1 tob cco , whoch ° ctu lly 
rk Di rsion of 
of h O crop at the 
d in he lat ~ifti 
h form of high 
(Cf. C n r 1 B nk of h 
R port , 1966 , p . 122 . ) 
of r ou c mobiloty 
con r st with th usu 1 
mo bilOt . 
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ot : Th two i n d · c s are base-w ight d arithmetic 
Sourc 
av rag s of qu ntum re1ativ The wight are 
b s d on th 1 55 production va1u s . 
The indic s w r comput d directly fro m 
productio n and va1u data supp1i d by th 
D part m nt 01 gricu1tur and atura1 
R sourc s . 
191 
On to export crops and the cc lerating growth in th 
production of th s at the xpe nse of food crops . t 
le st two other factors wer of i mportance . First , in 
the cas of sugar , ports to the prof "tabl Unit d 
St t s mark t wer pr sing o n U. S . quota l" mits at th 
e n d of the n i n t n-fifti s . Th add"tio nal n o n - quot 
a l location of 176 , 426 hort to n s grant d to th 
PhiLippin s by the Unit d States , following its 
suspe n sion of i mports fro m Cuba near th b ginning of 
the Philippine d co n trol period , was u n doubtedly an 
i nc n t "v to expand sug r cane cultivation i ndep ndently 
of a ny chang i n sugar pric s relative to the pric s of 
oth r crops . S co ndly , in 1963 an agricultural land 
reform bill be c a me law . By providi ng for the 
propriat"o n of larg t nant d estat s of grainland , 
this 1 gis l atio n e nc our ged to so me xt nt a div rsion 
o f such est t s i n to xport crop production , 
particul r l y sugar . 1 
THE 0 -AGRI CULTURAL SECTOR 
Th main th m of this Structuralist approach , it 
will b r c 11 d , is th t in th absenc of a g neral 
e c ss or d fici ncy of aggr gat demand a sectoral 
i mb 1 n ce which r sults in a change in food prices is 
lik ly to affect the absolute pric 1 vel ; first , 
b caus of the unresponsiveness of non- food pric s to 
th opposit i mbalanc betw en the supply and de mand for 
non- food co mmoditi a n d , co ndly , b caus of the 
i n direct effects that ch nges i n absolut food pric 
wil l h v o n costs of production nd h nc pric s of 
n o n- f o od co mmoditi s . 
t is nece s ry to nv tigat th s two c laims . 
With r g rd to th unr po n siven ss or ' nfl ibility 
no n - food pric s , th s (m asur d in t r ms of the 
co nsum r nd r t il pric indic s ) g n r lly do not 
app ar to hay mov d on y ar - to - y r b s s i n the 
oppos"t d"r ction to absolut food pric s . I n only 
two of n On t n po sibl ~n t n c s i n th per ' od 
1 
of 
Cf . C nt 1 B nk 0 th Philippin s , =E~i~g~h~t~~~~~n~n~u~a~l 
R port , 1966 , p.122 . 
1946- 65 did such ph nom non occur n th Manila 
Co mpos·t Consumer Pric nd , and in only thr o.f 
n · n t n possibl instanc s in th sam p riod did it 
occur i n th Manil Compos·t R tail Pric Index . 
Th r .for n so f r as there wer offs tting 
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· mb lan c s n th food and no n-food co mmodity mark ts , 
th latt r i mbalanc s g n rally did not te n d to counter 
the i mpact of th for mer on the pric 1 v 1 , as 
measur d by th se two indic s . Unfortunately , no dir ct 
vid nc as to wheth r or not th situations of xc ss 
de ma n d for food wer m tched by situations of excess 
supply for other commodities , a n d vice v rsa , is 
avail bl . Si milarly , no direct evid nc can b 
off r d on pricing policies in the non- agricultural 
sect o r . Howev r , ·t is usually argued theoretically that 
this s ctor ' s pric s are r lativ ly i nflexibl in the 
face of supply and de mand i mbalan c s because th y ar 
do minat d by industrial or manufactured goods pric s 
which are set according to ' cost - plus ' or 'mark- up ' 
principl s . 
If it is provisionally assum d that Philippine 
·ndustrial prices moved only with un·t variable costs , 
h n (·n accordance with the Structuralist view) it is 
unlik ly that they could have fall n much in the 
inflation ry p riod 1955 - 65 , ven if in fact cess 
s ctoral supply for manufactured goods did occur . 
Adm·tt dly , this f ilur to f 11 would probably not have 
b n the result o.f the b haviour of unit labour costs . 
B tw n 1955 and 1965 th phys·c 1 volume of production 
in manuf cturing incr s d by 100 . 9 per c nt , whil 
mploym nt ·n manufactur·ng rose by only 27 . 0 per cent , 
accord· n g to indic of th s v riabl published by 
th C ntral B nk of th Philippine . 1 Tog th r th se 
· ndic s y ld a rough stimat of 58 . 2 p r c nt for the 
ncr n over- 11 1 bour product · v·ty in manufacturing 
ov r th d cade . I.f this is corr ct d Eor hifts in th 
d·str·but·on of mploym nt within th m nufacturing 
s ctor , th · m t d incr s in labour productivity 
1 
C ntr 1 B nk of th Philipp· n , St tistical Bull tin , 
Vol . XV 0 . 3 (s pt mb r 1966) . 
proper 1 becomes 54 . 3 per c nt . 
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Both thes sti mates 
are far in excess of th 29 . 2 p r cent increase in 
average monthly earnings of wage - earn rs in Philippin 
manufacturing industries from 1955 to 1965 , and e v n mor 
in excess of the 14 . 4 and 22 . 5 per cent increas s in 
i ndustrial wage rates in Manila for skill d and 
unskill d workers respectiv ly over the sam period . 2 
Thus , ven allowing for all the inaccuracies inher nt 
in comparisons such as these , th y do suggest that 
average labour costs d clined . On th other hand , 
howev r , other input costs undoubt dly rose . So me 
i ndication of this is supplied by the C ntral Bank ' s 
Wholesal Pric e Index of Raw Materials in Manila which 
increas d 95 . 1 per c e nt between 1 955 and 1965. 3 With 
regard to specific inputs , th indices of th whol sale 
prices of mineral fuels , che micals , inedibl crude 
materials , and ani mal and veg table oils and fats 
increased by 42.2 per c nt, 42 . 4 per cent , 92 . 3 per cent 
a nd 130 . 0 p r cent r sp ctively.4 In gen ral , rising 
mater'al input costs must have g one far towards 
offsetting and may hav offset complet ly falling 
labour costs . Th y would thus hav probably prevented 
1 
Th i mpact of th shift in th distribution of 
mployment was eliminat d b re - calculating the labour 
productivity index as the weighted av rage of the labour 
productivity indices for individual 'ndus tries , where 
th wights w r th b s period shar s in the total 
valu of production . [ Cf . P . H . Karm 1 , Applied 
Statistics for Econo mists (M lbourn , Pitman, 1957) , 
pp . 3 4 6-347 , specially p . 347n] . Of cours e , both the 
corr ct d and uncorr ct d stimat s of th move ment 'n 
labour productivity in manufacturing are at best only 
approx' m t and refl ct th d f cts of th Central Bank ' s 
production nd mploym nt indi c es . For a dis c ussion of 
th s d f cts , s 
St t ' stics 'n th 
World B nk R sid 
C n tr 1 B nk of 
Vo 1 . XV . 0 . 3 (S 
3 
C ntr 1 B nle of 
C n tr 1 B TIl of 
Vol. XV I , 0 . 3 (S 
th Ph'lippin s , 
pt mb r 1 66) . 
th 
th Philippin s , St tis tical Bull tin , 
pt mb r 1966) . 
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tot 1 un't costs fro m f ll'ng i n th p r 'o d 1955 - 65 . 1 
Turn'ng to a con 'd ratio n of the ff ct of 
movem nts i n absolut food pric s on h costs of 
product' o n nd h nce ( according to th Structuralist 
vi w) on th prices of non- food co mmodi t' s , this s m d 
to be w k or non- ist nt n th post -war Philippin 
cono my . Such an eff ct ' s usually all g d to op rate 
through non- agr'cultural mon y wag s which are claimed 
to b respons've to mov m nts in th pric s of consum r 
goods and , in particular , to mo ve m nts in th price of 
f ood, which always absorbs a large part of wage - earners ' 
i ncomes jn less dey loped countri s . In principle , this 
respo nsiveness will occur as a result of the supply of 
1 bour bing dep ndent on real rath r than mon y wag s . 
Thus , it is commonly suggested that in many 1 ss 
d v lop d conomies population pressur and disguised 
un mploym nt , particularly in agricultur , may give rise 
to market force which nsur a virtually infinitely 
e l astic supply of labour at a constant subsistenc or 
n ear- ubsist nce real wage . In other econo mies , 
usually one with high r real inco mes per capita , 
i n stitut'o nal lorce ssociated with th d v lopment of 
tr d unionism may partially rep lac the direc i mpact 
of m rk t forces . In the e cas s money wages ar lik ly 
to ary positively with pric s in n upward direction , 
but th re will bar istance to cuts in money wages 
wh n pr c s are fall·ng . 
In fact , how v r , ther appears to hay been no 
ign'lican t positiv r 1 tionship betw n ch nges in 
mon y wages and ch ng s in food prices in the Philippines , 
ith r ov r the whol period 1946 - 65 or over just the 
years 1955 - 65 which w r 
Tabl V.ll shows th ind 
lmost entirely inflationary . 
of mon y wag rat s for 
un k'll d work rs in industri 1 st blishm nts in 
M n ila a n d suburbs for 1946- 65 and Tabl V. 12 shows th 
, nd of v rag monthly rnings Ol w g - arn rs in 
non- gricultur 1 industr' s 'n th Ph'lippin for 
1955-65 . ( Th la t rind does no t t nd b ck to 1946 . 
1 
With r g rd 
( p rt'cul rly 
th d fl t' on 
t h p ob bl 
to th li r ars , th l'mited data 
for th Lhr y ar 1946 - 4 wh n mo st of 
occurr d ) pr clud us lul minatio n of 
r nds 'n m nuf ctur'ng cost 
Tab1 V . ll: Index of Money Wag Rates for Unski ll ed 
Labourers in Industrial Establishments 
in Manil a and Suburb s, 194 6- 65 
( 1955= 100 ) 
Pe r c nt 
Year Index change from previ ous 
year 
194 6 87 . 5 
1947 90 . 0 + 2 .9 
1948 90 · 5 + 0.6 
1949 94 . 6 + 4 . 5 
1950 82 . 8 -1 2 · 5 
19 5 1 89 . 4 + 8 .0 
1952 95.6 + 6 . 9 
1953 98 . 3 + 2 . 8 
1954 97·1 - 1. 2 
1955 100.0 + 3 ·0 
1956 101·5 + 1. 5 
1957 100 . 4 - 1.1 
1958 101.0 + 0 . 6 
1959 101. 8 + 0.8 
1960 101. 9 "t 0.1 
1961 104.4 -)- 2 . 5 
1962 107 · 5 + 3 ·0 
19 63 113.4 + 5 · 5 
19 64 114.4 + 0·9 
1965 122·5 + 7 ·1 
ot This index consists o f two separate 
indic s linked at 1949. 
ourc s: Central Bank of th Philippines, 
Fourth Annua l Re por t , 1952j 
C n tral Bank of th Phi lippines, 
tatist·c 1 Bulletin, Vol . XVIII, 
0.3 ( ept mber 1966) . 
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Table V . 12 : Index of Average Monthly Earnings 
of Wage Earners in Se l ected o n-
Agricultural Industries , 1955-65 
(1955= 100 ) 
Per cent change 
Year Index from previous 
year 
1955 100 . 0 
1956 101. 4 + 1.4 
1957 104 . 9 + 3 · 5 
1958 105·9 + 1.0 
1959 1 10 . 4 + 4 . 2 
1960 116.9 + 5 · 9 
1961 117 · 2 + 0 · 3 
1962 119.0 + 1.5 
19 63 120 . 2 + 1.0 
1964 125 . 6 + 4 . 5 
1965 133 · 0 + 5·9 
Source: Central Bank of the Philippines, 
Statistical Bulletin, Vo1 . XVIII, 
0 .3 (September 1966) . 
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ts r l o st y ea i s 1952 . ) Simple lO n r c orre l tion 
o nnu 1 perc nt g chan ges n t h wag rat i n d x with 
a nnua l p rc n tag ch n g s i n th 
M n i l Co mposit Co n s u m r Pric 
ood co mpo n n t of th 
n de , n ith r u n l gg d 
or 1 gg d f orm, yi ld d no signifi c a n t r 1 t Oo nship , 
° t h r fo r t h p ri od 1 9 4 6 - 6 5 o r t h p ri o d 1955 - 65 . 
Simil r l y , c orr l atio n of nnual p rc n t ge cha n g s i n 
t h e °nd o av rag mo n t hly arni ngs with a nnua l 
p rc n tag cha n g s i n t h e ro od c o mpo n nt of the Ma nila 
Comp o site Co n sumer Proc n d n i t h r unlagg d or 
1 g g d orm, yi l d d n o s Og nifi c a n t r l atio n s h ip for 
th p ri o d 1 955 - 65 . 
Wi h r spect to t h relatio n ship betw n c han ges 
i n mo n y w ges n d c h n ges On c o n sum r pri c es as a 
wh o l e , t h resu lts are o nly s l ightly bett r . 
Co rr l at ion o f nnua l p rc n tage cha nges i n th wage 
ra t i n d wit h a nnua l perce n tage chang s in th ' all 
item' Co mpos i e Co n sumer Price I n d for Ma nila , in 
Ot h er u n lagged or lagged form, yielded no significant 
re l atio n s h ip for t h e p riod 19 4 6 - 65 , a nd i n unlagg d 
fo r m yie l ded no n e f o r t h shorter period , 1955 - 65 . 
L i k wis , for th period 1955 - 65 , corr 1 tion of annua l 
p rc n t g chan g s in the °nde of v rage monthly 
r n On gs with a nnu 1 perc n tage c ha n g s in the ' all 
°t ms ' Co mposit Co n u mer Pri c e nde , i n either 
un l gg d or l agg d form, yielde d no significant 
r 1 tio n s ho p . n f ct , ubject to utocorr lation , th 
o n l sOgn Ofocan t r ult to merg was : 
(V. 1) 
wh re 
2 ( r = 0 . 510 ) 
- 0 . 49 + 0 . 695%6 P c t 1 ( 0 . 25 8 ) -
%6W
t 
s t h p rc n tag chan ge i n the inde of 
wage r t for u n skoll d work rs i n M nila 
i ndustri 1 st b l ishm n ts fro m y ar t - l 
o r 
is t h e p rc n tag ch n g n he Manila 
Co mposi Co n sum r P roce Ind r fro m ye r 
t - 2 to y ar t - l. 
Th os r 1 t Oo n hip r 
1 95 - 5 . T h ough t h r 
to d ta for t h p riod 
°o n a n d corr 1 tio n 
o 
t h 5 p r 
p 
n ts r ign i i n Ll diff r n t f o m z ro at 
n t 1 v 1 , Lh r 1 tio n h Op ° 
ly tro n g o n . 
cl arly not 
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In 11 , th bs nc of a relat"o nship b tw n 
ch n g s n mon y wag s nd ch ng i n food pr"c s , nd 
t h r th r l"mited on wh"ch exists b tw n changes n 
mon y w g s nd chang s in cons um r pric s generally , 
mak "t unl"k ly that th chan g s i n absolute food 
pr"c s wh" ch occurr d h d ny stro n g ff ct via th 
1 bour mark t on non - gr "cu1tur 1 costs of production , 
v n abstracting fro m ch ng s in non-agricultural 
1 bo u r productiv"ty which w r , it has b n seen , 
r 1 tiv ly large for a 1 ast manufacturing in th period 
1 955 - 65 . Thus , v n ir pric s outsid agricultur were 
co t - d t r min d , the changes which occurr d in th m 
canno t be attribut d with any confid nce to a 
S tructuralist l"nk b twe n food prices and money wage 
In fact , r gard1 ss of th fundam ntal forc s b hind 
th post -war price lev 1 mov ments , the abs nce of this 
link probably e plains to a consid rabl tent the 
r 1ative1y moderat natur of thes mov ments aft r 
1946- 47 . 
SOME SHORTCOMI GS OF THE APPROACH 
It will h v b come appar nt that this general 
approach to e plaining Phi1ippin price 1 vel movements 
ov r th period 1946-65 is open to criticism on several 
grounds . 
n itially , so me doubts must r main about the 
" n su1 tion 0 Phil"ppin do mestic food pr"ces from 
for ign food pr ces. 1though it has be n argu d that 
for mo st of the p riod und r study various factor such 
as s hipp" n g bottlen cks , quantita iv i mport 
r trictio n s and th gOY r nm nt monopolization of 
i n t r n t"onal tr d in ric ffectively pr v nted 
do m stic food pric rrom b "ng d t rmined , irrespective 
o do m t"c supply a n d d m nd , by ' giv n l world pric of 
food "mports , l this conclus"o n cl r1y did not hold for 
11 ood products co n tinuou 1y throughout th full 
t w n ty y r 1946 - 65. n particu1 r , th y ars 1947 - 48 
a nd 1962-65 w r p riods wh nor wid rang of 
co mmod"t" s ther w r no l"mitations on i mports and 
wh n , s onsequ n t1y prob b1y f to co n c1ud , m ny 
1 
Tog th r with th ch n ge r t and ny t riff . 
1 9 
food i mports wer for all practic 1 purposes n 
infinit ly lastic supply . Th refor , in th s p riods 
t 1 st , chang s on th ov r - all food pric s i ndic s , 
both bsolut and r latOv , cannot n c ssarily b 
attribut d solely to do m stic sectora l imb l a nc s . Th y 
m y well have refl ct d changes in t h e prices of 
i mport d nd import-comp ti ng food produ cts which were 
t h r s ul t of e og nou s forc s such as chang s i n world 
pric s , tarOffs a nd ( in the latter period) the xchang 
rat 
Unlortunately , a lack of id nt ifOable data on th 
pric s of import d food items precludes analysis of th 
earlier period , but for th latter period when the only 
sign ificant restrictions on food imports related to 
ric , corn , some vegetabl s a n d finish d coffee products , 
°t is possible to sep rat the food components of the 
Manila Composite Consumer and Retail Price Indices into 
ub - compon nt s measuri ng move ments in the prices of 
i mported food products and domestic food products . This 
h s been do ne in Tabl s V. 1J and v.14. Consider first 
t h e con umer pric inde. Betw en 1961 and 1965 the 
ub-ind of import d food pric s increased by 67 . 0 
poi nt (o r 48.J per cent ). Since the wight of this 
sub-ind x on th total food inde is 0 .1154 , it follows 
t h at 7 . 7 of th latter ' s 42.4 points ris (i. e . 18.2 per 
cent of °ts absolut ris ) over this period i explain d 
by th nc reas i n th former . With r gard to the 
ov r - all consum r pric inde , th move m nt in th pric 
of import d food ccounts for J . 7 of its 27 . 2 poi n ts 
rOse ( i . e . lJ.6 per c n t 01 its ab olut rise ) . 
Co rr spo ndingly , diss ction of th retail price ind 
s how s that its ub-ind of °mport d food products 
ncr sed by 58 . 1 poi n ts ( or 41.9 p r cent) betw n 1961 
nd 1965. Sinc th w ight of this sub - indoe in he 
ot 1 food compon nt of th r tail price i nd is 0 .1589 , 
°t follow th t 9 . 2 of th total food co mponent ' s 4J.l 
poi n t is ( i . 21.J p r c nt of its absolut ris ) 
ov r hi s per ° od s plained by the incr ase in 
import d lood pric \v i th r gard to the ov r - all 
r t il pr ce i nde , Lh incr s i n the pric of 
import d food product ccounts for 4.5 of its JO . O 
po n ts ris ( i. 15·0 p r c nt of the ab olut r s ) . 
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Table V.1]: Mani l a Composite Consumer Pric nd x : 
Y a r 
19 55 
1961 
1962 
196] 
1964 
1965 
Dom stic and I mported Food Compon nts; 
1955, 1961-65 
(1955=100) 
Domestic I mported All Food All tems 
Food Food Products 
Products Products 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
116 . 2 1]8.7 118·9 11]. 2 
121.8 174. 8 1 27 ·9 119· 8 
1]]· 5 192 · 7 140.4 126.5 
152 · 9 200 ·7 1 58 . 4 1]6 .9 
155· 5 205 · 7 6 1.] 140.4 
Source : Central Bank of the Philippines, Central Bank 
Vo1.XIX, 0.17 (April 25, 1967) . 
Tab le v .14: Mani l a Composite Retai l Price Index: 
Y ar 
1955 
1961 
1962 
196] 
1964 
1 65 
Sourc 
Dom stic and I mport d Food Components; 
1955, 19 61- 65 
(1955=100) 
Dom stic Imported All Food All tems 
Food Food Products 
Products Products 
100 . 0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
116 .8 1]8.5 120 . 2 119·7 
122.] 171. 9 1]0.2 128.] 
1]4.8 187.4 14].1 1]6.4 
154.4 194 . 2 160.7 146 . 9 
157.0 196 . 6 16].] 149·7 
As for T b1 V.1]. 
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t Os thus cl ar that th ncr s n th pric of 
i mport d food products , in t rms 01 °th r the consum r 
or r t °1 pric ind x , contribut d On a not insignifocant 
w y 0 th absolut s in food pric sand th pric 
1 v 1 , as me sur d by th s indic s. Equally importantly , 
th increas contributed not insignifi~antly to th rO s 
n th r lative price of food . Thus , if the sub - index 
of imported food products in the cons um r price ind x 
had not changed fro m 1961 to 1965 , the re lative pric 
of 100d , as m asur d by the ratio of th to t al food 
co mpon nt ind x to the ' other items ' component index of 
th consumer price index on a base of 1955 = 100 , would 
have risen from 109 . 9 in 1961 to only 126.4 in 1965 , 
inst ad of to 132 . 8 in 1965 as , in fact, it actually 
dOd . ( S Table V. 3 . ) Similarly , if th sub - index of 
imported food products in the retail price ind x had 
not changed fro m 1961 to 1965 , then the r lativ pric e 
of food , as measured by the ratio of the total food 
co mpon nt ind x to th ' other items ' component index of 
the r tail pric ind x on a base of 1955 = 100 , would 
have ris n from 100 . 8 in 1961 to only 112 . 7 in 1965 , 
inst ad of to 119 . 5 in 1965 as , in fact, i t actually 
did . (S again Tabl V.3 · ) 
Furthermore , acc pting that the impor t d food 
products appearing in the regime ns of the consumer and 
r tail proce indic s w r in virtually infinitely 
ela tOc supply , it i likely that th s calculations 
und rst t the importanc of the b haviour of the pric e s 
of food imports in d termining chang s in relativ 
pric s nd the absolut pric level ov r the s years . 
Thu ,th ' given ' pric s of these products would hav 
d t rmin d , s was sugge t d abov th pric s of any 
comp ting local food products which ppear in the 
r gOm ns of th indice as domestic products . In all, 
i pp ars unjustifi d to e clud th argument of 
th pr c dOng sections has don , consid ration of 
og nously d t rmin d food import pric . s in the p rOod 
1 62-65. 
Anoth r shortcoming of this g n r 1 pproach 
r 1 t to th stirn t s of the p e r c pit incom 
1 stOcity of d m nd for food s whol nd for ric 
lon which w r us d r p ctiv ly for asc rtaining 
ch ng s On th d m nd ror food s a whol and ric alon 
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t unch ng d r lativ pric s . Th inappropriat n ss or 
mploying constant av r g lasticity stimates ov r a 
tim span or tw nty y ars during which av rag p r 
c pOta r al incom wa s growing notic ably has aIr ady 
b n indic t d . Howev r , th r is also another probl m 
conn cted wOth th us of constant stimat s . 
Subs qu ntly , in Chapt r VIII , it will be argued that 
ther wer marked changes On the distribution of incom 
On th Philippin s ov r the post-war p riod . Attention 
will be concentrated on th functional and s ctoral 
chang s in distribution that occurr d , but such chang s 
also implied changes in th degree of quality of 
p ronal incom s and in income distribution b twe n 
urban and rural ar as . ndependently of the behaviour 
of average income per capita for the conomy as a whole, 
th s changes must hay caus d the values of the av rage 
p r capita income elasticities of d mand for food and 
for ric alon to hay varied considerably . To allow 
quantitatively for the influenc of such factors would 
require mor information than that offered by th limited 
data available . How ver , the qualitative knowledge of 
th ir pr sence sugge sts a n ed for caution in interpr ting 
r suIts obtained with the aid 01 constant elasticity 
stimat s . 
With r spect to the non-food or non-agricultural 
s ctors , att ntion has already b n drawn to the lack of 
dir ct vOd nce ith r in support or contradiction of 
th Structuralist hypoth s s concerning imbalances 
b tw en supply and d mand in thes s ctors and the 
unr sponsiven ss of pric s to such imbalances . How v er, 
th provisional ssumption that the prices of dom stic 
manufactured goods w r cost - determin d and th refore 
lik ly to b f irly infl ible can b attacked indirectly 
on th grounds that the Philippine manufacturing industry 
is 1 rg ly n i mport - substitute on From the tim of 
th di pp ar nc 01 th arly post - war shipping 
short g until th introduction of quantitative 
r strictions on imports in 1949 price of m nufactur d 
goods would to con id r bl t nt hay b n d termin d , 
irr sp ctiv of dom stic costs of production, by the price 
01 comp tOng import which w r in abundant supply . 
d mO tt dIy , with th coming of import controls and th 
cons qu nt r tionOng of imports? the dOr ct constraint 
or °mport pric s on dom stic pric disapp ar d . 
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Imports of m nufactur d goods bec m complet ly 
price - onelastic in supply , although th or volum w s 
subj ct to utonomous shifts as a r sult of policy and 
administrativ fiat . v rtheless , during th p riod 
of r strictions from 1949 unti l th d control programm 
of th arly n i n te n-sixti s , do m stic costs of 
productio n ar unlikely to have be n th sole 
det r minants of the pric s of do m stically manufactur d 
goods . D mand pr ssures and the scarcity of i mports 
would hay be n major forc s in pric determination in 
this sector . Ev ntually , after d control , which saw 
the abandonment of all direct restrictions on imports , 
it is likely that the situation rev rted to that of 
th late ninet n - forties ; namely , one wh re the pric s 
of ma nufactures wer det r mined by ' given ' import prices 
in pesos . 
This is certainly not to deny the exist nc of 
price infl ibility with respect to variations in 
do mestic de mand in so me years of the period 1946 - 65 . 
Clearly, ther is a strong case for its existence in the 
years of u nrestricted i mports . Howev r , it is not a 
cas bas d on ' cost - plus ' price determination , but 
rather on the very fact that imports of manufactures 
were unimp d d . l As with the earli r criticism 
conc rning food import price , this criticism also 
sugg ts the ne d to carry the analysis of price 1 v 1 
behaviour beyond ntirely domestic conomic forc s. 
Finally , regardless of th d gre of r sponsiveness 
of non-food pric s to i mb lances betw en supply and 
de mand , th fact remains that th s prices , in so f r 
as th y w r coy r d by the consumer and r tail pric 
indic s , peri nc d considerable mo m nt in the period 
1946-65 , not withstanding arli r r marls t~at movem nts 
in food pric s ~ s account d for th bulk of the 
pr -1 55 d flation nd th post -1955 inflation . In 
1 
This discussoon of pric d t rmination in th 
manuf cturi n g s ctor h ignor d th t p rt of th s ctor 
which proc d pri m ry product ultimat ly d tined for 
port ( . g . timb r nd copra ). How r , e pos d as th y 
w r to °nt rn tion 1 co mp t otio n throughout th po t - w r 
p r Oo d , th pric s of proc ssed port products w r 
c rt Only not d t r min d 01 ly by do m stic costs , 
Orr sp ctiv of d mand . 
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dd·tion , b tw n 1949 nd 1951 , wh n th pre - 1955 
d flation was temporarily int rrupt d , it w s non-food 
pr c s which played the major role in this interruption. 
(S Tabl s V.l and V. 2 .) Therefor , sinc it has b n 
stablish d that mov ments in non-food pric s cannot b 
xplained satisfactorily i n terms of a Structuralist 
link betw n food and non-food pric s (bas d on the 
sensitivi ty of non- agricultural mon y wages to food 
pric s and on ' co st - plus ' pricing polici s outsid th 
agricultural s ctor) , it appears that the general 
hypoth se outlin d at the beginning of the chapt r , 
tho ugh probably partially relevant , do not account fully 
for th b haviour of th pri c 1 v 1 b tween 1946 and 
Other for c es w r obviously at work. It is with 
a n analysis of those asso ciated with the foreign trade 
s ctor and the balanc of payme nt s that th next 
chapt r is concern d . 
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CHAPTER VI 
STRUCTURAL FACTORS (b) THE BALA CE OF PAYME TS 
Th object of this chapter is to pr sent an analysis 
of Philippine price lev 1 behaviour in th post-war 
period which emphasizes th economy ' s foreign trading 
relationships and exchang rate policies . In this 
r sp ct, a series of h'storically consecutive 
explanations of pric movements will be advanc d. 
Additionally, an attempt will be made to relate two of 
these to the specific Structuralist hypothesis that 
inflation may be caused, not by a failure to maintain 
internal balance, but by economic growth generating an 
increasing demand for imports which is excessive in 
relation to the growth in foreign exchang receipts, and 
which must therefore bring about , either by way of 
market forces or government policy, changes in the 
prices of traded goods relative to the prices of 
1 non-trad d goods . Since to some extent the explanations 
off red may appear inconsistent with or unrelated to 
previous analysis, it should be mention d that the tasks 
of reconciliation and r -ass ssment will be undertaken 
in th following chapt r. 
If, as sugg st d arli r, th pric s of Philippine 
exports and imports can be assumed to hav been 
xog nously d t rm'n d (' .. , if, for all practical 
purposes, th world d mand for Philippine exports and 
th supply of mports a ailable to the Philippines can 
b tr d ha ing b infinit ly pric - elastic) , 
2 
at as n 
th n it follows that in the absenc of quantitative 
trad and xchang controls mo m nts in th domestic 
curr ncy pri es of ports and imports can hav r sult d 
onl from mo m nts in og nously d t rmined world 
prices, tariffs and subsidi s, and th exchang rat . 
1 
Th t rms ' t aded goods ' and ' non-trad d goods ' , as 
well as th rms ' portabl s ' and ' importabl s ' (which 
ar mploy d blow) ha b n d fin d abo e . Se p . 5 4 n . l. 
2 
'I'h 
th 
alidity o.f th s 
end of th ch pt r . 
assumptions is discussed at 
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Und r th abov conditions, and irr sp ctiv of the 
balanc b tw n aggr gat demand and supply, these 
factors ar potentially capable of having ac counted 
dire ctly for a considerabl part of chang s in the 
Philippin pric e level, particularly bec a us th 
dom stic curr ncy pric s of exports would have 
d termin d directly the prices of all exportables, 
including thos consum d domestically, and th dom stic 
curr ncy prices of imports would have d termined directly 
the prices of all importables, including those produced 
domestic a lly . 
However, it must be re-emphasized that with regard 
to import prices this argum nt is not applicable in the 
period between 1949 and 1962 because of the existence 
of import and exchang controls. When first applied 
s ver ly these caus d a sharp drop in the volum of 
imports . As we shall presently demonstrat , this 
creation of an effective inelasticity of supply, together 
with the state of demand, caused the dom stic wholesale 
and retail prices of imports and import-competing 
products to rise sharply and ind pendently of world 
prices, th xchange rate and the tariff structure. In 
other words scarcity raised s lling prices and created 
a windfall profit margin for importers on those 
quantities of goods which they could still purchase 
from abro d. Subsequ ntly the maintenance of the 
ov r-valu d peso by th se controls was to nsure the 
continu d pr sence of this excessiv margin between the 
land d cost of imports and the domestic prices at which 
they were sold . This margin provided, at least 
partially and subject to for ign exchange allocations, 
a cushion to absorb th impact of any changes in 
int rnational pric s and tariffs . Ultimately, it was 
also to soften th 
d luation. Howe 
cost-inflationary impact of 
er, b for analyzing in detail the 
p riod of controls and its aftermath , it is nec ssary 
to xamin th prior y ars of r construction, 1946-L~9· 
POST-\ AR o 
Th Philippines em rg d from th S cond World War 
in st t of physical d astation and with a grossly 
inflat d pr'c 1 1. More ov r, b aus of th d cision 
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to maintain th pr -war xchange rat , th curr ncy was 
ov r- alu d in terms of th dollar . In vitably, th re 
w s a s r b alanc of payments probl m. In th four 
immediat post-war y rs, 1946-49 , the volum of xports 
lagg d markedly b hind pre-war lev ls . According to 
1 Golay , th volum of xports ( xcluding gold) amoun d 
in 1946 to only 19 per c nt of its 1937 -40 av rage and 
by 1949, although it had ris n gr atly, it was still 
only 66 p r cent of th latter average. Admittedly , a 
substantial rise in xport pric shelp d to rais the 
dollar valu of xports in the years aft r 1946 to 
levels considerably in xc ss of pre-war values, but a 
vast import bill resulted in balanc of trade deficits 
which gr w from U.S. $232 million in 1946 to U . S·$338 
million in 1949. (S e Table VI.l . ) According again to 
Golay , 2 av rag imports for the years 1947 - 49 were ov r 
fi e times higher in total value and 2 . 12 tim s higher 
in volume than in 1937 . This rise in th volum of 
imports r flected reli f and r construction needs, a 
propensity to consum imported commodities which had 
b n sharpen d by privations during the occupation, and 
th maintenanc of the pre-war exchange rate despite 
the larg war-tim increases in Philippine domestic 
costs and pric s r lative to thos of the Philippin s ' 
main trading partn r, the United states . 
Although the U. S . Government ' s transfer paym nts 
and in isible purch s s of goods and ser ices were larg 
sourc s of for ign exchang in th arly post - war years, 
the tr d d ficits and ant outflow of private 
non-trad r mittances in this p riod w re also financed 
p rtly at th xpens of the int rnational reserv 
Th rat of d clin of th latter was not imp d d by 
in ff cti attempts at import controls in January and 
Jun 1949. Indeed, th rate accelerat d in the final 
qu rt r 0 that y ar s a capital flight de elop d . 
By way of r spons strOng nt chang controls were 
°ntrodu d . At th tim of th ir introduction 
(n c mb r 9, 1949) th int rnational r s r e was only 
1 
Op • ° t . , p . 75 . 
2 
bOd ., p . 7J . 
Tab1 VI . 1 : Th Balance of Trade; 1937-40 , 1946-65 
(mi11'on u .s . dollars ) 
Y ar a 
a Balance of Imports Exports Trade 
1937 109 · 6 153 . 4 + 43 · 8 
1938 132.1 116.1 - 16 . 0 
1939 122 . 2 121.6 0 . 6 
1940 134 . 8 118 . 0 - 16 . 8 
1946 295 · 9 64 . 2 -231. 7 
1947 511 . 1 263 · 4 -247 · 7 
1948 584 . 9 309 . 6 -275 · 3 
1949 585 · 9 247.9 -338 . 0 
1950 341 . 9 331.0 - 10 · 9 
1951 489 · 0 427·4 - 61. 6 
1952 421 . 4 345 · 7 - 75·7 
1953 452 . 4 398 · 3 - 54 . 1 
1954 478 . 7 400 . 5 - 78 . 2 
1955 547·7 400.6 -147 · 1 
1956 506.2 453 · 2 - 53 · 0 
1957 613 · 2 431 . 1 -1 2 . 1 
1958 558·7 492 . 8 - 65·9 
1959 523 · 6 529 · 5 + 5 · 9 
1960 603 · 9 560.4 - 43 . 5 
1961 611. 3 499 · 5 -111 . 8 
1962 586 . 7 556.0 - 30 · 7 
1963 61 .2 727 · 1 +10 · 9 
1964 780 · 3 742.0 - 3 · 3 
1965 807·6 76 · 5 - 39 · 1 
M r handis only, . o . b . 1u . 
Sou s : 
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U . S . $251 million compar d with u . s . $669 million at the 
end of 1945 . 1 
What was the rol of th for ign trade sector in 
th substantial deflation which occurr d over this 
p riod? To estimate the direct contribution of both 
export and import prices it is nec ssary to rely on the 
Composite Wholesale Price Index for Manila (1955 100) 
which consists of three components : a pric index of 
locally produc d commoditi s for home consumption h aving 
a weight in the over-all index of 76 . 59 per cent, a 
price ind x of export products having a weight in the 
over- all index of 9 . 28 p r cent, and a price index of 
imported products having a weight in the over- a ll 
index of 14 . 1J per cent . These indices ar shown for 
the twenty years 1946-65 in Tabl VI . 2 and th ir annua l 
percentage rates of change in this period appear in 
Table VI . J . It is apparent that there were no 
significant net changes in the export and import 
components of the over-all wholesal price index 
betw en 1946 and 1949· Over this p riod the 42 . 4 per 
cent decline in th price level, as measur d by the 
over- all index, was almost completely th r sult of a 
d clin in the prices of goods produced locally for home 
conswnption . Specifically, the decline in the component 
m asuring mov ments in these latter prices accounted for 
81 . 4 of the 81 . 5 absolut points fall in the over-all 
wholesal pric ind x. Furthermor, it seems likely 
that this deflation was confined mainly to so - called 
non- traded goods; that is, to those goods whose prices 
are d termin d by internal costs and demand and are 
thus not affected directly by the prices of exports and 
imports . Although th component price inde of 
commoditi s produced locally for hom conswnption need 
not hav be n limit d in its r gim n to non- traded 
goods and could th r fore ha e included som 
import - comp ting products and som products of an 
portabl nature conswn d domestically, the pric s of 
th s latt r products could ha mo d only with the 
dom stic pric s of imports and e ports, both of which, 
1 Annual 
ol . XVIII , 
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Table VI.2: Composite Wholesale Price Index for Manila, 
1946-65 
(1955 = 100) 
Locally Produced Export Imported Year Commodities for All I terns 
Home Consumption Products Produc ts 
1946 221.4 110.6 86.2 192.0 
1947 126.4 127 . 4 9J.4 121.9 
1948 122.4 154 . 7 94.J 121. 4 
1949 115·1 112.1 84.4 110.5 
1950 105.4 122·9 102·5 106.6 
1951 115 · 9 126 . 7 128·9 118.7 
1952 108 .9 100.8 114.4 108·9 
195J 106.8 12J·5 108·5 108.6 
1954 101. 4 108·5 105 · 2 102 . 6 
1955 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1956 102.0 104.J 108 . 0 10J.l 
1957 106.1 109·2 114.6 107 . 6 
1958 108·5 120.8 119·2 111.2 
1959 106 . 7 lJ6.5 129 .. 9 112·7 
1960 111 . 8 lJJ.O lJ7.4 117.4 
1961 117 . 4 lJ8.l 144.5 12J.2 
1962 119·6 167.1 158.2 129·4 
196J lJO.l 200.0 167.8 142.0 
1964 lJ9 · 2 194.2 169.4 148.6 
1965 142.8 199.6 170.2 151.9 
Sources : Central Bank of the Philippines, Third 
Annual Report,1951; 
Central Bank of the Philippines, 'Statistical 
Bulletin, Vpl .XVII, No.4 (December 1965); 
Unit d ations, Yearbook of International 
Trad Statistics, 1958, Vol.I . Also see 
App ndix A, Part I, below. 
Tab1 
Y ar 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
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v . 3 : Compos· 
P rcentag 
1947 - 65 
Who1 sal Pric Ind x for Manila; 
Change from Pr vious Year, 
Locally Produc d Export Import d Commodities .for All Items 
Hom Consumption Products Products 
- 42 · 9 + 15 · 2 + 8 . 4 - 36 . 5 
3 · 2 + 21. 4 + 1.0 0.4 
6 .0 - 27·5 - 10·5 9 · 0 
8 . 4 + 9 . 6 + 21 . 4 3 · 5 
+ 10 . 0 + 3 · 1 + 25 · 8 + 11. 4 
6 . 0 - 20 . 4 - 11. 2 8 · 3 
1.9 + 22 · 5 5 · 2 0 · 3 
5 · 1 - 12 . 1 3 · 0 5 · 5 
1 . 4 7 · 8 4 . 9 2 · 5 
+ 2 .0 + 4.3 + 8 . 8 + 3·1 
+ 4 . 0 + 4 · 7 + 5 · 3 + 4 . 4 
+ 2·3 + 10 . 6 + 4.0 + 3 · 3 
1.7 + 13·0 + 9 · 0 + 1.3 
+ 4.8 2 . 6 + 5 · + 4.2 
+ 5·0 + 3·8 + 5 · 2 + 4.9 
+ 1·9 + 21 . 0 + 9 · 5 + 5 ·0 
+ 8.8 + 19·7 + 6 .1 + 9 · 7 
+ 7·0 2 · 9 + 1.0 + 4.6 
+ 2.6 + 2 . + 0 · 5 + 2 . 2 
Sourc s: Phi1ippin s, ·Third 
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according to Tabl VI.2, showed lOttl n t chang b tw n 
1946 and 1949. Thus, th d clin On this ind x must 
appar ntly ha r fl ct dad cline in th proc s of 
non- trad d goods . 
Th most straight-forward explanation of th fall in 
non- trad d goods pri s is that th r was a d fico ncy 
o f aggr gate d mandj that is, th r was a t ndency for 
real output to expand fast r lhan d mand . This 
plan tion is not nec ssarily inconsist nt with th 
fact that th period was one of larg balance of trad 
d ficits and, mor g n rally, large balanc of payments 
deficits . A deficiency of home demand and an over-valu d 
curr ncy ar by no m ans incompatibl This exp l anation 
is also not n cessarOly inconsOstent with th fact that 
the pric s of traded goods ( exportabl s and importabl s) 
fail d to show a significant net d cline. Under normal 
circumstanc s such pric s would have be n unaffected by 
a lack of internal balanc if, as suggested above , world 
pric s of ports and imports wer xogenously det rmined 
and if, as in fact is true, ther w re no widespread and 
ff cti controls on for ign trade and no induced 
chang s in th chang rate or on th t ation and 
subsidization of commodities ent ring foreign trade. 
How r, if h pric s 01 trad d goods did not 
r spond to a lack Ol int rnal balance, it could still b 
p ct d, according to this planation, that the volume 
of e ports and the olum of imports would ha e be n 
aff ct d. A defl tion of th pric s Ol non- trad d goods 
would ha encourag d th di rsion 
of r sourc s into th produ tion of 
(in a r lative sens 
portabl s and 
import substitut s , while a th same tim it would ha 
also ncourag d th di rsion ( again in a r lativ sense) 
of d mand away from trad d goods towards non-trad d 
goods . For both th s r asons , it is probabl that th 
olum 01 ports would ha grown fast r than real 
output s a whol and th t th latt r, in turn, would 
ha grown f st r th n th olume of imports. This, n 
fa t, 0 urr d . According to T ble VI.4, th olum of 
ports in r sed b 2~6 . p r c nt b w n 1946 nd 19~9 j 
o th sam p iod G P l 1955 pric s in rased b a 
1 1 ss r 139.4 p r ntj d 1inally , n mor 0 r th 
1 
S Tabl I . J blow. 
Tabl VI.4: Quantum Indic s oE Imports and 
Exports, 1946- 65 
(1955 = 100 ) 
Ye r Imports Exports 
1946 54 . 2 15 · 8 
1947 86 · 9 50·7 
194 98.1 51. 5 
1949 109 · 3 54 . 8 
1950 63.8 70 . 6 
1951 79 · 7 79 · 2 
1952 72 · 3 88 · 3 
1953 79 · 9 82 . 6 
1954 88 · 3 91. 7 
1955 100 . 0 100 . 0 
1956 92 . 1 Ill. 6 
1957 109 · 1 104 · 7 
1958 96.'-1 115·6 
1959 87 · 2 114·7 
1960 96 · 5 123 · 2 
1961 99 · 0 119·2 
1962 93·7 130.6 
1963 92.1 162·3 
1964 113·9 166·3 
1965 117·1 170·7 
ot Both "ndi s r link d s ri s. In ach 
instan th liruag occurs at 1955 · 
Sour s : 
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sam p riod and g in 
volum 0 impo ts in 
ording to Tabl V .4, th 
1 
5 d by onl 101 . 7 p r cent . 
It should be not d that th apid xpansion or, 
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mor p cos ly, rapid partial r ov ry in the volume of 
ports do s not on lict w"th th gum nt of th 
pr ous 
gri ultur 
hapter that h relati e pric structur in 
in 1946 "niti lly h lp d to bias recov ry 
towards lood crops at th p ns o.f port crops . For 
on Lh" ng, ports w r noL solely gr "cultur 1 in natur 
Th y "n lud d imb r and m"n rals. Th p oduction of 
th .form r ncr as d 0 r four-fold b tw n 1946 and 1949,2 
while 0 r Lh sam p riod the latt r, including go ld, 
in r as d n arly twenLY-li -.fold from an almost 
n g ligibl le 1 . S ondly, although th L ndency for 
lood rop pr"ce 0 lall relaLiv 1 to e po t crop pric s 
probably contribut d to port rop production (and 
e port ) growing r lati ly fast r than food crop 
production b t en 1946 and 1949 , th high 1 el of lood 
pric s r la i to port p ic in 1946 would ha e 
g n an "n"tial imp tus to food crop production. This, 
t o g th with h lact that food crop production in 1946 
w s r 1 tivel mu hIss b low its pr - w rIels than 
was port rop produ tion, nsured that th 
r co r n food rop produ ion was ttain d earli r 
than th r co r in po t rop production . 
Th abo 
on pr c ind 
anal sis of the 1946- 49 d .flation reli s 
dat whi h, unfortunately, ha e a def ct 
in th " con tru t"on. This onc rns the import 
compon nt of th Composit Whol s le Pri 
Manil. For th ars 1946-4 inclusi 
Inde for 
th ind 
1 
n "w Ol he.fa t Lh L most Ol th .f 11 in th 
o 11 whol sale p i ind in Lh th e" ars 1946- 49 
n 1946 and 1947, it" noteworthy th t th 
"on in this sh rt r period w al 0 the r suIt o.f 
11 "n Lh· pri s o.f goods produc d 10 ally fo hom 
E onom " 
p . 6 . 
and ordinal ranl ing of th 
t growLh in th olum of 1 
olum of import fo thi hort was 
t n ith th bo typ o.f pI 
k 0 Lh 
0.) ( S pL 
u1' Miss"on to th Philippin s, op.c"t ., 
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numb rs 0 thOs ompon nt ar not tru °nd numbers of 
th whol sale pric s of import d products. Data on such 
pric s are una ailabl in distinguishable form prior to 
n onstructing th °nde for thOs study use had 
to be made th r fore 0 a substitut pric series. Sinc 
th re wer also no di tinguishabl data prior to 1949 on 
mo m nts in th consume 0 r tail proc s of import d 
products, the se s chos n was the ind of the dollar 
unit lu s of imports. This latt rind x was f It to 
b a faOrly ad quat guid to mov m nts in the wholesale 
pric s 0 import d products betwe n 1946 and 1949, because 
from th end 01 th War until th last month of 1949 
there w r no wide pr ad and ffectiv government 
restrictions on imports, no chang s in th 
and no significant alt rations in tariffs. 
xchange rat 
Accordingly, 
it was lime d to th prop r whol sal price index of 
import d p oducts at 1949, the earli st year of the 
latt r, and thus incorporat d into the construction of 
th 0 er- 11 Composit Whol sale Pric Index for Manila. l 
How r, whil it is likely that for the years 
1947-49 the unit values of imports and th wholesal 
P ic s of impor d produc s did mo tog ther clos ly, 
this may not ha e b nob twe n 1946 and 1947. In 1946 
the dom s ic whol sal prices of import d goods were 
still bing k pt r lati 1 
2 high by shipping shortag s, 
but by 1947 thes sho tag had largely been overcome. 
For thOs reason, whol h unit alue inde of imports 
show a ri from 1946 to 1947, whol sal prices of 
mpo t d products may not ha e ri n b proportionately 
as mu h and rna w 11 ha fall n. Th r for , th n t 
fall in th wholesale pis of °mported products over 
th P riod 1946-49 m y ha 
in Tabl 
b n larg r than that hown 
In so far s this possibl inaccur cy ists, it 
r suIts in th 0 
und st tOng the 
-all whol s 1 pric ind 
of the deflation b twe n 1946 
and 1949. n addOtion, how , it poss sse some 
ana 1 !":ignifi c • 
1 
S App ndi A, P t 
2 
ShippOng 
port s On 
produc ion 
t impli s that whol ale 
unlik 1 
of th 
to ha onstraOn d 
y low lev 1 of e po t 
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import pric s would ha contributed relativ ly mor to 
th d flation than Table VI . 2 indicat s and that this 
add " tional contribution would not hav b en attributabl 
to a lack of int rnal ba1anc . Th p o ssibl xt nt of 
the additional contribution cannot , of c ourse , b judged , 
but in iew of th relatively small weight of th import 
component in the ov r-all wholesale price index , its 
impact on this ind x would probably have still been 
marginal . 
IMPORT CO TROLS AND THE KOREA WAR BOOM 
As arly as 1947 the Joint Philippine - American 
Finance Commission had recommended the implementation of 
limited import controls on ' non - essential ' and luxury 
" 1" lmports . ThlS recommendation was motivated not so much by 
th then current balanc of payments situation (the 
Phi1ippin s at that stag still poss ssed abundant 
for ign e change r serv s) as by the beli f that controls 
could shift the composition of imports away from consumer 
goods towards capital goods, thereby promoting 
2 
r construction and development. Th first 1 gislation 
authorizing the establishment of import controls came a 
year lat r (Republic Act 0.330 of July 15, 194 ) and 
the first r~ strictions, duly limited to ' non- essential 
and lu ury ' it ms, wer implem nted nominally on January 
1, 1949 . Howev r, as a result of the continued decline 
in th int rna ional r serve, the controls wer in 
principle xt nded in rang and s verity six months lat 
by E ecuti Order 0 . 231 of June 28 , 1949 · 
r 
Th s controls failed to limit imports . By no means 
all import d commoditi s "\ r cover d by th m, and for 
those commoditi s that were 1 gally so cov red, the 
controls prov d for th most part to b quite in ffective . 
From 1948 to 1949 th physical olum of imports 
incr as d by no less han 11 . 4 p r cent . It was because 
of th ir in ff cti en ss that th s controls w re ignor d 
in th analysis of th pr ious section . 
1 
Op . cit ., p . 68 . 
2 
Ib "d., p . 67. 
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E f ti r stri Gion of imports was no t achi e d 
until th nd of 1949 , following two new E e utiv Ord rs , 
0 . 2 95 and 0.297 of ov mber 29 and D c mb r 24 
r spoc ly . This achie ement ow d much to the 
'ntroduction on D c mb r 9 of exchang controls and th 
cons qu nt rat'on'ng or foreign xchang . The C ntral 
Bank , which admin'st r d th 
s r l y th amount of for ign 
change controls, limit d 
change available for 
the importaG'on of commodities not subject to direct 
impor control through the abo executiv ord ers . 
Subs qu n tly , irtually all imports becam s ubj ct to 
l'c ns'ng, first by an mport Control Administration and 
1 ter b an mport Control Commission, with th issue of 
lic nc s dependent ultimat e ly on the over- all a ailability 
of for ign e chang for imports as c rtifi d by th 
Central Bank. Howe r , in 1953 th existing i mpor t 
control 1 gislation xpir d. In the absenc of new 
1 gis l ation th Import Control Commission cased to 
funct'on and th dir ct adm ' nistration of quantitative 
import r s rictions de 01 d upon th Central Bank . 
ntil their abandonment at the time of decontrol 
(19 60 - 62 ), this institution administ red the restrictions 
as part of its wider task of chang control. 
Th introduction of eff cti e import controls 
brought a sharp cut-ba k in th olum or imports . In 
1950 th quantum indo of imports was only 58 .4 p r cent 
or its 19Li 9 1 el. M anwhil , wi th th b ginning of th 
Ko r an War , port arnings ros sharply , as a result of 
both pric and quantity increases . B tw n 19Li9 and 
1950 th ind x of Ghe doll r unit alu or xports ros 
b y 5 . 5 p r c nt and Gh quantum ind of ports ros by 
n early 29 P cen . All th so factors , plus the 
r stri tions on in ' bl for ign chang payments 
mpo s d by th ntral BanI, contribut d to a mark d 
mpro m nt in Gh balan or payments situation . By 
t h nd of 1950 th Phil'ppin 'nt national r s r e had 
ris n to . S . $356 mill ' on and d by U. S . $96 million 
, 1 1 months pr VlOUS y . its 1 
This g 
th 1 
1 
1 of u . s . $260 million twel 
n in .for ign " hang holdings wa follow d in 
h 1f' or 1951 b om r 1 t'on in th intensit 
1 Ban.l or U, Philipp'n ,St istical Bull t'n, 
01. 0.3 ( S pt mb r 1966), p:JO . 
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of °mport control. For 1951 as a whol th volum of 
imports increased to 72.9 per cent of its 1949 1 v 1 . 
Tog th r wi h a is in th ir for ign currency pric s , 
this rais d th total dollar value of imports 
consid rably abo th 1950 figure . How ver , in 1951 
port pric s and quantOtO s again incr as dover th 
pr ious year, so that the balanc of trad deficit for 
that y ar was limit d to U . S.$61 . 6 million . Owing to a 
small surplus of in isibl r ceipts over disbursements, 
the d clone in th international res rv was som what 
less than this amount. Thus, at the nd of 1951 the 
r s rye at U . s . $J04 million was still som u . s . $44 
million abo e its le 1 two years pr viouSly . l 
Price 1 1 b haviour within this period 1949-51 is 
par icularly not worthy b cause it forms an inflationary 
break in the otherwis generally deflationary environment 
which pr ailed betwe n 1946 and 1955. After falling 
from 1946 to 1949, the Composite Consumer and R tail 
Price Indices both ro se from 1949 to 1950 and again from 
1950 to 1951. Although the G P implicit price d flator 
and the Composite Whol sale Pric Index continued to fall 
from 1949 Lo 1950, they al 0 both rose from 1950 to 1951 . 
D flationary trends w r , of ourse, r sumed in all four 
indices aft r 1951. 
The origins of this temporary inflation appear to 
li larg ly in th introduction of eff ctive import 
controls and th Kor an War boom in int rnational 
commodity pric s. Becau th Composit \{hol sale and 
R taOl Price Indic s ar the two indic s of th abo e 
four which ar b t suit d for obs ring the impact of 
these ph nom na, att ntion will be de oted to analyzing 
prO c 1 1 b ha our as m asur d by them . The former 
ind and °t annual p r nt g rate of change ha e 
alr ady b en pr s nt d in component form in Tabl s I . 2 
and VI . J. Th latLer °nd 
and dom sti compon nts, 
di id d into its import d 
pp ars n Tabl Its 
or-all annual p rc ntag rates of chang ru,d the annual 
p c n t g rat s of' chang of its two compon nts app ar 
n T bJ. .6. 
Th suc SLul impl m ntation of import controls 
m t that import d produ ts in Philippin markets , aft r 
1 
IbOd . 
21 9 
Tab1 VI . 5 : Composlt R tail Pric Ind x for Manila , 
1946- 65 
Y ar 
1946 
1 947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
195 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1961.j 
1965 
Sourc s : 
Dom st · c 
Products 
n . a . 
n . a . 
n . a. 
113 · 1 
110 · 7 
121. 8 
114 . 6 
108 · 3 
102 . 1 
100 . 0 
103 · 3 
106 . 2 
111 . 0 
10 . l.j 
115 · 0 
116 . 6 
123·0 
131.2 
143·0 
145 · 
(1955 = 100 ) 
Import d All Items Products 
n . a . 201. 4 
n . a . 124 · 5 
n . a . 119 · 9 
85 · 8 107 · 0 
101. 2 108 . 6 
115 · 5 120 . 4 
109 . 4 113 · 4 
108 . 8 108 . 4 
103 · 7 102 · 5 
100 . 0 100 . 0 
109 · 0 104 . 6 
112 . 6 107 · 6 
117 · 6 112 . 4 
126 . 112 · 5 
127 · 9 117 · 
130 · 5 119 · 7 
147 . 0 12 · 3 
154 · 5 136 . 4 
160 . 146 . 9 
163 · 5 149 · 7 
Phi1ippin s, Fifth 
App ndix E ; 
Phi1ippin s, Statistical 
0 . 4 ( D c mber 1965 ); 
Philippines , Central 
Dig st , ol . XVIII , 0 · 51 
~==~~~~2~0~,~1~966 ). Also s App ndi A, 
low . 
Table VI.6: Composit Retail Pric Index f or Manila ; 
P centag Chang from Previous Y ar , 
1947-65 
Y Domestic Imported All Items Pr odu ts Produc ts 
1946 
1947 n. a. n.a . - J8 . 2 
1948 n.a. n.a. J · 7 
1949 n. a . n.a. - 10 . 8 
1950 2 . 1 + 17 · 9 + 1. 5 
1951 +' 10 . 0 + 14.1 + 10 · 9 
1952 5 · 9 5 · J 5 · 8 
195J 5 · 5 0 · 5 4 . 4 
1954 5 · 7 4 . 7 5 · 4 
1955 2.1 J . 6 2 .4 
1956 + J.J + 9 ·0 + 4.6 
1957 + 2. + J.J + 2·9 
1958 + 4.5 + 4 . 4 + 4 · 5 
1959 2 . J + 7 · 8 + 0.1 
1960 + 6.1 + 0·9 + 4 · 7 
1961 + 1.4 + 2.0 + 1.6 
1962 + 5·5 + 12 . 6 + 7·2 
196J + · 7 + 5 · 1 + 6 . J 
1964 + 9·0 + 4.1 + 7 · 7 
1965 + 2.0 + 1.7 + 1.9 
Sour bl VI.5 . 
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having b n in a st t of virtually infinit ly elastic 
supply, b cam sudd nly scarc and compl t ly in lastic 
in supply. As a ons qu nc , the dom stic pr"c s of 
imporL b am r sponsi e to d mand . Sp c"fically, th 
c ss d mand ror imports , which was cr at d artificially 
by th controls , caus d th dom stic pric s of imports 
to ris "nd pendently of th unit costs of importation . 
Thus betw n 1949 and 1950 th imported products 
component of Lhe wholesal price index incr ased by 21 . 4 
P r c nt and the imported products compon nt of the 
retai l pric ind x incr as d by 17 . 9 P r c nt j while 
o r th sam period th dollar unit value index of 
imports , present d in Tabl VI . 7 , show d no change at all . 
E n allowing for som diff r nc s in weighing patterns, 
ther was ob iously a div rgence between r lativ 
mov ments in the dom stic prices at which imports were 
so l d and their for ign xchange costs . Sinc there wer 
no changes in the exchange rate or tariffs over this 
p rOod , th div rg nc can be clearly attributed to the 
quantitativ restriction of imports . Finally, it should 
be not d that th direct inflationary impact of this 
r stri tion would not ha e b n confined to imported 
products, but would hav ff cted all importables . Thus, 
dom stically produc d import-competing products would 
in "t bly ha risen in pr"ce also. 
At th same time as this was occurring, another 
"n~laLionary forc was m rging in th e port s ctor. 
o rs as pric s for Philippin ports, particularly 
copra , sugar and nati tobacco, w r rising. Thes 
brought an already-m ntion d incr ase of 5 . 5 p r cent in 
th unit alu ind of ports and an incr ase of 9 . 6 
p r c nt in th whol sal pric ind of port products 
b tw n 1949 d 1950. Hower , d spit th latter 
incr as and th incr a in th whol sal price ind x 
of "mport d produ ts, th 0 r- 11 whol sale price ind 
still f 11 by 3 . 5 p r nt. Th d cl"n was due to th 
1 rg wight g n to th compon nt ind of commodities 
produ d lolly fo hom consumption which its If fell 
b .4 p r nt. B ring in mind th l"k lihood that 
h"s ompon nt in lud produ s of an portabl and 
import bl n tu ,whi h mu t h ris n in pric , it 
app r 
still 
Lh t lati ly s r defl tion r pr ssu r 
L d in what h s b n t rm d th non-trad d 
Tabl 
Y a 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
195J 
1 954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
195 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
196J 
196q. 
1965 
o t 
Sou 
I . 7: ndic s 0 th Unit alues of I mp orts , 
th nOt Valu s of Exports and the et 
T rms of Trad , 194 6 - 65 
( 1955 = 100) 
Un ° t Value Unit Value et Terms 
of Imports of E ports of Trade 
100·7 90.1 89 · 5 
109 · 1 122 . 2 112 . 0 
110 . 1 145 . 6 IJ2 . 2 
98 . 6 IlJ · 5 115 · 1 
98.6 119 · 7 121. 4 
Ill. 2 127·7 114.8 
109 · 5 100 . 6 91. 9 
104 . 5 122 . 8 117 · 5 
100 . 0 109 · 0 109 · 0 
100 . 0 100.0 100.0 
101.4 101. 4 100 . 0 
104.6 102.8 98.J 
107·0 106 . 9 99·9 
109·2 115·9 106.1 
111·5 114.1 102 . J 
I1J.2 105·0 92 . 6 
115 . 4 106 . 2 92.0 
1 2 J . 0 111 . 8 91.0 
124 . 1 110·9 9 · 4 
126.2 112.8 89 . 4 
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Both unit alu °nd oc s, and h n th t rms of 
ad l°nked s ri s . In ach 
nst 0 rs at 1955 · 
s : national 
I : 
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sect o r of th economy. Such an impression is supported 
by the b haviour of th domestic products component of 
the Composite Retail Price Index . Although this 
component may also in principle include some items of 
an exportable and import-competing nature, it fell by 
2.1 per cent between 1949 and 1950. Nevertheless , in 
this instance the over-all price index did show a rise 
of 1.5 per cent on account of the heavy weight (22.27 
per cent) given to its imported products component . 
These divergent price movements in the various 
sectors of the economy point to a state of sectoral 
imbalance. They suggest that the deficiency of domestic 
demand, which has been advanced as a possible explanation 
of the deflation of the three preceding years taken as 
a whole, still existed for domestically produced goods 
not directly influenced by the prices of exports and 
imports; but that in terms of its effect on the price 
level as a whole it was offset either partially or 
wholly, depending on the choice of index, by inflationary 
forces originating in the economy ' s foreign trading 
relationships. The internal deflationary pressure 
s ms to have received its impetus from a continued rapid 
expansion in the production of non-traded goods (real 
GNP as a whole was 8 .9 per cent higher in 1950 than 
1949) that was sufficient to offset, at least at that 
stage, a growth in demand, which must have been 
stimulated by the increase in export incomes and the 
d mand-diverting eff cts of the rise in the price of 
importables. 
The externally-caus d xport boom persisted into 
1951 and, v n though it passed its peak before the end 
of that year, the unit value index of exports for the 
y ar as a whol was 6 .7 p r cent higher than ~n 1950 and 
the whol sale pric ind x of export products for the 
y ar as a whol was 3 . 1 per cent higher than in 1950 . 
Excess demand for imports also continued into 1951, so 
that, despite some partial relaxation of the controls 
during the year, the wholesale and retail price indices 
of import d products for the y ar as a whol were 
resp ctiv ly 25.8 per c nt and 14 . 1 per c nt higher 
than th ir 1950 lev Is. It is tru that over the same 
p riod th unit valu index of imports rose by 12.8 
p r c nt, but neither this nor a 17 per cent tax on 
... 
sal s of for . gn 
Ph·lipp·n Congr 
change, which was na t d by th 
1 
ss t 11. nd of March 1951, w r 
r spons·bl for th ris n th dom st·c pric s of 
. mports . Su 11. cost incr as s as th se two factors 
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brought r sulted mer ly ·n a d·m·nution of the scarcity 
prof·ts wh ·ch the r clpi nts of import l·c nces w r 
2 
r c iv ng . Som videnc hat 11. cost ncr as s wer 
no p ass d on by import rs is provided by the fact that 
th whol sal and retail pric s of import d products 
reach d th ir p ak ·n about April and May 1951 and 
th raft r 11 st ad·ly , n hough th tax had only 
just b n introduc d and foreign exchang costs of 
·mport rs wer not to reach a p ak until the following 
Augus . Th r asons for the fall in domestic prices of 
imports w r , in fact, th som wha mor lib ral 
allocation of foreign xchange lor importers and the 
cons qu nt increas in th supply of imports . 
By 1951 th additional mon y incom generat d in 
th port and import - competing s ctors, aided by the 
ffects of the ris in th domest ·c pric s of 
importabl s and e portabl s in div rting d mand towards 
d producti r sourc s away from th r st of th 
onomy, app ars 0 ha finally caused total d mand in 
th r st of the conomy to hay outrun supply. In 
o 11. r words, an inflat·onar lack of int rnal balance 
would s m to h m rg d . C rtainly, this conclusion 
is consis nt w·th the fa t that the whol sal price 
ind of commodities produc d locally for home 
con ump on, aft r f lling con inuously from 1946, rose 
1 
R public A t 0.601 (M rch 2 ,1951 ). It should b 
noted that ' Th A t pro id for num rous c ptions 
·nclud·ng a numb r of foods, t tbooks, n wsprint, 
medi 1 supplies, m ch·n r and raw rna rials · to b us d 
·n lin w and n ssar industr· S", p ns s of stud nts 
studying abro d, and l·f nsuranc pr miums r m·tt d 
bod. I ( Gola , op . it . , p.179n.) 
2 
E n llow ·ng for th 
sin 19~9·n import s ' 
imports would prob bl h 
Comb·ning th r s in h 
a 
11. 
s b tw 19~· 9 and 
cost incr incr as 
unit profits on p rmitt d 
till b substantial. 
lu ·nd of 
17 p r c nt 
chang , s tima t d 
P r nt 0 p riod n 
tariff ) of purchasing 
a 
p 
fo ign 
s 0 J . O 
ost ( luding 
om abro d . 0 r th sam p r·od th r w s 
s in th dom t·c whol s 1 nt ·n r 
of impor d P odu ts. 
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by lO .O P r nt b tw n 1950 and 1951 . t is also 
consist nt with h ncr as of a s'mil r proportionat 
magnitud r cord d by the dom stic products compon nt of 
h retail pro ind ov r th same per·od . 
Th st tistical importanc of th mov m nts in 
th s la t r two indic s in determining th mov ments 
betw n 1950 and 1951 in th 0 er-all pric indic s of 
wh'ch th y r sp e ctiv ly form part must b mphasized . 
B w n th s two y ars th 0 r - all whol s a l pric 
ind incr as d by ll . 4 P r cent . This reflected an 
a bsolut e rise of l2 . l points of which 8 .0 points or 
66 . l p r cent was the r sult of the absolut rise in 
th whol sal pr c compon nt ind of commodities 
produc d locally for hom consumption . Betw en the 
sam y ars th 0 er - all r tail price index increased by 
lO . 9 P r c nt which r fl ct d an absolut rise of ll . 8 
points . Of this absolut ris , 8 . 6 points or 72.9 per 
cent w S contributed by th rise in its dom stic 
products component . 
THE RET RN TO DEFLATIO 
B tw n 1951 and 1955 the deflation which had 
charact r'z d Ph'lippin pr'c lev l b haviour in th 
imm di t post - war years was r sum d . Over this period 
the G P implicit pric d fla or fell by ll . 4 per cent 
and th Manila Composit Consum r, R tail and Whol sale 
Pr'c Indic s by ll . 9 P r c nt, l6 . 9 p r c nt and l5 · 8 
p r c nt r specti ly. By 1955, according to all four 
'ndic s, th pric l v l w s at its low st point in th 
per'od und r study . 
Th d ~l tion was not th r sult o~ pric s falling 
in onl som s tors of th conomy . Th ph nom non 
app rs to h mbr d most goods produc d and/or 
onsum d in he Philipp'n s . For ampl, in t rms of 
th compon n s of th whol s le pric ind th pric s 
of commodiL' s produ d loc II for hom consumption 
f II by lJ.7 p r 
f II by 2l.l P r 
produ ts l' II b 
ompon nts th 
nt, h pr c s of port p oducts 
n , and th pr'c s of 'mport d 
22.4 P r c nt. In t ms of th 
i ind th pric of 
dom st· II produc d comm d ' ti s f II by l7.9 P r c nt 
nd th pr s of impor d produ ts II by lJ . 4 p r c nt. 
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Although the d flation was not s ctorally or 
produc conc ntrat d, d clin s in th dom st·c pric s 
of portabl and ·mportabl products mad a substantial 
contribution to it . Tog th r, the movem nts in the 
whol sal price indic s of xport and import d products 
account d for 6 . 6 of th 18 . 7 absolut points d clin 
( or some 35 . 3 per c nt of th d flation) in the ov r-all 
wholesale pric index . Fur hermor , in so far as 
i mport-substitu e products and domestically consumed 
products of an xportable nature were included in the 
regimen of th compon nt whol sale pric index of 
commodit· s produc d locally for domestic consumption, 
this stimate und rstates th direct contribution to the 
deflation in the 0 r-all index made by mo ements in th 
pric s of xportabl and importable products . Thus illLy 
e planation of deflation in this period n ds to explain 
sa isfactorily the latt r pric mov m nts . 
As m.ay b exp c t d in an nvirorunen t of change 
rat stability and no e port tax s or subsidies, the 
b haviour of the domestic prices of exportabl s b twe n 
1951 and 1955 r flected v ry closely the behaviour of 
th world prices of Philippine e ports b tween the same 
y ars. This is brought out learly by a comparison for 
his p riod of the wholesal price index of export 
products (which, subject to diff rences in w ighting, is 
also n c ssar·ly an ind x of the wholesale prices of 
commod· ties of an portable natur consum d domestically) 
and th dollar unit value index of xports. (S e Tabl s 
VI . 2 and VI . 7 .) With both presented on a base of 
1955 = 100, th d·scr pancies b tw en the ruLnual 
read·ngs of these two indic s are extr mely slight and 
can b attr·but d m r ly to diff r nc s in weighting 
structur . Thus dom sti pric s of port products 
faithfully mirror d th slump in th world pric s of 
Phi1ippin ' por s in 1952 , th ir 1arg r co ry in 
1953 , and th ir subs qu nt d cline through 1954 to 1955· 
In so far as th world pr·ces of Ph·lippin e ports can 
b tr at d as ha ing b 
th r for 1 ar hat h 
n ogenously d t rmin d , it is 
·nt rnal p so pr·c s of 
portabl 
par 01 th 
products 
mo m nt 
an b s·milarly tr at d and that a 
n th dom st · c pri 1 1 , at 
1 ast as m sur d by h 0 r-all whol sal pri ·nd 
anb s ·b d d·r c ly to 0 nc s . 
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On the other hand, the domestic s lling prices of 
imports and import-competing products in this period 
w r still s ver d from mov ments in th unit peso costs 
of importation, and thus from the for ign currency or 
Id ' f' t 1 b h wor prlces 0 lmpor s, y t e presenc of quanti tativ 
restrictions on imports . B twe n 1951 and 1955 th 
fall in the wholesal pr'ce index of imported products 
of 22 . 4 p r cent (which also must indicate approximately 
the fall in th whole sal prices of impor t -competing 
products) xceeded gr atly the fall of 10 . 1 per cent in 
th unit value index of imports . Th former fall can be 
xplained by three factors , two relating to the supply 
of imports and import -competing products and one 
relating to th demand for thes commodities . First, 
on the supply side , the authorities permitted an 
increas of some 25 . 5 per cent in the real volume of 
imports betwe n 1951 and 1955 (see Table VI . 4) ; although 
it must b conceded that nearly all this increase came 
after 1953 . The expansion in volume outweighed the 
fall in dollar unit values . The consequent rise in the 
total value of imports was largely financed through a 
decline in the international reserve which at the end 
of 1955 was only U.S. $209 million compared with U. S . $296 
million at the end of 1953 and U. S . $304 million at the 
nd of 1951 . 2 S condly, and also on the supply side, 
the introduction of eff cti e import controls in late 
1949 had cr at d a protected int rnal market with prices 
that w re initially ery high by comparison with the 
pre-control p riod. This encourag d a rapid expansion 
in th production of import-substitutes . Th se were 
mainly manufactured consumer goods . 3 Some idea of the 
1 Betw n 1951 and 1955 th re w re no significant changes 
in tariffs or in th special tax of 17 p r cent on sales 
of for ign chang ( c pt for som broad ning in th 
list of mptions fro m th latter) . 
2 Central Bank of th Phil'ppines, Statistical Bull tin , 
Vol .XVIII, 0.3 (s pt mb r 1966), p.30 . 
3 ot that th pans' on in the production of 
import-substitutes r Ii d h a ily on imported raw 
mat rials, semi-proc ss d goods and capital quipment, 
for wh'ch for ign xchang was mad r latively freely 
a a'l bl . In fact , a substantial part of th pansion 
in th olum 0 imports b tw n 1951 and 1955 was the 
r suIt of th import r quirem nts of th s industri s . 
Thus th n t bsolut growth in th total supply of 
i mport abl s, though larg , would have b n considerably 
l ess than that sugg st d by a s'mpl addition of the 
a bsolu 'n r as s in imports and in import - substitut 
produ ts . 
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growth in their production is obtain d from the ind x 
of th physic 1 volum or production on manu~acturing 
pr s nt d in Table VI . 8 . Betw en 1951 and 1955 
industrial output, ac ording to this ind x , inc eased 
by mor th n 50 per c ent . L astly, on th demand sid , 
this was a p e riod wh n th fina l d mand for import abIes 
probably grew fairly slowly . Whil it is true that from 
1954 a d v lopm nt - conscious M gsaysay administration was 
r sponsible for a considerabl boost to total purchasing 
pow r , th four year p rOod ending in June 1955 was, 
taken as a whol , n v rtheless one of tax reform and 
conservativ fiscal and monetary policies . The 
cumul at iv national gOY rnm nt budget balance for fiscal 
y ars 1 951/52 to 1954/55 inclusive was a small surplus 
of P 22 millionl and th average yearly money supply in 
1955 was only 1 . 7 p r c nt higher than in 1951 . 2 In view 
of th failure ev n to return to a level of merchandis 
xport in orne as high as that in 1951 (see Tabl VI . l) , 
s uch d ata ar sugg sti e of a v ry restrained growth in 
domestic d mand generally and in the demand for 
i mportabl s particularly . 
These three factors - a lic nsed expansion in the 
olum of imports, the rapid development of 
import - substitute industries and a r lativ ly slow 
growth in d mand - tog th r app ar to have ensured that 
b tw n 1951 and 1955 the supply of import abIes as a 
whol grew faster than th d mand for them . They thus 
provide an xplanation of the fall in the domestic 
pri s of these products . Within this p riod th two 
supply factors appear to have play d the major role 
f om a bout 1953, whil the d mand factor was apparently 
dominant earli r . 
Ilow er , it has b n s n that in addition to the 
fall in the pri s of trad d goods, th r also appears 
to hay b n d flation Is wher in th onomy ov r 
th se rs . In vi w of th probabl r straint in the 
growth or ggregat dem d and th fact that aggr gate 
output, as me sured b r 1 G P , in r as d at th 
impr ssov a rag annual rat of 7 . 4 p r cent in this 
1 
T bl V . 2 . 
2 
Tabl I I . 4 . 
I: 
I, 
II 
I: 
... 
Tabl VI.8 : Ind x of th Physical Volume of 
Production in Manufacturing , 1949-65 
Y ar 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
Sourc 
(1955 = 100) 
Per cent change 
Index from previous 
year 
46·9 
56 . 6 + 20 · 7 
66 . 4 + 17·3 
69 · 9 + 5·3 
79 · 0 + 13·0 
88.8 + 12.4 
100.0 + 12.6 
115 · 7 + 15 · 7 
125 · 0 + 8 .0 
134 . 6 + 7·7 
145 . 8 + 8 · 3 
150 · 5 + 3 · 2 
160·5 + 6 . 6 
169·7 + 5 · 7 
180 · 5 + 6.4 
195 · 5 + 8 · 3 
200 · 9 + 2 . 8 
Central Bank of th Philippines, 
Statistical Bulletin, Vol . XVIII ', 
No.3 ( S pt mb r 1966) . 
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period, it would s n consistent and r asonabl (in th 
abs nce of in ormation relating sp cifically to the 
production of non-trad d goods and s rvic s) to 
attribut th deflation 'n th prices of non-traded 
goods and s r ic s to th same broad typ of source as 
that to which the deflation in the prices of importable 
products has b n attribut d j namely, a mor rapid 
growth in supply than in d mand. l 
THE BEGI NI GS OF I FLATIO 
In 1955 the Philippin price level reached its 
low st post-war level . The subsequent decade was mor 
or less continuously inflationary, although prior to 
th foreign exchange decontrol programme which commenced 
in 1960 th rate of incr ase of prices was relatively 
mod rate . Thus b tween 1955 and 1959 the G P implicit 
pric d flator increased by only 8 . 1 per cent, while th 
Manila Composite Consumer, Retail and Wholesale Price 
Indices rose by 7 . 0 per cent , 12 . 5 per cent and 12 . 7 
per cent respectiv ly . 
The inflation, as m asured by the latter three of 
th s indic s, was particularly noteworthy for the 
important part played in it by the rise in th prices of 
th products of th foreign trade sector . Consider 
first th consumer price ind x which after 1955 can be 
divid d m aningfully into a domestic products component 
and import d products component . It can be seen from 
Table VI . 9 that b tw n 1955 and 1959 the former 
compon nt rose by only 4 · 7 p r cen compared wi th th 
latter compon nt which rose 32 · 3 per c nt . Mor over, 
th w ght of th latt r (8 . 20 p r cent) implies that 
its absolut rise account d for 37 . 1 p r cent of the 
absolut r s in the ov r-all inde Secondly, in the 
r tail pri ind pr s nt d earli r in Table VI . 5 the 
dom sti products compon nt corded an increase of 
1 
A highly imp rf ct guid to th growth in the supply 
o non-trad d goods and s r ices is gi n by the growth 
n n nat'onal product ( p ) at 1955 factor cost 
lud'ng h contributions to that aggr gat of the 
agr cultu min'ng and manufacturing s tors, all of 
which crul ons'd r d 0 consist of port or 
impo t - subs 'ut industri s or both . B tw n 1951 and 
1955 th a rage ruLnual growth of P t 1955 factor ost 
xcluding th s contributions was a high 6 . 7 p r c nt . 
.... 
Tabl V 
· 9: 
Y ar 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
196J 
1964 
1965 
Source: 
2Jl 
Composit Consum r Pric nd x for 
Manila , 1955-65 
(1955 100) 
Dom stic Imported All It ms Products Products 
100.0 100 . 0 100.0 
101·9 111 · 5 102 · 7 
10J.4 116 . 1 104 . 5 
106 . 8 121 · 7 108 . 0 
104.7 IJ2 . J 107 · 0 
109 · 6 IJJ . l 111 · 5 
111.0 IJ8 . 2 IlJ . 2 
115.6 166 . 6 119· 
121. 179 · 4 126·5 
IJ2 . 1 190 . J IJ6 . 9 
IJ5 . 4 195 · 5 140.4 
Central Bank of the Philippines, C-entral 
Bank News Digest , Vol . XVIII, 0 . 51 
(D cember 20 , 1966) . 
Tabl VI . I0 : Composite Consum r Price Index for 
Manila ; P rcentage Chang from 
Pr ious Y ar , 1956 - 65 
Dom stic Imported All Items ar Products Products 
1955 
1956 + 1.9 + 11 · 5 + 2 · 7 
1957 + 1.5 + 4 . 1 + 1.8 
195 + J . J + 4.8 + J . J 
1959 - 2 .0 + 8 · 7 - 0 · 9 
1960 + 4 · 7 + 0.6 + 4 . 2 
1961 + 1.J + J . 8 + 1.5 
1962 + 4 . 1 + 20 · 5 + 5 · 8 
196J + 5 · 4 + 7 · 7 + 5 . 6 
1964 + 8 · 5 + 6 . 1 + . 2 
1965 + 2 · 5 + 2 · 7 + 2 . 6 
ou Tabl 
· 9 · 
2J2 
only 8 . 4 per c nt for th period 1955 - 59 as against an 
incr as of 26 . 8 p r c nt in th imported products 
component for the same p riod . In this instanc th 
latt r increas , in absolut terms , was r sponsibl for 
48 . 0 p r c nt of th absolute ris in th ov r - all 
pric ind Finally , with r spect t o th wholesal 
pric ind x for the y ars 1955-59, its component cov ring 
products locally produced for hom consumption increased 
by only 6.1 per cent compar d with its components of 
export and import d products which increased by J6 . 5 per 
c nt and 29 . 9 per cent respectively , thereby togeth r 
accounting in absolute t rms for 59 . 8 per cent of the 
absolute rise in the over - all index . 
It is apparent from th s calculations that the 
inflation of th latter half of the nineteen - fifties 
was confined in a large degr to th pric s of traded 
goods . Expr ssing this point negatively, it can be said 
that if there had been no increase in the domestic 
prices of imported and xport products, then the 
or- all amount of inflation, esp cially viewed in terms 
of its average annual rate, would have been extremely 
slight . This sugg sts that the inflation that did 
occur was not to any great ext nt the result of a lack 
of internal balance ; that is , its predominant cause was 
not a general exc ss of aggr gate demand . It would ha e 
b en e tr mely unlikely that such a phenomenon would 
have manifested itself so xclusively in the behaviour 
of th prices of traded goods , as measured by the 
consum r , retail and wholesale price indic s of imported 
products and the whol sal pric index of xport products . 
What th n caus d the ris s in th se latter prices 
b tw n 1955 and 1959? Considering first export proces, 
w must initially not that, unlike th perience of 
arlo r y ars, th dom stic pric s of e port products 
div rg d considerably from the world pri s of 
Philippin e ports . This is brought out cl arly in 
Figur V . la . B tw n 1955 and 1959 th whol sale price 
ind of port produ ts increas d by J6 . 5 p r c nt , 
whil the dollar unit alu inde of e ports incr as d 
b only 15 . 9 p r c nt . Cl arly, th r fore , the incr ase 
n th dom stlc pric s of port products canno be 
attrObut d solly to the ncreas on world prices . In 
th bs nc of any hang s in th official xchang rate , 
Figure VI . la : Export Price Indices Figure VI . lb: I mport Price Indices 
Lo g Scale Log Scale 
200 200 
190 190 
180 180 
170 Wholp.sale 170 
Index 
160 160 
150 150 
140 140 
130 130 
I / 
... 
... 
... 
.... 
, 
120 L I l20 r / / / / f . o . b . dollar / 
, - - - -
/ " 
unit value i ndex 
\ 
,, -- - - -- - c . i . f . dollar 110 l- I 
" 
\ , 
" 110 / u n it value i n dex \ / 
\ / 
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-
" -
.-
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-
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55 60 65 55 60 65 w w 
Source : See Tables VI . 2 and VI.7 
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th's t nd ncy for the dom stic prices of export products 
to rise faster than th ir world pric s is probably 
xpl in d by two factors, th so-call d ' no - dollar 
import law ' and the upward trend in th black mark t 
exchang rate aft r about 1955 . 
Republic Act 0 . 1410 of Sept mber 10 , 1955, 
oth rwis known as the ' no - dollar import law ', had as 
its principal provision a s ction intended as an 
inc ntiv to export xpansion . This s ction permitted 
the ' bart r ' of marginal exports for imports outside 
th exchange and import control system . Such imports 
could th n be sold at th premium prices arising from 
th controls, ther by increasing handsomely exporters ' 
r turns . The Act, subject to some variation in the 
r gulations impl m nting it, was to remain law until 
Jun 1959, wh n it was r peal d and replaced by R public 
Act 0 . 2261 which reduced the exports eligible for 
barter . During the lifetime of th Act barter exports 
b cam of considerable importance. In 1957 they were 
1 
n arly 10 p r cent of total exports . ominally, 
b art r rights to import goods wer limited to export 
produc rs and producers ' associations , but an active 
2 black market for th se rights soon developed with the 
result that the domestic pric s of export products rose 
indep nd ntly of and faster than international prices . 
Th oth r factor which probably contributed to the 
domestic prices of xport products rising faster than the 
int rnational pric s of these products was the widening 
discr pancy b tween tho official and black market 
for ign xchange rat s ov r the period 1955 - 59 . Figure 
VI . 2 compar s th se rat s from 1952 to 1959 . The 
discrepancy b tw en th m at any time, pro ided that it 
was abov a c rtain m' nimum size suffici nt .to co er 
risk and oth r additional costs , creat d an inc nti e 
to d th chang control requir m nt that xport 
r c 'pts had to b surr nd r d to th C ntral Bank and 
con rt d to p sos at th official rat of P2 . 00 per 
1 
C ntr 1 Bank of th Philippin s, Thirt enth Annual 
R port , 1961 . 
2 
Am do A . Cst r 0, :;;.P...:h~i-=l:.::l::.Jp;:..p!::.:=i..:.;n:..::........:::::.::.:.t:.;::.;:.....::~:::...::::....:-.::::..=-::.&:..:::..:::.:..:...;: 
1950 - 65 ( S hool of 
Phil'pp'n s, 1967 ; 
Figure VI . 2: Black Market and Official Foreign Exchange Rates , 1952 - 59 
Peso s per 
u. s . dollar 
4 . 00 
3 · 00 ,. 
Black Market 
2 . 00 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - .- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ---
Official 
1. 00 
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Note : The black market exchange rates plotted above are centred 4 - quarter moving averages 
of the actual rate s . 
Source: Pick's Currency Yearbook . 1Q61 (Pick Publishing Corporation, New York , 1961) . 
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U . S . $l . OO . Specifically , it cr at d an inc ntive to 
s muggl xports out of th country so that th ir 
proc ds coul d b conv rted to pesos at th higher , 
more lucrativ black mark t rate . Thus, wh n th 
discr pancy was large nough , the dom stic pric s of 
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xport products would hav t nded to r fl ct to som 
nt th black market rather than th official rate 
of xchang In i w of th fact that aft rap riod 
of r lativ stability the former rate rose from about 
P3 . 00 p r U. S . $l . OO in 1955 to about p4 . o0 per U . S . $l . OO 
in 1959, it is lik ly that th profitability of smuggling 
incr as d and that this contribut d to the averag 
dom stic prices of xport products rising faster than 
1 
the av rage world pric s of exports . 
Turning to th b haviour of th domestic prices of 
import d products , it will b recalled that the various 
indic s suggest that between 1955 and 1959 these prices 
ros 32 . 3 per cent, 26 . 8 p r cent and 29 . 9 per cent at 
th consumer, retail and whol sale levels respectively. 
B fore accounting for th se price increases, a number of 
factors influencing th costs of importation must be 
m ntion d . First , there was a rise of 9 . 2 per cent in 
th ind x of dollar unit values of imports. S condly, 
th 17 P r c nt tax on sales of for ign exchange which 
had b n introduc d in 1951 was replaced at the end of 
1955 by a so - call d Special Import Tax . Initially, this 
was Iso 1 vied at a rate of 17 p r c nt, but it was to 
b progressively reduc d to z ro in increments of 1 · 7 
perc ntage points p r annum ov r th following ten years . 
The progressi e r duction was , however, temporarily 
susp nd d in July 1959 and th prevailing rate of tax 
was rais d from 11 . 9 p r cent back to 15 . 3 p r cent for 
1 
It should be not d that to th extent that outward 
smuggl'ng took the t chnical form of und rstating the 
alu of physical consignm nts of e ports, this would 
hav bias d downwards unit alu s of exports . If such 
und r aluation b cam progressiv ly gr at r relative to 
the tru unit alu s of ports 0 r th period 1955 - 59, 
th n th incr as in th world pric s of Philippine 
as m asured by th inde of th dollar unit 
por s, would also ha b n bias d downwards . 
g n rally, it should .furth r b noted that the 
r port d w'd spr d pr val nc of both t chnical and 
con ntional smuggling, nw rds as w 11 as outwards , 
casts s rious doubts on the r liability of all official 
for ' gn tr d stati~tics . 
2J7 
he r st of the y 1 ar . Th"rdly, at th b ginning of 
1956 , as a r sult of Ex cutiv Order 0.150 of D cemb r 
Jl , 1955, and lat r in 1957 , as a result of Congress 
2 
appro ing a n w tariff cod, ther wer consid rabl 
chang s in tariffs. v rth less , d spit moderate 
incr as s in many rat s of duty, the net outcome was 
mor a re-structuring of the tariff system than an 
all-round raising of duties. J Fourthly, th United 
Stat s-Phil"ppine Trade Agreement of 19464 was revised 
in 1955. The main conomic change incorpora ted into 
the R ised Agreement was the acc 1 ration of the rate 
at which Philippine tariffs wer to be levied on imports 
from the Unit d Stat s. Thus from January 1, 1956, 25 
per nt of normal Philippine duti s wer chargeabl on 
thes imports and on January 1, 1959, this figure ros 
to 50 per cent. (Subsequently, on Janu~ry 1, 1962, it 
became 75 per cent . ) Fifthly and lastly, a new 25 per 
cent ' margin fee ' or ta on sal s of foreign xchange 
was introduced on July 20, 1959 . 
On balanc , th n t ffect of these fiv factors 
was without doubt to raise the costs of imports to 
import rs, the impact being felt mostly in 1959. 
How r, while it is tru that in conditions of 
unr strict d imports such factors would hay been more 
or less solly responsibl for chang s in the domestic 
pric s of imports and importables g nerally, it is 
unlik ly that together they played a major initiating 
rol in raising these pric sunder th conditions of 
xchang and import controls that pr vailed in the 
period 1955 - 59 . Thcs pric increases are, in fact, 
mor lik ly to ha e b n th result of a growth in the 
d mand for importables, part"cularly for manufactur d 
consum r goods , r lati to the domestic supply of 
importables and th volum of imports, where th latt r 
was strictly limited by the size of for ign xchange 
1 
Th Sp cial Import Ta , 
subj ct to a consid rabl 
2 
lik its pr d c ssor, was 
number of important e emptions . 
R publ"c Act 0 . 19J7 of Jun 22, 1957 · 
J 
4 
Cf . Golay, op . it . , pp . 175 - 9 · 
S blow pp . 12-1J . 
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licens s . Th abov cost increases would m r ly hav 
absorb d som of the scarcity profits that import rs 
would otherwise hav mad as a result of the domestic 
" " 1 prlC rlses . 
In inv stigating this claim, it should initially 
b not d that b tw n 1955 and 1959 G P at 1955 prices 
grew at an average annual rate of 4.9 per cent or by a 
total of 21 . 0 per c nt . This suggests that, ev n 
granting the absence of any significant general exc ss 
d mand , th r was likely at unchanged relative prices 
to have been a consid rable growth in the demand for 
importables . Over th same period the real volume of 
imports r corded ant fall . According to the quantum 
index of officially recorded imports (Table VI . 4), the 
volume of imports in 1959 was only 87 . 2 per c nt of its 
1 vel in 1955 and in only one of th intervening years 
( 1957 ) did it actually exceed that 1 vel . In view of 
th direct quota restrictions on imports and abstracting 
from the growth in th production of import - substitutes, 
these data provide prima facie evidence of upward 
sectoral d mand pressure on the domestic prices of 
importables . 
In fact, ther was a continuation of the rapid rate 
of import substitution which had commenced in the first 
half of the decade . As in that earlier period, it was 
concentrat d on the last stages of production of finished 
manufactur d consum r goods and, as b fore , a rough 
guide to its rapidity can be obtained from the index of 
the physical volume of production in manufacturing which 
ros 45 . 8 p r cent b tw en 1955 and 1959 . 2 The effect of 
1 
C rtainly not all th scarcity profits were so absorbed . 
Premiums on unofficial or black market offer"s to buy 
import licens s wer still report d in som instances to 
b as high as 60 or 80 p r cent at the end of 1959 . 
[ Int rnational B rue for Reconstruction 
Economic Pos"tion and Pros ects of th ines 
April 29, 1960 , p . 6 . 
2 
ot that this index, apart from being only a rough 
guid to th growth of production of import - substitutes , 
prob bly understat s th growth of manufacturing output 
as a who1 . This und rstatem nt is lik ly because the 
ind is construct d from data suppli d by a fi d sample 
of firms . Th ff ct on output of th incr as 0 er 
tim "n th numb r of firms is ignor d . 
th:s import substitution in constraining rises in th 
dom stic pric s of manufactured consumer goods was, 
how v r , mor than offset by an absolut shr°nkage 
in suppli s of competing imports . This shrinkag 
was th result of dir ct r strictions designed to 
foreign xchang for l ess ntial ' imports in 
the face of a relati ely slow growth in total 
for ign exchange r cOpts . Ironically, these 
' essential ' imports were to a larg xt nt th 
result of the above import substitution process . 
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Th industries producing finished import - competing 
manufactured goods w re highly dep ndent on supplies 
of ' ssential ' imported raw materials, intermediate 
goods and capital equipment which, in so far as they 
rec i d favourable foreign xchange allocations, they 
1 
were abl to import directly and therefore cheaply . 
The e pansion of such industries encouraged the demand 
for these °mported inputs and this in turn r quired 
mor stringent restrictions on imports of finished 
commodities in order to provide foreign exchange to 
meet this d mand . A type of icious circle was formed 
n so far as these additional restrictions stimulated 
v n more import substitution at the finished 
consum r good stag and thus th demand for ven more 
import d components and capital goods . The over-all 
ef ect on the composition of imports is indicated in 
Tabl VI . ll. Betw n 1952 and 1959 the share of 
consumer goods On total imports (which had be n as 
high as 37 . 3 per cent in 1949) fell from 23 . 4 per 
cent to 12 . 0 p r c nt, whil 0 er the same p riod 
the share of ' produc r ' goods ros from 76 . 6 p r cent 
to 8 . 0 p r cent . Hower, in itably foreign 
xchange allocations w r not sufficient to me t 
1 
To th t nt that raw mat rials , interm diat 
goods d capO tal quipm nt w r import d dir ctly 
b y th produ cers who utilOz d th m, th ir pric s to 
th s produc rs did not dOr ctly aff ct th whol sal 
proc °nd of i mport d products . This ind 
r 1 t s to th P ic s of i mport d products in 
°nt rnal Ph olippin marl ts . 
~ - ~ 
Table VI .11 : Percentage Distribution of Imports According to End Use ; 1949, 1952 - 59 
Item 1949 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 
Producer Goods 62 . 7 76 . 6 79 · 7 80 . 6 79 · 5 82 · 5 83 · 2 81 . 4 88 . 0 
Machinery and Equipment 9 · 9 11 . 6 10 . 1 3 . 4 8 · 9 13 · 0 11 . 2 12 . 1 15 · 5 
Unprocessed Raw Materials 1 . 1 1 . 2 1.6 2 · 3 2 · 3 4 · 9 5·3 8 . 0 9 · 4 
Semi - Processed Raw Materials 41 . 6 44 . 8 50 . 0 53 . 4 51 · 9 50 . 0 52 . 1 47 · 8 48 . 8 
Suppli es 10 . 1 19 · 0 18 . 0 16 · 5 16·3 14 . 6 14 . 6 13 · 5 14 . 2 
Consumer Goods 37 · J 2J . 4 20 . J 19 · 4 20 ·5 17·5 16 . 8 18 . 6 12 . 0 
Durable Goods 2 · 5 1 · 7 1.5 1 . 6 1 . 6 1 . 2 1 . 0 0 . 8 0 · 7 
Non-Durable Goods 34 . 8 21 · 7 18 . 8 17·8 18 · 9 16 . 3 15 · 8 17 · 8 11. 3 
TOTAL IMPORTS 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 100 . 0 
Source : Central Bank of' the Philippines, Central Bank News Digest, Vol . XVIII, No . 22 (May 31, 1966) . 
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+-
o 
241 
inpu t requirements , supply bottl n cks 1 m rged , and 
th s w r refl cted in th rising prices of whatever 
dom sti c substitutes were available . 
If this analysis of the b haviour of trad d goods 
pric s is valid and if th failur of other prices to 
ris by any c onsiderable amount can be taken , as 
suggest d above , to indicat an absence of excess 
demand els wher in the economy, th n it is possible 
to argu that the moderate inflation of the p riod 
1955 - 59 had largely what may be termed a structural 
origin . Thus , relating the pr ced'ing analysis to the 
Structuralist approach, it can be summarized in the 
following manner . The rat and structural bias of 
economic growth , through stimulating the demand for 
importabl s of both a finished and intermediate nature, 
exerted an increasing pressure on the balance of 
payments and the international reserve . This pressure 
r sult d in a rise in th prices of traded goods 
relative to non- traded goods which , in so far as the 
latt r did not decline, also entailed an absolute rise 
in the form r that was necessarily inflationary . The 
imm diate factors responsible for converting this 
pressur in 0 pric increases were the existing 
xchange and import controls . In addition to causing 
xc ss d mand for importables to be converted directly 
into price incr ases, they also indirectly resulted in 
this d mand encouraging ' no-dollar importation ' and 
bringing about a rising black market foreign exchange 
rat . Both th se latter phenomenona contributed to the 
incr as in th dom stic prices of exportables . 
1 
In 1959 the American Chamber of Commerce of the 
Philippin s conduct d a survey of its m mber firms 
which w r engag d in manufacturing . Th survey 
re al d that in th t year 0 er half of the firms 
sampl d w r operating b low capacity . ( Among these 
latt r f'rms the median degr of capacity utilization 
was 50 p r c nt ). Appar ntly th ma'n reason ad anced 
for this under capacity production was not defici nt 
d mand but 'nsuffici nt for ign chang allocations 
for raw mat rials, spar parts , replacem nt quipment , 
tc . S A. V . H. Hart ndorp , History of Industry and 
Trad of th Ph'lippin s : the Magsaysay Administration 
(Man'l , Phil ' ppin s Education Company , 1961), 
pp . 444- 449. 
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DECO TROL AND DEVALUATIO 
Th increasing structural pr ssur of the late 
n'n tn- fifties serv d to add s riously to th original 
balanc of payments probl m which had been a heritag of 
th War and which had 1 d to th imposition of import 
and exchange controls at th end of th pr vious d cade . 
This pressur was its lf increased by two factors: a 
d t rioration in the terms of trade which, on a base of 
1955 100, fell from 117 . 5 in 195J to 98 . J in 1957 and 
then r cover d to only 106 . 1 in 1959 ; and a d clining 
trend in the main source of non - merchandise foreign 
exchang r ceipts, namely United States Gov rnment 
disbursements in the form of purchases of goods and 
services in th Philippines, pension payments and grants . 
In th period 1955 - 59 inclusive these disbursem nts 
averag d only U.S. $lJ2 million per annum compared with 
an av rag of u . s . $168 million per annum in the preceding 
fi e y ars . Despit the existence of controls, the 
int rnationa l r s rve situation continued to worsen . 
By the nd of 1959 the r serve was only u . s . $16J million, 
admitt dly a littl higher than th crisis level of 
u . s . $140 million at th end of 1957, but considerably 
lower than the 1955 figure of U . S . $209 million and well 
und r half that at the end of 1950 . 1 This downward 
tr nd is illustrat d in Figur VI . J . 
Th perilous state of the international reserve, 
political pressur s from xporting and other interests, 
and th incr asing difficulties of implementing 
off ctiv ly h import and e chang control system 
ventually brought open d valuation and ' decontrol' . 
The latter ultimat ly in olv d the dismantling of all 
quantitati e import controls and n arly all xchange 
controls . Th process, which was drawn out over n arly 
two y ars, b gan cautiously with C ntral Bank Circulars 
0 . 105 and 0 . 106 of April 25, 1960 . These created a 
mult'pl change r t system with two basic xchang 
rat s, th old official parity rate of P2 . 00 per 
. S . $l . OO and a n w so-c lled ' fre mark t ' rate (,hich 
w s , 'n f c , administrati ly d t rmined) of PJ . 20 per 
1 
C ntral Bank of th Philippin s , Statistical Bulletin, 
Vol . XV I, o . J (S pt mb r 1966 ), p . JO . 
j 
, 
Figure VI . 3: The International Res erve , 1945 - 65 
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1 U . S . $l . OO . With respect to for ign xchange rec ipts, 
75 p r c nt of xport earnings , U . S . Gov rnment outlays 
and oth r °nvisibles ( xcluding gold proc eds and 
tourist r c ipts) had to b surrender d at th offocial 
rate, while th remaining 25 p r c nt wer sold at th 
free market rate . This meant an effectiv composit 
rat for these it ms of ~2 . JO per U . S . $l . OO . Gold 
proce ds and tourist r c ipts wer conv rted entir ly 
at th fre mark t rate. On th disbursem nt side of 
the balanc e of payments a controlled amount of foreign 
exchange , for what were judged to be the more essential 
import cat gori s , was made available at th official 
rate of ~ 2 . 00 per U . S . $l . OO . This rate also applied 
for government outlays abroad and various minor it ms . 
Foreign exchange for oth r purposes , including the 
importation in xc ss of foreign exchange licenses of 
commodities in the above ss ntial categories, was made 
relatively freely a ailable at th higher fre mark t 
rat 2 
A little under fiv months after this system 
commenced to operat Central Bank Circular 0 . 111 of 
September 12, 1960 introduc d the first modification to 
it . Th free market exchange rate was reduced to P J . OO 
per U . S . $l . OO and the proportion of foreign exchange 
receipts from exports , U . S . government outlays and 
oth r in isibles (e cluding gold proceeds and tourist 
receipts) which were to be converted at this rate was 
rais d to JO per cent. This s rved to leave the 
ffective composit rat for these items unchanged, but 
it low r d it for gold and tourist receipts and for all 
disburs ments oth r than those made at the official rate 
of P 2 . 00 per U . S . $I . OO . 
1 
All for ign exchang r c ipts still had to b 
surr nd red to th C ntral Baru< and that institution 
was still th sol 1 gal source of foreign change for 
disbursem n purpos s . 
2 
Sinc th margin f or ta of 25 p r cent on sales 
of for ign change .hich had been introduced the 
pr ous ar was stOll In op ration and ( e n allowing 
for an nsi list of r mptions) still affect d a 
wOd rang of transactions, th actual cost of for ign 
xch ng at ith r th offocial or fre mark t rat w s 
on r g high r than that impli d by th se rat s . 
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On mber 28, 1960, as a result of Central Bank 
Circular 0 . 117, mor transactions w r shift d to th 
fre market rat , though this its If rema in d unchanged . 
In addition to proc ds from gold and tourism, r c ipts 
arising from for ign investments , inward remittances to 
war trans and Filipino citiz ns , and the p rsonal 
expens s of diplomatic p rsonnel wer now permitt d to 
be con rted at the fre market rat With re gard to 
othe r r c ipts (ma inly from exports and U.S . g ov rnment 
outlays ), 50 per c ent of th se could a lso now b 
conv rt d at that rate . This rais d the effective 
composit rate for the l atter items to P2 . 50 per 
U . S . $1. 00 . Lastly, on the disbursement side th re w re 
significant cuts in the amounts of foreign e xchange 
al low d for financing essential imports at the che ap 
1 
official rat of P2 . 00 per U . S . $l . OO . 
C ntral Bank Circular 0 . 121 of March 21, 1961, 
took the d velopment of this decontrol programme one 
stage furth r . The effective composite exchange rate 
for xports, U . S . government outlays, and thos other 
invisibl s which still had to be partially converted at 
th offici a l exchang rate was raised to P2 . 75 per 
U . S . $l . OO . This was a chi e d by increasing to 75 per 
c nt th proportion of the proce eds from these sources 
which could b e conv rt d at the unchanged free market 
rate of PJ . OO per U . S . $ l . OO . At the same time there 
w re furth r cuts in th amount of foreign exchange 
a v a ilabl e at the officia l exchange rate for financing 
essential imports . Thus most foreign exchange 
disbursem nts w r by now transferred to th free market 
2 
exchang rat cate gory . 
Th net eff ct of th se circulars taken together 
was to raise gradua lly th averag price of foreign 
xchang . On Janua ry 2 1, 1962 the l a st of them was 
sup rs d d by Circular o . lJJ which, with the exception 
of a r quir ment that 20 p r c nt of export proceeds had 
to b surr nder d to th C ntral Ban1c at the still 
1 
Th impact of this m asur wa s soft n d a little as a 
r suIt of C ntr a l B ill Circular 0 . 11, a lso of ovember 
1 8 , which r duc d th m rgin f e to 20 p r cent . 
2 
Th m rgin f 
to 15 p r c nt . 
was , how r , again r duced , this tim 
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official rate of P2 . 00 per U . S . $l . OO, removed n arly all 
dir ct quantitativ r strictions on trad and on 
h t . 1 exc ang ransactlons . Foreign xchange dealings wer 
h nceforth to take plac in a g nuinely fre market at 
an e change rate that, apart from som minor official 
stabilization activity, was to b e determin d ntirely by 
pri at mark t forces. ( Th stabilization a ctivity was 
int nd d ' to help maintain an orderly exchange market 
without countering any fundam ntal tr nd in the exchang 
rat ., 2 ) 
Following he implementation of ' full decontrol ' 
in January 1962, the peso price of the dollar ros 
sharpl y above the old administratively determined free 
market rat, th n fell a little, and finally set of on 
a sl ower rise lasting until nearly the nd of the year 
wh n it l ev lIed off at PJ . 90 per U . S . $l . OO . (In view 
of the 2 0 p r cent surr nd r requirement on export 
proceeds, this rat implied a composite export rate of 
P J . 52 p r U . S . $l . OO . J) From that time until ovember 6, 
1965 , and possibly in contradiction to its claim of not 
count ring any fundamental trends in the foreign 
exchange market, the Central Bank of the Philippines 
(operating in th mark t through its agent, the 
Philippine ational Bank) kept the exchange rate 
continuously at or v ry close to this level . On the 
latter date the exchange rate syst m was unified by 
p rmitting all xport rec ipts to be sold on the open 
4 
mark t . Two days later, on ovember 8 , 1965, th 
official par value of th peso was finally changed from 
P 2 . 00 p r U .S . $l .OO to ~J . 90 p r U . S . $l . OO and the 
Central Bank committ d its If openly to the buying or 
s lling of dollars on d mand at that rate, subject of 
cours to th usual small comm rcial spread between th 
actu 1 buying and selling prices . This commitment 
nsur d that the stability which th for ign e change 
rat had shown 0 er th pr ious thr 
maintain d . 
years would b 
1 Th margin f e was Iso suspend d compl tely . 
2 C ntr 1 Bank Ol th Philippines, Fourt enth Annual R port, 
1962, p.6 . 
J Th 2 0 P r cent requ'r m nt was in lieu of an e port t 
[ Cf . S· to I\:, Ro as , ' E chang D control in th Philippin s ,' 
Philippin S tudi s, 01. 10 , 0 . 2 (April 1962), p . 187 J. 
4 For r c ipts from som minor e port products this had , 
in lact, aIr dy b n p rmitt d sinc D c mb r 1, 1964 . 
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D aluation and d control were associat d with an 
acc 1 rated continuat'on of the inflation which had 
commenc d in 1955. B tw n 1959 and 1965 th G P 
implicit pric deflator increased by 37 . 2 per c nt, 
while th Manila Composit Consum r, R tail and 
Whol sal Pric Indic s rose by 31 . 2 per cent , 33 . 1 
p r c nt and 34 . 8 p r cent r sp ctively. In the 
remainder of this section an attempt will be mad to 
explain this inflation as largely the outcome of the 
d valuation . 
Initially , it can be claimed that independently of 
any indir ct ffects, part of the post-1959 ris in the 
pric level result d directly from devaluation raising 
the price of foreign exchang and thus the prices of 
traded go ods . In this resp ct the immediate 
inflationary i mp a c t of devaluation on the domestic 
prices of exports, and exportables generally , is 
suggested by a comparison of movements in the wholesale 
pric index of xport products and the ind x of the 
dollar unit values of exports (See Figure VI . la . ) Over 
the period 1959-63, th terminal years of which are the 
on s immediately pr ceding and succe ding the d control 
programme proper, the former index ros by 46.5 per cent, 
while th latt r index actually fell by 3 . 5 per cent . 
Such a discr pancy is much too large to be explained by 
differ nc s in weighting patterns . Similarly, the 
immediate inflationary impact of d valuation on the 
domestic pric s of imports , and importables generally, 
is suggested by a comparison of mov ments in the 
wholesal price ind x of import d products and the 
ind x of the dollar unit values of imports over the 
sam p riod (See Figur VI.lb.) In this case, th 
former inde ros by 29 . 2 P r cent, while the latter 
ros by only 12 . 6 p r cent. Although smaller, this 
discr pancy also app ars too larg to b e explain d by 
w ight'ng diff r nc s . 
It is , how v r, noteworthy that , whil the peso 
pri s of both xport products and import d products 
app r ntly rose r lat'v ly to their respective world 
pri s , th ris was r lativ ly much 1 ss in the cas 
of import d products . On the assumption that the 
incr as in th whol sal pric ind x of port products 
r lati to th unit alue index of exports r flected 
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more or less faithfully the devaluation of th peso, 
the r suiting conclusion is that th higher peso price 
of th dollar was not pass d on fully into th domestic 
1 
wholesale pric s of imported products . 
S veral r asons can be advanced to explain this 
behaviour . The first of th se, and probably th most 
important, relates to th ff cts of the quantitative 
restrictions on imports in the nineteen-fifties. As has 
been argu d, th se controls caused the peso selling 
prices of imported commodities, particularly those of a 
finished consumer good typ against which restrictions 
were most s v re, to rise relatively to their actual 
costs of importation . Scarcity resulted in premium 
domestic pric s . Subsequent devaluation, rather than 
causing the higher land ed costs of imports to be passed 
on compl t ly to th final purchasers, had its impact 
partially cushion d by th elimination of the importers' 
scarcity profit margins that had existed under exchange 
and import licensing . 2 The second reason relates to the 
margin f e of 25 p r cent on sales of for ign exchange 
1 
In fact, it is likely that th disparate behaviour of 
th two export price indic s understates the extent of 
the d aluation for two r asons . 
First, it has be n noted that prior to decontrol 
domestic prices of e ports wer raised relatively to their 
dollar unit values by ' no - dollar' importation and by 
smuggling to take advantage of th premium black market 
e chang rate . Devaluation and d control in the legal 
for ign exchange market (which put an end to these 
a ctiviti s) would thus not have brought about as large a 
ris in peso whol sale prices r lativ to dollar unit 
valu s as would hav occurred if prior to decontrol all 
"port proc ds had been converted to pesos at the old 
official rat of e change. 
S condly, it has also been noted that after decontrol 20 
p r c nt of e port proce ds still had to b surrender d 
for som years at th old official rate of exchang (P2 . 00 
p r .S . $l.OO), th r by causing th number of pesos 
r iv d p r dollar of ports to b blow th new 
chang rat actually prevailing in th mark t . This must 
ha r dad pr ssing effect on post - decontrol 
whol sal pric s for xport products. 
How r, n so far as a comparison of th two indic s 
und rstates the t nt of the de aluation , th abo e 
con lus ' on about import pric s is corr spondingly 
str ngth n d . 
2 
t must dmitt d that th s margins would hav air ady 
b n r duc d som what prior to d control by th n t effect 
on costs of the factors num rat d on pp . 236 - 7 abo 
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introduc d in 1959 . At that tim this s rv d to rais 
th ff ctiv , as distinct from nominal, cost of 
for ign exchange for imports . During the decontrol 
programme it was reduced in stages and finally abolish d 
at th time of full decontrol in 1962 . The 
disapp arance of this tax would hav offset to some 
ext nt the impact of devaluation on domestic import 
pric s . Thirdly, th so - called Special Import Tax, 
which ( it will be recall d) was temporarily raised to 
15 . 3 per cent in July 1959 , also fell in stages to 5 . 1 
per cent in 1963 , ther by also offsetting somewhat the 
high r cost of foreign exchange for imports . l Finally, 
there was a re - adjustment of the tariff structure in 
arly 1962 . Although this raised many tariff rates for 
protective purposes , it also reduced a substantial 
number on it ms of mass consumption . 2 
Some idea of th dir ct contribution to inflation 
of the largely d valuation- induc ed increases in the peso 
prices of exports and imports can be obtained from the 
fact that the absolute increases in the wholesale price 
indices of export products and imported products between 
1959 and 1963 were together responsible for 11 . 2 points 
of th absolute rise of 29 . 3 points in the over - all 
wholesale price ind x between the same years . In other 
words , they account d for 38 . 2 per cent of the rise in 
the gen ral level of prices in that perio~ as measured 
by the latter index . This estimate is, of course, 
lik ly to be an und rstat ment of th direct contribution 
of th incr as s in th whol sale prices of all traded 
goods to the ris in th ov r - all index . Part of the 
ris in the r maining compon nt index of the latter, 
that r lating to commoditi s produced locally for home 
consumption , would probably ha e be n the result of 
incr as s in the pric s of dom stically produced and 
consum d trad d goods . 
1 
In turn , how r , this falling tax rate may well have 
b n offs t in som d gr by th rise in duty on imports 
from th nit d Stat s, which , in accordance with the 
R "s d Unit d Stat s-Philippine Trade Agreement, 
occurr d at the b g"nning of 1962 . 
2 
B nito L g rda y F rnand z , 
D control and th Redir ct"on 
Philip p"n Economic Journ 1, 
1962 ), p . 20 . 
' For ign E chang 
of Incom Flows, ' 
ol . I , 0 . 1 (First Sem st r 
Th sam bas'c problem of und rstat m nt arises 
in att mpting to measur the dir ct contribution of 
incr as s in trad d goods prices to rises in th 
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consum r and retail pric indices . Still, it should be 
not d that in th consumer price index betwe n 1959 and 
1963 th imported products yomponent rose faster than 
the domestic products component, and the former ' s 
absolute rise account d for 20 . 0 per cent of the 
absolut rise in th over-all ind x . Similarly, in th 
r tail price index b tween 1959 and 1963 the imported 
products component also rose faster than the domestic 
products component and accounted for 25 . 9 per cent of 
the absolut ris in the over-all index . 
Despit the probability of understatement it is 
nevertheless most unlikely that the inflation between 
1959 and 1963 was in toto directly attributable to 
increas s in the prices of traded goods . After 1963 it 
is ev n more improbabl that the inflation can be so 
attributed . Betw en 1963 and 1965 the wholesale price 
inde of products produced locally for home consumption 
ros by r latively more than ither the wholesale price 
ind x of xport or imported products, and in both the 
consumer and retail price indic s the domestic component 
rose fast r than the imported component . Furthermore, 
in this latt r p riod the direct impact of devaluation 
on th pric s of trad d goods would have been in the 
past. With a stabl foreign exchange market and no 
physical controls on trade and payments, the sma ll 
changes which occurred in the domestic price indices 
covering only import d or export products can be 
explain d larg ly by movements in th world prices of 
1 
th s produc s . 
How v r, i t can b suggested that the influence 
of d valu tion on th price 1 vel was not confined to 
th imm d'at rol of raising th pric s of trad d goods . 
1 
This stat m nt ignor s th unification of th exchang 
rat in 0 mber 1965 wh n, by dropping th r quirem nt 
that 20 p r cent of xport proc eds still had to be 
surr nd r d at h ld r a L of P2 . 00 p r U. S . $I .OO, 
th ff ti xchang rat for xports was rais d to 
that pr vailing for all oth r transactions . Occurring 
so lat in th y ar ( th fin lone of this study) , th 
unification would hav had only a slight impact on the 
av rag dom st'c pric s of xport products for the year 
as a whole . 
I' 
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In addition to this, d valuation seems to have contributed 
to inflation elsewher in the economy : first, by 
boosting aggregate demand ; and , secondly, by encouraging 
the diversion of resources away from the production of 
those goods whos prices did not rise directly in 
response to the higher price of foreign exchange . 
D valuation would have increased aggregate demand 
primarily through raising export incomes . Although its 
total direct and indirect effects on these incomes 
canno t be isolated precisely, it was clearly associated 
with a most substantial increase in them . Between 1959 
and 196) the peso value of officially recorded 
merchandise exports increased 2 . 4 times from PI059 
million to P2559 million . l The absolute increase of 
P1500 million amounted to 1) . 2 per cent of the 1959 
estimate of G P a t current prices . Admittedly, this 
estimate of the expansion in export receipts is likely 
to be a considerable overstatement . Prior to decontrol 
there was considerable outward smuggling of exports . 
Aft r decontrol the incentive to undertake such 
smuggling largely disappeared with the probable result 
that hitherto unrecorded exports appeared in the 
offici a l statistics for the first time . (To some 
extent this may have accounted for the extraordinarily 
large increase of )6 . 2 per cent in the quantum index of 
exports between 1961 and 196) . ) Moreover, even after 
allowing for this factor, the increase in export receipts 
would not h ave been entirely a net addition to incomes . 
In particular , part of th increase appears to have been 
achieved by diverting resources to xport production at 
the expense of other production . (We consider another 
asp ct of this re - allocation process immediately below . ) 
1 
Th s stimates wer d rived by converting the official 
U . S . dollar figur s for merchandise exports in 1959 and 
196) ( shown in Tabl VI . l) to pesos at the prevailing 
official xchange rat s for exports in those years . 
( Th chang rates were P2 . 00 per U . S . $l . OO in 1959 and 
P ) . 52 p r U . S . $l . OO in 196) . ) 
D flation of th s stimat s by th Manila Composite 
Consum r Price Ind suggests that the r al domestic 
purchasing power of officially recorded m rchandise 
xports increas d by approximately 100 p r cent over 
th p riod 1959- 6) . 
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e rth 1 ss , despit these qualifications, exports must have 
b een th source of a v ry l a r ge a ddi ti on to purchasing 
pow r in th arly nineteen-sixti s which in turn 
result d in aggregate dom stic demand expanding 
consid rably . 
Dev a luation was a lso responsibl for stimulating 
th grow th in production of trad d go ods partially at 
the xpense of non-traded goods. This was achieved 
t hrough a chang e in r l at i e prices . Specifically , 
d valuation rais ed trad d g oods prices but did not 
affect dire ctly non-trade d go ods prices . As a 
consequence r es ourc es were shift d, in a relative sense , 
from the production of non- t r a d ed goods t o the 
production of trad d g oods . In the face of an incr ase 
in aggre gate domestic demand, possibly re - inforc ed b y 
th r l at iv pric e change divert ing d ema nd towards 
non- t r a d d g oods, this tended to create a shor t f a ll in 
th supply of som non - traded g oods and hence upward 
pressur on their absolut e prices . 
This resource re - a lloc at ion ffect was most 
notic a bl within, and in fact mainly confined t o, the 
agri cultura l sector of the e conomy where it contribut e d 
to an a cc e lerat ion in the growth of expor t crop 
production and a retardation in the growth of food crop 
production . l In Chapter V it was argu d that dom stic 
1 
Dev a luati on h ad b y no means an unequivoc a lly stimulating 
ffect on the l a r gely import -competin g manuf a cturing 
sector . The ma inly d ev a luati on-induced rise in the 
pric s of its finish e d products was at l east mat ched by 
a ris in th prices of its "mported r a w materials, 
compon nts and capital quipment . Ind e d, b c a us 
import cont rols h a d b n more stringent against finished 
conswn r manufac t ures than against inputs used in these 
manufactures and against capi tal quipm ent, " the incr ase 
"n th p so pric s of th former (and thus of their 
domestic subst " tutes ) was gen rally 1 ss t han the 
incr as s in th p so pric s of th latt r . To some 
xt nt, th r fore , import -subs titute manufa cturing 
suffer d from a pr"c - o st sque ze . A sampl sur ey of 
200 ma nuf a cturing fOrms r ve a led that in 1965 th ir 
a rag r at of n t profits on sal s . a s only 6 . 1 per cen t 
compar d w" th 10 . 0 P r c nt in 1959 . (Tr a d g old and Hool ey , 
op . cit . ) Admitt dly, growth in r al output app ared to show 
only a small r tard tion after d control . In th p riod 
1962-65 th C n r a l Bank's index of manufacturing production 
incr s d a t an a rag annual r at of 5 . 8 p r cent comp a r e d 
with an a r g annual r t of increase of 8 . 0 per c nt in 
th p riod 1956-59 . How r,it is IiI ely tha t post-d control 
industr" a l g rowth st mm d not so much from import-substitute 
industri s d p nd nt on import d inputs as from industri s 
pro ssing r w mat rials for e port . 
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food prices were larg l y insulated from ' giv n ' 
°nt rnational food prices or, in 0 her words, that food 
products in th Philippin s wer , at 1 ast from th 
vi wpoint of pric det rmination , effecti e ly non-traded 
1 
g oods . In addition , it was se n that in the decad e 
aft r 1955 th prices of export crops ros relativ ly to 
th prices of domestic food crops. Th evidence 
(Figures v . 4 and V . 5 ) suggested that this caused a 
relative div rsion of land r sourc s away from food 
crops towards export crops and a corresponding 
acc leration in the growth in production of the latter 
at the expense of the growth in production of the former . 
Undoubt edly devalua tion, since it helped to raise the 
pric s of xport crops relative to food crops, was 
partly responsibl for this phenomenon . 
The combination of a l a rgely devaluation-induced 
growth in d mand and a partly devaluation-induced lag 
in food production offers an explanation of the rise in 
food prices in th decontrol and post-decontrol periods 
which is a modification of that presented in Chapter V . 
Bearing in mind th large weight given to food in all 
the g n ral price indices, this rise in food prices, 
tog ther with the again larg ly devaluation-induced 
increases in th prices of imported and export products, 
accoun ts for most of the inflation between 1959 and 
1965 · That part of the xpansion of aggregate demand 
not dir ct d towards foodstuffs app ars to ha e had only 
a limited eff ct on prices . Th increase of 27 .1 per 
cent in th quantum index of imports between 1963 and 
1965 sugg sts hat towards the end of the period it was 
dissipat d mainly abroad . 
To what xt nt can this int rpretation of the 
post-1959 inflation be t rm d ' Structuralist ' ? In the 
pre ious s ction of this chapt r it was suggested that 
stru tural pr ssur nt d on th b alanc of payments 
1 
It was also argu d, as a criticism, that after 
d control many foodstuffs could be freely imported in 
irtually °nfinit ly lastic supply from a broad . To 
that t nt, they wer trad d goods with exog nously 
d t rmin d pric s . In fact, how r, it was 
acknowl dg d that this criticism was invalid for th 
most important food st pIe, rice, and a lso for som 
oth r m jor foodstuffs . Thus the criticism was , at 
b st , partial one. 
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(and not g neral xcess demand) was r sponsibl for th 
inflat'on of 1955-59. At th beginning of this section 
it was pointed out that this same structural pr ssur 
was a factor contributing to the situation which 
prompted devaluation and d control . Ther fore, sinc 
devaluation, whose fundamental purpos was to rais th 
prices of traded goods relatively to the prices of 
non-traded goods , n cessarily also rais d (independently 
of internal balance) th a bsolut e prices of trad d 
goods, th contribution th se absolut ris s made to 
the inflation may be said to have been partly structural 
in origin . Howev r, the remaining part of the inflation, 
that pertaining to non-traded goods , was not structural, 
gi n the abov interpretation . Rather , it was all ged 
to have b een the result of a lack of int rnal balance 
(albeit sectorally concentrated) which stemmed from the 
income eff ct of devaluation. 
Of course, if the rise that occurred in non-traded 
goods prices had been attributed , not to excess demand, 
but to a resistance to the changes in relative prices 
initially caus d by the devaluation, then th 
interpretation would have be n fully Structuralist . In 
this g n ral context the most frequently mentioned 
resistanc mechanism is that of d evaluation raising 
dir ctly the cost of living and this in turn inducing 
higher mon y wages . Thes higher money wages are 
claim d to increase, through a cost-inflationary process, 
the prices of non-traded goods . How ver, for the 
Philippin s ov r th inflationary p riod 1955-65, the 
analysis of Chapt r V found only a r latively weak 
l agged r lationship b tw en consumer prices and money 
wag rat s and no r lationship at all between consumer 
pric s and a erag monthly earnings of wag - arners . 
Henc , it is unlik ly that this Structuralist mechanism 
op rat d . 
CO CLUDITG OTE 
In concluding this chapter th re is a need to 
amin bri fly two analytically conveni nt assumptions 
which ha b n mploy d w'thout any attempt at 
justif'cat'on throughout th pr ceding analysis . The 
assumptions are thos of e ogenously d t rmin d world 
pric s of imports and xogenously d t rmin d world 
pric s of e ports . 
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Wi th resp ct to imports , it is almost certainly 
valid from the Philippin viewpoint to treat their world 
prices as ha ing b en ' giv n '. At any on time the 
Philippine demand for import d commodities was so small 
r lativ to world production and trade in these 
commoditi s that fluctuations in it were likely to have 
had an entir ly negligibl impact on the internat ional 
pric s of these commodities . l 
With respect to exports, an assumption of exogenously 
det ermined world pric s is not so easily justified for 
some major products in the short run . For example, the 
Philippines is th world ' s largest producer of coconuts 
for commercial purposes . In the latter years of the 
period und r study it accounted for over half the world's 
xports of copra and a lesser but still substantial 
proportion of th world's exports of the principal 
processed product, coconut oil . Fluctuations in supplies 
from the Philippines, particularly of copra , would 
undoubtedly have been capable of affecting the world 
prices of th s products in the short run . Over the 
long run, howev r, the demand for these products is 
likely to have been ry elastic because of the many 
clos substitut s for coconut oil and the fact that it 
accounted for only a small part of the world's total 
supply of fats and oils . As a consequence, over the 
long run th prices the Philippines received for these 
products are likely to have been largely exogenously 
det rmined . 2 The sam is true of the determinat ion 
of the world pric of abaca (Manil a hemp) of which the 
Philippin s possess s a virtual monopoly in production . 
Ov r the long run, although certainly not th short run, 
1 
Sugg sti e of this conclusion is the fact tha t in not 
one year in th period 1951-65 inclusive did Philippine 
imports d 0 . 6 p r cent of total world exports 
wh r th latter wer d fin d to exclude th 
Phil'ppines ' own exports and the export s to one another 
of China (Mainland ), Mongolia, orth Vietnam and orth 
Kor . [ Sourc s of data : Central Bank of the 
Philippin s, Statistical Bull tin, Vol . XVIII, o . J 
(S pt mb r 1966 ); Unit d ations , Yearbook of 
Int rnat'onal Trad Statistics , various issues . ] 
2 
I am ind bt d to Mr Gorge L . Hicks for discussion 
on this point . 
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demand is likely to have b n highly 
th increasing array of substitut rop 
lastic because of 
1 products . 
Unfortunately, it is not possibl , barring an 
inv stigation in d pth of various international 
commodity markets , to isolate the precise short run 
influ nce of forc s int rnal to the Philippine economy 
on the world prices r c ived for Philippine exports 
ov r th period 1946 - 65 . Accordingly, whil not 
necessarily regarding this influenc as having be n 
negligible , the above procedure of tr ating these 
pri c es as ' given ' and the movements in th m as 
exogenously- caused appears the most practical approach . 
1 
With r gard to sugar , virtually all exports in the 
post - war p riod hav gon to the sh It r d United 
Stat s mark t . In VO w of th U . S . price support 
polici s , th dollar pric s the Philippin s r c i d 
for its sugar in this market can b regard d as having 
b n og nously d t rmin d , in both th short and 
long run , v n though th ffectiv d mand in this 
m rk t for Philippin sugar , bOng limit d by an 
i mport quota , dOd not poss ss th ' infinit ' price 
l asticOty which und r normal trading arrangem nts is 
th n c ssary condition for an og nously d t rmin d 
xport pric . 
Ii 
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CHAPTER VII 
AN OVER- ALL ASSESSMENT 
According to a ll four indices which have been 
used to me asure Philippine price l evel behaviour over 
the period 194 6- 65 (the Manil a Composi te Consumer, 
Retail a nd Wholesale Pr i c I ndi ces and the GNP 
i mp l icit price defla t or), this behaviour showed a 
certain degree of symmetry. Betwee n 194 6 a nd 1955 
prices genera lly followed a decelerating downward 
trend . After 195 5 this trend was reversed and became 
an acce lerat ing upward one . The symmetry was spoiled 
in only one maj or respect. In 1950-51 or in 1951 only , 
depending on the choice of index, there was a significant 
inflationa ry devia t ion from the downward trend which 
existed prior t o 1955 . 
I n the l ast four c hap ters four differen t 
approaches have been employed in separate attemp ts to 
expl a in this price l eve l behaviour . The first of these 
a ppro ac hes was based on the Quant ity The ory of Money . 
The second was Keynesian in nature . It was primari l y 
oncerned with acc ounti ng for the generation of tota l 
money expenditure. However , when a llowance was made 
for movement s in rea l output, it a lso offere d an 
explanation of pri ce l eve l moveme n ts . The third 
a pproac h was a Structur a lis t one . It attempted to 
expl a in price level movements not as a resul t of 
imb a l a nces between a ggregate dema nd and supply, but 
rather as a result of sectoral imba l a nces between the 
d ma nd for a nd supply of de ma nd. The fourth approach 
a nalyz d price level beha viour from the viewpoint of the 
Philippines' for ign trading rel a tionships a nd exchange 
rate policy . Unlike the thr e pr vious a ppro ac hes, it 
was not conc rned with xamining a ny single hypothesis. 
Both Mon tarist a nd Stru ctura list explanations of price 
lev 1 movements we re a dvance d . What t heoreti cal unity 
this ppro ac h po s ess d was d riv d from t he analytical 
distinction it dr w b etw e n mov ments in t h prices of 
trad d and non- traded products . 
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The principal aims of the present chapter are to 
review briefly these different appro ac hes, and then to 
reconcile their arguments ~s far as possible) with a 
view to developing a short but general explanation of 
the main forces responsible for price level movements 
in th p eriod under study . 
REVIEW 
In Chapter III the relevance of the Quantity 
Theory of Money was investigated . Some evidence of 
relationships consistent with that theory was found. 
Annual changes in mone y supply a nd annual changes in 
total money expenditure or income tended to some 
extent to v ary together, while a nnual changes in 
money supply and in real GNP together accounted 
statistically a nd in a ma nner consistent with the 
Quantity Theory for much of the variance of annual 
movements in the price level. evertheless, it was 
clear that the income velocity of circulation experienced 
considerable variability over time. S ome of the 
variability appe ared to reflect a rising long run 
trend in velocity which was attributed principa lly to 
th rapid growth of quasi- money or money substitutes . 
This growth, it was argued, served to reduce the demand 
for money relative to income . However, even after 
a llowing f0r trend, the behaviour of velocity was 
still far from stable . It was this substantial residual 
instability which consituted the mai n shortcoming of a 
Quantity Theory explanation of Philippine price level 
mov ments . Other difficulties were, first, a n inab ili ty 
to establish that in the limited stat istical relationship 
which did exist between changes in money supply and 
change in total xpenditure the direction of causation 
was consist ntly from the former to the latter (and not 
vice versa); a nd, s cond, a Deglect of the complicating 
influ nc of int rn tion 1 trading r l at ionships . 
In Ch pter IVan att mpt was ma de to explain 
mov m nts in total mon y e penditure or income in terms 
of Keyn sian multipli r theory. Clear statistical 
r l ati on hips were found to 
in consumption penditu 
ist between annual changes 
t current pric s and prior 
a nnua l changes in autonomous xpenditure at curr nt 
pri s . (Autonomous e penditure was defined as the 
........ 
the sum of private investment, governm nt expenditur 
on goods a nd services, and xports of goods and 
s rvices less imports of goods a nd servic s . ) These 
relationships were interpr t d as evidence of a 
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r latively stable l agg d multiplier process . In view 
of the f act that G P in any year necessarily equall d 
the sum of consumption and autonomous expenditures in 
that year, it was therefore s uggested that changes in 
G P at current prices or total money expenditure were 
largely determined by prior and synchronous changes in 
aut onomous expenditure at current prices . 
The analysis was then related to mov e men ts in the 
price level . Such movements, at le ast as me asured by 
the G P implicit price deflator, reflected discrep ancies 
between the r ates of expansion of total money expenditure 
on rea l output a nd real output itself . Thus , in so 
far as the suggested multiplier process was able to 
account satisfactorily for changes in total money 
expenditure, it followed that, after ma king a llowance 
for movements in real output, it was also ab l e to 
acc ount for movement s in the pri ce level . 
Various shortcomings of the a pproach were 
discussed . They included the non-Keynesian failure 
to a nalyz the responsiveness of real output to mov e ment s 
in a ggregate demand; the absence of a significant 
synchronous relationship between annua l changes in 
auto nomous expenditure and annua l changes in 
consumption xpenditurej and the fact that the statistical 
' fits' of th l agge d relationships between these 
v ariables, though fairly good, still implied considerab le 
independent movement in consumption expenditure . 
Both the Qu antity Theory and Income-Exp enditur 
approaches w re completely aggregative in na'ture, in 
eff ct tr ating th conomy as if it produced a single 
product . o att mpt was ma de to analyze price level 
movem nts as th outcome of individual price changes over 
a rang of differ nt ectors or commodity groups . 
Rath r, pric level movements, both upward and downward , 
w re vi ~ d as the r sult of a general economy-wide 
i mb l ance b tween the supply a nd dem a nd for commoditi s . 
u h a view is essentially a Monetar ist on , a lthough 
tr'ctly sp a k"ng) Mon tarist a n a lysis is conc rned 
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sol l y wit h inflation a nd even then concentrat s 
l arg lyon monetary factors as th sourc of macro-
imbalan 1 
Th third approach to exp l aining Philippine price 
level behaviour, that of Chapter V, was, however, sectoral 
rath r than aggregative . It arose from the observation 
of two rel ated facts; first, food price movements 
acc ounted for a l arge p a rt of over-all price level 
movemen ts ; and, secondly, a bro a d positiv association 
existed between movements in food prices relative to 
other p rices and movements in the over-all p rice level. 
An attemp t was therefore made to account for price level 
movements in terms of the structuralist-type argument 
that, in the absenc of a general excess or deficiency 
of aggregate d e ma nd, changes in the price l evel may 
o ccur if the processes of economi c and population 
growth are such as to cause the e mergence of sectoral 
imbalances b etween the supply of and demand for food . 2 
Evid nce was presented which indicate d that, regardless 
of the state of macro-b a l a nce, the growth of food 
supply tended to l a g behind the growth in the demand 
for food over the inflationary post-1955 period. Thus, 
to the ext nt that demand was deficient in other sectors, 
pressure would have developed (in a manner consistent 
with th Structuralist argum nt) for a rise in relative 
food prices which, given downward price inflexibility 
in oth r sectors, would have been inflat ionary in its 
ffe t. It was a lso suggested, though with less 
certainty, that regardl ss of the state of macro -
b a l a nce the supply of food tended to grow faster than 
the demand for food over the l argely deflati onary 
1 
A cording to the l att r criterion a Keynesian Incom -
Exp nditure ppro ach need not necessarily involve pur ly 
Mon t rist anal ysis . It is possib l e that in this 
approa h non-mon tary factors may be identified as the 
caus of ess aggregat dema nd and, hence, of a rising 
pric 1 v 1. Mon y supply may be s en as merely 
adjusting passively to growing demand for mon y . 
How v r, in this instanc , Monetarists would argue that 
infl t'on could be brought to an end by the mone tary 
authoriti s pr v nting th xpansion of th money 
supply . 
2 
Of cours , pur Structuralist an l ysis, lik pur 
Mon tarist nalysis, is on erned solly with inf l ation . 
...... 
261 
pre - 1955 period . In converse fashion it could th refore 
b argued tha t, to the extent that d ma nd was excessive 
in oth r sectors, pressure would h a v developed for a 
d cline in rel a tive food prices which, given a lso 
upwa rd pric inflexibility in other sectors, would have 
been deflationary in its effect . 
Unfortunate ly, it was not po ssible to establish 
wheth r imb a l a nces in food ma rkets were offset by 
opposite imb a l a nces in non-food marke ts . However, it 
wa s provisiona lly ass umed that prices would h ave te nded 
to have been inflex ible in these l atte r markets, 
particular ly the ma rket for industri a l goods, because 
of cost-plus pricing poli c ies . In this latter respec t 
it wa s demonstrated that at le a s t in the ma nufacturing 
sector costs of production were not likely to h ave fallen 
over the inflationa ry post-1955 period. 
The theoretical a rgumen t supporting this type of 
analysis claims that t h e significance for the a bsolu te 
price level of sectora l imba lances is not necessarily 
confined to the initi a l imp act-effect of the induced 
change in rel ative prices . This imp act-effect is 
beli ved to be capable of causing a n a djustment in the 
same dir ction of non- a gricultural money wages which, 
through its ffect on production costs, le a ds to a 
simil a r a djustment in non- a gricultura l prices. However, 
for the Philippines no evidence of a relat ionship 
b tween money wages and food prices wa s found . The 
only wag -price link discovered was a relatively weak 
one between industri a l wa ge rates (not earnings) a nd 
l a gg d onsumer pric s a s a whole. 
confined to the inflationary period 
This link was 
1955- 65 . 
I n a ddition to drawing atte n t ion t o th difficulties 
resulting from ina dequate data, two c onc p t u a l criticisms 
of this appro ac h were m de. First , i t was noted that 
in 1947-48 a nd 1962 - 65 ma ny food items (th most 
importa nt xception in both periods being the staple 
product, ric ) were fr ely obta ina ble from a broad at 
pr sum bly exog nously d termined prices. Mov me nts 
pri es, t 1 a st in the latter p riod, a ppe a r in th 
to h v rt d a not insignificant influence on 
ov r-all food pri beh viour . This influ nce was 
ppar ntly ind p ndent of int rn 1 ectoral i mb a lanc 
S ond, th provision 1 as sumption that the pri es of 
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dom stic ma nufactured goods were cost-det rmined was 
a ttack d on the grounds t h at thes goods w r l argel y 
import-substitut s . As such , their prices in the years 
of unre trict d importati on w r l argely governed by 
the prices of co mpe ting imports, while in the years of 
con trols they were influenc d by dema nd pressure 
arising fro m the shortages created by th c ontrol s . 
I n a ll, t his approach was judged only p art i a lly relevant 
in explaining Philippine pri ce level behaviour . 
Th fina l a ppro ach, t hat of Chap t er VI , originate d 
to some xtent in t he shortcomings of Ch apter V . Like 
th preceding app ro ach, it was p a rti a lly dis aggregative. 
However, in other respects it differed c onsiderab ly . 
Emphasis was pl ace d on the role of the economy's 
in te rnationa l trade and p a yments relationships and, 
wo r king from this viewpoint, a series of historically 
consecutiv expl a n at ions of price leve l move me nts were 
a dva nced . 
The early post-war defl at ion of 1946- 49, which was 
l a rgely c onfined t o the prices of non-tra d e d goods, 
wa s attributed to a tendency for real ou t pu t t o expand 
(or recover) f a s ter than dem a nd . It wa s pointed out 
that this expl a n ati on was not inconsistent with the 
fact tha t the pri ces of traded goods showed lit t le 
signifi cant net c h a nge. The l atter pr ices, it was 
suggested, c ould be treated as having been exogenously 
determined by world pri ces , the exchange r ate a nd 
(in t he case of impor tables) tariffs . It was also 
pointed ou t that a defi c iency of home dema nd was no t 
inconsist nt with the l arge b a l ance of trade deficits 
of the period, given the ex istence of a n ov r -va lued 
currency which was primari ly the result of war- time 
d estruction a nd infl ation a nd the d cision to ma intai n 
the pr -wa r xcha nge rat . 
Th inf l at iona ry bre a k betwee n 1949 a nd 19 5 1 in the 
downwa rd trend of pri c s was c l aimed to have been 
l a rgely the result of two d v lopments in the foreign 
tr d s ctor . They w r the i mpl e mentation of eff ctive 
i mp or t c on tro l s ne a r t h nd of 1949 (this impl mentation 
bing r sponse t o th continu d d teri orat ion of the 
int rna tion 1 res rv ) a nd the Korean War boom in 
xport pri ces which bega n on mid-1 950 . o t only did 
t h s dev lop m nts r a i the dom stic price s of 
.... 
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trad d goods directly, but in addi ion it was argued that 
by 1951 they had cr at d, through both multiplier and 
relative price effects, a n i n f l ationary stat of excess 
dem nd elsewhere in the economy . 
Following the collapse of the export boom and a 
partial r l axatio n in the severity of import controls, 
th re was a return to defl atio n . This deflation, which 
l aste d until 1955, ap pe are d to embrace the prices of 
both traded and non-tra d d goods . Apart from the 
domestic prices of exportables, which were treated as 
xogenously determined, the decline in prices was 
attributed in broad terms to the combination of a rapid 
growth in aggregate supply (including a 25 . 5 p er cent 
increase in the v olume of licensed imports between 19 51 
a nd 1955) and a relatively restrained expansion in 
aggregate domestic demand . It was suggested that the 
latter was due l argely to the failure of merchandise 
export incomes to recover to their Korean War boom 
levels and to conservative monetary and fiscal policies . 
The deflation came to an end in 1955 and the 
Philippines embarked on a decade of inflation . For the 
period 1955-59 (taken as a whole) price increases 
appeared heavily concentrated on traded goods . If there 
had been no increases in these prices, the rise in the 
over-all price level would have been very small . 
Accordingly, it was suggested that in this period 
the predomina nt cause of inflation was not a general 
excess of d ma nd . I nste ad, following a detailed 
ana l ysis of the increases in the pri ces of traded goods, 
it was c l aimed that it was possible to view the inflation 
as having h a d a l arg ly structural origin centred on the 
b a l a nce of p aym nts . Specifically, the argument wa 
that the rat and structural bias of economic , growth, 
through incre asi ng the d ma nd for importables, put a 
growing pr ssure on the int rnational res rve . This 
l ed to a rise in the pri ces of raded goods relative to 
non-trad d goods . In 0 f ar as th absolute prices of 
'the l atter f a il d to decline, this change in relativ 
pric s was inflationary . Th main factor immediately 
responsible for the ris in the pri c s of traded goods 
wer id ntified as the isting import a nd xchange 
c ontro l s . Th se convert d xc ss demand for importabl 5 
dir ct l y into domest 'c pric increases . In a ddi tion, 
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they caused this excess demand to stimulate 'no-dollar 
imports' and to contribute to a rising bla k market 
foreign exchange rate . In turn, these phenomena, 
together with a rise in the world prices of exports, 
caused the increase in the domestic prices of 
exportables . 
The worsening balance of payments situation, 
political pressure and the difficulti es of preserving 
the effectiveness of the import and exchange control 
system led eventually to open devaluation and decontrol. 
It was argued that the rise in the price level between 
1959 and 1965 could be largely explained as the 
result of this policy decision. Devaluation was shown 
to have directly brought about further increases in 
the prices of importables and exportables. In addition 
it was claimed that devaluation, firstly, boosted 
aggregate domestic demand (as a consequence of its 
effect on peso export incomes) and secondly, contributed 
to a diversion of productive resources in agriculture 
away from domestic food crops (whose prices were still 
insulated to a considerable extent from wor ld food 
prices) towards export crops. The interaction of these 
latter effects was held to have been the major reason 
for the increase in food prices. l 
RECO CILIATIO A D RESTATEME T 
To some extent the above four approaches can be 
reconciled . It is possible to demonstrate that some of 
their differences are merely the result of examining 
post-war Philippine price level behaviour from different 
viewpoints and therefore emphasizing different (though 
related) variables. However, in addition, it has 
become apparent that, as applied to the Phillppines, some 
of the approaches have considerable deficiencies . Thus 
the process of reconciliation a lso involves the tasks of 
discarding a nd combining parts of the above analyses . 
1 
This argument was, of course, recognized not to apply 
to the prices of all foodstuffs . As has been noted, 
many foodstuffs were fr ely obtainable from abroad from 
1962 onwards . The rise in their prices could be 
attributed to the direct ffect of devaluation on the 
price of foreign exchange plus changes in tariffs and 
world prices . 
,.. 
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Commen ing with the aggregative Qu a nti ty T h ory 
of Mon y a nd Keynesian a pproac he s of Chap t rs III and IV 
respectively, t he most explicit difference which exists 
b tween them in the pre sent co ntext lies in their 
e planations of the cause s of mov ments in a ggregate 
money demand. The Quantity Theory a ppro ach emphasizes 
the role of hanges in the money supp l y , while the 
Keynesian appro ach emphasizes the role of change s in 
auto nomou s expenditure. Yet it was no ted in Chapter IV 
that the mone y supply can in principl e be an active 
determina nt of autono mous expenditure. To the extent 
that i t actuall y was, a certai n degree of reconciliation 
is possible. However , a l though some statistical evidence 
of relationships between changes in money supply and 
change s i n auto n omou s expenditure was found, it was by 
no me a ns certain that the former was the independent 
variable a nd the l atter the dependent variable. Ind eed , 
it was s uggested that , in so far as the relationships 
implied a ny causali ty at all , this may have been at 
le a st p art i a lly in the opposite di rect ion. This criticism 
was c learly related to the similar one ma de earlier in 
co nne ct ion with the re l ationship between money supply 
and tota l money expenditur on final products. 
The possibili ty of changes in autonomou s 
expenditure having to some extent brought about 
changes in money supply instead of vi ce versa serves 
to stre ng then the case for the Keynes i an appro ach vis -~-vis 
t h e Quantity Theory app roach rather t han to reconci l e 
1 
t he two appro aches . The Keynesian a ppro ach is a l so 
strengthened indirectly by the absence of a significant 
positi e relationship between synchronous first 
differ n c s in averag annua l mone y supply a nd in 
annua l co nsump tio n e pendi ture . F or the peri.o d s 194 6- 65 
a nd 1947- 65 the lin ar regressio n relationships betw en 
thes variables are positive, but their coefficients 
of d termination (r2 values) are only 0 . 082 and 0.144 
1 
Th pos s ibili ty t hat at times a utonomous e penditure 
may h v influ n d mon y supply does no t, of c ours e , 
imp l y tha t th rev rse pos s ibili ty was prec lud d at 
other tOm s . Th former, for xample, is p rf ct l y 
co nsistent with th vOew that c ontrolled money supply 
c n l imit infl tion through restraining the privat 
investment 1 ment in a utono mous expe nd iture . 
266 
resp ctively . On th basis of these v ry poor results it 
can b suggested that the statistical relationships 
betwe n first differ nce s in money supply and G P over 
the same periods,l which wer used in Chapter III in 
supp ort of the Qu a nt i ty Theory approach, a re largely 
a ref l ection of the caus a l l y suspect re l ationships between 
first differences in money supp ly and that component of 
G P designated as autonomous expenditure, again over the 
same p eriod . 
While the exp l a nat ion of the generation of aggregate 
de ma nd offered by the Keynesian a ppro ach may thus, from 
the monetary viewpoint, be the mo re general of the two 
a ggr g a tive explanations, the highly over-simplified 
a n a lysis of price level movemen ts presente d in Chapter 
IV is by no me a ns satisfactory as it stands. Various 
shortcomings within its aggregative context have a lre a d y 
been considered . The remaining one is its aggregative 
nature per se . This implies a neglect of the disparate 
sectora l price movemen ts of which price level behaviour 
was composed over the period 194 6- 65 . More gene rally, 
this type of neglect a ppe ars to lie at the heart of 
th Monetarist-Structura list controversy which t o some 
d gree h as s upplied the the ore tical framework of the 
pre c eding a n a l yses . 
Mo netarists, i t has been no ted, usually see 
inflation in less developed economies as b e ing the 
result of excess aggregat d e mand . Structura lists, 
while not disputing this possibility, argue that in 
a ddition inflat ion can a nd do es occur, when a ggregate 
dema nd equals aggregate supply, b ecause of s ectora l 
i mb a l a nces that a re ass ociated with downward price 
inf l e ibility, imp rfect resource mobility a nd 
resistances to changes in relative prices, both between 
commodities a nd l a bour a nd between different commodities . 
Th s fa tors are believ d p articul a rly li a ble t o exist 
in o mbination in tho less developed economies which 
2 h a v m rged from the predomina ntly subsistence stage . 
1 
Equ tions III . 4 a nd III . 7 . 
2 
For n att mpt to r l at th likelihood of ~tructura l 
"nf l tion to th st ges of e onomic evo l ution, see 
Julio H. G . Oliver, op.cit . , pp . J29 - Jl . 
... 
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Theoretic a lly, these types of infl a tion are 
clearly distinguishable. I n pract ice, especi a lly in a 
growing economy experienc ing structural change, the 
dis tinction between them can become extremely blurred. 
Even if a ggrega te dema nd is growing faster than a ggre gate 
supply, it is most unlikely that the excess dema nd will 
be distributed evenly throughout the economy. So-c a ll e d 
bottlene ck se ctors will emerge where demand pressure 
is greatest. E lsewhere this pressure will be les s a nd 
in some sectors i t is possible that dema nd may in fact 
l a g behind supply . In so far as prices in the la tter 
sectors are 'sti c k y' the inflati onary tendencies 
cre ated in t he former sectors by dema nd-pull forces 
will be augmented by a failure of the ' prices in the 
l atter sectors to decline. I n a ddi t ion, the associated 
changes in relative p rices could trigger off cost-push 
pressures which would add to the inflation through 
raising pri c es in sectors where they have lagged either 
bec a use excess dem a nd is not so gre at or non-existent 
or be cause such prices are institutionally or 
administratively determined. I ndeed, even if excess 
dem a nd were distr ibuted among c ommodities in roughly 
equivalent proportionate magnitudes, there would be no 
re a son why the pri ces of such commodities should a ll rise 
at the same rate . Consequent l y, even in this situation, 
there could be induced changes in relative prices which 
may have all independen t inflationary imp ac t . 
Under such ci rcumstance s there are elements of 
v a lidity in both the Mone tarist a nd Structuralist views. 
Furthermore, on the policy side both schools would a gree 
that strict limi tation of the mone y supply would eventually 
bring the inflation to a halt through preventing the 
expansion of a ggregate demand. Where they would dis agree 
is over the desirability of this me a sure. The 
Mon tarists wou ld argue in f avour of it on the grounds 
that only in a n environm nt of price stability can the 
market me chanism su cess full y perform its tasks of 
signa lling a nd induci ng 'desira ble' changes in resource 
a llo ation, both among industries and over t ime, thus 
fulfilling its role in th promo ti on of sustained 
conomi c growth. By c ontrast, the Struc t ura lists 
would argue a g a inst it on the grounds that to eliminate 
infl a tion e ntirely would r quire reducing the expansion 
I: 
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of aggregate demand to a rate at which there was an 
abs n e of sectora l bottlenecks. Because of their view 
of th unb I an ed nature of economic growth, the y would 
claim that this would imply an over-all rat of 
economic growth below the full potential rate . l 
It is apparent that much of this policy clash 
stems from different views of the efficiency of the 
price me c ha nism. However, at this stage the present 
study is not c oncerne d with policy impli cati ons. Of 
more immedi a te importa nce is the recognition that a 
blend of Monetarist and Structura list elements can o ccur 
in an infl a tionary situation . A similar blend may be 
exp cted in some deflat ionary situat ions a lso, 
a lthough not necess arily in a complete l y symmetrical 
form. It can therefore be suggested that there exis ts 
s c ope for reconciling the Keynesi a n view that price 
level movements (downward a s well a s upward) were the 
result of imbalances between a ggregate dema nd and 
supply with the Structuralist food supply a pproach of 
Chapter V. Such a reconciliation would overcome at 
least p artially the aggregative difficulties of the 
former view, while at the same time avoiding the 
over-rigid and hence impl ausible tructuralist hypothesis 
that imba lances between the supply a nd dema nd for 
food were offset by imb a l a nces of a similar magnitude 
between the supply a nd dem a nd for other commodities . 
Anthony Clunies Ross in his a n a lysis of P hilippine 
infl a tion in the years 1962 -64 ac hieves a reconcili at ion 
1 
Some tructuralis ts apparently c l a im that t o eliminate 
infl at ion entirely from a context of unba l a nced grow th 
requir s ' reducing over- a ll growth to the rate of 
expansion taking pl ac in the bottl neck sectors' . 
[ K. C . S n, 'Economic Growth a nd the Price Leve l- An 
Analysis of Some Asian Data,' Philippine Ec onomi c J ourna l, 
Vo l. V, 0. 2 ( econd Semes ter 1966), p.JJ9. Se also 
Rich rd Ruggles, ' Summary of the Conference on Inflation 
a nd Economi c Growth in Latin Americ a ' in Baer a nd 
1 r ten tzk y, op . cit ., p . 5 . ] As a g nera l rule, howe er, 
the n d for a r duction of this ma gnitude is by no 
m ans rt in . It would depend, inter alia, on the 
n om l a ticity of d mand for the produc ts of the 
bottl n k e tor . 
I 
I.' 
.. 
1 
of this type. His work involves a car ful dissection 
of the movement in the official Mani l a Consumer Pri e 
Index between December 1961 and December 1964 . 2 Over 
this p riod the index rose by 29 .1 points or roughly 
25 P r cent . Clunies Ross demonstrat s that nearly 81 
per cent of its abso lute rise was the result of an 
increase in food prices. Moreover, he c l aims that a 
large part of the much less important increases in the 
non-food components of the index can be explained by 
the direct impact of the change in the foreign exchange 
rate a nd by the political or admini strative decision to 
raise some public utility charges . Apart from increases 
directly attributable to these 'ins titutional' factors, 
there were only 'very small price increases' in the 
non-food components of the index. 
This skewed pat tern of price increases reflected, 
acc ording to Clunie s Ross, the structural characteristics 
of the Philippine economy . He suggests that in his 
chosen period of ana l ysis the domes tic food supply was 
extrem ly inelastic, but that the supply of services 
and domestically produced manufactured goods was highly 
elastic . This high elasticity of supply in the non-
agricultural sector was claimed to be the result of 
three factors: substantial unused industrial capacity, 
a n 'unlimited' supply of foreign exchange (near l y a ll 
restrictions on imports had been removed by late 
January 1962) and 'unlimited' supplies of l abour . 
Clunies Ross's explanation of the actual origin 
a nd sequence of the inflation is broadly as follows. 
Deva luation raised the incomes of export producers 
substanti a lly. (His conservative estimate was that 
betw e n 1960 and 1962 its direct price effect a lone 
1 
l Und rst nding the Phi lippine Inflation . ' See also 
his paper ' The Philippine Economic Challenge, II . 
Th Att mpt at Economic Management under Macapaga l, ' 
Australia ' s Nei ghbours, 4th Series, os · 38-39 
( Septemb r-October 1966) . 
2 
l Und rstanding th Philippine I nflation,' pp. 234-9. 
ote that over this period th offici a l (Central Bank) 
ind is identical with the Manil a Composite Consumer 
Pric nd x employ d els where infuis study . 
270 
rais d thes in omes by at least 5 p r c nt of national 
in ome .
l ) This in turn meant that aggregate demand rose 
substantially . 2 Becaus of th in l asti ity of food 
supply that p art of th in rase in demand direct d at 
food r sulted in rising food prices . On the other hand, 
that part of th increase in demand directed towards 
the non-agricultura l sector induced an expansion in real 
output with littl chang in prices. A considerable 
industrial boom was set off which, through raising 
non-agricultural incomes, put additional pr ssure on 
food p rices . Higher food prices increased food producers' 
incomes and this raised further the demand for and output 
of industri a l products; a nd thus the spiral continued. 
In essence, Clunies Ross portrays a n export multiplier 
proc ss which had different sectoral impacts because 
of differ nt sectoral supply elasticities. 
There are two as pe cts of this analysis which 
warrant Some comment . The first concerns the a lleged 
b oom in real non- agricultura l output. Clunies Ross 
argues that the official national accounts data and the 
index of the volume of industrial production understate 
the extent of the e p ansion in production. J As evidence 
of th boom he employs a series of indicators relating 
to th ma nufacturing, transport and construction 
sectors. The indicators are the consumption of energy 
for industrial purposes, motor vehicle registrations 
and th constant pri e permit value of private building 
in Manila. Howe er, for several reasons, the growth 
in th s series may, in fact, have overstated the 
pansions of non-agricul tural output . First, in an 
economy with a r l ative ly small, not p articul ar ly 
energy-intensive manufacturing sector the figures for 
th onsumption of industrial energy could have been 
h avily influ nc d by the establishment or expansion of 
one or two industries with l arg pow r input requirements. 
1 
bid . pp . 254-6. 
2 
Cluni s Ro ss also sugg sts thaot .Ransionar~ fi scal policy 
in 196J m y have ontributed in a minor way to the 
growth in ggr g t d mand. Ibid., pp . 252-J . 
J 
'Th Philippin E onomi Ch 11 ng 
t Economic Man gem nt und r Macapagal, ' 
The Attempt 
p . 6 . 
..... 
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econdly, new vehicle r gistrations, which would h a ve 
reflected predominantly v hicle imports and not domestic 
production, consisted to a large extent of registrations 
of private cars. The transport services rendered by 
these wou l d not have formed a part of aggregate production 
as conventionally defined. Final l y, the construction 
data related only to the City of Manila . It was not 
necessarily representative of the economy as a whole. 
It is therefore possible that the r sponse of 
non- agricultural production to the growth in demand 
was not as great as Clunies Ross claims . As suggested 
in the previous chapter, much of the increase in that 
part of aggregate demand not directed towards foodstuffs 
may have been alternatively dissipated on imports. 
evertheless, together with the assumption of a high 
elasticity of supply of services, this still implied 
that there was over-all a high elasticity of supply of 
non-agricultural products. Thus the very small degree 
of inflation in non-food consumer prices is still 
explain d satisfactorily. 
The other feature of Clunies Ross's analys is which 
warrants comment conc rns the alleged inelastic ity of 
the domestic food supply which, although augme nted by 
large government-controlled rice imports, clearly 
lagged behind demand . Clunies Ross appears to treat 
the domestjc food supply as having been autonomously 
determined and hence explains food price behaviour more 
or less solely in terms of a change in demand conditions . 
Howev r, it has been seen that, a p art from the very 
short run when it would have been governed by seasonal 
factors, food production is likely to h ave possessed 
som d gree of price- l asticity on account of the scope 
which isted for switching productiv resources between 
domestic food crops and port crops. The only 
problem in this respect (other than tim l ags) was 
that th prices influ ncing resource allocation were 
r lativ a gricultural on s. Thus th main r ason that 
domestic food production failed to r spond to the growth 
in the d mand for food and thereby to constrain the ris 
in food prices was not it pric insensitivity but the 
fact that th pric s of alternativ port crops had 
ris n dram tical ly up to 1963, largely s a result of 
th devaluation. 
1,1 
I : 
" 
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Clunies Ross's work points the way to a more general 
reconciliation of the Keynesian aggregative and 
Structuralist food supply approaches; namely, one which 
is able to account for the dominant role of food prices 
(particularly as observed from the consumer or retail 
v iewpoint) in the inflation of the entire post - 1955 
decade . Essentially the argument is that over this 
decade food supply constituted an inflationary 
bottleneck . In other words while it is conceded that 
aggregate demand tended to grow faster than aggregate 
supply, it is also argued that excess demand tended to 
be concentrated on a few sectors, one of which was the 
food supply sector. Therefore, in so far as food prices 
tended to be highly flexible, it follows that the rise in 
these prices was necessarily a major source of the 
inflation. The actual lag in food supply relative to 
demand was especially large because of three factors . 
First, owing to a slow rate of technical progress in the 
agricultural sector, the decreasing fertility of new 
land brought into cultivation, the increasing scarcity 
of this land, and (particularly prior to 19 60) a rapid 
rate of import-substituting industrialization, there 
was a tendency for the growth of the agricultural sector 
as a whole to lag relatively to growth elsewhere in the 
economy. Secondly, within the agricultural sector there 
was after 1959 a relative diversion of resources away 
from domestic food crops towards the increasingly more 
profitable export crops. Finally, there existed 
government restrictions on the import of foodstuffs, 
1 ' 1 particularly on the import of the stap e rlce. 
Of course, with regard to this last factor, it must 
be recalled once more th t restrictions on food imports 
were by no means universal after the decontr:ol programme 
of 1960-62 . Therefore some of the increase in food 
1 
Th food supply bottlen ck thesis is indirectly 
support d by events in the on year in this decade when 
the bottlenecl temporarily disappeared . In 1959 an 
atypically larg increase in food crop production over 
the previous year resulted in a short-lived abundance 
of food . Food pr -'c s fell absolutely and, although 
demand appears to have expanded rapidly elsewhere in 
the e onomy the over-all rate of inflation fell away 
sharply . I~ fact, according to the Manila Composite 
Consumer Price Index, the price level actually declined 
slightly . 
I 
I; 
1 
I ' 
, 
I 
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prices after decontrol can be attributed not to the 
direct effect of an excess demand for food, but to the 
changes in the exchange rate, tariffs and the 'given' 
world prices of various imported foodstuffs . 
In the earlier years 1946-55, the food supply was 
clearly not a bottleneck factor impeding the deflation 
of those years. On the contrary, declining food prices 
made a substantial contribution to the deflation. 
This contribution was particularly 'great pr i or to the 
temporary inflationary interruption of the Korean War 
boom . Accepting that there was a deficiency of aggregate 
demand for domestic output in the early post-war period 
(1946-49 approximately), and accepting that domestic 
food prices in this same period were determined largely 
independently of the 'given' world prices of food 
, t 1 th f lmpor s, e act that food prices fell faster than 
other prices2 can be explained by a tendency for 
excess supply to be concentrated particularly strongly 
on food and by the marked downward felxibility which 
characterizes the prices of agricultural products . The 
magnitude of the excess supply of food can be attributed 
mainly to food crop production recovering towards pre-war 
levels sooner than production in other sectors and to 
large government-controlled imports of rice . 
For the most part this reconciliation of the 
Keynesian and structuralist food supply approaches, which 
(from the viewpoint of price determination) treats 
foodstuff s as predominantly non-traded goods, is not 
inconsistent with the balance of payments approach of 
Chapter VI . Indeed, to some extent it even draws 
implicitly on the latter approach. However, it does not 
provide a full explanation of price level behaviour over 
the period 1946-65 . In order to achieve this, the 
reconciliation must itself be combined explicitly with 
1 
As has been seen, such a conditinn cannot, in fact, be 
accepted for all foodstuff s for the years 1947-4 . 
However, it is true throughout for the main foodstuff, 
rice . 
2 
This phenomenon wa s especially noticeable in the 
Manila Compo site Cons ume r Price Index. In the Manila 
omposite Retail Price ndex it appeared largely 
conf'ned to the years 1946-47 . 
I,i 
, 
Ii 
I' 
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the two principal contributions of the balance of payments 
approach . 
The first of these concerns the years when there 
were no direct dome stic controls over foreign trade, 
except for some food imports . For these years the 
prices of traded goods generally, and not merely those 
remaining foodstuffs whose imports were unrestricted, 
can be treated as having been exogenously determined by 
world prices, the exchange rate and (in the case of 
importables) tariffs. For a small and open economy this 
is an analytically more useful and appropriate technique 
than that of the Keynesian approach which treats total 
expenditure on exports and imports as exogenously or 
autonomously dete r mined. It serves to emphasize the 
direct impact which devaluation had on the price level 
in the early nineteen-sixties . In addition, it highlights 
the probability that movement s in the domestic component 
of aggregate demand or in real output did not directly 
a f fect the prices of traded goods and services. In 
this latte r respect it provides an explanation of why 
the prices of traded products contributed so little to 
the defla tion of 1946-49, thereby a Iso supplying an 
additional reason for the major role of the decline in 
the price of food in that deflation. 
Under conditions of import and exchange controls 
the situation was radically different. The domestic 
prices of importables became dir ectly responsive to 
domestic demand (and to the lo cal production of importables) 
as a resul t of the creation of an artificial inelasticity 
in the supply of imports. Indirectly, the domestic 
prices of exportables were also eventually affe ~ te d. 
Thus the second contribution of the balance of payments 
approach is its indentification of the rationed 
scarcity of fo reign exchange as an additional inflationary 
bottleneck which contributed in a disproportionately 
large manner to price level movements. This bottleneck 
first emerged in 1950-51 following the introduction of 
effect've import controls and then again in 1955-59 . 1 
1 
From 1951 to 1955 the generally slow growth of 
domestic d mand, th rapid development of import-substitute 
industries and some rela ation in the 'nitial sev9rity 
of the mpo t ontrols ensured that the d flation of 
th's p r'od was not imped d by a foreign e change 
bo ttlene cl . 
Ii 
I 
I: 
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Its origin la y in the balance of payments difficulties 
created by the \{ar. Subsequently, it was exacerbated 
in the second half of the fifties by the structural 
bias of economic growth, a deteriorat ion in the terms 
of trade and a declining Unite d Stated Government 
contribution to invisible foreign exchange receipts . 
It may be thought that the food supply bottleneck 
wa s m rely a partial manifestation of this wider 
bottleneck; but, in fa ct, there is evidence to suggest 
that food price increases and increases in the domestic 
prices of imports ( taken as a whole) were not 
directly related . Thus between 1949 and 1950 food 
price indices continued their fall of previous years 
while indices of the domestic prices of imported 
products rose sharply in response to the implementation 
of quantitative ~port restrictions . Again, between 
1958 and 1959 the indices of the domestic prices of 
imported products registered substantial increases, 
while food prices underwent a temporary decline. l 
On the other hand, it can be suggested that the two 
bottlenecks were indirectly related . Thus, it has 
been argued above that import-substituting industrialization 
led to a growth in real incomes which was not accompanied 
by sufficiently rapid expansion of food production. 
industrialization process clearly received a strong 
impetus from the foreign exchange bottleneck; that is 
1 
ee footnote p.272 n .l above . 
This 
ote also the conclusion of Chapter VI that increases 
in the domestic prices of imported and export products 
dominated the inf l ation of the period 1955-59. This 
conclusion, which was reached by dissecting and 
comparing over-all price index numbers for the terminal 
years 1955 and 1959, ignores completely the rDle of 
"increas s in food prices within this period . " This was 
because food prices, whose movements mainly formed a 
part of movements in the price indices of domestic 
products and products produced locally for home 
consumption, registered their atypical and temporary 
d cline betw en 1958 and 1959. This served to 
offset part"ally the·r increase between 1955 and 1958. 
If, howev r, the price data for 1959 is not considered, 
it can be s en that food prices did have a major role 
in the arly stag s of the post-1955 inflation . 
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from the captive market created by import and exchange 
controls . Furthermore, the increasing pressure on this 
bottleneck led to devaluation which further retarded 
food production relative to demand by encouraging a 
d i version of agricultural resources towards export 
production, while simul taneous ly boosting aggregate 
domest ic demand . 
Recognition of this indirect rela t ionship serves to 
complete the process of reconciling the v arious approaches 
of Chapte rs III to VI inclusive . The reconciliation 
has yielded a composite and over- all view of the major 
forces behind Philippine price level behaviour in the 
twenty year period 1946-65 . It is apparent that this 
behaviour was influenced strongly by the processes of 
economic reconstruction and growth. However, the 
re lat ionship between these variables may not have been 
a simple uni-directional one. Accordingly, the remainder 
of the present study will investigate whether or not 
price level behaviour in turn inf l uenced reconstruction 
and growth over this same period. 
